{"number":5,"slug":"cyber-electronic-warfare","title":"Cyber & electronic warfare","score":-0.25,"position":43.8,"rating":"Contested","tone":"contested","confidence":"Low–moderate","call":"The contest is highly capable, continuous, and unusually opaque. U.S. offensive talent is strong, but critical-infrastructure exposure, lower-tier DIB security, spectrum dependence, and uneven readiness prevent a confident advantage call.","reasoning":["Cyber advantage cannot be inferred from spending or elite units when mission systems and suppliers remain vulnerable.","Electronic warfare is a readiness discipline: software-defined capability, spectrum data, operator repetitions, and degraded-mode tactics matter more than a one-time platform feature."],"subcategories":[{"name":"Cyber mission force","score":1.0,"position":75.0,"rating":"U.S. edge","tone":"us-edge","rationale":"Talent, authorities, partnerships, and operational experience provide a credible U.S. strength."},{"name":"Critical-infrastructure defense","score":-1.0,"position":25.0,"rating":"Competitor edge","tone":"competitor-edge","rationale":"Persistent access campaigns demonstrate that homeland systems remain an operational target."},{"name":"Spectrum maneuver","score":0.0,"position":50.0,"rating":"Contested","tone":"contested","rationale":"Capabilities exist, but joint readiness and rapid reprogramming are difficult to verify publicly."},{"name":"DIB cyber resilience","score":-1.0,"position":25.0,"rating":"Competitor edge","tone":"competitor-edge","rationale":"Intellectual-property theft and operational disruption remain acute across a very large supplier network."}],"policy_label":"Regain the edge","policy":"Shift the measure of success from compliance to mission survival. Exercise forces and suppliers through loss of cloud, satellite, GPS, and preferred spectrum; fund rapid patching and reprogramming; deploy shared cyber/EW ranges; and concentrate DIB assistance on suppliers whose failure would stop production or sustainment.","indicators":["Time to patch exploitable mission-system vulnerabilities","Units certified under denied-spectrum and disconnected operations","Mission-critical suppliers with verified incident response and recovery"],"sources":[{"title":"FY2026–2030 Department of War Strategic Plan","url":"https://dam.defense.gov/Portals/47/Documents/Strategic%20Management%20Plan/FY26-30%20DoW%20Strategic%20Plan%206Apr2026%20r18.pdf?ver=hXqjVWlYOwuL98sd_5C6Hw%3D%3D","kind":"Execution plan","date":"Apr 2026"},{"title":"FY2026 DoW Inspector General Management Challenges","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2025/Nov/25/2003831751/-1/-1/1/MANAGEMENT%20CHALLENGES%20FY2026.PDF","kind":"Oversight","date":"Nov 2025"},{"title":"Defense Leaders on Cyber Defense and Critical Infrastructure","url":"https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4188996/dod-leaders-urge-congressto-bolster-cyberdefenses/","kind":"Threat evidence","date":"May 2025"},{"title":"Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Implementation Plan","url":"https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2723228/media-roundtable-on-the-electromagnetic-spectrum-superiority-strategy-implement/","kind":"Guidance","date":"Aug 2021"}]}