{"schema_version":"1.0","slug":"air-dominance","number":1,"title":"Air dominance","evidence_cutoff":"August 5, 2026","overall":{"score":0.75,"label":"U.S. edge","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"The United States and accessible allies retain the stronger high-end air-combat system, but the advantage is conditional: low observable aircraft and integration cannot create theater air dominance if tankers, runways, weapons, maintenance, and command links fail under the opening attack.","composition_note":"Direct evidence supports a U.S. qualitative edge in penetrating aircraft, coalition integration, and operational learning. The call is held below a lead because fleet readiness is materially below goals, tanker readiness has missed standards for seven consecutive fiscal years, preferred-weapon quantities remain thin relative to theater demand, and PRC proximity plus missile coverage attacks the enabling chain rather than the fighter alone."},"takeaways":[{"eyebrow":"Strongest U.S. advantage","title":"Penetrating quality and integration","body":"A mature low-observable force, combat systems integration, and recurring allied air operations give the United States more high-end pathways than a platform count alone shows."},{"eyebrow":"Most dangerous PRC leverage","title":"Attack the sortie chain","body":"Long-range strike against runways, fuel, tankers, maintenance, and command nodes can neutralize aircraft that remain technically superior in the air."},{"eyebrow":"Binding U.S. weakness","title":"Ready aircraft and weapons","body":"F-35 mission-capable performance, tanker availability, delayed upgrades, and finite preferred munitions constrain usable combat power now."},{"eyebrow":"Decision","title":"Preserve the edge as a system","body":"Fund survivable sortie generation, accepted weapons output, and operational CCA units as one package rather than treating aircraft procurement as the result."}],"drivers":[{"id":"AD-D1","name":"Penetrating aircraft & mission systems","score":1.25,"label":"U.S. edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"The United States fields the deeper operational low-observable ecosystem and more mature fusion across aircraft, weapons, and allies.","contrary":"The PLAAF is expanding J-20 and J-16 capacity and integrating KJ-500 support; platform quality gaps are narrowing and public mission-system comparisons are incomplete.","source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S2"]},{"id":"AD-D2","name":"Sensing, command & combined integration","score":0.75,"label":"U.S. edge","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"Joint and allied exercises demonstrate a broader integration base, while U.S. combat architectures have more operational history.","contrary":"The PRC report documents improving airborne early warning and joint support; exercise participation is not proof that links survive jamming and attack.","source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S5"]},{"id":"AD-D3","name":"Basing, fuel & tanker survivability","score":-1.25,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"PRC proximity and strike coverage impose the more favorable geometry, while U.S. refueling and forward-base capacity remain concentrated and readiness-constrained.","contrary":"Agile Combat Employment and allied access add routes and complicate targeting, but public exercises do not establish sustained output after repeated attack.","source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S3","AD-S5"]},{"id":"AD-D4","name":"Weapons quality, depth & reload","score":-0.25,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"U.S. air-to-air and stand-off weapons are capable and diverse, but disclosed annual procurement is not evidence of sufficient theater coverage or reload depth.","contrary":"Classified stocks and allied inventories could improve the U.S. position; PRC inventory reliability and combat effectiveness are also uncertain.","source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S6"]},{"id":"AD-D5","name":"Sortie generation & sustainment","score":-0.75,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"F-35 mission-capable and fully mission-capable performance has deteriorated, while late upgrades and parts constraints reduce the usable margin behind the headline fleet.","contrary":"Mission-capable rates do not directly measure wartime sortie output, and forward units may outperform fleet averages.","source_ids":["AD-S2","AD-S7"]},{"id":"AD-D6","name":"Affordable mass & collaborative aircraft","score":0.0,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Low–moderate","judgment":"CCA architecture and contracts create a credible U.S. path to added mass, but operational units, mission software, sustainment burden, and production economics are not yet publicly demonstrated.","contrary":"Rapid U.S. test progress may understate current maturity; PRC uncrewed and optionally crewed programs are also difficult to compare publicly.","source_ids":["AD-S4","AD-S1"]}],"threads_heading":"Five mission threads determine usable air power.","threads_intro":"The analysis follows effects that have to work together in combat. Aircraft quality is a parallel contributor; bases, tankers, weapons, maintenance, and command links become required dependencies when the mission demands range and repeated sorties.","threads":[{"id":"AD-T1","name":"Penetrating counterair","decisive_node":"Aircraft quality converted through readiness","mission_effect":"Find, engage, and survive against advanced aircraft and integrated air defenses.","scope":"Operational low-observable aircraft, mission systems, weapons, and available crews—not announced programs.","priority":"Protect the edge","score":1.0,"label":"U.S. edge","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"The U.S. system remains more mature, but readiness erosion means the operational edge is smaller than fleet or technology labels imply.","mitigation":"Allied F-35 fleets, common weapons, and recurring combined exercises widen the available force.","gap":"Public sources cannot compare classified signatures, electronic-warfare performance, sensor fusion, or combat-coded availability symmetrically.","nodes":[{"name":"Aircraft","status":"us"},{"name":"Mission systems","status":"us"},{"name":"Weapons","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Ready sorties","status":"prc"}],"source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S2"],"recommendation_ids":["AD-A1","AD-A2"],"observations":[{"id":"AD-O01","driver_ids":["AD-D1","AD-D5"],"node":"Ready aircraft","observation":"Across the F-35 fleet, the mission-capable rate fell from 67 percent in fiscal 2021 to 44 percent in fiscal 2025.","value":"44","unit":"percent mission capable","metric":"Usable penetrating force","applied_rule":"A fleet-level mission-capable rate below 50 percent is a material readiness constraint even when platform quality leads.","bucket":"Constrained","effect":"Reduces the size and persistence of the U.S. platform-quality edge.","as_of":"FY2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Fleet average is not a theater sortie-generation rate and includes multiple services and variants.","source_ids":["AD-S2"]},{"id":"AD-O02","driver_ids":["AD-D1","AD-D5"],"node":"Full mission capability","observation":"F-35 full mission capability fell from 38 percent in fiscal 2021 to 25 percent in fiscal 2025.","value":"25","unit":"percent fully mission capable","metric":"All-mission availability","applied_rule":"A full-mission-capable rate at or below one quarter indicates a severe gap between possessed aircraft and aircraft able to execute every assigned mission.","bucket":"Acute readiness gap","effect":"Prevents adjudicating a U.S. lead despite superior aircraft attributes.","as_of":"FY2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Some non-FMC aircraft can still execute the specific mission needed.","source_ids":["AD-S2"]},{"id":"AD-O03","driver_ids":["AD-D1","AD-D2"],"node":"PRC counterair","observation":"The Defense Department assesses that growing J-16 and J-20 inventories, combined with KJ-500 airborne early warning, improve PRC standoff and integrated counterair capacity.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Peer mission-system maturity","applied_rule":"Fielded advanced aircraft integrated with airborne sensing narrows a qualitative lead even when symmetric performance data are unavailable.","bucket":"PRC capability growing","effect":"Caps confidence and makes the U.S. edge perishable.","as_of":"2024 activity reported in 2025","confidence":"Moderate","limitation":"The report does not provide a symmetric combat-effectiveness comparison.","source_ids":["AD-S1"]}]},{"id":"AD-T2","name":"Distributed basing and refueling","decisive_node":"Survive and fuel repeated sorties","mission_effect":"Generate combat radius and persistence from bases exposed to long-range attack.","scope":"Operating tanker readiness, runway/fuel resilience, dispersal, access, and exercised distribution.","priority":"Break PRC leverage","score":-1.25,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"Geography and strike coverage favor the PRC. The United States is actively exercising dispersal, but the most important enabling fleet has missed its own availability standards for years.","mitigation":"Allied fields, expeditionary logistics, deception, and rapid runway repair create redundancy if authorities and stocks are prearranged.","gap":"Public evidence does not disclose wartime tanker demand, usable fuel days by node, or sortie output after repeated runway attack.","nodes":[{"name":"Access","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Runways & fuel","status":"prc"},{"name":"Tankers","status":"prc"},{"name":"Distributed sorties","status":"mixed"}],"source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S3","AD-S5"],"recommendation_ids":["AD-A1"],"observations":[{"id":"AD-O04","driver_ids":["AD-D3"],"node":"Tanker readiness","observation":"The KC-135 and KC-46A fleets did not meet Air Force availability and capability standards in any fiscal year from 2019 through 2025.","value":"7","unit":"consecutive fiscal years below standard","metric":"Refueling mission availability","applied_rule":"Failure to meet availability standards across five or more consecutive years is a persistent enabling-force constraint.","bucket":"Persistent constraint","effect":"Strengthens the PRC geographic and range advantage.","as_of":"FY2019–FY2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Specific rates are controlled information and the public metrics incompletely represent the primary refueling mission.","source_ids":["AD-S3"]},{"id":"AD-O05","driver_ids":["AD-D3"],"node":"Base attack","observation":"The PRC report describes Rocket Force options against air bases, command facilities, and radar sites and a broader mission to deter or defeat third-party intervention.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Forward-node exposure","applied_rule":"A fielded adversary strike architecture able to target a required fixed node creates a current exposure unless redundant output is demonstrated.","bucket":"Exposed","effect":"Makes base and tanker survival a binding dependency rather than a supporting consideration.","as_of":"2024 activity reported in 2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Public reporting cannot measure wartime accuracy, salvo allocation, or defenses at each node.","source_ids":["AD-S1"]},{"id":"AD-O06","driver_ids":["AD-D2","AD-D3"],"node":"Dispersal","observation":"The 2025 Department-Level Exercise operated across the Indo-Pacific with allies and practiced Agile Combat Employment from distributed and austere locations.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Exercised dispersal","applied_rule":"Demonstrated distributed operations count as mitigation, but not as a proven wartime offset without measured throughput after infrastructure loss.","bucket":"Mitigation demonstrated","effect":"Reduces—but does not erase—the PRC edge in base geometry.","as_of":"2025","confidence":"Moderate","limitation":"Exercise conditions and sustained sortie outputs are not fully public and do not reproduce repeated missile attack.","source_ids":["AD-S5"]}]},{"id":"AD-T3","name":"Air-combat and stand-off magazine","decisive_node":"Weapons available at theater demand","mission_effect":"Sustain counterair and strike effects after the first high-intensity exchanges.","scope":"Disclosed annual procurement, qualified launch platforms, shared production lines, and public inventory gaps.","priority":"Close the gap","score":-0.25,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"Weapon quality and launch diversity favor the United States, but annual procurement quantities do not establish sufficient inventory for a demanding theater campaign.","mitigation":"Allied purchases and common platforms broaden the pool; multiyear contracting can stabilize output.","gap":"Operational plans, existing war reserves, expenditure rates, and allied release authorities are nonpublic.","nodes":[{"name":"Weapon quality","status":"us"},{"name":"Inventory","status":"unknown"},{"name":"Production","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Reload","status":"unknown"}],"source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S6"],"recommendation_ids":["AD-A2"],"observations":[{"id":"AD-O07","driver_ids":["AD-D4"],"node":"Air-to-air production","observation":"The fiscal 2026 budget overview requests 534 AMRAAM missiles.","value":"534","unit":"FY2026 requested missiles","metric":"Annual accepted weapon output","applied_rule":"Annual procurement is an output observation, but remains unscored for sufficiency without a public theater-demand denominator.","bucket":"Output known / sufficiency unknown","effect":"Supports production activity but cannot prove U.S. magazine advantage.","as_of":"FY2026 request","confidence":"High","limitation":"Requested quantity is not accepted delivery, total inventory, or theater allocation.","source_ids":["AD-S6"]},{"id":"AD-O08","driver_ids":["AD-D4"],"node":"Stand-off production","observation":"The fiscal 2026 budget overview requests 389 JASSM missiles, below the 450 shown for fiscal 2025.","value":"389","unit":"FY2026 requested missiles","metric":"Annual accepted weapon output","applied_rule":"A disclosed annual quantity below the prior-year request is not evidence of expanding depth unless inventory, capacity, or substitution demonstrates the offset.","bucket":"Finite output","effect":"Constrains confidence in sustained U.S. stand-off advantage.","as_of":"FY2026 request","confidence":"High","limitation":"Budget quantities may change and do not reveal variants, inventories, or operational allocation.","source_ids":["AD-S6"]},{"id":"AD-O09","driver_ids":["AD-D4"],"node":"Comparative depth","observation":"Public sources provide no comparable current U.S./allied and PRC inventory-to-demand ratio for preferred air-to-air and stand-off weapons.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Magazine coverage","applied_rule":"Missing or incomparable stock-and-demand denominators remain unknown and cannot be converted into a zero or an assumed lead.","bucket":"Unknown","effect":"Keeps the driver contested rather than mechanically favoring either side.","as_of":"August 2026","confidence":"High","limitation":"The absence is a public-data limitation, not evidence that inventories do not exist.","source_ids":["AD-S1","AD-S6"]}]},{"id":"AD-T4","name":"Sortie sustainment and modernization","decisive_node":"Convert possessed aircraft into repeated mission output","mission_effect":"Maintain combat-coded aircraft, software, engines, parts, and crews through sustained operations.","scope":"Observed readiness trends and delivered combat capability, not planned 2030 targets.","priority":"Repair the foundation","score":-0.75,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"Readiness and delayed modernization materially reduce U.S. usable capacity now even though the underlying aircraft remains highly capable.","mitigation":"Updated sustainment strategy, organic repair, and better technical-data access can recover output without waiting for new aircraft.","gap":"Comparable PLAAF mission-capable and sortie-sustainment data are not credible publicly.","nodes":[{"name":"Parts & data","status":"prc"},{"name":"Software","status":"prc"},{"name":"Maintenance","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Sorties","status":"unknown"}],"source_ids":["AD-S2","AD-S7"],"recommendation_ids":["AD-A1","AD-A3"],"observations":[{"id":"AD-O10","driver_ids":["AD-D5"],"node":"Delivery timeliness","observation":"F-35 aircraft delivered in 2024 were late by an average of 238 days.","value":"238","unit":"average days late","metric":"Delivered combat capacity","applied_rule":"Average delivery delay greater than six months is a material fielding constraint when the force plan depends on growing the fleet.","bucket":"Severe delay","effect":"Reduces usable force growth and confidence in modernization schedules.","as_of":"2024 deliveries","confidence":"High","limitation":"Delivery delay does not by itself measure combat readiness after acceptance.","source_ids":["AD-S7"]},{"id":"AD-O11","driver_ids":["AD-D1","AD-D5"],"node":"Combat-capable software","observation":"As of May 2025, the program had accepted 174 TR-3 aircraft in a non-combat-capable configuration while software remained delayed.","value":"174","unit":"accepted non-combat-capable aircraft","metric":"Capability acceptance","applied_rule":"Accepted hardware that cannot execute the intended combat configuration does not count as current mission capacity.","bucket":"Capacity not yet usable","effect":"Prevents nominal deliveries from inflating the U.S. advantage.","as_of":"May 2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Some aircraft supported training and later software updates may have changed individual status.","source_ids":["AD-S7"]},{"id":"AD-O12","driver_ids":["AD-D5"],"node":"Sustainment performance","observation":"GAO reports that F-35 performance has not met goals and trended down while sustainment costs continued to rise since 2021.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Readiness trend","applied_rule":"Multi-year deterioration against service goals is a negative current condition even when a corrective strategy has been announced.","bucket":"Negative trend","effect":"Makes sustainment a drag on the overall U.S. edge.","as_of":"FY2021–FY2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"The program spans variants, services, and operating conditions.","source_ids":["AD-S2"]}]},{"id":"AD-T5","name":"Collaborative combat mass","decisive_node":"Operational autonomy at affordable scale","mission_effect":"Add sensors, weapons, deception, and attritable capacity without matching crewed-aircraft cost and training burden.","scope":"Contracted and demonstrated capability; planned production does not count as current operational mass.","priority":"Convert promise into units","score":0.0,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Low–moderate","judgment":"The United States has a credible architecture and active competition, but current public evidence does not establish operational CCA mass or validated contested autonomy.","mitigation":"Modular autonomy and multiple airframe competitors preserve competition and can accelerate iteration.","gap":"Mission-software performance, unit cost at production rate, sustainment demand, and PRC comparison are unavailable.","nodes":[{"name":"Airframes","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Autonomy","status":"unknown"},{"name":"Weapons & links","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Operational units","status":"unknown"}],"source_ids":["AD-S4","AD-S1"],"recommendation_ids":["AD-A4"],"observations":[{"id":"AD-O13","driver_ids":["AD-D6"],"node":"Program competition","observation":"The Air Force has active CCA design and production-representative contracts and describes an open autonomy architecture intended to support continuing software competition.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Program maturity","applied_rule":"Contracted production-representative work is credible progress but remains an enabler until operational mission output is demonstrated.","bucket":"Demonstrated development","effect":"Creates a U.S. option without changing current combat mass.","as_of":"June 2026","confidence":"High","limitation":"Official release evidence is program-reported and omits classified performance and schedule details.","source_ids":["AD-S4"]},{"id":"AD-O14","driver_ids":["AD-D6"],"node":"Operational scale","observation":"No public record establishes fielded CCA operational squadrons, sustained sortie output, or accepted production volume as of the evidence cutoff.","value":"0","unit":"publicly verified operational CCA units","metric":"Fielded mass","applied_rule":"A capability with no publicly verified operational unit remains not yet fielded for current-state scoring.","bucket":"Not yet fielded","effect":"Keeps affordable mass contested rather than assigning a U.S. edge from intent.","as_of":"August 2026","confidence":"High","limitation":"Classified experimentation may exceed public evidence; zero refers only to publicly verified units.","source_ids":["AD-S4"]},{"id":"AD-O15","driver_ids":["AD-D6"],"node":"PRC mass","observation":"The PRC report documents growing advanced crewed and uncrewed aviation capability but does not provide a comparable operational-autonomy effectiveness measure.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Comparative autonomous mass","applied_rule":"Noncomparable program counts do not support a relative lead; direct mission performance or fielded output is required.","bucket":"Unknown comparison","effect":"Limits confidence in both U.S. and PRC claims.","as_of":"2025 report","confidence":"Moderate","limitation":"Public PRC program disclosures and U.S. intelligence estimates remain incomplete.","source_ids":["AD-S1"]}]}],"recommendations":[{"id":"AD-A1","rank":1,"title":"Buy survivable sortie generation as one capability","diagnosis":"Aircraft advantage is capped by tankers, fuel, runway recovery, technical data, and maintenance at exposed nodes.","action":"Create theater-node packages that combine dispersal rights, fuel, rapid runway repair, deception, maintainers, spares, and tanker operating concepts; grade them on sorties generated after simulated node loss.","expected_effect":"Protects the largest share of existing combat value and reduces PRC leverage over fixed enablers.","feasibility":"High","cost_band":"High","lead_time":"1–4 years","owner":"Air Force, INDOPACOM, allies","prerequisites":"Pre-negotiated access, common data standards, node-specific demand models, and exercise authority to impose realistic infrastructure loss.","verification":"Named nodes sustain required combat sorties after loss of primary runway, fuel source, command link, and a share of tanker capacity.","thread_ids":["AD-T1","AD-T2","AD-T4"],"source_ids":["AD-S3","AD-S5"]},{"id":"AD-A2","rank":2,"title":"Contract for accepted weapon output and theater coverage","diagnosis":"Annual budget quantities do not show whether preferred weapons cover operational demand or arrive on time.","action":"Use multiyear demand, supplier-level capacity milestones, and acceptance-based reporting for AMRAAM, JASSM/LRASM, and other priority weapons; tie allied pools to pre-agreed release authorities.","expected_effect":"Turns weapon quality into repeatable combat depth and exposes shared bottlenecks early.","feasibility":"High","cost_band":"High","lead_time":"2–5 years","owner":"OSD, Air Force, Navy, Congress, allies","prerequisites":"Classified demand denominator, source-qualified production map, and stable appropriations.","verification":"Accepted annual output and accessible inventory meet the classified theater coverage standard without double-counting allied stocks.","thread_ids":["AD-T1","AD-T3"],"source_ids":["AD-S6"]},{"id":"AD-A3","rank":3,"title":"Make deployable F-35 readiness the contract outcome","diagnosis":"Fleet readiness and delayed combat software reduce current capacity despite large sunk investment.","action":"Tie sustainment incentives to deployable mission-capable output, repair cycle time, technical-data access, and theater spares rather than contractor activity or aircraft possession.","expected_effect":"Recovers usable penetrating capacity faster than waiting for an equivalent number of new aircraft.","feasibility":"Moderate","cost_band":"Medium–high","lead_time":"1–3 years","owner":"F-35 Joint Program Office and services","prerequisites":"Mission-specific readiness metrics, auditable parts data, and authorities for organic/deployed repair.","verification":"Mission-capable and fully mission-capable rates improve against service standards while deployed repair time and non-combat-capable acceptances decline.","thread_ids":["AD-T4"],"source_ids":["AD-S2","AD-S7"]},{"id":"AD-A4","rank":4,"title":"Field CCA as complete operational units","diagnosis":"Airframes and autonomy demonstrations do not yet constitute affordable combat mass.","action":"Keep airframe and autonomy software competitions separable, then fund weapons, links, maintainers, mission-data pipelines, ranges, and squadron-level exercises alongside airframe production.","expected_effect":"Creates a measurable path from promising prototypes to distributed, replaceable combat capacity.","feasibility":"Moderate","cost_band":"High","lead_time":"2–5 years","owner":"Air Force","prerequisites":"Open interfaces, testable mission contracts, production cost ceiling, and operational acceptance criteria.","verification":"Operational units repeatedly generate assigned CCA sorties under jamming and disconnected conditions at the approved cost and maintenance burden.","thread_ids":["AD-T5"],"source_ids":["AD-S4"]}],"methodology":{"scope":"The assessment uses the latest credible public evidence available through August 5, 2026 and evaluates capability usable now. Announced programs appear as mitigations or options until operational output is observed.","selection_rule":"Threads are included when failure would materially change theater air-combat output, when they represent a distinct failure mode or policy lever, and when public evidence can support at least a bounded judgment.","composition_rule":"The overall score is adjudicated from direct mission outcomes and required dependencies. Parallel strengths are not added blindly, and one severe dependency can cap—but does not automatically erase—the wider capability.","evidence_rule":"Official readiness, budget, fielding, and threat records receive the greatest weight. Program announcements establish activity, not delivered combat effect. PRC evidence is used with an explicit reliability and comparability caveat.","unknown_rule":"Classified inventories, operational plans, signatures, and performance remain unknown. Missing PRC data never becomes a U.S. lead, and missing U.S. data never becomes a PRC lead."},"limitations":["Public mission-capable rates are fleet aggregates and do not reveal theater-specific sortie generation.","Classified aircraft signatures, electronic-warfare performance, weapons stocks, and operational plans prevent symmetric comparison.","Exercise output demonstrates procedures and access but cannot reproduce a sustained missile attack.","PRC readiness, maintenance, pilot proficiency, and weapon reliability data are especially opaque.","Allied capacity is credited only where access and interoperability are publicly credible; release decisions remain scenario-dependent."],"sources":[{"id":"AD-S1","title":"2025 Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","date":"December 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"PLAAF modernization, airborne sensing, exercises, and Rocket Force threats to air bases and intervention forces.","limitation":"Unclassified U.S. threat assessment; some estimates and methods are not disclosed."},{"id":"AD-S2","title":"F-35 Sustainment: Actions Needed to Ensure Updated Strategy Improves Persistent Readiness Challenges","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108113/index.html","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","date":"June 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Fleet mission-capable and fully mission-capable trends and sustainment performance.","limitation":"Aggregates services and variants; does not provide theater-specific wartime output."},{"id":"AD-S3","title":"Aerial Refueling Tankers: Air Force Needs More Focused Metrics and a Risk-Based Mitigation Plan","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-109154/index.html","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","date":"June 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"KC-135 and KC-46 availability history and metric limitations.","limitation":"Specific annual rates were withheld as controlled information."},{"id":"AD-S4","title":"Air Force Advances Future Air Superiority With CCA Contracts","url":"https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4520575/air-force-advances-future-of-air-superiority-with-cca-contracts/","publisher":"U.S. Air Force","date":"June 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"CCA contract, architecture, and program-maturity evidence.","limitation":"Service announcement; omits classified performance, cost, and operational acceptance data."},{"id":"AD-S5","title":"Deployment to Employment: The 2025 Department-Level Exercise","url":"https://www.amc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4257852/deployment-to-employment-the-2025-dle-showcases-operational-capabilities/","publisher":"U.S. Air Mobility Command","date":"July 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Distributed Indo-Pacific operations and Agile Combat Employment exercise evidence.","limitation":"Exercise narrative does not publish adversary pressure, node-loss, or sustained throughput measures."},{"id":"AD-S6","title":"FY2026 Defense Budget Request Overview","url":"https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2026/FY2026_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf","publisher":"Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)","date":"June 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Requested AMRAAM, JASSM, LRASM, PrSM, Tomahawk, and SM-6 quantities.","limitation":"Budget request is neither final appropriation nor accepted delivery and does not disclose inventory sufficiency."},{"id":"AD-S7","title":"F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Actions Needed to Address Late Deliveries and Improve Future Development","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-107632/index.html","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","date":"September 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Delivery delays, TR-3 non-combat-capable acceptances, and Block 4 schedule evidence.","limitation":"Program status changes after the reporting cutoff may affect individual aircraft."},{"id":"AD-S8","title":"2026 National Defense Strategy","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","date":"January 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Strategic benchmark and force-prioritization context.","limitation":"Strategy states priorities and intent rather than measured operational performance."}]}