{"schema_version":"1.0","slug":"maritime-undersea","number":2,"title":"Maritime & undersea","evidence_cutoff":"August 5, 2026","overall":{"score":-0.25,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"The maritime contest is split: U.S. and allied undersea quality, operational reach, and coalition access remain formidable, while PRC regional mass, proximity, commercial shipbuilding depth, and faster replacement capacity offset that edge. The result is contested—not because the fleets are equivalent, but because their advantages sit in different mission threads.","composition_note":"The overall call preserves the strong U.S. undersea advantage and allied access without letting either conceal repair and production constraints. PRC regional mass and industrial throughput carry greater weight in a nearby, attrition-intensive fight; U.S. attack submarines and distributed allies prevent a PRC edge from becoming an overall lead. Unpublished readiness, munitions, and acoustic data limit confidence."},"takeaways":[{"eyebrow":"Strongest U.S. advantage","title":"Undersea denial with allies","body":"Quiet attack submarines, experienced crews, long-range weapons, and Australian and Japanese access create a difficult denial problem that surface-fleet counts do not capture."},{"eyebrow":"Strongest PRC advantage","title":"Regional mass and replacement","body":"The PLAN operates close to home beneath land-based cover, while China's shipbuilding base can launch and repair hulls at a scale the United States cannot presently match."},{"eyebrow":"Binding U.S. weakness","title":"Maintenance removes scarce hulls","body":"Attack-submarine delay days, surface-ship deferred work, and slow construction convert nominal fleet strength into unavailable combat power."},{"eyebrow":"Decision","title":"Buy deployable days, not plans","body":"The highest-return move is to recover existing hull availability, then stabilize accepted ship and weapon output while making allied repair access executable."}],"drivers":[{"id":"MU-D1","name":"Undersea sensing, quieting & weapons","score":1.5,"label":"U.S. lead","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"The U.S. and allied attack-submarine system retains the clearest qualitative edge and can impose disproportionate sea-denial costs.","contrary":"Acoustic performance, weapon effectiveness, and deployable submarine numbers are classified; PRC submarine construction is expanding and quality is improving.","source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S4","MU-S8"]},{"id":"MU-D2","name":"Regional fleet mass & geography","score":-1.25,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"PRC forces operate near dense bases, sensors, missiles, coast guard, and logistics, while U.S. global commitments dilute total fleet comparisons.","contrary":"Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and other accessible partners widen the operating network and complicate a simple local-count comparison.","source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S6","MU-S8"]},{"id":"MU-D3","name":"Fleet readiness & repair throughput","score":-1.0,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"Persistent submarine delay, surface maintenance deferral, skilled-labor shortages, and dry-dock constraints reduce usable U.S. hull-days now.","contrary":"Active attack-submarine idle time fell sharply by fiscal 2025, demonstrating that focused management can recover availability even while the larger backlog persists.","source_ids":["MU-S3","MU-S4","MU-S5"]},{"id":"MU-D4","name":"Shipbuilding & supplier regeneration","score":-2.0,"label":"PRC lead","confidence":"High","judgment":"China's combined commercial and naval shipbuilding capacity is a structural advantage; every U.S. battle-force shipbuilder is constrained against current delivery goals.","contrary":"U.S. spending, advanced manufacturing, and allied yards offer recovery pathways, and production tonnage is not a direct measure of combat effectiveness.","source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S2","MU-S3","MU-S7"]},{"id":"MU-D5","name":"Weapons, reload & distributed logistics","score":-0.25,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Low–moderate","judgment":"The U.S. fields high-quality sea-control weapons and global logistics, but public evidence does not establish accessible magazine coverage or reload capacity inside a contested theater.","contrary":"Classified war reserves, allied inventories, vertical-launch capacity, and underway replenishment could materially improve the U.S. position.","source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S7"]},{"id":"MU-D6","name":"Crewed–uncrewed integration","score":0.0,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Low","judgment":"Both sides are experimenting rapidly, but public evidence does not yet show resilient, sustained, weapon-integrated uncrewed maritime formations at operational scale.","contrary":"Classified operations and rapid fielding may exceed public disclosures; counting prototypes would overstate current capability on either side.","source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S6"]}],"threads_heading":"Five maritime threads determine usable sea control.","threads_intro":"Fleet size is an input, not the result. The applied analysis separates undersea denial, regional surface control, hull availability, industrial regeneration, and crewed–uncrewed operations so one strength cannot hide a different failure mode.","threads":[{"id":"MU-T1","name":"Undersea denial","decisive_node":"Deployable quiet submarines with weapons","mission_effect":"Find, hold at risk, and deny surface and undersea forces in contested approaches.","scope":"Attack submarines, crews, weapons, access, maintenance, and deployable hull-days—not total hull inventory.","priority":"Protect the edge","score":1.25,"label":"U.S. edge","confidence":"Moderate","judgment":"The U.S. and allied undersea system remains the most consequential offset to PRC surface mass, but a small force magnifies every construction and maintenance delay.","mitigation":"AUKUS, Japanese access, allied anti-submarine warfare, and service-life extensions can widen the denial network if readiness and authorities are real.","gap":"Public data cannot compare acoustic signatures, surveillance coverage, weapon loadouts, crew proficiency, or theater-specific submarine availability.","nodes":[{"name":"Sensing","status":"us"},{"name":"Quiet platforms","status":"us"},{"name":"Weapons","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Deployable hulls","status":"prc"}],"source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S4","MU-S8"],"recommendation_ids":["MU-A1","MU-A3"],"observations":[{"id":"MU-O01","driver_ids":["MU-D1","MU-D3"],"node":"Maintenance delay","observation":"Attack submarines accumulated 3,454 depot-maintenance delay days in fiscal 2021–2025, more than the 3,040 days in fiscal 2016–2020.","value":"3454","unit":"delay days","metric":"Deployable submarine availability","applied_rule":"A rising five-year delay total for a scarce, high-value fleet is a material constraint on the otherwise leading mission thread.","bucket":"Persistent availability loss","effect":"Reduces the usable size of the U.S. undersea advantage.","as_of":"FY2021–FY2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Delay days do not reveal which boats or theater plans were affected.","source_ids":["MU-S4"]},{"id":"MU-O02","driver_ids":["MU-D3"],"node":"Active idle time","observation":"Active attack-submarine idle time fell from a 1,518-day peak in fiscal 2022 to 166 days in fiscal 2025.","value":"166","unit":"active idle days","metric":"Recovered availability","applied_rule":"A reduction greater than 80 percent from peak is a demonstrated mitigation, but does not erase depot delays or inactive idle growth.","bucket":"Material improvement","effect":"Prevents adjudicating a broader PRC lead in undersea availability.","as_of":"FY2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Active idle time is one part of total lost availability.","source_ids":["MU-S4"]},{"id":"MU-O03","driver_ids":["MU-D1"],"node":"Comparative performance","observation":"No public source provides a symmetric current measure of U.S./allied and PRC submarine acoustic performance, detection probability, or combat-effective availability.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Undersea mission effectiveness","applied_rule":"Classified or noncomparable performance remains unknown; the judgment must use converging platform, exercise, and readiness evidence rather than a false ratio.","bucket":"Unknown comparison","effect":"Limits confidence in the U.S. undersea lead.","as_of":"August 2026","confidence":"High","limitation":"Unknown public evidence is not evidence of parity.","source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S8"]}]},{"id":"MU-T2","name":"Regional surface sea control","decisive_node":"Local combat mass under land-based cover","mission_effect":"Concentrate sensors, shooters, escorts, and logistics rapidly in the Western Pacific.","scope":"Operationally relevant regional forces and enabling geography—not worldwide fleet totals alone.","priority":"Offset local mass","score":-1.25,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"PRC proximity and growing surface capacity create the stronger opening regional concentration; U.S. and allied access prevents uncontested control but requires political and logistical conversion.","mitigation":"Distributed allied ports, land-based fires, submarines, and air power can impose cross-domain costs on concentrated PLAN forces.","gap":"Public sources do not provide comparable combat-ready hulls, weapons load, damage tolerance, or sustained local sortie rates.","nodes":[{"name":"Regional sensors","status":"prc"},{"name":"Surface shooters","status":"prc"},{"name":"Allied access","status":"us"},{"name":"Sustained control","status":"mixed"}],"source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S6","MU-S8"],"recommendation_ids":["MU-A3","MU-A4"],"observations":[{"id":"MU-O04","driver_ids":["MU-D2"],"node":"Regional mass","observation":"The 2024 Defense Department report assessed the PLAN as the world's largest navy with more than 370 battle-force platforms and projected continuing growth; the 2025 report records new carrier, amphibious, frigate, and shipyard activity.","value":">370","unit":"battle-force platforms in 2024 assessment","metric":"Regional force mass","applied_rule":"A larger and growing force operating near home bases creates a regional concentration advantage unless readiness or combat-effectiveness evidence negates it.","bucket":"PRC mass advantage","effect":"Drives the PRC edge in the surface-control thread.","as_of":"2024 force estimate; 2025 industrial update","confidence":"High","limitation":"Hull count mixes types and does not measure readiness, tonnage, weapons, or effectiveness.","source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S8"]},{"id":"MU-O05","driver_ids":["MU-D2"],"node":"Operating geometry","observation":"The PRC's Eastern and Southern Theater Commands combine naval forces with nearby air, missile, island, and logistics infrastructure focused on Taiwan and the South China Sea.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Regional force concentration","applied_rule":"Forces with shorter internal lines and land-based support receive a current regional-access advantage when the benchmark fight occurs in their home theater.","bucket":"Favorable PRC geometry","effect":"Increases the combat value of PRC mass relative to global U.S. totals.","as_of":"2024 activity reported in 2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Geography does not determine outcome and fixed nodes are targetable.","source_ids":["MU-S1"]},{"id":"MU-O06","driver_ids":["MU-D2","MU-D5"],"node":"Allied network","observation":"U.S. naval strategy explicitly relies on a joint and combined ecosystem, while regional allies provide ports, bases, sensors, forces, and repair options unavailable to the PRC on comparable terms.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Credible combined access","applied_rule":"Allied capacity counts only where access, interoperability, and operating concepts are demonstrated or formally arranged.","bucket":"U.S. offset","effect":"Keeps regional surface control contested rather than assigning a PRC lead overall.","as_of":"2024–2026","confidence":"Moderate","limitation":"Crisis permissions, capacity, and survivability vary by country and facility.","source_ids":["MU-S6"]}]},{"id":"MU-T3","name":"Fleet readiness and repair","decisive_node":"Return hulls to deployable status on time","mission_effect":"Generate combat-ready ships and submarines from the force already owned.","scope":"Depot delay, idle days, material condition, qualified labor, parts, and dry docks.","priority":"Recover current capacity","score":-1.0,"label":"PRC edge","confidence":"High","judgment":"U.S. maintenance performance removes too much combat capacity and remains a binding current weakness despite pockets of improvement.","mitigation":"Private repair capacity, condition-based planning, and allied yards can add throughput if the Navy provides stable workloads, data, and nuclear/non-nuclear qualification pathways.","gap":"Comparable PLAN material availability and repair-cycle data are not public, so the relative label relies more heavily on observed U.S. underperformance and PRC industrial depth.","nodes":[{"name":"Condition data","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Parts & labor","status":"prc"},{"name":"Dry docks","status":"prc"},{"name":"Deployable return","status":"prc"}],"source_ids":["MU-S3","MU-S4","MU-S5"],"recommendation_ids":["MU-A1","MU-A3"],"observations":[{"id":"MU-O07","driver_ids":["MU-D3"],"node":"Submarine cost of delay","observation":"GAO estimated $4.2 billion in fiscal 2016–2025 operating and support costs for attack submarines idle before maintenance or delayed in shipyards.","value":"$4.2B","unit":"estimated cost","metric":"Cost without operational output","applied_rule":"Multi-billion-dollar cost attached to unavailable high-demand platforms indicates a systemic throughput failure, not an isolated schedule slip.","bucket":"Systemic repair constraint","effect":"Weakens current U.S. deployable capacity and regeneration.","as_of":"FY2016–FY2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Cost is not a direct measure of combat days lost and includes historical periods.","source_ids":["MU-S4"]},{"id":"MU-O08","driver_ids":["MU-D3"],"node":"Surface sustainment","observation":"GAO identified 46 unimplemented surface-ship sustainment recommendations as of September 2024; progress was underway on 12.","value":"46","unit":"open recommendations","metric":"Corrective-action closure","applied_rule":"Dozens of unresolved recommendations spanning parts, personnel, metrics, and deferred maintenance indicate persistent institutional risk.","bucket":"Persistent governance gap","effect":"Reduces confidence that funding alone converts into ready hulls.","as_of":"September 2024","confidence":"High","limitation":"Recommendation counts vary in severity and some actions may have advanced since the cutoff.","source_ids":["MU-S5"]},{"id":"MU-O09","driver_ids":["MU-D3"],"node":"Repair capacity","observation":"GAO found private ship-repair capacity had improved since 2019, but infrastructure and workforce limitations can block unplanned work when the required dry dock is unavailable.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Surge repair accessibility","applied_rule":"Nominal industrial capacity does not count as usable surge capacity unless the right dock, labor, and authorization are available when needed.","bucket":"Capacity conditional","effect":"Identifies a real mitigation while preserving the repair constraint.","as_of":"February 2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"Firm-level capacity and Navy demand are not fully public.","source_ids":["MU-S3"]}]},{"id":"MU-T4","name":"Shipbuilding and regeneration","decisive_node":"Accepted combat capacity per year","mission_effect":"Replace losses, grow the fleet, and modernize without consuming readiness in endless construction delay.","scope":"Delivered hulls, schedule, supplier output, workforce proficiency, and yard capacity—not budget authority or ships under contract.","priority":"Break the structural disadvantage","score":-2.0,"label":"PRC lead","confidence":"High","judgment":"Shipbuilding is the clearest PRC lead. China's integrated commercial/naval capacity is producing new classes while U.S. yards are missing delivery goals across the portfolio.","mitigation":"Large U.S. investment, stable multiyear workloads, design maturity, modular construction, and allied industrial participation can raise output but do not count until accepted deliveries improve.","gap":"Comparable quality, rework, and wartime conversion data for PRC yards are limited; commercial tonnage cannot be translated directly into naval combat power.","nodes":[{"name":"Design maturity","status":"prc"},{"name":"Suppliers","status":"prc"},{"name":"Yard throughput","status":"prc"},{"name":"Accepted hulls","status":"prc"}],"source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S2","MU-S3","MU-S7"],"recommendation_ids":["MU-A2"],"observations":[{"id":"MU-O10","driver_ids":["MU-D4"],"node":"Virginia production","observation":"Virginia-class shipbuilders were producing at about one submarine per year as of June 2025—half the Navy's two-per-year goal—and both submarines delivered in 2025 were more than three years late.","value":"1 of 2","unit":"submarines per year versus goal","metric":"Accepted submarine output","applied_rule":"Output at 50 percent of goal with multi-year delivery delay is an acute production constraint.","bucket":"Acute output gap","effect":"Directly supports the PRC lead in industrial regeneration.","as_of":"June–December 2025","confidence":"High","limitation":"One year does not establish future steady-state output.","source_ids":["MU-S2"]},{"id":"MU-O11","driver_ids":["MU-D4"],"node":"Portfolio delivery","observation":"GAO found none of the seven U.S. shipbuilders constructing battle-force ships was positioned to meet Navy delivery goals; DDG-51 Flight III delays had grown to 22–58 months by February 2026.","value":"0 of 7","unit":"shipbuilders positioned to meet goals","metric":"Portfolio delivery confidence","applied_rule":"A portfolio-wide failure against delivery goals is structural and cannot be treated as one troubled program.","bucket":"Systemic production failure","effect":"Makes shipbuilding a bottleneck on the overall maritime call.","as_of":"February 2026","confidence":"High","limitation":"Positioned-to-meet-goals is GAO's assessment, not an accepted-output count for every yard.","source_ids":["MU-S2"]},{"id":"MU-O12","driver_ids":["MU-D4"],"node":"PRC industrial depth","observation":"The 2025 Defense Department report describes China as the top commercial ship-producing nation by most measures, with capacity for large numbers of naval submarines, surface combatants, auxiliaries, and amphibious ships, alongside new-yard expansion and new-class launches.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Industrial regeneration base","applied_rule":"Demonstrated commercial scale plus continuing naval output creates a structural regeneration advantage, while combat quality is adjudicated separately.","bucket":"PRC structural lead","effect":"Establishes the strongest PRC driver in the maritime assessment.","as_of":"2024–early 2025 activity","confidence":"High","limitation":"Commercial capacity is not fully fungible with complex warship construction, and corruption/quality problems are documented.","source_ids":["MU-S1"]}]},{"id":"MU-T5","name":"Crewing, weapons and uncrewed extension","decisive_node":"Complete combat formations rather than isolated hulls","mission_effect":"Generate distributed sensing and fires while preserving scarce crewed platforms and reload capacity.","scope":"Crews, weapon inventories, links, autonomy, maintenance, and operational formation acceptance.","priority":"Turn experiments into capacity","score":0.0,"label":"Contested","confidence":"Low","judgment":"The U.S. has credible concepts and allied experimentation, but public evidence does not establish resilient crewed–uncrewed combat formations or sufficient weapon reload depth today.","mitigation":"Open interfaces, common control, containerized payloads, and forward repair can create useful mass without waiting for exquisite new hulls.","gap":"Operational autonomy, contested communications, weapons inventory, launch-cell reload, and PLAN readiness are largely classified or noncomparable.","nodes":[{"name":"Crews","status":"mixed"},{"name":"Weapons","status":"unknown"},{"name":"Autonomy & links","status":"unknown"},{"name":"Operational formation","status":"unknown"}],"source_ids":["MU-S1","MU-S6","MU-S7"],"recommendation_ids":["MU-A4"],"observations":[{"id":"MU-O13","driver_ids":["MU-D5"],"node":"Weapon output","observation":"The fiscal 2026 budget overview requested 238 LRASM, 139 SM-6, and 57 Tomahawk missiles, but did not disclose theater demand, accessible inventory, or reload coverage.","value":"238 / 139 / 57","unit":"requested FY2026 missiles","metric":"Annual maritime weapon output","applied_rule":"Budgeted annual quantities count as production activity, not magazine sufficiency, without accepted deliveries and a demand denominator.","bucket":"Output known / sufficiency unknown","effect":"Keeps maritime weapons and reload contested.","as_of":"FY2026 request","confidence":"High","limitation":"Requests can change and do not disclose existing stocks, variants, or allocation.","source_ids":["MU-S7"]},{"id":"MU-O14","driver_ids":["MU-D6"],"node":"Operational uncrewed formations","observation":"Navy strategy calls for operationalizing robotic and autonomous systems, but public evidence does not identify accepted, weapon-integrated formations at sustained combat scale.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Fielded crewed–uncrewed capacity","applied_rule":"Strategy and experimentation remain enablers until a formation repeatedly delivers assigned effects under contested links and sustainment.","bucket":"Not yet demonstrated at scale","effect":"Prevents planned autonomy from inflating current U.S. capacity.","as_of":"August 2026","confidence":"Moderate","limitation":"Classified fielding and experimentation may exceed public disclosure.","source_ids":["MU-S6"]},{"id":"MU-O15","driver_ids":["MU-D6"],"node":"PRC uncrewed comparison","observation":"The 2025 PRC report records new maritime uncrewed concepts, including a claimed submarine-launched air/sea drone, but provides no symmetric evidence of resilient operational formations.","value":"","unit":"","metric":"Comparative autonomous mission output","applied_rule":"A claimed prototype or concept does not establish current operational advantage without accepted units and repeatable mission output.","bucket":"Unknown comparison","effect":"Keeps crewed–uncrewed integration contested.","as_of":"Early 2025 reporting","confidence":"Low–moderate","limitation":"Claimed performance has not been independently validated in the public record.","source_ids":["MU-S1"]}]}],"recommendations":[{"id":"MU-A1","rank":1,"title":"Purchase deployable hull-days from the existing fleet","diagnosis":"Maintenance delay removes scarce submarines and surface ships faster than new construction can replace them.","action":"Set class- and shipyard-specific targets for induction, cycle time, rework, and deployable return; fund parts, technical data, labor, and dock availability against recovered operational days rather than dollars obligated.","expected_effect":"Recovers combat power sooner than an equivalent new-build program and protects the U.S. undersea advantage.","feasibility":"High","cost_band":"Medium–high","lead_time":"1–3 years","owner":"Navy, NAVSEA, public and private yards","prerequisites":"Authoritative condition data, stable availability schedules, supplier mapping, and accountable program ownership.","verification":"Maintenance delay and idle days fall while on-time deployable returns and material availability rise by class.","thread_ids":["MU-T1","MU-T3"],"source_ids":["MU-S4","MU-S5"]},{"id":"MU-A2","rank":2,"title":"Contract for accepted ship output, not optimistic schedules","diagnosis":"All seven battle-force shipbuilders face delivery risk, and submarine output remains half the stated goal.","action":"Stabilize mature designs and multiyear workloads; expose supplier and trade bottlenecks; stage incentives on verified module completion, test closure, and accepted delivery rather than spending or ships under contract.","expected_effect":"Raises predictable output and stops nominal procurement from obscuring late combat capacity.","feasibility":"Moderate","cost_band":"High","lead_time":"3–10 years","owner":"Navy, OSD, Congress, shipbuilders","prerequisites":"Portfolio industrial strategy, design maturity gates, supplier-level capacity baselines, and consistent demand.","verification":"Accepted annual deliveries converge on contracted rates while median delay, rework, and incomplete-work transfer decline.","thread_ids":["MU-T4"],"source_ids":["MU-S2","MU-S3"]},{"id":"MU-A3","rank":3,"title":"Make allied repair access executable before crisis","diagnosis":"Allied geography is a U.S. offset only if ports, docks, data, parts, labor, and authorities can support damaged or overdue ships.","action":"Qualify named allied facilities by class and work package; pre-negotiate liability and technical-data access; place repair kits and conduct measured battle-damage and voyage-repair events.","expected_effect":"Adds theater repair redundancy and reduces long transits to a concentrated U.S. yard base.","feasibility":"Moderate–high","cost_band":"Medium","lead_time":"1–4 years","owner":"Navy, State Department, Japan, Australia and other allies","prerequisites":"Security agreements, export approvals, cyber standards, qualification teams, and repeatable funding.","verification":"Named allied yards complete representative repairs to standard inside operational time limits without ad hoc approvals.","thread_ids":["MU-T1","MU-T2","MU-T3"],"source_ids":["MU-S3","MU-S6"]},{"id":"MU-A4","rank":4,"title":"Field crewed–uncrewed packages with weapons and sustainment","diagnosis":"Prototypes and control software do not yet add combat mass if links, payloads, maintainers, and replenishment are missing.","action":"Organize mission packages around a crewed command element, multiple uncrewed sensors/effectors, alternative communications, common payload interfaces, and forward maintenance; test against jamming and platform loss.","expected_effect":"Expands sensing and firing options while preserving scarce crewed hulls.","feasibility":"Moderate","cost_band":"Medium–high","lead_time":"2–5 years","owner":"Navy and Marine Corps","prerequisites":"Operational acceptance criteria, spectrum access, open interfaces, weapons-release rules, and production cost ceilings.","verification":"A deployable unit repeatedly completes assigned sea-denial missions under degraded links with measured availability, cost, and maintenance burden.","thread_ids":["MU-T2","MU-T5"],"source_ids":["MU-S6"]}],"methodology":{"scope":"The assessment evaluates maritime capability usable now using credible public evidence available through August 5, 2026. Future fleet plans and industrial investments count as mitigations until accepted output or deployable availability is observed.","selection_rule":"Threads are included when they represent a distinct way to gain or lose sea control and when a failure would materially change operational output in the Indo-Pacific benchmark.","composition_rule":"Undersea quality, regional mass, repair, industrial regeneration, and crewed–uncrewed capacity are adjudicated separately. The overall score is a bounded judgment, not a hull-count ratio or arithmetic mean.","evidence_rule":"GAO readiness and production findings receive greatest weight for U.S. output; official threat assessments bound PRC capability. Budget authority, contracts, plans, and prototypes do not equal accepted combat capacity.","unknown_rule":"Classified readiness, acoustic performance, weapons stocks, and war plans remain unknown. Missing PRC data does not become a U.S. lead, and nominal allied capacity is credited only when access is credible."},"limitations":["Public hull counts mix platform types and cannot represent readiness, weapons, survivability, or mission effectiveness.","Submarine acoustic performance, surveillance coverage, and combat-effective availability are classified.","PLAN maintenance, crew proficiency, weapons reliability, and repair-cycle evidence are especially opaque.","Commercial shipbuilding scale indicates industrial depth but is not directly convertible into complex combatant output.","Allied access and repair capacity are credited only where agreements or repeated operations make availability plausible."],"sources":[{"id":"MU-S1","title":"2025 Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","date":"December 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"PRC naval, shipbuilding, theater-force, and uncrewed-system developments.","limitation":"Unclassified U.S. threat assessment; underlying estimates and methods are partly undisclosed."},{"id":"MU-S2","title":"Navy and Coast Guard Shipbuilding: A Disciplined, Strategy-Driven Approach Is Needed","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-109068/index.html","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","date":"May 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Portfolio delivery delay, Virginia production rate, and shipbuilder readiness against goals.","limitation":"Program status is a point-in-time assessment and does not predict future output."},{"id":"MU-S3","title":"Shipbuilding and Repair: Navy Needs a Strategic Approach for Private Sector Industrial Base Investments","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-106286/index.html","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","date":"February 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Yard, workforce, infrastructure, investment, and repair-capacity evidence.","limitation":"Firm-sensitive capacity data are aggregated and some conditions may have changed."},{"id":"MU-S4","title":"Military Readiness: DOD Should Take Further Actions Across Air, Sea, Ground, and Space","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108888/index.html","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","date":"March 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Attack-submarine delay, idle-day, maintenance-period, and cost evidence.","limitation":"Some findings were preliminary pending a dedicated submarine report."},{"id":"MU-S5","title":"Navy Surface Ships: Maintenance Funds and Actions Needed to Address Ongoing Challenges","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106990","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","date":"January 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Surface-maintenance spending, deferred work, personnel, parts, and open recommendations.","limitation":"Recommendation count spans findings of different severity and reports through 2024."},{"id":"MU-S6","title":"Navigation Plan for America's Warfighting Navy 2024","url":"https://www.navy.mil/Portals/1/CNO/NAVPLAN2024/Files/CNO-NAVPLAN-2024-high-res-v2.pdf","publisher":"U.S. Navy","date":"September 2024","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Readiness goals, combined ecosystem, autonomous-system intent, and force priorities.","limitation":"Strategy and targets are not measured performance."},{"id":"MU-S7","title":"FY2026 Defense Budget Request Overview","url":"https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2026/FY2026_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf","publisher":"Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)","date":"June 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"Requested ship and maritime-munition procurement quantities.","limitation":"Budget request is not final appropriation, accepted delivery, inventory, or theater allocation."},{"id":"MU-S8","title":"2024 Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITYDEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLICOF-CHINA-2024.PDF","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","date":"December 2024","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","primary_use":"PLAN battle-force size, regional organization, and force-growth baseline.","limitation":"Force-size estimate predates the evidence cutoff and does not measure readiness or combat effectiveness."}]}