{"schema_version":"1.0","slug":"diplomacy-coalitions","title":"Diplomacy & Coalition Statecraft","status":"live","current_through":"2026-08-12","current_through_display":"August 12, 2026","primary_question":"Which system is better able to turn diplomatic relationships into voluntary, usable, coordinated, and durable action: a U.S.-anchored coalition with participating partners or a PRC-centered coalition with participating partners?","boundary":"A current public-source comparison of how U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered diplomatic systems, with participating partners identified separately, convert relationships into access, coordinated action, bargaining effects, and durable arrangements.","benchmark":"Political conversion from relationships and commitments to authorized, usable, delivered, and durable coalition effects.","bottom_line":"The U.S./partner system retains the stronger political-conversion architecture: its commitments, access, activation, delivery, institutional machinery, and costly-role durability are more deeply specified, exercised, and observed. The PRC is a peer competitor in formal diplomatic reach, informal elite access, and coalition formation; it is especially strong in Asian and Global South engagement, party-to-party taskability, alternative-institution attraction, and broad issue-position coalitions in the UN General Assembly. Current U.S. withdrawals, arrears, aid disruption, WTO obstruction, partner dependence, and host caveats narrow every U.S. advantage. The decisive distinction is conversion depth, not post, member, summit, vote, or finance totals.","axis":{"left":"PRC-centered advantage","center":"Contested","right":"U.S. / partner advantage","unscored":"Insufficient comparative basis","note":"Positions are independent ordinal judgments. Confidence remains separate, and no overall diplomatic-power score is calculated."},"conversion_chain":[{"stage":"Relationship and reach","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D02"],"finding":"Contested","interpretation":"Both systems can reach formal and informal decision networks, through different regional and organizational strengths."},{"stage":"Coalition formation","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"finding":"Contested","interpretation":"The U.S. is stronger in role-specific high-capability coalitions; the PRC is stronger in broad alternative-forum attraction and many universal vote coalitions."},{"stage":"Commitment and access","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05"],"finding":"U.S. / partner edge","interpretation":"U.S.-anchored commitments more often have explicit triggers, legal authority, resources, sites, permissions, and exercises."},{"stage":"Activation and delivery","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"finding":"U.S. / partner edge","interpretation":"Standing political and implementation machinery has a broader record of rapid activation and critical-role delivery."},{"stage":"Institutional reproduction","category_ids":["DC-D08","DC-D10"],"finding":"U.S. / partner edge","interpretation":"Western institutions show deeper monitored implementation and costly-role durability, while PRC-centered alternatives show genuine attraction, growth, and selective delivery."},{"stage":"Bargaining effect","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"finding":"Insufficient comparative basis","interpretation":"The evidence cannot isolate a stable diplomatic-system advantage from case difficulty and cross-domain leverage."}],"competitive_profile":{"us_partner_advantages":["Treaty and political commitments connected to standing authorization, planning, resourcing, and exercise","Broad, verified, and repeatedly used overseas access architecture","Mature coalition decision, command, coordination, monitoring, peer-review, and evaluation machinery","High-capability partners able to supply differentiated and substitutable roles","Long stress-tested history of alliance adaptation and repair"],"prc_centered_advantages":["Near-peer global diplomatic footprint and stronger formal reach in East Asia, Africa, and parts of the Pacific","Centrally taskable party-to-party channels with access beyond foreign ministries","Strong recent diplomatic influence in Asia and broad attraction to BRICS and related Global South forums","Large development-finance and infrastructure relationship network with material implementation and repair","Broader issue-position coalitions on most clean opposite U.S.-PRC UN General Assembly votes in 2021-2025"],"us_partner_vulnerabilities":["Current withdrawals, arrears, aid disruption, and WTO adjudication obstruction","Government-change volatility and uncertainty about U.S. stewardship","Host-state caveats, access revocation, and dependence on sovereign partner consent","Burden concentration and the risk of assigning autonomous partner performance to Washington","Regional diplomatic erosion in Asia and weaker Global South legitimacy on many issues"],"prc_centered_vulnerabilities":["Fewer observable high-cost mutual obligations and narrower verified military access","Consensus constraints, member rivalry, and heterogeneous aims inside BRICS and the SCO","Opacity in staffing, failed initiatives, agreement terms, permissions, and obligation-level implementation","Party-state taskability can impose legitimacy, reciprocity, and partner-autonomy costs","Broad memberships, votes, port finance, and summit commitments often fail the conversion test without role or outcome evidence"]},"method":{"name":"Relationship-to-durable-effect chain","stages":["Relationship established","Coalition formed","Commitment documented","Authorized","Resourced","Access made usable","Exercised or tested","Activated","Delivered","Bargaining outcome","Durable effect"],"rules":["A mission, contact, summit, vote, signature, pledge, or facility is an input until a defined conversion is observed.","Formal and informal diplomacy remain separate because their sponsors, observability, risks, and conversion mechanisms differ.","Partner action is credited only when authorization, relevance, timing, and the contributing actor are observed.","A failure or missing record on one side never establishes an advantage for the other.","Contested requires positive evidence for both systems; otherwise the category remains explicitly unscored.","Military output, sanctions effects, finance, and information influence remain enabling or rival mechanisms from adjacent domains.","No weighted overall diplomatic-power composite is calculated."]},"categories":[{"id":"DC-D01","number":1,"slug":"diplomatic-reach-expertise","title":"Diplomatic reach & expertise","position":"Contested","position_label":"Contested","axis_label":"Contested","axis_position":50,"tone":"contested","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Low","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Low","comparative_observability":"limited","evidence_role":"split_or_inconclusive","comparative_mechanism":"","decision_rule":"A system receives credit for matched priority-country coverage plus qualified staff, continuity, recurring access, and observed warning or problem-solving capacity. Post totals, formal training rules, ambassador biographies, and meeting counts are inputs, not sufficient outcomes.","judgment":"The global position is Contested. The formal networks are effectively equal in size, with the PRC stronger in Africa, East Asia, and the Pacific and the United States stronger in Europe, North and Central America, and South Asia. Current Asian evidence favors the PRC, while both systems show substantial professionalization machinery. No common public record measures mission staffing, language match, tour continuity, access quality, warning, and crisis-channel performance, so the category cannot support an edge at more than low comparative confidence.","decisive_reason":"Near-equal global footprints and opposed regional strengths; mission-level expertise and conversion remain asymmetrically observed.","findings":[{"label":"Global formal coverage","finding":"Contested","basis":"The common 2023 inventory reports 274 PRC posts and 271 U.S. posts, a difference too small and functionally unweighted to establish advantage.","limitation":""},{"label":"Regional reach and activity","finding":"Regionally split; PRC edge in East Asia and Africa, U.S. edge in Europe and the Americas","basis":"Post distribution and the 2025 Asia indexes point in opposite regional directions rather than to a global lead.","limitation":""},{"label":"Expertise and continuity","finding":"Insufficient comparative basis","basis":"The U.S. publishes training rules and historical gaps; PRC ambassador biographies show professionalization, but neither yields a common current mission-level fill and performance dataset.","limitation":""}],"counterevidence":["A three-post global difference is not operationally meaningful without staff and function weights.","The PRC's much stronger East Asian footprint and 2025 regional diplomatic influence prevent a U.S. global edge.","Historical U.S. language and staffing gaps show that a mature training system does not guarantee qualified occupancy.","PRC ambassador professionalization does not reveal mission-wide expertise, continuity, or access quality."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner edge","explanation":"The PRC has the slightly larger global network, stronger coverage in several priority regions, record Asian diplomatic-influence evidence, and a professionalized ambassador corps."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge","explanation":"The United States has near-equal global coverage, stronger reach in Europe and the Americas, a deeply institutionalized language-training system, and dense partner institutions; the PRC's regional gains do not generalize globally."},{"label":"Why not either lead","explanation":"Neither side demonstrates a global advantage across coverage, expertise, access, continuity, warning, and crisis readiness under common measures."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Material. Regional security and economic priorities explain post placement and diplomatic tempo."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Material. Market size, aid, and military presence can generate access credited superficially to diplomacy."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Decisive for confidence. U.S. staffing failures are disclosed through oversight while PRC personnel and failure data are sparse."}],"sensitivity":{"to_us_partner_edge":"Requires current matched evidence that U.S. posts have higher qualified-fill, continuity, access, warning, and crisis-channel performance across multiple regions.","to_prc_centered_edge":"Requires the PRC's Asian influence and regional post advantages to convert into superior recurring access and problem-solving across a representative global sample.","to_insufficient_comparative_basis":"Revert to unscored if the category is required to be decided only from full mission-level expertise and outcome data rather than a profile combining reach and bounded performance evidence.","current_call_robust_to":["Removing meeting counts and ambassador rank from decisive evidence","Treating the 274-to-271 post difference as substantively equal","Separating regional from global findings"],"current_call_not_robust_to":["A new matched mission staffing and access dataset","Large undisclosed 2024-2026 post closures or workforce changes","A rule that forbids component-profile adjudication when expertise remains unscored"]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":"PRC-centered edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The PRC has substantially more East Asian posts and the 2025 regional indexes report record PRC diplomatic influence; composite and expertise limits preclude a lead."},{"slice":"Africa","position":"PRC-centered edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The PRC has a modest formal-post advantage and denser party and forum channels, but mission capability and access outcomes are not matched."},{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The United States leads formal post coverage and operates inside denser allied institutions; that does not establish post-level expertise everywhere."},{"slice":"Latin America and the Caribbean","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"U.S. coverage is materially denser in North and Central America, while South American post totals are equal; outcome data remain thin."},{"slice":"Middle East","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"Formal post totals are equal and isolated crisis successes do not create a representative reach-and-expertise comparison."}],"issue_slices":[],"source_ids":["DC-S01","DC-S02","DC-S03","DC-S04","DC-S05","DC-S06","DC-S96","DC-S97","DC-S98","DC-S99","DC-S100","DC-S123"],"metric_ids":["DC-M01","DC-M02","DC-M03","DC-M04","DC-M05"],"case_ids":["DC-C20"],"observation_ids":["DC-CO001","DC-CO002","DC-CO003","DC-CO004","DC-CO005","DC-CO006","DC-CO007"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d01","institutional_family":["Georgetown University","Lowy Institute","U.S. Department of State","U.S. Government Accountability Office"]},{"id":"DC-D02","number":2,"slug":"informal-reach-access","title":"Informal reach & access","position":"Contested","position_label":"Contested","axis_label":"Contested","axis_position":50,"tone":"contested","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Low","fact_confidence":"Moderate","comparative_confidence":"Low","comparative_observability":"limited","evidence_role":"split_or_inconclusive","comparative_mechanism":"","decision_rule":"An informal or hybrid network counts only when it is current, reciprocal, attributable, and connected to consequential access, warning, coordination, deconfliction, or policy. Exposure, alumni titles, claimed contacts, audience size, and covert or coercive activity do not receive ordinary relationship-capital credit.","judgment":"The category is Contested at low confidence. The United States operates a large, plural, long-lived ecosystem of exchanges, alumni, educational, civic, professional, business, and subnational ties with documented participant and collaboration effects. The PRC operates an unusually taskable party-state network that reaches governing parties, opposition actors, and power brokers beyond foreign ministries, with observed though generally moderate effects in Southeast Asia. The networks differ too much in sponsor, target, disclosure, autonomy, and outcome measures to justify an edge; each has a distinct advantage that the other does not replicate.","decisive_reason":"U.S. plurality and durability versus PRC party-state taskability and elite access; unlike network forms and outcome records prevent an edge.","findings":[{"label":"U.S. / partner","finding":"Plurality, longevity, and cross-government persistence","basis":"Causal policy conversion is often self-reported, selection-affected, and weakly attributable to Washington.","limitation":"Causal policy conversion is often self-reported, selection-affected, and weakly attributable to Washington."},{"label":"PRC-centered","finding":"Central taskability and direct access to party elites inside and outside government","basis":"Many recorded ties are shallow, outcomes are opaque, and political-control or legitimacy costs can reduce reciprocity and durability.","limitation":"Many recorded ties are shallow, outcomes are opaque, and political-control or legitimacy costs can reduce reciprocity and durability."}],"counterevidence":["More than half of the parties in the 2002-2017 ID-CPC dataset had only one or two observed contacts.","U.S. alumni prominence is heavily affected by participant selection and does not prove favorable policy behavior.","Southeast Asian research characterizes CPC party diplomacy as a moderate status-quo multiplier, not a structural transformation.","Central taskability can impose legitimacy and partner-autonomy costs, while plural U.S. ties are less controllable and therefore cannot always be mobilized."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner edge","explanation":"The CPC's party network supplies centrally directed access to influential ruling and opposition actors at a scale the U.S. government does not reproduce."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge","explanation":"The U.S. plural ecosystem is older, broader across social sectors, more resilient to centralized policy failure, and supported by evaluations showing continuing collaboration and leadership networks."},{"label":"Why not either lead","explanation":"Neither system has a matched record of relationship-to-policy conversion, and each network's apparent strength is partly a consequence of unlike institutional form."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Strong. Exchange, training, business, and party relationships often track material opportunities rather than autonomous diplomatic influence."},{"id":"DC-A03","assessment":"Strong. Participants may join both systems' networks to hedge, gain skills, or preserve access without policy alignment."},{"id":"DC-A05","assessment":"Material. Regime type and party dominance shape whether party ties or plural civic networks produce access."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Decisive for confidence. Private ties and failures are underreported; U.S. evaluations and CPC activity records use incompatible outcomes."}],"sensitivity":{"to_us_partner_edge":"Requires matched cohorts showing greater U.S. network persistence, reciprocal access, warning, and policy conversion after leadership change.","to_prc_centered_edge":"Requires current entity-level evidence that CPC relationships convert into agenda entry or policy more often without prohibitive autonomy and legitimacy costs.","to_insufficient_comparative_basis":"Revert to unscored if unlike sponsor and outcome forms are deemed too heterogeneous for a profile judgment.","current_call_robust_to":["Excluding audience and contact totals from outcome credit","Treating U.S. and PRC networks as plural and party-state systems rather than unitary blocs","Retaining regional asymmetry"],"current_call_not_robust_to":["A current matched network panel with verified policy outcomes","Large 2025-2026 program closures or revived exchange portfolios","Systematic partner-side evidence of coercion or nonreciprocity"]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"YSEALI and other U.S. networks show broad alumni collaboration; CPC ties deliver privileged elite access, especially in party-led systems, but matched policy outcomes are absent."},{"slice":"Africa","position":"PRC-centered edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"CPC party training and ruling-party relationships are unusually dense and taskable; partner autonomy and policy-effect data keep confidence low."},{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"Educational, professional, civic, business, and subnational networks are broader and less dependent on a single political channel, but they are not centrally assignable."},{"slice":"Global / multilateral","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"No common entity-level inventory covers current ties, reciprocity, attrition, access, and policy conversion for both systems."}],"issue_slices":[],"source_ids":["DC-S07","DC-S08","DC-S09","DC-S10","DC-S11","DC-S34","DC-S35","DC-S101","DC-S102","DC-S103","DC-S104","DC-S127"],"metric_ids":["DC-M06","DC-M07","DC-M08"],"case_ids":["DC-C09","DC-C14","DC-C26"],"observation_ids":["DC-CO008","DC-CO009","DC-CO010","DC-CO011","DC-CO012","DC-CO013"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d02","institutional_family":["AidData","Asian Perspective","CPC International Department","ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute","Institute of International Education","Oxford University Press","Pew Research Center","U.S. Department of State","U.S. Department of State ECA"]},{"id":"DC-D03","number":3,"slug":"coalition-forming","title":"Coalition forming","position":"Contested","position_label":"Contested","axis_label":"Contested","axis_position":50,"tone":"contested","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Moderate","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Moderate","comparative_observability":"partial","evidence_role":"split_or_inconclusive","comparative_mechanism":"","decision_rule":"A coalition counts when voluntary participants fill the political, geographic, legal, economic, legitimacy, or operational roles required by its stated purpose. Membership, attendance, declarations, population, favorable votes, and aggregate GDP are inputs unless meaningful roles and partner agency are observed.","judgment":"Coalition forming is Contested. The U.S./partner system has the stronger observed portfolio of function-specific coalitions that include pivotal high-capability states and assign costly, differentiated roles. The PRC-centered system has the stronger recent record of expanding Global South forums and attracting members and partners seeking greater voice, while the PRC position also aligns with much broader coalitions on many UN General Assembly votes. Neither strength dominates the full category: threat and material incentives explain much U.S. participation, while BRICS and vote breadth do not establish PRC command, role coverage, activation, or delivery.","decisive_reason":"U.S. strength in pivotal, role-specific coalitions is offset by PRC-centered Global South attraction and broader recent UN issue-position coalitions.","findings":[{"label":"Security and crisis coalitions","finding":"U.S. / partner edge","basis":"NATO, the Defeat ISIS coalition, and adjacent formats combine pivotal actors with differentiated legal, military, financial, logistics, and political roles.","limitation":""},{"label":"Global South institution attraction","finding":"PRC-centered edge","basis":"BRICS expansion and partner demand demonstrate genuine voluntary attraction to an alternative forum, even though leadership is shared and motives are heterogeneous.","limitation":""},{"label":"Universal vote-coalition breadth","finding":"PRC-centered edge","basis":"The PRC position had the larger coalition on 331 of 375 clean opposite votes in 2021-2025; sponsorship and persuasion remain unproven.","limitation":""}],"counterevidence":["U.S.-anchored security coalitions benefit from direct threat and material military dependence.","BRICS members constrained expansion choices and pursue distinct visions, so expansion cannot be assigned to Beijing alone.","UN vote alignment is not sponsorship, persuasion, or meaningful role assignment.","Large coalitions can be shallow, while narrow coalitions can fill every decisive role."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner edge","explanation":"BRICS expansion, PRC-centered forum demand, party networks, and recent UN vote-coalition breadth are genuine positive coalition-forming evidence."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge","explanation":"The U.S./partner system repeatedly assembles pivotal actors into specific high-cost roles rather than only broad membership or aligned declarations."},{"label":"Why not either lead","explanation":"Partner agency, hedging, threat alignment, and role-versus-breadth tradeoffs prevent either system from dominating across security, development, rules, and regions."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Strong. Shared threats explain much U.S.-anchored security coalition formation."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Strong. Protection, market access, finance, and sanctions risk shape participation in both systems."},{"id":"DC-A03","assessment":"Strong. BRICS and other memberships often represent hedging and voice-seeking rather than alignment."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Material. Public records observe formal coalition entry more readily than private failed recruitment or side payments."}],"sensitivity":{"to_us_partner_edge":"Requires a predeclared cross-issue sample showing superior pivotal-role coverage and voluntary participation after controlling for threat and material dependence.","to_prc_centered_edge":"Requires BRICS, FOCAC, and UN breadth to convert into verified partner-defined roles across multiple consequential issues without coercion or one-sided dependence.","current_call_robust_to":["Removing raw membership and GDP totals","Separating formation from activation and delivery","Treating members as autonomous actors"],"current_call_not_robust_to":["A representative failed-recruitment denominator","Common role maps across security and non-security coalitions","Evidence that current U.S. policy discontinuity causes pivotal partner defections"]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"moderate","basis":"NATO and adjacent coalitions recruit pivotal states into defined roles, but Russian threat is a major independent cause."},{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"moderate","basis":"U.S. minilateral and alliance networks offer high-capability roles; the PRC has stronger broad regional diplomatic activity and attractive economic and political forums."},{"slice":"Africa","position":"PRC-centered edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"FOCAC, BRICS, party ties, and formal reach create broader PRC-centered convening capacity; role and delivery denominators remain incomplete."},{"slice":"Global / multilateral","position":"PRC-centered edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"BRICS expansion and UN vote alignment favor PRC-centered breadth, while U.S.-anchored clubs remain stronger in role specificity and execution."},{"slice":"Middle East","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The U.S. retains formal and ad hoc security coalitions, while the PRC has credible recent convening and mediation gains; no common role-coverage portfolio decides the region."}],"issue_slices":[],"source_ids":["DC-S03","DC-S04","DC-S05","DC-S20","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S45","DC-S93","DC-S95","DC-S105","DC-S106","DC-S121"],"metric_ids":["DC-M09","DC-M10","DC-M11","DC-M12"],"case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C05","DC-C10","DC-C16"],"observation_ids":["DC-CO014","DC-CO015","DC-CO016","DC-CO017","DC-CO018","DC-CO019"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d03","institutional_family":["Afrobarometer","BRICS Presidency","Carnegie Endowment for International Peace","Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute","Kiel Institute for the World Economy","Lowy Institute","NATO","U.S. Department of State","United Nations"]},{"id":"DC-D04","number":4,"slug":"commitment-credibility","title":"Commitment credibility","position":"U.S. / partner edge","position_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_position":75,"tone":"partner","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Low","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Low","comparative_observability":"limited","evidence_role":"comparative_mechanism","comparative_mechanism":"Broader explicit and resourced obligation architecture, bounded by severe current U.S. discontinuities and material PRC program delivery.","decision_rule":"Commitments receive credibility credit only when obligations and triggers are specific enough to test, the necessary domestic authority and resources exist, and performance is observed when eligible conditions occur. Treaty form, rhetoric, reputation, finance, and project completion are neither necessary nor sufficient alone.","judgment":"The U.S./partner system has a low-confidence edge. It sustains a broader observed architecture of ratified, geographically explicit security obligations connected to domestic authorization, standing institutions, plans, forces, exercises, and budgets. PRC credibility is real in development-finance delivery, FOCAC follow-up, and the durable China-DPRK treaty, but its security obligations are fewer and many political commitments are less specific or less observable. The edge is narrow: U.S. withdrawal from the initially implemented JCPOA, current foreign-aid disruption, international-organization withdrawals, arrears, and WTO obstruction materially damage continuity; the PRC's Hong Kong record and opaque commitment universe similarly preclude a PRC advantage.","decisive_reason":"Broader explicit and resourced obligation architecture, bounded by severe current U.S. discontinuities and material PRC program delivery.","findings":[{"label":"Security obligation specificity and assurance","finding":"U.S. / partner edge","basis":"The United States has multiple ratified defense arrangements tied to standing authorization and resourcing machinery; the PRC's observable mutual-assistance architecture is much narrower.","limitation":""},{"label":"Development and program delivery","finding":"Contested","basis":"PRC project delivery and repair are material, while U.S. and Western institutions show substantial implementation but current U.S. aid discontinuity; instruments and disclosure differ.","limitation":""},{"label":"Government-change continuity","finding":"Contested","basis":"U.S. policy reversals and PRC performance disputes supply serious negative evidence on both sides without a common denominator.","limitation":""}],"counterevidence":["Updated alliance research finds meaningful historical violation and coding sensitivity rather than automatic treaty reliability.","The U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA after initial IAEA-verified implementation.","The 2025 foreign-aid pause and 2025-2026 international withdrawals create a current cross-program continuity shock.","PRC development finance includes large volumes of completed and repaired projects and partner demand, refuting an empty-promise thesis.","The United Kingdom's continuing Joint Declaration noncompliance assessment is serious PRC counterevidence even though Beijing disputes it."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner lead","explanation":"Current U.S. reversals, arrears, aid interruption, and alliance-reliability uncertainty are too consequential; formal specificity cannot substitute for fulfillment."},{"label":"Why not contested","explanation":"The U.S./partner system has the broader positive record of explicit obligations already connected to authorization, resources, exercises, and live activation, not merely a PRC evidence deficit."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge or lead","explanation":"PRC development delivery is strong counterevidence, but no comparable multi-region portfolio matches the specificity, standing resources, and observed activation of U.S.-anchored commitments; major PRC compliance disputes remain."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Strong. Treaties are selected where interests already align, and changing interests explain much fulfillment."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Strong. Military and financial resources make promises credible; this category credits only their conversion into specific, authorized commitment."},{"id":"DC-A05","assessment":"Strong. Elections and domestic law drive U.S. discontinuity, while PRC centralization may increase short-run continuity but reduce transparent accountability."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Decisive for confidence. U.S. obligations and failures are more observable; missing PRC evidence is never coded as nonperformance."}],"sensitivity":{"down_to_contested":"Move to Contested if current U.S. discontinuities spread to core security obligations or if matched PRC commitments show comparable specificity, authorization, resources, and trigger fulfillment.","up_to_us_partner_lead":"A lead requires repeated, timely fulfillment across core and non-security portfolios plus repair of current stewardship and continuity failures.","to_prc_centered_edge":"Requires a representative PRC obligation ledger showing higher fulfillment and government-change persistence under common definitions, not simply greater central policy stability.","current_call_robust_to":["Treating historical alliance reliability as calibration rather than U.S. performance","Giving full positive credit to PRC development delivery and the active DPRK treaty","Counting all current U.S. withdrawals as one correlated political shock"],"current_call_not_robust_to":["Undisclosed PRC trigger and fulfillment records","A core U.S. alliance abandonment or funding failure","A common program-level commitment universe that reverses observed conversion rates"]},"regional_slices":[],"issue_slices":[],"source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S26","DC-S31","DC-S32","DC-S33","DC-S43","DC-S56","DC-S59","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S67","DC-S107","DC-S108","DC-S109","DC-S110","DC-S111","DC-S112","DC-S118","DC-S119","DC-S126","DC-S128","DC-S129","DC-S130","DC-S131"],"metric_ids":["DC-M13","DC-M14","DC-M15","DC-M16","DC-M34"],"case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C11","DC-C15","DC-C19","DC-C21","DC-C25","DC-C26"],"observation_ids":["DC-CO020","DC-CO021","DC-CO022","DC-CO023","DC-CO024","DC-CO025","DC-CO026","DC-CO027","DC-CO028","DC-CO051","DC-CO052","DC-CO053"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d04","institutional_family":["ATOP Project","AidData","BRICS Presidency","Coalition of the Willing co-chairs","Executive Office of the President","International Atomic Energy Agency","NATO","OECD","Oxford University Press","P5+1 and European Union","PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FOCAC","PRC treaty system","PRC-DPRK treaty relationship","Philippine defense and national-security authorities","RANEPA Center for International Institutions Research","U.S. executive branch","U.S. treaty system","UNFCCC","United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and Multinational Force Ukraine","United Kingdom government","United Nations","United Nations Treaty Section","University of Toronto G7 Research Group","World Health Organization","World Trade Organization"]},{"id":"DC-D05","number":5,"slug":"usable-access","title":"Usable access","position":"U.S. / partner edge","position_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_position":75,"tone":"partner","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Moderate","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Moderate","comparative_observability":"partial","evidence_role":"comparative_mechanism","comparative_mechanism":"Much broader verified agreement-to-site-to-exercise-to-activation network; sovereign caveats and PRC port pathways prevent a global lead.","decision_rule":"Access must be scenario-relevant, legally available, host-approved, resourced, logistically usable, and exercised or activated. A treaty, port investment, commercial concession, peacetime visit, facility, or intelligence-sharing promise is nominal until the required permissions, capacity, data, and timing are verified.","judgment":"The U.S./partner system has the clearest remaining comparative advantage, but the global category is an edge rather than a lead. It has an order-of-magnitude broader verified network of bases and access sites, supported by treaties, compacts, SOFAs, host investments, persistent presence, prepositioning, and exercises. PRC access is real at Djibouti and increasingly at Ream, and Chinese finance, ownership, and naval familiarity span many ports. Yet most of that wider port network remains conditional potential rather than documented crisis access. Turkey, Niger, Philippine caveats, Cambodian agency, classified terms, and the underobserved nonmilitary portions of the category preclude a global lead.","decisive_reason":"Much broader verified agreement-to-site-to-exercise-to-activation network; sovereign caveats and PRC port pathways prevent a global lead.","findings":[{"label":"Security and logistics access","finding":"U.S. / partner lead","basis":"At least 128 U.S. bases in at least 51 countries are tied to legal and resourced arrangements, compared with one acknowledged PRC overseas base, preferential Ream access, and a wider conditional port network.","limitation":""},{"label":"Host-permission reliability","finding":"U.S. / partner edge","basis":"The U.S. has more exercised relationships and repair mechanisms, but denial and revocation cases demonstrate that none are automatic.","limitation":""},{"label":"Diplomatic and information access","finding":"","basis":"Classified intelligence, data-sharing, backchannel, transit, and overflight permissions lack a common public denominator.","limitation":""}],"counterevidence":["Turkey blocked combat use in 2003 and Niger forced a U.S. withdrawal in 2024.","Philippine officials have imposed public scenario caveats even as EDCA expands.","China has an acknowledged Djibouti base, persistent PLAN use at Ream, and naval activity at many Chinese-financed or owned ports.","A U.S. ship visit to Ream and Cambodian denials of exclusivity preserve host agency and complicate a simple PRC-base label.","Neither side publishes a complete inventory of crisis permissions, capacity, intelligence access, or denied requests."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner lead","explanation":"The category extends beyond public military basing; sovereign hosts have denied and revoked U.S. use, national caveats are scenario-specific, and PRC access pathways are expanding faster than formal-base counts imply."},{"label":"Why not contested","explanation":"The U.S. advantage rests on positive verified chains from agreement through funded facility, persistent presence, exercise, and real activation across many countries, not on missing PRC disclosure."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge or lead","explanation":"PRC port finance and naval activity are real but generally do not establish legal, exclusive, timely crisis access or matched capacity."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Strong. Hosts grant access because of shared threats and local incentives, not simply U.S. diplomatic quality."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Strong. Military scale and finance create much of the physical access; this category credits the political and legal conversion only."},{"id":"DC-A03","assessment":"Material. Hosts hedge by granting visits, commercial access, or limited permissions to multiple powers."},{"id":"DC-A05","assessment":"Strong. Elections, coups, courts, and public opinion can change permissions quickly."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Strong. Classified agreements and operations create asymmetric uncertainty for both systems."}],"sensitivity":{"down_to_contested":"Move to Contested if scenario-specific host permissions remove a large share of U.S. sites or if PRC-owned and financed ports demonstrably provide repeatable crisis access and logistics at representative scale.","up_to_us_partner_lead":"A global lead requires common scenario tests confirming access, capacity, timing, and survivability across military and nonmilitary functions and showing denial risk is not outcome-changing.","to_prc_centered_edge":"Requires a verified network of PRC legal access, host approval, capacity, exercise, and activation that outperforms matched U.S. sites rather than a count of financed ports.","current_call_robust_to":["Giving full positive credit to Djibouti, Ream, and observed PRC naval activity","Excluding commercial ports without crisis permission","Retaining Turkey and Niger as decisive U.S. countercases"],"current_call_not_robust_to":["Classified agreements that materially expand PRC access","A major host withdrawal across Japan, ROK, Philippines, or Europe","A broader definition that treats commercial finance as usable access without a legal-permission gate"]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":"U.S. / partner lead","comparative_confidence":"moderate","basis":"Standing allied bases, command arrangements, exercises, and access are extensive and repeatedly used."},{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"moderate","basis":"Japan, ROK, Australia, the Philippines, and the freely associated states provide a dense exercised network; PRC growth at Ream and commercial ports is genuine but narrower and less legally transparent."},{"slice":"Middle East","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The United States has broader exercised access, while permissions are politically contingent and PRC port and diplomatic options are expanding."},{"slice":"Africa","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The United States has multiple sites but suffered a major Niger revocation; China has Djibouti, dense port finance, and host relationships without a matched crisis-use denominator."},{"slice":"Latin America and the Caribbean","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"The U.S. has geographic and legal advantages, while PRC ports are expanding; common scenario, capacity, and permission tests are absent."}],"issue_slices":[],"source_ids":["DC-S15","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S37","DC-S46","DC-S113","DC-S114","DC-S115","DC-S116","DC-S117","DC-S124","DC-S131"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17","DC-M18","DC-M19"],"case_ids":["DC-C03","DC-C05","DC-C23","DC-C24"],"observation_ids":["DC-CO029","DC-CO030","DC-CO031","DC-CO032","DC-CO033","DC-CO034","DC-CO035","DC-CO036","DC-CO053"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d05","institutional_family":["ATOP Project","AidData","Associated Press","CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative","Congressional Research Service","NATO","Philippine defense and national-security authorities","U.S. Department of Defense","U.S. Government Accountability Office","U.S. and Iraqi governments","U.S.-Philippines alliance"]},{"id":"DC-D06","number":6,"slug":"coalition-activation","title":"Coalition activation","position":"U.S. / partner edge","position_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_position":75,"tone":"partner","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Low","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Low","comparative_observability":"limited","evidence_role":"comparative_mechanism","comparative_mechanism":"Observed high-stakes political-to-command activation, with Afghanistan and AIIB-World Bank parity preventing a lead.","decision_rule":"A defined trigger must produce timely collective authorization, delegated or coordinated implementation, and participation by the relevant assigned actors. Statements, institutional design, and meeting speed do not establish activation unless an executable collective action follows.","judgment":"The U.S./partner system receives a provisional edge because NATO converted a high-stakes invasion trigger into same-day political authorization, delegated command authority, and a first collective-defence deployment within four to five days. The available SCO stress cases produced declaratory coordination, a directly observed consensus failure, and later formal repair, but not a comparable executable collective response. The edge is narrow and low-confidence: NATO's Afghanistan endgame is a major countercase, both the World Bank and AIIB activated material COVID-19 facilities rapidly, the SCO is not a collective-defence alliance, and the matched event universe remains small.","decisive_reason":"Observed high-stakes political-to-command activation, with Afghanistan and AIIB-World Bank parity preventing a lead.","findings":[{"label":"security_crisis_activation","finding":"U.S. / partner edge","basis":"NATO demonstrated a short political-to-command-to-deployment chain after a defined armed-attack trigger. The SCO's Afghanistan response and 2025 ministerial breakdown show coordination and repair capacity but not a similarly executable collective chain.","limitation":"Threat, mandate, geography, warning time, and assigned functions differ sharply. The finding credits the capability actually present but does not treat SCO non-intervention as failure to perform an alliance obligation it does not possess."},{"label":"pandemic_mdb_activation","finding":"Contested","basis":"The World Bank approved its fast-track package six days after the common pandemic trigger. AIIB preparation began earlier and produced a launched facility after 23 days and first Board approvals after 36 days. Both converted standing institutional machinery into material crisis instruments.","limitation":"Different mandates, scale, preparation dates, approval structures, borrower sets, and multilateral member agency prevent a speed ranking from becoming a system lead."},{"label":"consensus_failure_and_repair","finding":"Mixed PRC-centered capability","basis":"The SCO failed to adopt a ministerial statement when a pivotal member withheld consent, then achieved higher-level consensus 67 days later. That is evidence of both a veto constraint and a repair mechanism.","limitation":"The repaired product was declaratory and does not reveal whether the organization could authorize or coordinate an executable response."}],"counterevidence":["NATO's own Afghanistan lessons record delayed reporting, constrained political direction, insufficient allied discussion of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, and an evacuation outside NATO command and control.","AIIB moved from early preparation to a launched COVID-19 facility and first Board approvals within weeks, showing genuine PRC-initiated multilateral activation.","The SCO repaired the June 2025 ministerial consensus failure at the September heads-of-state summit, so one failed statement does not establish durable paralysis.","NATO's 2022 response benefited from direct threat, years of warning, standing forces, and a collective-defence mandate unavailable in the PRC-centered comparison."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner lead","explanation":"The event sample is too small and heterogeneous; NATO's Afghanistan endgame is a serious countercase; World Bank-AIIB pandemic activation is competitive; and member-level participation denominators remain incomplete."},{"label":"Why not contested","explanation":"The U.S./partner system has repeatedly observed political-to-command machinery for a live high-stakes security trigger, while the current PRC-centered security sample shows declarations, coordination, and repair but no comparable collective authorization-to-action chain."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge or lead","explanation":"AIIB is strong positive counterevidence in a public-goods crisis, but no matched portfolio shows PRC-centered mechanisms activating executable collective responses more reliably across the declared category universe."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Strong. Direct European threat, prior warning, geography, and aligned national interests explain part of NATO's speed and reduce causal credit to institutional machinery."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Strong. NATO's command capacity and members' military resources are material enablers; this domain credits only the conversion from political decision to coordinated authorization and role assignment."},{"id":"DC-A03","assessment":"Strong. NATO, the SCO, the World Bank, and AIIB have different mandates. The ruling does not penalize an institution for declining tasks outside its remit, but system-level capability still records whether an executable mechanism exists."},{"id":"DC-A04","assessment":"Material. Public records reveal formal decisions more readily than private consultation and bilateral activation, especially in the PRC-centered system."}],"sensitivity":{"down_to_contested":"Move to Contested if a mandate-adjusted sample finds PRC-centered mechanisms matching U.S./partner trigger-to-authorization and participation performance, if additional NATO or U.S.-anchored stress cases repeat the Afghanistan consultation failure, or if national-interest controls remove most institutional conversion credit.","up_to_us_partner_lead":"A lead requires a larger predeclared event universe with common clocks, eligible-role denominators, national caveats, and repeated U.S./partner advantage across security and non-security activation after controlling for mandate and threat.","to_prc_centered_edge":"A PRC-centered edge requires repeated real-event cases in which PRC-centered mechanisms authorize and coordinate consequential assigned action faster or more completely than matched U.S./partner mechanisms.","current_call_robust_to":["Excluding statements, exercises without after-action evidence, membership totals, and institution charts from decisive activation evidence.","Treating AIIB and World Bank output as multilateral institutional action rather than unilateral PRC or U.S. action.","Counting the SCO's September 2025 declaration as successful formal repair rather than persistent paralysis."],"current_call_not_robust_to":["A rule that prohibits any system-level position until institutions with identical mandates and threat environments can be matched.","Undisclosed bilateral or party-state activation evidence that materially changes the observed PRC-centered event portfolio.","A larger representative sample showing NATO's 2022 speed is an outlier rather than repeatable capability."]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"NATO demonstrated real-event activation, but the absence of a positive regionally matched PRC-centered comparator keeps confidence low."},{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"SCO evidence includes coordination, failure, and repair, but U.S.-anchored regional arrangements have not yet been tested on equivalent triggers and functions."},{"slice":"Global / multilateral","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The matched multilateral-development-bank crisis sample shows material activation by both institutional families."}],"issue_slices":[{"slice":"Security and access","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"NATO supplies observed crisis authorization, delegation, deployment, exercises, and standing command integration; the available PRC-centered security cases show narrower coordination and greater consensus constraints."},{"slice":"Development and public goods","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"World Bank and AIIB pandemic facilities both activated quickly enough to produce material portfolios, with no common mandate-adjusted speed or participation denominator that separates them decisively."},{"slice":"Global governance and rules","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"Statements, votes, and summit output do not yet provide a common trigger-to-executable-action sample."}],"source_ids":["DC-S27","DC-S48","DC-S73","DC-S74","DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77","DC-S78","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S81","DC-S82","DC-S83","DC-S84","DC-S85","DC-S86","DC-S90","DC-S129","DC-S130"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M21","DC-M22"],"case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C02","DC-C12","DC-C13","DC-C18"],"observation_ids":["DC-AD001","DC-AD002","DC-AD003","DC-AD004","DC-AD005","DC-AD006","DC-AD007","DC-AD008","DC-AD009","DC-AD020"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d06","institutional_family":["Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","Associated Press","Coalition of the Willing co-chairs","Foreign Policy Research Institute","Government of India Ministry of Defence","Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","North Atlantic Treaty Organization","Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","Swedish Institute of International Affairs","United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and Multinational Force Ukraine","World Bank Group","World Health Organization"]},{"id":"DC-D07","number":7,"slug":"coalition-delivery","title":"Coalition delivery","position":"U.S. / partner edge","position_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_position":75,"tone":"partner","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Low","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Low","comparative_observability":"limited","evidence_role":"comparative_mechanism","comparative_mechanism":"Broader independently observed high-cost critical-role delivery, bounded by burden concentration, Afghanistan, AIIB, and selected BRICS implementation.","decision_rule":"Assigned critical roles and outputs must be delivered within the relevant window and to a usable standard. Pledges, approved finance, gross spending, activity, and equal burden shares are not delivery outcomes; partner output is credited to the partner or institution unless a coalition mechanism is observed.","judgment":"The U.S./partner system receives a provisional edge because it shows a broader independently observed record of consequential, high-cost delivery and repair: NATO moved from authorization to deployed force, the World Bank scaled a rapid pandemic portfolio subject to independent evaluation, G7 members implemented a substantial selected commitment set, and European partners replaced much of the 2025 U.S. Ukraine-aid withdrawal. It is not a lead. AIIB produced a large and partly completed COVID-19 portfolio, the state-affiliated BRICS study reports implementation comparable in headline rate to the G7 sample, burden sharing inside the U.S./partner system is highly uneven, and many delivery totals lack common acceptance and outcome standards. The call rests on breadth and critical-role evidence, not on lower PRC-centered observability.","decisive_reason":"Broader independently observed high-cost critical-role delivery, bounded by burden concentration, Afghanistan, AIIB, and selected BRICS implementation.","findings":[{"label":"ukraine_aid_delivery","finding":"U.S. / partner edge","basis":"A standing alliance moved authorized forces within days, and a 41-donor tracker shows sustained, adaptable partner delivery to Ukraine. European allocations rose sharply when new U.S. aid nearly stopped in 2025, preserving much of the aggregate flow.","limitation":"The current package lacks a matched PRC-centered high-cost security-assistance campaign with common roles and stakes. Threat exposure and national policy explain much of European action."},{"label":"pandemic_mdb_delivery","finding":"Contested","basis":"Both the World Bank and AIIB moved from crisis facilities into material multi-country portfolios. Independent World Bank oversight supplies stronger quality evidence; AIIB's internal closeout reports substantial completion in the reviewed subset.","limitation":"Scale, age, borrower mix, co-financing, instruments, completion coverage, and review independence differ. Neither institution's output can be assigned wholesale to Washington or Beijing."},{"label":"selected_commitment_compliance","finding":"Contested","basis":"The selected G7 and BRICS portfolios both report substantial implementation, at 80 and 83 percent respectively, but neither is a complete commitment universe or an accepted-output measure.","limitation":"Samples, years, commitments, coding, provenance, and attribution differ. The BRICS report is state-affiliated and internally inconsistent about the number of selected commitments; the G7 sample covers only 20 of 148 commitments."},{"label":"burden_and_repair","finding":"Mixed U.S./partner resilience","basis":"European partners materially adapted after U.S. retrenchment, but replacement was incomplete and delivery remained heavily concentrated among northern European donors.","limitation":"GDP share is not an obligation denominator, and aggregate aid values do not reveal every critical-role or quality shortfall."}],"counterevidence":["AIIB approved 68 COVID-19 operations totaling $18.48 billion across 26 members, and its internal review reported strong completion among the 11 projects with completion notes.","The RANEPA BRICS report records an 83 percent average selected-commitment compliance rate, slightly above the non-equivalent G7 sample's 80 percent headline rate.","The United States scored below the G7 average in the selected 2025 portfolio, so autonomous partner implementation is not evidence of unilateral U.S. delivery.","European Ukraine support in 2025 did not fully replace every U.S. shortfall, and contributions were highly concentrated among northern European donors.","NATO's Afghanistan endgame shows that sustained inputs and activation can coexist with failed consultation, coordination, bargaining, and durable effect."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner lead","explanation":"AIIB and BRICS evidence refutes an empty-delivery thesis, U.S./partner burden sharing is uneven, and common accepted-output, critical-role, and outcome denominators remain incomplete."},{"label":"Why not contested","explanation":"Even after crediting AIIB and BRICS implementation, the U.S./partner portfolio contains a wider independently observed range of high-cost, time-sensitive, and critical-role delivery plus demonstrated partner substitution under stress."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge or lead","explanation":"The positive AIIB and BRICS cases do not yet form a comparably broad, independently verified portfolio of critical-role delivery across security, public goods, and economic coordination."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Strong. Threat and national interests explain much of Ukraine delivery and burden variation; institutional machinery receives credit only where coordination, substitution, or a common vehicle is observed."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Strong. Wealth, inventories, military capacity, and development-bank capital enable outputs. The category records political conversion and coalition role completion rather than re-crediting material capacity."},{"id":"DC-A03","assessment":"Strong. Disclosure asymmetry favors Western-system observation. The ruling therefore credits positive AIIB completion evidence and does not convert missing PRC-centered data into a deficit."},{"id":"DC-A04","assessment":"Material. World Bank age and scale explain part of its portfolio advantage, while AIIB's younger age and co-financing model complicate causal attribution."}],"sensitivity":{"down_to_contested":"Move to Contested if independent project and obligation ledgers show AIIB, BRICS, SCO, or FOCAC matching U.S./partner breadth and critical-role completion, if a common-output reanalysis removes the Ukraine and World Bank advantages, or if partner substitution proves episodic rather than repeatable.","up_to_us_partner_lead":"A lead requires repeated accepted-output and critical-role completion across a predeclared portfolio, balanced burden or reliable substitutes, and no material PRC-centered portfolio approaching the same breadth after disclosure adjustment.","to_prc_centered_edge":"A PRC-centered edge requires independently verified, mandate-adjusted delivery across multiple institutional families, including critical roles, timeliness, quality, repair, and participant retention, not approvals or selected compliance alone.","current_call_robust_to":["Crediting AIIB's reported reviewed-project completion and BRICS selected-commitment implementation as genuine positive counterevidence.","Removing headline pledges, raw finance, membership counts, and unaccepted commitments from decisive evidence.","Crediting European 2025 Ukraine aid to participating partners rather than automatically to the United States."],"current_call_not_robust_to":["A rule requiring identical mandates and outputs across every matched case before any portfolio-level position.","New independent PRC-centered completion data that closes the current breadth and critical-role gap.","Evidence that tracked allocations systematically overstate timely, usable delivery or that institutional coordination did not contribute to partner substitution."]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"NATO activation and Ukraine support provide high-stakes delivery evidence, while burden concentration and U.S. retrenchment prevent a lead."},{"slice":"Global / multilateral","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The matched G7-BRICS and World Bank-AIIB portfolios produce positive evidence for both institutional families under incompatible denominators."},{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"AIIB and SCO evidence is not yet matched to U.S./partner regional delivery on common roles, outputs, and acceptance standards."},{"slice":"Africa","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"FOCAC delivery requires an African partner-side obligation and completion ledger before a regional position."}],"issue_slices":[{"slice":"Security and access","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"Observed force deployment, sustained multi-donor support, partner substitution, and standing logistics support a narrow edge, with uneven burden and unresolved outcome attribution."},{"slice":"Development and public goods","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"World Bank and AIIB pandemic portfolios both show material crisis delivery; evidence quality and portfolio structure differ too much for a clean edge."},{"slice":"Economic coordination","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"Selected G7 and BRICS implementation results are both positive but non-equivalent and cannot establish full-portfolio delivery."}],"source_ids":["DC-S48","DC-S50","DC-S67","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S85","DC-S86","DC-S87","DC-S88","DC-S89","DC-S90","DC-S91","DC-S92","DC-S93","DC-S94","DC-S95","DC-S128"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24","DC-M25"],"case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C02","DC-C07","DC-C11","DC-C13","DC-C18"],"observation_ids":["DC-AD003","DC-AD004","DC-AD010","DC-AD011","DC-AD012","DC-AD013","DC-AD014","DC-AD015","DC-AD016","DC-AD017","DC-AD018","DC-AD019","DC-AD021"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d07","institutional_family":["AIIB CEIU","Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","Kiel Institute for the World Economy","NATO","North Atlantic Treaty Organization","RANEPA Center for International Institutions Research","University of Toronto G7 Research Group","World Bank Group","World Bank Independent Evaluation Group","World Health Organization"]},{"id":"DC-D08","number":8,"slug":"institutional-leadership","title":"Institutional leadership","position":"U.S. / partner edge","position_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_position":75,"tone":"partner","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Moderate","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Moderate","comparative_observability":"partial","evidence_role":"comparative_mechanism","comparative_mechanism":"Deeper recurring implementation and oversight in Western institutions, sharply narrowed by current U.S. stewardship failures and real PRC-centered institution building.","decision_rule":"Leadership requires agenda support, rule or program adoption, implementation, stewardship, and enough legitimacy to attract and retain participants. Founding status, voting shares, membership, finance, declarations, and vote alignment are inputs unless they convert further.","judgment":"The U.S.-anchored system retains an edge because NATO, the G7, the OECD, and the World Bank demonstrate deeper and more routinely monitored conversion from collective decisions into implementation than the available BRICS, SCO, FOCAC, and AIIB portfolio. It is not a lead: current U.S. arrears, lower-than-group G7 compliance, WTO Appellate Body obstruction, and withdrawals from WHO, the Paris Agreement, and other bodies materially weaken stewardship; PRC-centered institutions also show real attraction, financing, oversight, and partial implementation. The finding credits participating partners separately and does not treat institutional output as unilateral U.S. or PRC output.","decisive_reason":"Deeper recurring implementation and oversight in Western institutions, sharply narrowed by current U.S. stewardship failures and real PRC-centered institution building.","findings":[{"label":"U.S.-anchored Western institutions","finding":"Execution depth favors the U.S./partner system; current U.S. stewardship within that system is mixed.","basis":"The United States scored below the G7 average in the 2025 selected-commitment portfolio, and institutional performance often reflects autonomous partner action rather than U.S. leadership.","limitation":"The United States scored below the G7 average in the 2025 selected-commitment portfolio, and institutional performance often reflects autonomous partner action rather than U.S. leadership."},{"label":"Universal institutions","finding":"Contested by function: PRC-position coalition alignment is broader in the recent UN General Assembly vote universe, while both powers remain indispensable funders and selective obstructers; current U.S. stewardship has sharper documented discontinuities.","basis":"The United States still joins very large issue-specific coalitions on selected nonproliferation and space resolutions; both principals carry UN arrears and use veto power; WTO dispute activity continues despite the Appellate Body impasse.","limitation":"The United States still joins very large issue-specific coalitions on selected nonproliferation and space resolutions; both principals carry UN arrears and use veto power; WTO dispute activity continues despite the Appellate Body impasse."},{"label":"PRC-centered and alternative institutions","finding":"PRC-centered edge in institution formation and agenda reach; implementation is real but uneven and less independently observed.","basis":"BRICS commitment coding covers a small selected subset and is partly state-affiliated; AIIB is multilateralized; SCO initiatives reveal Russian and Indian constraints; FOCAC lacks a complete independent obligation-to-delivery ledger.","limitation":"BRICS commitment coding covers a small selected subset and is partly state-affiliated; AIIB is multilateralized; SCO initiatives reveal Russian and Indian constraints; FOCAC lacks a complete independent obligation-to-delivery ledger."}],"counterevidence":["The U.S. position was the larger coalition in major UN votes on nonproliferation, fissile-material negotiations, and responsible space behavior.","The G7's selected 2025 commitments averaged 80 percent compliance even though the United States scored 73 percent, showing autonomous partner-system resilience.","AIIB has broad membership, large commitments, Board-reporting oversight, and published project learning, refuting an empty-institution thesis.","BRICS compliance research reports material implementation, but its selection and institutional provenance limit the strength of the inference.","Both the United States and China carried substantial UN arrears at the April 2026 cutoff and both have recently used Security Council vetoes.","SCO expansion coexists with competing leadership and blocked PRC initiatives, while its narrow mandate may make alliance-style tests inappropriate."],"why_not":[{"label":"U.s. / partner lead","explanation":"Rejected because current U.S. behavior weakens institutions it helped build, the PRC position aligns with much broader UN General Assembly coalitions on many recorded votes, and AIIB plus expanded BRICS demonstrate material alternative institution-building capacity."},{"label":"Contested","explanation":"Rejected for the global category because the Western basket still shows a broader set of mature, repeatable implementation, peer-review, evaluation, and political-to-operational mechanisms across consequential institutions. The PRC-centered basket has not yet matched that full-chain depth with comparably independent evidence."},{"label":"Prc-centered edge","explanation":"Rejected because vote convergence and membership growth do not establish PRC sponsorship or implementation, BRICS delivery evidence is selectively coded and partly state-affiliated, SCO leadership is shared and contested, and AIIB is a professional multilateral institution whose output cannot be assigned wholesale to Beijing."},{"label":"U.s. / partner lead recovery gate","explanation":"Would require material repair of current stewardship failures and sustained implementation, not simply greater inherited institutional scale."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Material. Threat and interest alignment explains part of NATO and UN vote behavior; it does not erase the institutional conversion machinery but reduces causal credit to either leading state."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Material. Wealth, military protection, market access, and finance enable institutional output; only the political conversion mechanism is credited here."},{"id":"DC-A03","assessment":"Strong in the BRICS, SCO, and AIIB basket. Multi-membership and hedging make attraction different from alignment."},{"id":"DC-A04","assessment":"Strong. Institutional age and mandate explain substantial Western execution depth, which is why the position is an edge with moderate confidence rather than a lead."},{"id":"DC-A05","assessment":"Material. U.S. administration change explains current stewardship discontinuity and must remain distinct from the durability of partner institutions."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Strong. Western institutions disclose more failures and independent evaluations; PRC-centered evidence relies more heavily on official and state-affiliated sources, limiting symmetric confidence."}],"sensitivity":{"down_to_contested":"The global call falls to Contested if U.S. withdrawals, arrears, and WTO paralysis persist through the next annual checkpoint while PRC-centered institutions show independently verified implementation and retention across at least two distinct institutional families, or if matched attribution removes most Western-system credit.","up_to_us_partner_lead":"A lead requires sustained NATO and G7 conversion plus material U.S. repair of UN funding and WTO adjudication and reengagement or durable substitution for major withdrawals, while PRC-centered portfolios continue to lack independently verified delivery.","to_prc_centered_edge":"A PRC edge requires more than UN vote convergence: predeclared proposal sponsorship, independently verified BRICS, SCO, FOCAC, and AIIB implementation, participant retention under stress, and evidence that current Western institutional failures reduce delivered outcomes.","current_call_robust_to":["Removing raw membership, voting-power, post-count, meeting-count, and finance-size inputs from the decisive evidence.","Treating all 2025-2026 U.S. withdrawals as one correlated policy shock rather than independent observations.","Treating the RANEPA BRICS report as state-affiliated evidence and excluding it from independent corroboration.","Crediting AIIB and World Bank outputs to the institutions and participating members rather than wholesale to Beijing or Washington."],"current_call_not_robust_to":["A decision rule that values current stewardship over inherited implementation depth as the sole decisive function.","New matched evidence showing the apparent Western implementation advantage is mainly institutional age, mandate, or case selection rather than repeatable system capability.","Independent obligation-level evidence showing PRC-centered delivery and repair equal to or greater than the Western portfolio."]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"NATO provides strong positive evidence, but the current register lacks a matched positive PRC-centered regional comparator; absence of an equivalent organization cannot alone establish a comparative lead."},{"slice":"Global / multilateral","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"moderate","basis":"Western institutions retain deeper implementation, while PRC-position UN coalition alignment, alternative-institution growth, and current U.S. stewardship failures prevent a system lead."},{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"AIIB and SCO evidence is not yet matched against U.S.-anchored regional institutions and partner implementation on the same functions."},{"slice":"Africa","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"FOCAC partner-side follow-up lacks a matched U.S./partner institutional portfolio and verified obligation-level delivery."},{"slice":"Middle East","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"Institutional memberships and recent Security Council votes do not yet provide matched implementation and stewardship cases."},{"slice":"Latin America and the Caribbean","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"UN vote alignment and BRICS participation are inputs without a matched regional institution-to-outcome portfolio."}],"issue_slices":[{"slice":"Security and access institutions","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"NATO combines durable political authority, consensus procedures, standing implementation machinery, and observed burden adaptation; the SCO shows real security coordination but less observed full-chain conversion. Mandate and threat differences prevent a lead finding.","sensitivity":"Returns to Insufficient comparative basis if national caveats and delayed implementation prevent the 2025 commitment from converting or if the NATO-SCO mandate gap defeats the comparison; moves higher only after matched activation and delivery cases."},{"slice":"Universal coalition alignment","position":"PRC-centered edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"On 375 opposite U.S.-PRC yes/no votes in 2021-2025, the PRC position had the larger other-member coalition on 331 resolutions; issue-specific U.S. majorities and attribution limits prevent a lead finding.","sensitivity":"Returns to Contested if predeclared issue weights, sponsorship records, and bloc controls show the aggregate is driven mainly by repeated low-consequence resolutions or independent preferences rather than PRC coalition capacity."},{"slice":"Economic rules and implementation","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"OECD peer review and World Bank evaluation demonstrate mature implementation depth, while AIIB demonstrates credible but younger delivery and oversight; WTO paralysis sharply narrows the Western-system advantage.","sensitivity":"Returns to Contested if AIIB completion evidence and other PRC-centered rule implementation match mature-bank cohorts, or if WTO adjudication remains unrepaired while alternative mechanisms deepen."},{"slice":"Development and public goods","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","comparative_confidence":"not_assessed","basis":"World Bank and AIIB evidence is not yet matched for mandate, age, borrower mix, commitment, disbursement, completion, independent outcome, safeguard performance, and additionality.","sensitivity":"Score only after the predeclared World Bank-AIIB project cohorts and FOCAC delivery ledger are complete."},{"slice":"Current institutional stewardship","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"The United States shows consequential withdrawal, arrears, and adjudication obstruction; China also carries arrears, selectively resists rules and scrutiny, and has not demonstrated superior repair across universal institutions.","sensitivity":"Moves toward either system only with a common obligation, payment, compliance, repair, and retention profile across the same institutions and periods."}],"source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S20","DC-S22","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S26","DC-S27","DC-S28","DC-S29","DC-S31","DC-S32","DC-S49","DC-S50","DC-S51","DC-S52","DC-S53","DC-S54","DC-S55","DC-S56","DC-S57","DC-S58","DC-S59","DC-S60","DC-S61","DC-S62","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S66","DC-S67","DC-S68","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71","DC-S72","DC-S73","DC-S74","DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M27","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C07","DC-C08","DC-C10","DC-C11","DC-C12","DC-C13","DC-C15","DC-C16","DC-C17","DC-C18"],"observation_ids":["DC-O001","DC-O002","DC-O003","DC-O004","DC-O005","DC-O006","DC-O007","DC-O008","DC-O009","DC-O010","DC-O011","DC-O012","DC-O013","DC-O014","DC-O015","DC-O016","DC-O017","DC-O018","DC-O019","DC-O020","DC-O021","DC-O022","DC-O023","DC-O024","DC-O025","DC-O026","DC-O027","DC-O028","DC-O029","DC-O030","DC-O031","DC-O032","DC-O033","DC-O034","DC-O035","DC-O036","DC-O037","DC-O038"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d08","institutional_family":["AIIB CEIU","African Union Commission","Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","BRICS Presidency","Executive Office of the President","Government of India Ministry of Defence","Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","NATO","North Atlantic Treaty Organization","OECD","OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS","RANEPA Center for International Institutions Research","Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","Swedish Institute of International Affairs","U.S. Trade Representative","UNFCCC","United Nations","University of Toronto BRICS Research Group","University of Toronto G7 Research Group","World Bank Group","World Bank Group Development Committee","World Bank Group Independent Evaluation Group","World Health Organization","World Trade Organization"]},{"id":"DC-D09","number":9,"slug":"bargaining-outcomes","title":"Bargaining outcomes","position":null,"position_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","axis_label":"Insufficient comparative basis","axis_position":null,"tone":"unscored","is_scored":false,"confidence":"Not assessed","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Not assessed","comparative_observability":"limited","evidence_role":"split_or_inconclusive","comparative_mechanism":"","decision_rule":"A bargaining case requires objectives documented before the outcome, a defined baseline and endpoint, demand-level concessions, counterpart compliance at 12 and 24 months, a plausible coalition counterfactual, and explicit tests of force, finance, threat, and domestic-politics alternatives.","judgment":"Insufficient comparative basis is the completed judgment. Both systems have real positive cases and serious failures: the U.S.-anchored P5+1 obtained initial verified JCPOA implementation before U.S. withdrawal; Beijing facilitated Saudi-Iran diplomatic restoration after earlier Iraqi and Omani work; the Gulf coalition achieved Kuwait's liberation; the Defeat ISIS coalition ended territorial control; and Afghanistan failed to produce a durable political settlement. These cases do not form a valid comparative portfolio. Objectives, opponents, instruments, issue stakes, compliance windows, and coalition counterfactuals differ, and military or economic power often supplies the proximate causal mechanism. Calling the category Contested would manufacture a tie from incomparable evidence.","decisive_reason":"Real successes and failures exist on both sides, but no matched portfolio controls objectives, opponents, leverage, compliance windows, and coalition counterfactuals.","findings":[{"label":"JCPOA","finding":"Initial U.S.-anchored multilateral bargaining success followed by U.S. durability failure","basis":"Positive and negative calibration; not a unilateral U.S. or PRC case because China and European states participated.","limitation":""},{"label":"Saudi-Iran restoration","finding":"Bounded PRC facilitation success","basis":"Positive PRC evidence; prior Iraqi and Omani talks and bilateral incentives prevent strong causal or coalition attribution.","limitation":""},{"label":"1990-1991 Gulf coalition","finding":"Bounded objective achieved","basis":"Cross-domain calibration; overwhelming military force prevents a diplomatic-system inference.","limitation":""},{"label":"Defeat ISIS","finding":"Territorial objective achieved, enduring objective incomplete","basis":"Shows that formation and delivery can coexist with an unsettled final outcome.","limitation":""},{"label":"Afghanistan","finding":"Durable political outcome failed","basis":"Major U.S./partner negative case with powerful local, military, and bilateral rival causes.","limitation":""}],"counterevidence":["The P5+1 and IAEA record demonstrates that a coalition can obtain and verify a complex negotiated objective.","Saudi-Iran embassy restoration demonstrates a concrete PRC-facilitated diplomatic result.","Afghanistan and the later JCPOA trajectory demonstrate that initial agreement or enormous coalition effort does not guarantee durable effect.","Gulf and ISIS cases demonstrate outcomes but rely principally on military and economic mechanisms outside this domain."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not contested","explanation":"Contested requires positive evidence for both systems under a common rule; this portfolio contains unlike cases, not a matched tie."},{"label":"Why not us partner edge or lead","explanation":"U.S. cases combine genuine successes with self-inflicted durability failure and major cross-domain confounding, without a matched PRC case set."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge or lead","explanation":"Saudi-Iran restoration is important but is one bounded mediation case, not evidence of superior coalition bargaining across issues."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Decisive. Opponent and partner interests often explain agreement or defection."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Decisive. Sanctions, force, market access, and security guarantees frequently dominate bargaining leverage."},{"id":"DC-A05","assessment":"Strong. Government change altered JCPOA durability and many counterpart compliance choices."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Strong. Private demands, side payments, abandoned objectives, and failed initiatives are systematically underobserved."}],"sensitivity":{"minimum_portfolio":"At least three predeclared matched pairs in two issue families, with one success and one failure eligible on each side.","required_fields":["ex ante objectives","baseline","final terms","decisive concessions","12- and 24-month compliance","coalition-only mechanism","rival explanations","sender and partner costs"],"current_shortfall":"No matched pair satisfies all required fields; public and private objectives plus counterfactuals remain incomplete."},"regional_slices":[],"issue_slices":[],"source_ids":["DC-S21","DC-S44","DC-S45","DC-S46","DC-S47","DC-S48","DC-S58","DC-S118","DC-S119","DC-S120"],"metric_ids":["DC-M30","DC-M31","DC-M32"],"case_ids":["DC-C02","DC-C05","DC-C06","DC-C17","DC-C21","DC-C22"],"observation_ids":["DC-CO037","DC-CO038","DC-CO039","DC-CO040","DC-CO041","DC-CO042"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d09","institutional_family":["Associated Press","International Atomic Energy Agency","North Atlantic Treaty Organization","P5+1 and European Union","U.S. Department of State","U.S. and Iraqi governments","United Nations"]},{"id":"DC-D10","number":10,"slug":"coalition-durability","title":"Coalition durability","position":"U.S. / partner edge","position_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_label":"U.S. / partner edge","axis_position":75,"tone":"partner","is_scored":true,"confidence":"Low","fact_confidence":"High","comparative_confidence":"Low","comparative_observability":"limited","evidence_role":"comparative_mechanism","comparative_mechanism":"Deeper observed costly-role persistence, adaptation, and repair; PRC forum expansion and current U.S. discontinuity make the edge narrow.","decision_rule":"Durability requires continued material participation and role delivery after 12 and 24 months, government change, cost, coercion, threat, or an internal dispute. Longevity on paper, repeated summits, membership without roles, and rhetoric without implementation do not decide the category.","judgment":"The U.S./partner system has a low-confidence durability edge. Its core alliances have survived decades of government turnover, adapted after strategic shocks, retained or added capable members, and repeatedly repaired internal disputes while continuing costly role delivery. PRC-centered forums are also durable: BRICS has expanded despite member disputes, FOCAC has persisted for twenty-five years, and the SCO has repaired consensus failures. What separates the systems is the depth of observed costly-role persistence and substitution, not mere institutional age. The edge is sharply narrowed by current U.S. withdrawals and aid disruption, transatlantic political strain, host-access reversals, and the fact that shared threat and autonomous partner action explain much U.S.-system resilience.","decisive_reason":"Deeper observed costly-role persistence, adaptation, and repair; PRC forum expansion and current U.S. discontinuity make the edge narrow.","findings":[{"label":"Institutional retention and expansion","finding":"Contested","basis":"NATO, BRICS, SCO, and FOCAC all show long-lived retention and adaptation; membership alone cannot rank them.","limitation":""},{"label":"Costly-role persistence under shock","finding":"U.S. / partner edge","basis":"NATO and Ukraine-support partners sustained and partly substituted high-cost roles after invasion and U.S. withdrawal; comparable PRC-centered role-level stress data are thinner.","limitation":""},{"label":"Government-change continuity","finding":"Contested","basis":"The U.S.-Philippines alliance repaired after Duterte, but 2025-2026 U.S. policy discontinuities are severe; PRC central continuity is higher but partner-government and treaty-performance samples are sparse.","limitation":""}],"counterevidence":["BRICS retained members through major disputes and expanded to a larger member and partner network.","FOCAC has sustained a regular China-Africa architecture for twenty-five years.","The SCO repaired a public consensus failure rather than fracturing.","U.S. withdrawals, aid disruption, host revocations, and transatlantic uncertainty show substantial current fragility.","European substitution for U.S. Ukraine support demonstrates partner-system durability but cannot be credited automatically to Washington."],"why_not":[{"label":"Why not us partner lead","explanation":"Current U.S. government-change discontinuity, host revocations, burden concentration, and partner-led substitution are too material; PRC-centered institutions show genuine expansion and persistence."},{"label":"Why not contested","explanation":"U.S.-anchored alliances have a broader positive record of continued costly-role delivery, adaptation, and repair under severe shocks, not merely older charters or more members."},{"label":"Why not prc centered edge or lead","explanation":"BRICS, FOCAC, and SCO longevity and expansion are strong, but public evidence of persistent costly-role fulfillment and substitution under pressure is thinner and often declaratory."}],"rival_explanations":[{"id":"DC-A01","assessment":"Strong. Russian and Chinese pressure and local security interests explain much allied persistence."},{"id":"DC-A02","assessment":"Strong. U.S. and European material power makes role substitution possible; finance and trade sustain PRC forums."},{"id":"DC-A03","assessment":"Strong. BRICS and SCO retention may reflect low exit costs and hedging rather than cohesive alignment."},{"id":"DC-A04","assessment":"Strong. NATO's age, mandate, and standing machinery make it unlike younger and looser forums."},{"id":"DC-A05","assessment":"Decisive for current confidence. Elections and coups explain U.S. continuity shocks and host-access changes."},{"id":"DC-A06","assessment":"Material. Open systems disclose dispute and shortfall data more fully than PRC-centered institutions."}],"sensitivity":{"down_to_contested":"Move to Contested if current U.S. discontinuities reduce core allied role delivery or if PRC-centered institutions document comparable costly-role retention and repair across multiple shocks.","up_to_us_partner_lead":"A lead requires sustained U.S. continuity plus representative role-level 12- and 24-month evidence across regions and issues, with reduced single-provider dependence.","to_prc_centered_edge":"Requires PRC-centered coalitions to retain and replace costly roles through leadership turnover, coercion, and member disputes at higher rates under common denominators.","current_call_robust_to":["Crediting European substitution to partners rather than the United States","Treating BRICS and FOCAC longevity as strong positive evidence","Counting 2025-2026 U.S. withdrawals as a decisive countercase"],"current_call_not_robust_to":["A major NATO or Indo-Pacific alliance defection","Independent PRC-centered role-level durability data","A methodology that treats membership retention as equivalent to material role retention"]},"regional_slices":[{"slice":"Euro-Atlantic","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"moderate","basis":"NATO retained and added members, adapted plans and investments, and sustained partner delivery after a major war shock, while current U.S. policy reduces confidence."},{"slice":"Indo-Pacific","position":"U.S. / partner edge","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"Long-lived U.S. alliances and the Philippines repair case show persistence; SCO and PRC relationships are durable but less observed in costly common roles."},{"slice":"Africa","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"FOCAC shows twenty-five years of institutional continuity, while U.S. and partner arrangements combine durable ties with recent aid and access discontinuity."},{"slice":"Global / multilateral","position":"Contested","comparative_confidence":"low","basis":"Western institutions show deeper monitored role continuation; BRICS expansion and forum retention provide strong PRC-centered counterevidence."}],"issue_slices":[],"source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S27","DC-S43","DC-S56","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S72","DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77","DC-S83","DC-S84","DC-S93","DC-S94","DC-S95","DC-S106","DC-S111","DC-S113","DC-S117","DC-S121","DC-S122","DC-S125","DC-S128","DC-S129","DC-S130","DC-S131"],"metric_ids":["DC-M12","DC-M33","DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C03","DC-C10","DC-C12","DC-C15","DC-C25"],"observation_ids":["DC-CO043","DC-CO044","DC-CO045","DC-CO046","DC-CO047","DC-CO048","DC-CO049","DC-CO050","DC-CO051","DC-CO052","DC-CO053"],"page_url":"/diplomacy-coalitions#dc-d10","institutional_family":["African Union Commission","Associated Press","BRICS Presidency","Carnegie Endowment for International Peace","Coalition of the Willing co-chairs","Congressional Research Service","Executive Office of the President","Government of India Ministry of Defence","Inclusive Society Institute and Zhejiang Normal University","Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","Kiel Institute for the World Economy","NATO","PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FOCAC","Philippine defense and national-security authorities","Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","South African Institute of International Affairs","Swedish Institute of International Affairs","U.S. executive branch","U.S.-Philippines alliance","UNFCCC","United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and Multinational Force Ukraine","United Nations","World Health Organization"]}],"case_portfolio":[{"case_id":"DC-C01","title":"NATO response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","period":"2022-present","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with European and other partners","region":["Euro-Atlantic"],"issue":["Security and access","Economic coordination","Global governance and rules"],"formality":"formal_alliance_plus_ad_hoc_formats","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","activated","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_us_candidate","selection_reason":"Tests whether a standing alliance and adjacent contact groups convert political alignment into sustained, differentiated roles under a live adversarial shock.","strongest_counterclaim":"High participation and delivery may be explained chiefly by direct European threat perception rather than U.S. diplomatic or institutional capability; bargaining outcomes remain unresolved.","source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S78","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S93","DC-S94","DC-S95"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C10","DC-C16"],"evidence_gaps":"Add national caveat and acceptance records, role-level delivery data, partner interviews, outcome definitions, and non-NATO counterfactuals."},{"case_id":"DC-C02","title":"NATO and partner engagement in Afghanistan","period":"2001-2021","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with NATO and non-NATO partners","region":["Global / multilateral","Middle East"],"issue":["Security and access","Crisis response"],"formality":"formal_alliance_plus_mission_coalition","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","access_usable","activated","delivered","bargaining_outcome","durable_effect"],"case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"A very broad and long-running coalition tests whether activation and large delivery totals produced the declared political and durability effects.","strongest_counterclaim":"Failure of the Afghan political settlement and forces does not by itself show coalition machinery failed at every assigned task, and the outcome also reflects military strategy and domestic Afghan factors outside this domain.","source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S47","DC-S48"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C05","DC-C06"],"evidence_gaps":"Add independent mission evaluations, national caveat and contribution data, original objectives by phase, Afghan sources, bargaining records, and post-2021 durability evidence."},{"case_id":"DC-C03","title":"U.S.-Philippines alliance and EDCA access conversion","period":"2014-present; emphasis 2023-present","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored bilateral alliance with regional partners","region":["Indo-Pacific"],"issue":["Security and access","Crisis response"],"formality":"formal_bilateral_alliance_and_access_agreement","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","access_usable","exercised_or_tested","activated","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"unresolved_current_case","selection_reason":"Directly tests the difference between alliance language, named access sites, host permission, exercised usability, activation speed, and resilience under Philippine political change.","strongest_counterclaim":"Expanded access may remain politically conditional, geographically vulnerable, or useful only in scenarios short of the assumed crisis.","source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S16","DC-S37"],"evidence_gaps":"Add Philippine legal and budget records, site-by-site readiness, exercise scale, crisis authorities, local opposition, logistics capacity, and matched PRC access evidence.","matched_case_ids":[]},{"case_id":"DC-C04","title":"U.S.-ROK regional cooperation framework","period":"2024-present","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored bilateral alliance with prospective regional partners","region":["Indo-Pacific"],"issue":["Security and access","Development and public goods","Crisis response"],"formality":"formal_bilateral_framework","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","exercised_or_tested","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"unresolved_current_case","selection_reason":"Tests whether a mature bilateral alliance can create usable third-country public-goods and security roles beyond its original geographic mission.","strongest_counterclaim":"The framework may be an agenda document with few additional resources, low recipient demand, or projects that would have occurred bilaterally anyway.","source_ids":["DC-S38"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C15"],"evidence_gaps":"Add annual project lists, resources, recipient consent, delivered outputs, independent evaluations, and evidence across a government-change checkpoint."},{"case_id":"DC-C05","title":"Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","period":"2014-present; Iraq transition emphasis 2024-2026","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored mission coalition","region":["Middle East","Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Crisis response","Security and access"],"formality":"ad_hoc_formal_coalition","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","access_usable","activated","delivered","bargaining_outcome","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_us_candidate","selection_reason":"Combines broad membership, specialized working groups, operational delivery, territorial change, and an explicit transition milestone suitable for conversion and durability testing.","strongest_counterclaim":"Territorial loss by ISIS depended heavily on local forces and combat power; continued ISIS activity, civilian costs, and uneven burden sharing may weaken diplomatic attribution and durability claims.","source_ids":["DC-S45","DC-S46"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C02","DC-C06"],"evidence_gaps":"Add coalition role and contribution data, independent territorial and governance evidence, Iraqi and Syrian partner perspectives, implementation of the 2025 transition, and a bounded political objective."},{"case_id":"DC-C06","title":"Coalition and UN authorization in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis","period":"1990-1991 with postwar durability checks","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored mission coalition","region":["Middle East","Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Security and access","Global governance and rules","Crisis response"],"formality":"un_authorized_ad_hoc_coalition","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","access_usable","activated","delivered","bargaining_outcome","durable_effect"],"case_role":"historical_calibration","selection_reason":"A bounded demand, recorded multilateral authorization, diverse coalition, assigned roles, and observable deadline make this a useful high-conversion calibration case.","strongest_counterclaim":"The case's unipolar context, military predominance, side payments, and unusual threat consensus limit comparison to current U.S.-PRC competition.","source_ids":["DC-S21","DC-S44"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C05","DC-C17"],"evidence_gaps":"Add coalition contribution records, Arab partner sources, bargaining chronology, burden and side-payment evidence, compliance measures, and a declared endpoint for durability."},{"case_id":"DC-C07","title":"G7 commitment implementation portfolio","period":"2018-present; rolling matched samples","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored Western institution with autonomous partners","region":["Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Economic coordination","Development and public goods","Global governance and rules"],"formality":"informal_institutional_club","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"matched_method_case","selection_reason":"Independent commitment-level compliance coding permits a portfolio rather than a celebrated-case test of implementation and burden distribution.","strongest_counterclaim":"G7 commitments differ in specificity and ambition, compliance coding may reward easy actions, and the United States cannot be credited for autonomous member delivery without mechanism evidence.","source_ids":["DC-S33","DC-S50"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C11","DC-C15"],"evidence_gaps":"Retrieve the full commitment-level sample, test selection sensitivity, distinguish collective from national implementation, and trace U.S. sponsorship and added value."},{"case_id":"DC-C08","title":"WTO Appellate Body impasse","period":"2016-present","anchor_system":"Universal institution; U.S. policy is a central causal claim","region":["Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Global governance and rules","Economic coordination"],"formality":"formal_universal_institution","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["commitment_documented","authorized","delivered","bargaining_outcome","durable_effect"],"case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Directly tests whether U.S. leadership in the liberal economic order includes maintaining, reforming, or disabling binding adjudication when Washington objects to institutional practice.","strongest_counterclaim":"U.S. objections may represent an effort to restore negotiated limits rather than abandonment of rules, while other members also failed to negotiate a durable reform.","source_ids":["DC-S32","DC-S59","DC-S60","DC-S61","DC-S62"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C13","DC-C18"],"evidence_gaps":"Add U.S., PRC, EU, and developing-country reform proposals; appointment chronology; dispute outcomes; alternative arrangements; and explicit criteria for legitimate reform versus obstruction."},{"case_id":"DC-C09","title":"YSEALI network and policy conversion","period":"2013-present","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored exchange and alumni network","region":["Indo-Pacific"],"issue":["Development and public goods","Global governance and rules"],"formality":"officially_sponsored_informal_network","primary_category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","coalition_formed","commitment_documented","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_us_candidate","selection_reason":"A long-running regional network with an available evaluation can test whether U.S. informal diplomacy yields reciprocal access, durable ties, and participant-led action rather than exposure alone.","strongest_counterclaim":"Participant selection, self-reporting, pro-U.S. affinity, and small grants may produce favorable narratives without consequential policy access or comparative advantage.","source_ids":["DC-S07","DC-S08","DC-S09","DC-S35"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C14"],"evidence_gaps":"Add alumni network mapping, matched nonparticipant outcomes, government and opposition access, consequential policy cases, attrition, cost, and comparison with PRC programs."},{"case_id":"DC-C10","title":"BRICS expansion and partner-country tier","period":"2023-present","anchor_system":"PRC-influenced but member-driven coalition","region":["Global / multilateral","Africa","Middle East","Latin America and the Caribbean","Indo-Pacific"],"issue":["Global governance and rules","Economic coordination","Development and public goods"],"formality":"informal_intergovernmental_grouping","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","activated","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_prc_candidate","selection_reason":"Tests PRC-associated coalition attraction among major Global South states while preserving the distinction between members, partners, issue alignment, and implementation.","strongest_counterclaim":"Expansion may reflect hedging, status seeking, or access to all members rather than alignment with China; consensus and internal rivalries may reduce executable action.","source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S26","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S66","DC-S67","DC-S68"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C16"],"evidence_gaps":"Add accession motives from each participant, attendance and opt-outs, decision records, contributions, implemented programs, bilateral disputes, and matched nonmembers."},{"case_id":"DC-C11","title":"BRICS Rio commitments and delivery","period":"2025-2027 milestones","anchor_system":"PRC-influenced but member-driven coalition","region":["Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Global governance and rules","Development and public goods","Economic coordination"],"formality":"informal_intergovernmental_grouping","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","activated","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"prc_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Following the 2025 declaration at instrument level tests whether agenda breadth and consensus can convert into funded, assigned, and implemented programs.","strongest_counterclaim":"Many BRICS commitments are deliberately political or coordinative rather than operational, so low measurable delivery could reflect inappropriate metric design rather than weak coalition capability.","source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S26","DC-S66","DC-S67","DC-S68"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C07","DC-C15"],"evidence_gaps":"Build the complete 250-commitment inventory, reconcile the report's seven-versus-eight selected-commitment inconsistency, identify owners and deadlines, and obtain independent and non-Chinese member verification."},{"case_id":"DC-C12","title":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation decision and implementation portfolio","period":"2002-present; rolling five-year emphasis","anchor_system":"PRC- and Russia-influenced regional institution","region":["Indo-Pacific"],"issue":["Security and access","Global governance and rules","Crisis response"],"formality":"formal_regional_organization","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","exercised_or_tested","activated","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"mixed_or_boundary_candidate","selection_reason":"Its chartered consensus rule, permanent organs, exercises, expansion, and heterogeneous membership test the difference between institutional breadth and coordinated implementation.","strongest_counterclaim":"SCO cooperation may be intentionally limited and sovereignty-protective; applying alliance-level activation expectations would misstate its goals and undercount quieter security coordination.","source_ids":["DC-S27","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S73","DC-S74","DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77","DC-S81","DC-S82","DC-S83","DC-S84"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C10"],"evidence_gaps":"Add Secretariat and RATS budgets and outputs, a broader predeclared crisis sample, exercise and national-participation records, member caveats, and Russian-versus-PRC attribution."},{"case_id":"DC-C13","title":"AIIB governance, participation, and project delivery","period":"2016-present","anchor_system":"PRC-initiated multilateral development bank with broad membership","region":["Global / multilateral","Indo-Pacific","Africa"],"issue":["Development and public goods","Global governance and rules"],"formality":"formal_multilateral_development_bank","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","activated","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_prc_candidate","selection_reason":"Provides observable membership, voting power, co-financing, project approvals, safeguards, and delivery through an institution created by China but joined by many U.S. partners.","strongest_counterclaim":"Broad membership and professionalized operations may show successful multilateralization rather than continuing PRC control; project delivery is economic output unless tied to coalition and institutional effects.","source_ids":["DC-S28","DC-S29","DC-S36","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71","DC-S90","DC-S91","DC-S92"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C08","DC-C18"],"evidence_gaps":"Expand project-level completion notes and independent evaluation, separate co-financing and disbursement, and add board votes, procurement, safeguard outcomes, member retention, and agenda sponsorship."},{"case_id":"DC-C14","title":"CPC party-to-party diplomacy network","period":"current network with trailing five-year cases","anchor_system":"PRC-centered party-state network","region":["Global / multilateral","Indo-Pacific","Africa","Latin America and the Caribbean"],"issue":["Global governance and rules","Development and public goods"],"formality":"party_to_party_hybrid_channel","primary_category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","coalition_formed","commitment_documented","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_prc_candidate","selection_reason":"Tests a centrally coordinated channel that reaches governing and opposition parties outside conventional foreign ministries and may shape elite access and agenda diffusion.","strongest_counterclaim":"The reported network total may count dormant or ceremonial contacts, and ideological exchanges may not generate reciprocal influence, policy change, public legitimacy, or durable alignment.","source_ids":["DC-S10","DC-S11","DC-S40"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C09"],"evidence_gaps":"Verify entity-level relationships, recency, reciprocity, governing status, partner accounts, policy conversion, leadership changes, and comparable U.S. plural-network data."},{"case_id":"DC-C15","title":"FOCAC Beijing Action Plan implementation","period":"2024-2027","anchor_system":"PRC-centered forum with African state participants","region":["Africa","Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Development and public goods","Global governance and rules","Security and access"],"formality":"formalized_regional_forum_with_hybrid_channels","primary_category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","activated","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"unresolved_current_case","selection_reason":"The action plan names financing intentions, sectoral measures, party and local channels, follow-up bodies, and reporting points suitable for commitment-to-delivery measurement.","strongest_counterclaim":"The plan is actor-authored, aggregates diverse African preferences, mixes grants, credit, investment, and aspirations, and may relabel bilateral activity rather than create coalition added value.","source_ids":["DC-S36","DC-S40","DC-S43","DC-S72"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C04","DC-C07","DC-C11"],"evidence_gaps":"Create obligation-level ledger; identify African co-authorship and demand; separate finance types; verify disbursement and completion; sample failures; and obtain African audit and public evidence."},{"case_id":"DC-C16","title":"UN General Assembly issue-coalition mobilization","period":"2014-present; predeclared issue portfolios","anchor_system":"Both systems and issue-specific coalitions","region":["Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Global governance and rules"],"formality":"formal_universal_institution","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","coalition_formed","commitment_documented","activated","durable_effect"],"case_role":"matched_method_case","selection_reason":"The official vote universe permits matched, reproducible tests of coalition breadth, abstention shifts, regional blocs, and persistence without relying on rhetorical claims.","strongest_counterclaim":"Votes reflect issue preferences, legal principles, regional groups, aid ties, and domestic politics; sponsorship and private persuasion are difficult to attribute to either power.","source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S21","DC-S34","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S41"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C10","DC-C17"],"evidence_gaps":"Predeclare resolution families and importance, map sponsors, construct issue-specific baselines, retain absences, model bloc and regime effects, and triangulate private diplomacy."},{"case_id":"DC-C17","title":"UN Security Council coalition bargaining and veto use","period":"1992-present; bounded crisis samples","anchor_system":"Both systems and rotating Council coalitions","region":["Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Global governance and rules","Crisis response"],"formality":"formal_universal_institution","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","activated","bargaining_outcome","durable_effect"],"case_role":"matched_method_case","selection_reason":"Recorded votes and draft texts can trace agenda access, coalition construction, amendments, veto threats, authorization, and subsequent compliance in consequential cases.","strongest_counterclaim":"Public votes miss private drafts and threatened vetoes; permanent-member power, crisis facts, and regional legitimacy may explain outcomes better than general diplomatic capability.","source_ids":["DC-S21","DC-S41","DC-S44","DC-S58"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C06","DC-C16"],"evidence_gaps":"Select crises prospectively by rule, recover draft and negotiation histories, code objectives before votes, include failed and withdrawn texts, and trace implementation outside the Council."},{"case_id":"DC-C18","title":"World Bank and AIIB governance and stewardship comparison","period":"2016-present","anchor_system":"Matched U.S.-influenced and PRC-initiated institutions","region":["Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Development and public goods","Global governance and rules"],"formality":"formal_multilateral_development_institutions","primary_category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","activated","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"matched_method_case","selection_reason":"A matched institutional comparison can separate governance weight, agenda sponsorship, member attraction, co-finance, implementation, safeguards, adaptation, and legitimacy.","strongest_counterclaim":"The banks have different mandates, ages, portfolios, voting systems, and borrower mixes; treating either institution as a national bloc instrument would erase member agency.","source_ids":["DC-S28","DC-S29","DC-S30","DC-S31","DC-S36","DC-S52","DC-S53","DC-S54","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71","DC-S85","DC-S86","DC-S87","DC-S88","DC-S89","DC-S90","DC-S91","DC-S92"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C08","DC-C13"],"evidence_gaps":"Define common project cohorts and accepted-output measures, expand independent AIIB completion evidence, model age and borrower mix, identify national sponsorship, and survey member exit or voice."},{"case_id":"DC-C19","title":"Alliance commitment fulfillment portfolio","period":"1815-2018 with post-1945 and post-Cold War subsets","anchor_system":"Comparative; U.S. and PRC commitments only where coded","region":["Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Security and access"],"formality":"formal_alliance_treaties","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["commitment_documented","authorized","activated","durable_effect"],"case_role":"historical_calibration","selection_reason":"ATOP and COW supply defined commitment universes that can calibrate obligation specificity, consultation, defense, neutrality, nonaggression, and duration without cherry-picking famous cases.","strongest_counterclaim":"Historical treaty coding is not current credibility, formal obligations vary, non-events and deterrence are hard to score, and PRC observations may be too sparse for a direct bilateral position.","source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S16"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C02","DC-C03"],"evidence_gaps":"Acquire event-level fulfillment data or build a documented trigger ledger, identify comparable obligations, handle non-events, extend current years, and preserve sparse-PRC limits."},{"case_id":"DC-C20","title":"Matched formal diplomatic footprint and activity portfolio","period":"2019-present with source-year controls","anchor_system":"Both systems","region":["Global / multilateral","Indo-Pacific","Africa","Latin America and the Caribbean","Middle East","Euro-Atlantic"],"issue":["Global governance and rules","Crisis response"],"formality":"formal_diplomatic_network","primary_category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D03"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","coalition_formed"],"case_role":"matched_method_case","selection_reason":"Combines post coverage, post type, personnel-oriented data, and bilateral and multilateral dialogue activity to establish the formal-network input baseline before testing conversion.","strongest_counterclaim":"Available datasets have different country coverage, collection years, counting rules, and weak measures of staffing, expertise, access quality, crisis performance, and causality.","source_ids":["DC-S01","DC-S02","DC-S03","DC-S04","DC-S05","DC-S06","DC-S12","DC-S13","DC-S39","DC-S42"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C09","DC-C14"],"evidence_gaps":"Reconcile unit and year, obtain mission staffing and vacancy data for both systems, code language and tenure, sample access quality, and connect networks to consequential case outcomes."},{"case_id":"DC-C21","title":"JCPOA coalition bargaining and commitment durability","period":"2013-2019 with later durability context","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored P5+1 coalition with PRC participation","region":["Middle East","Global / multilateral"],"issue":["Global governance and rules","Security and access"],"formality":"formal_multilateral_bargaining","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["coalition_formed","commitment_documented","authorized","delivered","bargaining_outcome","durable_effect"],"case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Tests whether a broad coalition obtained a verified negotiated objective and whether the leading participant sustained the agreement after a government change.","strongest_counterclaim":"Initial verified compliance shows real bargaining conversion, but U.S. withdrawal and later Iranian noncompliance make system credit, blame, counterfactuals, and endpoint selection contested.","source_ids":["DC-S63","DC-S118","DC-S119"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C08","DC-C17","DC-C22"],"evidence_gaps":"Add demand-level bargaining records, sanctions-relief performance, participant counterfactuals, and a common PRC-centered coercive-bargaining comparator."},{"case_id":"DC-C22","title":"PRC-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic restoration","period":"2021-2026","anchor_system":"PRC-brokered with prior Iraqi and Omani facilitation","region":["Middle East"],"issue":["Crisis response","Global governance and rules"],"formality":"formal_bilateral_mediation_with_third_party_facilitation","primary_category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","commitment_documented","bargaining_outcome","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_prc_candidate","selection_reason":"Provides an observable PRC diplomatic success with bounded terms and subsequent implementation checks without assuming all regional de-escalation is attributable to Beijing.","strongest_counterclaim":"The parties had independent incentives and prior Iraqi and Omani talks; restored embassies do not establish broader regional settlement or a PRC-centered coalition capability.","source_ids":["DC-S120"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C21","DC-C17"],"evidence_gaps":"Add a clause-level compliance ledger, 12- and 24-month security indicators, party interviews, and a matched U.S.-brokered regional normalization case."},{"case_id":"DC-C23","title":"U.S. overseas access network and host-state stress cases","period":"2003-2026","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with sovereign host states","region":["Global / multilateral","Indo-Pacific","Euro-Atlantic","Middle East","Africa","Latin America and the Caribbean"],"issue":["Security and access"],"formality":"treaty_compact_and_executive_access_arrangements","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","access_usable","exercised_or_tested","activated","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_us_candidate","selection_reason":"Tests the scale, legal availability, exercise, and revocability of a mature overseas access network under common usability gates.","strongest_counterclaim":"Base counts can overstate scenario access; Turkey, Niger, and other host decisions show that legal arrangements and physical facilities remain sovereign and revocable.","source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S37","DC-S46","DC-S107","DC-S113","DC-S116","DC-S117","DC-S121"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C03","DC-C24"],"evidence_gaps":"Add scenario-specific permissions, capacity, exercise scale, denied requests, survivability, classified agreements, and host-country sources."},{"case_id":"DC-C24","title":"PRC overseas port and military-access network","period":"2017-2026","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with sovereign host states and commercial operators","region":["Global / multilateral","Indo-Pacific","Africa","Middle East"],"issue":["Security and access"],"formality":"military_base_joint_center_and_commercial_port_network","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["commitment_documented","resourced","access_usable","exercised_or_tested","activated","durable_effect"],"case_role":"affirmative_prc_candidate","selection_reason":"Tests whether financing, ownership, visits, joint facilities, and the Djibouti and Ream precedents convert into legally and operationally usable access.","strongest_counterclaim":"Port finance, commercial operation, and a naval visit are not crisis permission; host agency, nonexclusivity, and undisclosed legal terms sharply limit conversion credit.","source_ids":["DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S114","DC-S115","DC-S124"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C23","DC-C13"],"evidence_gaps":"Add access agreements, scenario permissions, logistics capacity, denied calls, exercise evidence, host-language records, and classified-term sensitivity."},{"case_id":"DC-C25","title":"Current U.S. foreign-assistance commitment continuity","period":"2025-2026","anchor_system":"United States with bilateral and multilateral recipients","region":["Global / multilateral","Africa","Indo-Pacific","Latin America and the Caribbean","Middle East"],"issue":["Development and public goods","Global governance and rules"],"formality":"executive_and_congressionally_funded_program_portfolio","primary_category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Tests whether announced and appropriated non-treaty commitments survive an administration change, review, funding pause, rescission, and organizational restructuring.","strongest_counterclaim":"Lawful reprioritization is not automatically breach; the exact universe of binding, discretionary, waived, resumed, and terminated obligations remains incomplete.","source_ids":["DC-S56","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S111"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C15","DC-C26"],"evidence_gaps":"Build a program-level denominator from appropriations and agreements, trace waivers and court decisions, and collect partner-side delivery effects."},{"case_id":"DC-C26","title":"PRC development-finance commitment conversion and repair","period":"2000-2025","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with recipient governments and implementing firms","region":["Global / multilateral","Africa","Indo-Pacific","Latin America and the Caribbean","Middle East"],"issue":["Development and public goods","Economic coordination"],"formality":"bilateral_finance_and_project_implementation_network","primary_category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"causal_stages":["relationship_established","commitment_documented","authorized","resourced","delivered","durable_effect"],"case_role":"matched_method_case","selection_reason":"Provides a large project-level record of PRC commitment, implementation, trouble, repair, and recipient experience that avoids reducing credibility to security treaties.","strongest_counterclaim":"Finance, completion, and leader perceptions do not prove every diplomatic promise was fulfilled; terms and failed projects remain underdisclosed and the U.S. comparator differs in instrument mix.","source_ids":["DC-S110","DC-S127"],"matched_case_ids":["DC-C18","DC-C25"],"evidence_gaps":"Construct matched U.S.-PRC project cohorts with deadlines, accepted outputs, debt restructurings, cancellations, partner-defined quality, and 24-month effects."}],"metric_contracts":[{"metric_id":"DC-M01","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"causal_stage":"relationship_established","name":"Priority-country formal coverage","question":"Does the actor maintain an appropriate formal presence where the assessed objective requires it?","definition_or_formula":"Priority countries with a resident mission or documented fit-for-purpose accredited arrangement divided by all priority countries in the declared region-issue universe; report embassies, consulates, permanent missions, and nonresident coverage separately.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"enabler","horizon":"current and five-year trend","bucket_rule":"Research bins: broad >=90%; substantial 75-89.9%; partial 50-74.9%; thin <50%; unscored without a declared priority universe.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S01","DC-S02","DC-S06"],"comparative_requirement":"Use the same region, issue priority set, and post definitions for both systems; do not infer quality from presence.","known_failure_mode":"Post counts reward low-capability offices and actor-defined priorities; a nonresident mission can outperform a resident post for some objectives.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M02","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"causal_stage":"relationship_established","name":"Mission capability fill","question":"Are priority posts staffed for their assigned political, economic, consular, public, security, and technical functions?","definition_or_formula":"Filled mission positions meeting the position's grade, clearance, and functional requirements divided by all designated priority-mission positions; locally employed and interagency staff remain separate.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"required_dependency","horizon":"current and annual","bucket_rule":"Broad >=90%; substantial 80-89.9%; partial 65-79.9%; thin <65%; unscored when requirements or filled status are not public.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S06"],"comparative_requirement":"Require matched position definitions or withhold the relative call; one-sided U.S. vacancy data cannot establish a PRC advantage.","known_failure_mode":"Public PRC staffing denominators and qualification requirements may be unavailable; headquarters headcount can be mistaken for overseas capability.","application_status":"source_gap"},{"metric_id":"DC-M03","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"causal_stage":"relationship_established","name":"Expertise match","question":"Do personnel at priority posts possess the language, area, functional, and negotiation expertise their roles require?","definition_or_formula":"Filled designated positions whose incumbent meets the documented language and functional proficiency requirement divided by all filled designated positions; report language, area, and functional skills separately.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"quality_gate","horizon":"current and annual","bucket_rule":"Broad >=90%; substantial 80-89.9%; partial 65-79.9%; thin <65%; unscored without comparable requirements and test standards.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S06","DC-S42"],"comparative_requirement":"Compare requirements and proficiency standards rather than raw numbers of language speakers or career diplomats.","known_failure_mode":"Political appointee status, nationality, years of service, or gender cannot substitute for tested expertise; PRC definitions may be opaque.","application_status":"source_gap"},{"metric_id":"DC-M04","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"causal_stage":"relationship_established","name":"Access continuity","question":"Does the diplomatic network sustain working access and institutional memory through leadership and personnel changes?","definition_or_formula":"For named priority relationships, months with an accredited and functioning chief of mission plus recurring senior and working-level contacts, adjusted for gaps and turnover; report median and worst decile.","unit":"months_and_rate","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"continuity","horizon":"trailing five years","bucket_rule":"No universal advantage threshold; flag gaps longer than 180 days and relationships without a substantive working-level contact in 12 months.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S04","DC-S06","DC-S39"],"comparative_requirement":"Use the same office and contact thresholds; distinguish host denial from sender vacancy and ceremonial from substantive access.","known_failure_mode":"Public calendars undercount private access, while press releases overcount ceremonial contact; continuity may preserve a bad policy as well as expertise.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M05","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"causal_stage":"relationship_established","name":"Crisis-channel readiness","question":"Can leaders and working officials communicate securely and rapidly during a defined crisis?","definition_or_formula":"Highest verified status for each priority dyad: absent; announced; contact details established; tested; used during a real event; sustained two-way crisis management. Record elapsed connection time where observable.","unit":"ordinal_and_hours","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"required_dependency","horizon":"current and event-based","bucket_rule":"Usable only when tested or used; announced channels are nominal. No comparative rating without matched crisis definitions or representative tests.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S04","DC-S06"],"comparative_requirement":"Compare channel availability, reciprocity, decision access, and use under similar stress; private channels should reduce confidence rather than be assumed absent.","known_failure_mode":"Public silence may conceal an effective backchannel; a hotline can exist but go unanswered or fail to reach decision makers.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M06","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"causal_stage":"relationship_established","name":"Verified informal coverage","question":"How broadly does the actor maintain current non- or semi-official relationships in the priority political and social ecosystem?","definition_or_formula":"Priority stakeholder groups with at least one reciprocal, attributable contact in the last 24 months divided by required stakeholder groups; code governing parties, opposition, business, subnational, education, civil society, religious, and Track channels separately.","unit":"percent_by_channel","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"enabler","horizon":"current and trailing 24 months","bucket_rule":"Broad >=80% of required channel types; substantial 60-79.9%; partial 30-59.9%; thin <30%; unscored without a declared stakeholder universe.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S07","DC-S09","DC-S10","DC-S11","DC-S12"],"comparative_requirement":"Use equivalent stakeholder roles and a recency rule; never compare a PRC party tie directly with a U.S. alumni count without a common function.","known_failure_mode":"Self-reported relationship totals can include dormant or ceremonial contacts; covert or coercive ties can be misclassified as voluntary access.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M07","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"causal_stage":"relationship_established","name":"Network reciprocity & recency","question":"Are informal relationships two-way and active rather than one-directional exposure?","definition_or_formula":"Verified relationships with an exchange of access, information, participation, or resources in both directions during the last 24 months divided by all claimed relationships in the sampled network.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"quality_gate","horizon":"trailing 24 months","bucket_rule":"Strong >=75%; material 50-74.9%; limited 25-49.9%; nominal <25%; unscored when the claimed-network denominator cannot be audited.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S09","DC-S10","DC-S11"],"comparative_requirement":"Apply the same evidence minimum to both systems; a first-party event list establishes activity only after reciprocal participation is verified.","known_failure_mode":"Network secrecy and selective disclosure create asymmetric observability; reciprocity can reflect patronage rather than independent partner agency.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M08","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","name":"Informal conversion","question":"Do informal channels produce documented access, warning, deconfliction, or policy initiatives?","definition_or_formula":"Sampled informal relationships that can be process-traced to a documented formal meeting, early warning, crisis contact, joint initiative, or policy adjustment divided by sampled relationships with a defined objective.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"outcome_link","horizon":"trailing five years","bucket_rule":"No universal threshold until case calibration; report the numerator events, attribution strength, and unsuccessful attempts.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S08","DC-S09","DC-S10","DC-S11"],"comparative_requirement":"Use matched objectives and require a trace stronger than temporal sequence; do not count favorable attitudes as conversion.","known_failure_mode":"Successful conversions are more likely to be public, creating severe selection and attribution bias.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M09","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"causal_stage":"coalition_formed","name":"Required-role coverage","question":"Does the coalition include willing participants for every role necessary to pursue its declared objective?","definition_or_formula":"Critical political, geographic, legal, financial, intelligence, logistical, technical, and implementation roles assigned to a willing and capable participant divided by all roles in the ex ante coalition design.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"required_dependency","horizon":"at formation and activation","bucket_rule":"Complete 100%; robust 80-99.9%; partial 50-79.9%; hollow <50%; unscored without an ex ante role map.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S15","DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S24","DC-S27","DC-S37","DC-S38"],"comparative_requirement":"Use the same objective and role ontology; capability counts only when authorization and availability are documented.","known_failure_mode":"Analysts can define roles after seeing the coalition, making success tautological; partner capacity can be double counted across coalitions.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M10","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"causal_stage":"coalition_formed","name":"Meaningful participation conversion","question":"How many invited or endorsing actors accept a defined role rather than remain symbolic participants?","definition_or_formula":"Participants accepting a documented role, obligation, or implementation task divided by all actors listed as invited, endorsing, partner, or member for the specific initiative.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"conversion","horizon":"formation to authorization","bucket_rule":"Strong >=80%; material 60-79.9%; limited 30-59.9%; symbolic <30%; report nonresponse and ineligible categories separately.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S26","DC-S37","DC-S38"],"comparative_requirement":"Invitation and participation categories must be equivalent; partners with observer rights cannot be compared to full members without adjustment.","known_failure_mode":"Broad forums inflate the denominator, while secret tasking can understate roles; a defined role may still be trivial.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M11","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08"],"causal_stage":"coalition_formed","name":"Partner agency","question":"Do participating partners materially shape the coalition's agenda, terms, or implementation?","definition_or_formula":"Share of consequential agenda items or operative provisions with documented partner initiation, co-sponsorship, amendment, veto leverage, or implementation ownership; retain each mechanism rather than one blended score.","unit":"percent_and_categorical","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"legitimacy_and_durability","horizon":"formation through delivery","bucket_rule":"No universal bucket; require at least proposal authorship, accepted amendment, agenda control, or owned delivery for substantive agency credit.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S20","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S26","DC-S27"],"comparative_requirement":"Code the leading power and each partner separately; joint language is not assumed to reflect equal authorship.","known_failure_mode":"Private drafting obscures authorship; co-sponsorship can be traded, coerced, or symbolic, and formal veto power may not equal practical influence.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M12","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D10"],"causal_stage":"coalition_formed","name":"Counter-coalition retention","question":"Does the coalition retain pivotal participants when they face a rival offer, diplomatic pressure, or material cost?","definition_or_formula":"Pivotal participants that keep their assigned role through a defined competing offer or pressure episode divided by all pivotal participants exposed to that episode.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"stress_test","horizon":"event-based and 12 months","bucket_rule":"Strong >=80%; material 60-79.9%; fragile 30-59.9%; failing <30%; unscored without a bounded exposure event.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S34","DC-S35","DC-S36"],"comparative_requirement":"Use observed behavior rather than declared alignment; allow hedging or split alignment by issue.","known_failure_mode":"Pressure may be hidden and the analyst may select only visible defections; retention can reflect lack of alternatives rather than coalition appeal.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M13","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","name":"Commitment specificity","question":"How clearly does the commitment define actors, obligations, triggers, scope, authority, timing, monitoring, dispute, and exit terms?","definition_or_formula":"Count nine required elements as explicit, bounded, ambiguous, or absent for each commitment; retain the legal form and reservations separately rather than summing into an advantage score.","unit":"element_profile","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"credibility_input","horizon":"at commitment","bucket_rule":"Operational if all decisive elements are explicit or bounded; limited if any trigger, obligation, or authority is ambiguous; nominal if no actor-specific obligation exists.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S16","DC-S26","DC-S27","DC-S37","DC-S38"],"comparative_requirement":"Apply identical elements to treaties and political commitments while allowing not-applicable fields for informal coalitions.","known_failure_mode":"Detailed language can conceal escape clauses; deliberately ambiguous commitments may deter or reassure effectively despite a low specificity profile.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M14","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"causal_stage":"authorized","name":"Authorization conversion","question":"Do documented commitments obtain the domestic and institutional authority needed for execution?","definition_or_formula":"Commitments with all required ratification, legislation, executive authority, parliamentary approval, or institutional decision completed divided by commitments requiring those steps.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"conversion","horizon":"commitment to authorization","bucket_rule":"Strong >=90%; material 70-89.9%; partial 40-69.9%; nominal <40%; not-applicable for immediately effective commitments with documented authority.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S17","DC-S24","DC-S27"],"comparative_requirement":"Identify each actor's required process before judging conversion; executive statements are not treated as legislative authority where law requires more.","known_failure_mode":"Domestic procedures vary and may be opaque; emergency or customary authorities can be overlooked.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M15","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07"],"causal_stage":"resourced","name":"Resource conversion","question":"Do authorized commitments receive the staff, money, facilities, legal instruments, and implementation owners required?","definition_or_formula":"Authorized commitments with a named owner and verified resources sufficient for the first implementation milestone divided by all authorized commitments in the case.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"conversion","horizon":"authorization to first milestone","bucket_rule":"Strong >=80%; material 60-79.9%; limited 30-59.9%; unfunded <30%; unscored without a costed implementation plan.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S22","DC-S26","DC-S31","DC-S33","DC-S38"],"comparative_requirement":"Compare resources to the commitment's own requirement and timing, not gross national spending.","known_failure_mode":"Budgets and pledges can be mistaken for obligations or delivered resources; classified support and in-kind contributions can be missed.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M16","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"causal_stage":"activated","name":"Trigger fulfillment","question":"When a covered condition occurs, does the actor perform the promised consultation, assistance, restraint, or other obligation?","definition_or_formula":"Eligible obligations fulfilled substantially and on time divided by all obligations whose documented trigger occurred; code ambiguity, nonperformance, partial performance, and uncontrollable prevention separately.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"direct_credibility_test","horizon":"event-based","bucket_rule":"Strong >=90%; material 70-89.9%; unreliable 40-69.9%; weak <40%; unscored when trigger occurrence or obligation content is disputed.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S16","DC-S17","DC-S19"],"comparative_requirement":"Use obligation-level rather than alliance-level coding and include failures and non-events; do not transfer historical fulfillment automatically to a new issue.","known_failure_mode":"Trigger ambiguity and counterfactual deterrence make the denominator contested; survivors and famous betrayals are overrepresented.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M17","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"causal_stage":"access_usable","name":"Access usability","question":"Can the committed access actually support the specified coalition action in the required time?","definition_or_formula":"Categorical gate across legal permission, host approval, facility readiness, logistics, security, information access, capacity, survivability, and timing: verified_usable; conditionally_usable; nominal; unavailable.","unit":"categorical","direction":"eligibility_not_score","relationship_role":"required_dependency","horizon":"current and scenario-specific","bucket_rule":"Only verified_usable enters the base case; conditionally_usable enters a named milestone or sensitivity case; nominal receives no capability credit.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S37","DC-S38"],"comparative_requirement":"Apply the same scenario, time, and capacity requirement to both systems; separate host-state permission from physical facility capacity.","known_failure_mode":"Peacetime use can be mistaken for crisis permission; classified agreements and political caveats create asymmetric uncertainty.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M18","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"causal_stage":"exercised_or_tested","name":"Exercised access","question":"Are access rights tested at representative scale and under the relevant legal and logistical conditions?","definition_or_formula":"Verified usable access arrangements exercised with the required participants, permissions, data flows, and logistics in the last 24 months divided by all verified or conditional access arrangements.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"validation","horizon":"trailing 24 months","bucket_rule":"Validated >=80%; partly validated 50-79.9%; lightly tested 1-49.9%; untested 0%; preserve scale and scenario realism separately.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S37","DC-S38"],"comparative_requirement":"Match exercise purpose and scale; a port call is not equivalent to a deployment, information-sharing test, or crisis authorization exercise.","known_failure_mode":"Exercises are scripted, national caveats may be hidden, and public reporting emphasizes success rather than failures.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M19","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D06"],"causal_stage":"activated","name":"Access activation time","question":"How long after a defined request or trigger does committed access become legally and physically available?","definition_or_formula":"Elapsed hours or days from valid request or documented trigger to host approval and first usable access at the required location and capacity.","unit":"hours_or_days","direction":"lower_better","relationship_role":"latency","horizon":"event-based","bucket_rule":"Use case-specific requirement: on-time if within the declared operational or policy window; late if the objective window is missed; no universal cross-issue threshold.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S37"],"comparative_requirement":"Compare similar requests and decision levels; report approval, movement, and usable-capacity times separately.","known_failure_mode":"Trigger time can be disputed, quiet preparatory action can predate approval, and speed can sacrifice legitimacy or coalition breadth.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M20","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"causal_stage":"activated","name":"Collective decision time","question":"How quickly can the coalition move from a defined trigger to an authoritative collective decision?","definition_or_formula":"Elapsed time from a pre-specified observable trigger to the first decision that authorizes the relevant collective action; record consultation start, formal decision, and delegated actions separately.","unit":"hours_or_days","direction":"lower_better","relationship_role":"latency","horizon":"event-based and representative exercises","bucket_rule":"On-time only against the case's ex ante decision window; display distribution and worst case rather than an average alone.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S21","DC-S24","DC-S27","DC-S78","DC-S79","DC-S81","DC-S83","DC-S84","DC-S85","DC-S86","DC-S90"],"comparative_requirement":"Use similar trigger severity, required decision, and institutional level; consensus systems cannot be compared from rules alone.","known_failure_mode":"Private consensus may form before the recorded decision; a fast lowest-common-denominator statement can be less useful than a slower executable decision.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M21","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"causal_stage":"activated","name":"Activation participation","question":"How much of the committed coalition actually participates after authorization?","definition_or_formula":"Eligible committed participants performing their assigned activation role divided by all eligible committed participants; opt-outs, caveats, delayed entries, and substitute roles are separate.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"conversion","horizon":"activation event","bucket_rule":"Strong >=85%; material 65-84.9%; partial 35-64.9%; fractured <35%; role-weighted results reported alongside counts.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S19","DC-S20","DC-S24","DC-S27","DC-S77","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S81","DC-S83"],"comparative_requirement":"Use assigned roles and eligibility rather than total membership; one pivotal participant may matter more than many symbolic participants.","known_failure_mode":"Secret participation and substitute contributions can be missed; role weights can import analyst judgment.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M22","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"causal_stage":"exercised_or_tested","name":"Coordination readiness","question":"Can standing bodies, procedures, information systems, and assigned owners produce a coherent plan and resolve disputes?","definition_or_formula":"Highest verified state for the complete coordination chain: paper process; staffed; rehearsed; exercised with identified findings; corrective actions closed and retested; used successfully in a real event.","unit":"ordinal","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"quality_gate","horizon":"current and trailing three years","bucket_rule":"Ready only after representative exercise or real use plus closure of decisive findings; staffed or rehearsed is partial; paper-only is nominal.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S27","DC-S31","DC-S38","DC-S48","DC-S78","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S82","DC-S84","DC-S89","DC-S90"],"comparative_requirement":"Apply to the full political-to-implementation chain and preserve unresolved findings; organization existence alone receives no ready credit.","known_failure_mode":"After-action findings are often classified or self-reported; repeated activity can coexist with uncorrected coordination failures.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M23","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"causal_stage":"delivered","name":"Pledge delivery","question":"What share of pledged or assigned output arrives on time and to the agreed standard?","definition_or_formula":"Accepted output delivered by the deadline divided by pledged or assigned output using the same quantity, quality, location, and period; money, in-kind support, and policy actions remain separate.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"direct_delivery","horizon":"milestone and annual","bucket_rule":"Strong >=90%; material 70-89.9%; partial 40-69.9%; weak <40%; unscored if the pledge or acceptance standard is not bounded.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S23","DC-S26","DC-S33","DC-S38","DC-S50","DC-S67","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S87","DC-S88","DC-S90","DC-S91","DC-S92","DC-S93","DC-S95"],"comparative_requirement":"Use equivalent outputs and acceptance standards; announced ceilings and commitments without quantities cannot enter the denominator.","known_failure_mode":"Pledges may be deliberately conservative or aspirational; classified and indirect delivery can create missing numerator values.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M24","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"causal_stage":"delivered","name":"Critical-role completion","question":"Are all roles necessary for the coalition objective delivered, including low-visibility enabling roles?","definition_or_formula":"Critical roles delivered to minimum usable standard divided by all critical roles in the ex ante role map; any unmet non-substitutable role is flagged as a binding gap regardless of the ratio.","unit":"percent_plus_gate","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"required_dependency","horizon":"at each milestone","bucket_rule":"Complete only at 100% with no binding gap; robust at >=80% with substitutes; partial below 80%; failed when a non-substitutable role is unmet.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S23","DC-S26","DC-S38","DC-S48","DC-S50","DC-S67","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S87","DC-S89","DC-S92","DC-S93","DC-S95"],"comparative_requirement":"Use the DC-M09 role map and do not average away a decisive missing role.","known_failure_mode":"Role maps can be revised after failure; visible headline contributions can obscure missing logistics, legal, data, or enforcement functions.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M25","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"causal_stage":"delivered","name":"Burden concentration","question":"Is delivery dangerously dependent on one participant or institutional family?","definition_or_formula":"Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of accepted delivered output shares for the exact role or capability, plus the largest-participant share and number of independent substitutes.","unit":"index_0_to_1","direction":"lower_better_all_else_equal","relationship_role":"fragility","horizon":"milestone and annual","bucket_rule":"Diagnostic only: diversified <0.25; concentrated 0.25-0.49; highly concentrated >=0.50; no advantage call without quality and substitutability.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S22","DC-S23","DC-S33","DC-S50","DC-S67","DC-S93","DC-S95"],"comparative_requirement":"Compute by role and compatible output; financial and operational contributions are not interchangeable.","known_failure_mode":"Equal shares can be inefficient, quality differs, and a dominant provider may be a strength until it withdraws.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M26","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","name":"Agenda adoption","question":"Can the actor move a proposal from introduction to collective adoption?","definition_or_formula":"Consequential proposals introduced or demonstrably championed by the actor that receive the required institutional approval divided by all consequential proposals in the declared sample; code co-sponsorship and amendment separately.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"institutional_conversion","horizon":"annual and institutional cycle","bucket_rule":"No universal threshold; report by institution, issue, decision rule, and proposal importance with failed proposals retained.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S21","DC-S24","DC-S26","DC-S27","DC-S30","DC-S32","DC-S49","DC-S59","DC-S66","DC-S76"],"comparative_requirement":"Use a predeclared proposal sample and evidence of sponsorship; do not assign every coalition decision to its largest member.","known_failure_mode":"Proposal authorship and private agenda setting are hard to observe; actors may avoid introducing measures expected to fail.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M27","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","name":"Vote mobilization","question":"Does the actor increase issue-specific support beyond partners' baseline voting tendencies?","definition_or_formula":"For a predeclared set of comparable votes, observed support for the actor-backed position minus each state's issue- and period-specific baseline; report persuasion, abstention, absence, and bloc effects separately.","unit":"percentage_point_change","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"institutional_influence","horizon":"session and rolling three-year","bucket_rule":"No universal bucket; require confidence intervals or sensitivity to vote selection and alternative baselines.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S21","DC-S41"],"comparative_requirement":"Use the same issue coding, vote universe, and baseline for both systems; do not count consensus adoption or non-recorded votes as unanimous mobilization.","known_failure_mode":"Resolution selection, bloc voting, aid or security dependence, and principled issue preferences confound attribution.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M28","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"causal_stage":"delivered","name":"Institutional implementation","question":"Do adopted rules, standards, or programs produce verified national or organizational implementation?","definition_or_formula":"Adopted instruments with required domestic or institutional implementation completed and independently or peer reviewed divided by adopted instruments due for implementation in the period.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"direct_delivery","horizon":"instrument deadline and annual","bucket_rule":"Strong >=80%; material 60-79.9%; limited 30-59.9%; paper <30%; retain binding and nonbinding instruments separately.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S26","DC-S30","DC-S31","DC-S32","DC-S33","DC-S50","DC-S51","DC-S53","DC-S67","DC-S68","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71"],"comparative_requirement":"Use common implementation definitions and review mechanisms; adoption and dissemination do not count as implementation.","known_failure_mode":"Member self-reports and selective peer reviews can overstate compliance; implementation responsibility often sits outside the institution.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M29","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"causal_stage":"delivered","name":"Institutional stewardship","question":"Does the actor sustain the institution's resources, rules, adjudication, inclusiveness, and capacity to adapt?","definition_or_formula":"Profile of assessed and voluntary contributions paid on time, compliance with binding decisions, support for functioning dispute mechanisms, implementation monitoring, reform or repair actions, and member retention; no single weighted score.","unit":"multi_indicator_profile","direction":"context_dependent","relationship_role":"legitimacy_and_resilience","horizon":"annual and five-year trend","bucket_rule":"Adjudicate only from the complete profile. A governance share or large payment cannot offset a decisive obstruction or chronic nonimplementation without explicit reasoning.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S22","DC-S28","DC-S29","DC-S30","DC-S31","DC-S32","DC-S50","DC-S53","DC-S55","DC-S56","DC-S57","DC-S58","DC-S59","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S67","DC-S70","DC-S72","DC-S74"],"comparative_requirement":"Apply the institution's own rules and obligations to both actors; separate legitimate reform disputes from paralysis and power from stewardship.","known_failure_mode":"Normative disagreement can be mislabeled noncompliance; universal institutions and club institutions have different obligations and legitimacy bases.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M30","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","name":"Objective attainment","question":"Did the coalition obtain its bounded, predeclared bargaining objective?","definition_or_formula":"Fraction of specific ex ante demands achieved in the final observable terms, with each demand coded achieved, partially achieved, not achieved, abandoned, or not observable; decisive demands are not averaged away.","unit":"demand_profile","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"direct_outcome","horizon":"case endpoint","bucket_rule":"Successful only when all decisive demands are achieved or a documented acceptable substitute is obtained; mixed when some material demands move; failed when no decisive demand moves.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S21","DC-S26","DC-S32","DC-S37","DC-S38"],"comparative_requirement":"Use demands documented before the outcome and the same materiality rule; do not infer objectives solely from post hoc victory claims.","known_failure_mode":"Objectives are often private, revised, or deliberately vague; outcomes can reflect force or economics rather than diplomacy.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M31","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","name":"Opponent compliance","question":"Does the counterpart implement the agreed or demanded behavior, and for how long?","definition_or_formula":"Required counterpart actions completed on time divided by actions due, plus time to violation, reversal, or evasion; distinguish voluntary agreement, coerced concession, and unilateral adaptation.","unit":"percent_and_days","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"direct_outcome","horizon":"deadline, 12 months, and 24 months","bucket_rule":"Strong >=90% on time with no decisive reversal; material 70-89.9%; partial 40-69.9%; weak <40%; unscored if obligations are not observable.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S20","DC-S21","DC-S32"],"comparative_requirement":"Use the agreement's own obligations and independent verification where possible; coalition member compliance is assessed separately.","known_failure_mode":"Attribution to diplomatic pressure is difficult, verification can be politicized, and short observation windows overstate durable success.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M32","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","name":"Coalition added value","question":"Did coalition participation improve the bargaining result relative to a plausible unilateral or smaller-coalition baseline?","definition_or_formula":"Structured process trace comparing mechanisms available only because of coalition breadth, legitimacy, access, information, resources, or enforcement with a stated counterfactual and rival explanations.","unit":"ordinal_causal_confidence","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"attribution","horizon":"case endpoint","bucket_rule":"Direct when a coalition-only mechanism is necessary and observed; contributory when multiple causes remain; indeterminate when the counterfactual cannot be bounded.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S21","DC-S26","DC-S33"],"comparative_requirement":"Use matched or within-case evidence and state the counterfactual; size alone is not added value.","known_failure_mode":"Counterfactuals are unobservable, coalitions form endogenously around easier or harder cases, and military or economic effects can dominate.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M33","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"causal_stage":"durable_effect","name":"Twelve- and twenty-four-month retention","question":"Does the coalition retain participating actors and delivered roles after the initial event?","definition_or_formula":"Participants still performing their material assigned role at 12 and 24 months divided by participants that activated; report formal membership, material role, and delivery separately.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"durability","horizon":"12 and 24 months","bucket_rule":"Durable >=85%; mostly durable 65-84.9%; eroding 35-64.9%; fractured <35%; unscored before the checkpoint.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S20","DC-S23","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S27","DC-S33"],"comparative_requirement":"Use activated role-holders as the denominator, not all members; partial or substituted roles remain visible.","known_failure_mode":"Recent coalitions cannot be rated; quiet cooperation can persist after public withdrawal and nominal membership can hide nonparticipation.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M34","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"causal_stage":"durable_effect","name":"Government-change persistence","question":"Do commitments and delivery survive a leadership or governing-coalition change?","definition_or_formula":"Material commitments remaining authorized and implemented 12 months after a qualifying government change divided by commitments due to continue; policy changes allowed by explicit exit terms are coded separately.","unit":"percent","direction":"higher_better","relationship_role":"stress_test","horizon":"12 months after change","bucket_rule":"Strong >=85%; material 65-84.9%; fragile 35-64.9%; discontinuous <35%; unscored without a qualifying change.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S19","DC-S24","DC-S27","DC-S33","DC-S34","DC-S35"],"comparative_requirement":"Use comparable changes in executive and legislative control and distinguish lawful policy revision from breach.","known_failure_mode":"Government changes are not random, institutions differ, and dramatic cases are more visible than quiet continuity.","application_status":"applied_partial"},{"metric_id":"DC-M35","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"causal_stage":"durable_effect","name":"Shock resilience","question":"Does cohesion and delivery persist under economic coercion, security threat, domestic cost, or a rival wedge campaign?","definition_or_formula":"Change in material participation and delivery from the pre-shock baseline through 3-, 12-, and 24-month checkpoints for a predeclared coalition and shock; record adaptations and compensating support.","unit":"percentage_point_change_and_profile","direction":"lower_decline_better","relationship_role":"stress_test","horizon":"3, 12, and 24 months","bucket_rule":"Resilient when no decisive role is lost and aggregate material delivery remains at least 85% of baseline; adaptive when substitutes restore that level within the relevant window; otherwise fragile or failed.","primary_source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S23","DC-S24","DC-S27","DC-S34","DC-S35","DC-S36"],"comparative_requirement":"Use the same shock boundary, baseline, and material-role definition; identify coalition assistance that changes members' exposure.","known_failure_mode":"Multiple simultaneous shocks, hidden pressure, and changing objectives complicate attribution; public rhetoric can persist after practical erosion.","application_status":"applied_partial"}],"observations":[{"observation_id":"DC-O001","basket":"western","institution":"NATO","period":"current structure","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"authorized","actor_system":"U.S.-anchored institution with autonomous allies","observation":"NATO combines consensus at every committee level with standing political and military bodies that translate collective decisions into direction and implementation.","quantitative_value":"32 members; consensus decision rule","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of mature authorization and implementation machinery; national action and U.S. causal credit remain separate.","source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Design does not establish decision speed, national caveats, output quality, or success in a particular crisis.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O002","basket":"western","institution":"NATO","period":"2025-2035 commitment window","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","actor_system":"U.S.-anchored institution with autonomous allies","observation":"The 2025 summit adopted a new 5 percent-of-GDP defense and security investment commitment after all allies reported meeting or exceeding the prior 2 percent benchmark.","quantitative_value":"all allies reported >=2% in 2025; new 5% commitment by 2035","comparative_use":"Shows agenda conversion and burden adaptation inside a consequential standing institution, but the new commitment is not yet delivery.","source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S49"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Figures are alliance and national submissions; military output belongs to National Defense, and direct U.S. sponsorship is not the same as allied fulfillment.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O003","basket":"western","institution":"G7","period":"2025 summit cycle through 2026-06-01","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"U.S.-anchored Western institution with autonomous partners","observation":"Independent coding found substantial implementation across the selected Kananaskis commitments.","quantitative_value":"20 of 148 commitments sampled; G7/EU average 80%","comparative_use":"Provides cross-issue delivery evidence for the Western institutional basket under a disclosed compliance method.","source_ids":["DC-S50"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"The sample is selected, three-point coding can reward low-ambition actions, and the result does not establish U.S. authorship or added value.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O004","basket":"western","institution":"G7","period":"2025 summit cycle through 2026-06-01","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"United States within U.S.-anchored institution","observation":"The United States did not lead the G7's selected-commitment implementation ranking.","quantitative_value":"United States 73%; group average 80%; EU 95%; Canada 93%; United Kingdom 90%","comparative_use":"Directly prevents collective Western compliance from being attributed automatically to current U.S. stewardship.","source_ids":["DC-S50"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Twenty selected commitments are not the whole G7 agenda, and member scores do not isolate agenda sponsorship or institutional maintenance.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O005","basket":"western","institution":"OECD Inclusive Framework","period":"2016-2025","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"Western-origin institution with broad non-Western participation","observation":"The BEPS Action 14 process uses repeated peer reviews and follow-up to trace dispute-resolution standards into national legal and administrative changes.","quantitative_value":"more than 80 Stage 1 and Stage 2 reviews in the 2016-2022 process; additional 2025 batches","comparative_use":"Shows durable monitoring and implementation machinery beyond declarations.","source_ids":["DC-S31","DC-S51"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Review cohorts and legal systems differ; an OECD mechanism is not evidence of U.S. sponsorship or comparative PRC failure.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O006","basket":"western","institution":"World Bank Group","period":"FY2025","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"resourced","actor_system":"U.S.-influenced multilateral institution","observation":"The World Bank Group continued operating at large scale through a mature, member-governed institution.","quantitative_value":"$118.5 billion in commitments; $69.9 billion private capital mobilized","comparative_use":"Resource scale is a necessary implementation input and demonstrates continuing institutional capacity.","source_ids":["DC-S52"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"context_only","contrary_or_limit":"Commitments and mobilization are not disbursement, project outcomes, legitimacy, or evidence that the United States caused the activity.","ruling":"context_only","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O007","basket":"western","institution":"World Bank Group","period":"FY2022-FY2024 moving window","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"U.S.-influenced multilateral institution","observation":"Independent oversight validates substantial project delivery while also documenting material monitoring and private-sector performance limits.","quantitative_value":"83% of World Bank projects rated moderately satisfactory or above; IFC investments 50% mostly successful or better","comparative_use":"Supplies independently validated implementation evidence and retains weaker sub-portfolios instead of treating finance as outcome.","source_ids":["DC-S53"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The institutions use different standards and risk mixes; recent closures lag; project performance is multilateral rather than U.S. national performance.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O008","basket":"western","institution":"International Bank for Reconstruction and Development","period":"2025-06-30","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"authorized","actor_system":"Universal bank with disproportionate U.S. governance weight","observation":"The United States holds the largest single IBRD voting share, but the institution remains collectively owned.","quantitative_value":"United States 15.79%; Japan 7.00%; China 5.85%; Germany 4.16%; France and United Kingdom 3.82% each","comparative_use":"Establishes governance opportunity only; it is retained to stop voting power from being mistaken for agenda or outcome control.","source_ids":["DC-S54"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"context_only","contrary_or_limit":"Voting power is not a proposal record, coalition, stewardship, delivery, or causal attribution.","ruling":"context_only","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O009","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations","period":"2025-2027 assessment scale","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"resourced","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"The United States and China carry nearly half of the regular-budget scale and just under half of the 2026 peacekeeping scale under the same adopted rules.","quantitative_value":"regular budget: United States 22.000%, China 20.004%; 2026 peacekeeping: United States 26.1371%, China 23.7657%","comparative_use":"Shows that both are indispensable institutional resource providers and creates a matched obligation baseline.","source_ids":["DC-S22","DC-S55"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Assessment rates are formula-driven obligations rather than voluntary leadership; payment timing and voluntary contributions are separate.","ruling":"mixed","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O010","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations regular budget","period":"as of 2026-04-30","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"resourced","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"Both principals had unpaid regular-budget assessments, with the U.S. stock much larger at the common cutoff.","quantitative_value":"United States $2.037 billion; China $429 million; total unpaid $2.798 billion","comparative_use":"Direct matched counterevidence to a blanket current U.S. stewardship claim; also prevents treating China as fully compliant across all UN finance.","source_ids":["DC-S56"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"A point-in-time balance can be paid later and excludes peacekeeping, voluntary contributions, and reasons for payment timing.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O011","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations peacekeeping finance","period":"as of 2026-04-30","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"resourced","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"Unpaid peacekeeping assessments were substantial for both principals, again with the U.S. balance larger at the common cutoff.","quantitative_value":"United States $2.247 billion; China $870 million; total unpaid $3.544 billion","comparative_use":"Confirms that regular-budget arrears are not an isolated accounting category while retaining material PRC nonpayment.","source_ids":["DC-S55","DC-S56"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Balances reflect multiple assessment periods and legal or political disputes; finance alone does not settle broader institutional leadership.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O012","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations regular budget","period":"2025 payment year","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"resourced","actor_system":"China within a universal institution","observation":"China paid its 2025 regular-budget assessment in full during the calendar year.","quantitative_value":"honour-roll payment date 2025-10-29","comparative_use":"Narrow positive evidence of PRC compliance with an institutional resource obligation.","source_ids":["DC-S57"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Late-in-year full payment is not on-time payment under the 30-day rule and says nothing about 2026 balances or other budgets.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O013","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations General Assembly","period":"2021-2025","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M27"],"causal_stage":"activated","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"The reproducible vote extraction finds frequent substantive divergence between the United States and China across the complete covered recorded-vote universe.","quantitative_value":"550 adopted recorded-vote resolutions; 478 substantive vote differences excluding nonvotes; 375 opposite Y/N votes","comparative_use":"Defines a transparent matched universe for issue-coalition alignment instead of relying on selected speeches.","source_ids":["DC-S20"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"The dataset excludes failed drafts, paragraph votes, and adopted resolutions without recorded votes; resolutions are not equally consequential.","ruling":"context_only","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O014","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations General Assembly","period":"2021-2025","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M27"],"causal_stage":"activated","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"When the principals cast opposite yes/no votes, the PRC position was more often the larger observed coalition.","quantitative_value":"PRC-position larger on 331 resolutions; U.S.-position larger on 44; other-member votes matching PRC 49,170 versus U.S. 9,618; 6,392 abstentions and 6,445 nonvotes","comparative_use":"Strong evidence of broader issue-position convergence with China in this vote universe; not evidence of Chinese persuasion or sponsorship.","source_ids":["DC-S20"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Cuba, Palestine, development, arms control, regional groups, law, and domestic preferences drive many votes; pooled counts overweight repeated and low-consequence resolutions.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O015","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations General Assembly","period":"2025 sensitivity slice","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M27"],"causal_stage":"activated","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"The pooled result is not driven solely by older sessions; the 2025 slice shows unusually broad PRC-position convergence and U.S. isolation in the recorded-vote universe.","quantitative_value":"162 opposite Y/N resolutions; PRC-position larger on 159; U.S.-position larger on 3; average other-member support 154.3 versus 8.7","comparative_use":"Shows the direction survives an annual slice while flagging a major discontinuity that must not be silently pooled.","source_ids":["DC-S20"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"The 2025 resolution count is over three times each prior year's count, issue mix may have shifted, and alignment still cannot be attributed to PRC diplomacy.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O016","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations General Assembly","period":"2021-2025 issue examples","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M27"],"causal_stage":"activated","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"The United States still assembled very large issue-specific majorities against China on selected nonproliferation, fissile-material, and responsible-space-behavior resolutions.","quantitative_value":"largest examples: 173-2, 170-2, and 168-7 among other members","comparative_use":"Refutes any inference that PRC alignment breadth is universal and shows why issue slices are mandatory.","source_ids":["DC-S20"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Largest-margin examples are illustrative, not a preweighted portfolio, and do not establish U.S. sponsorship or implementation.","ruling":"counters_prc_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O017","basket":"universal","institution":"United Nations Security Council","period":"2025-2026 recent record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D09"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"authorized","actor_system":"Both systems within a universal institution","observation":"Recent veto records show both systems can block collective action on high-salience security questions.","quantitative_value":"United States vetoes in 2025 Gaza cases; China and Russia veto in an April 2026 Middle East case","comparative_use":"Provides symmetric obstruction evidence and prevents selective use of the veto record.","source_ids":["DC-S21","DC-S58"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"A veto's substantive merits and bargaining context differ by draft; frequency cannot be scored without a predeclared case universe.","ruling":"mixed","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O018","basket":"universal","institution":"World Trade Organization","period":"2019-2026","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"United States within a universal institution","observation":"U.S. objections prevented consensus on new Appellate Body appointments, leaving the body unable to function from December 2019; 130 members continued advocating selections in 2026.","quantitative_value":"Appellate Body nonfunctional since 2019-12-11; 130 members advocating selection","comparative_use":"A direct, consequential counterexample to automatic U.S. stewardship of the liberal economic order.","source_ids":["DC-S32","DC-S59","DC-S61","DC-S62"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"The United States identifies unresolved mandate and practice concerns, and other members have not negotiated a durable reform; obstruction is not proof of PRC stewardship.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O019","basket":"universal","institution":"World Trade Organization","period":"2025-2026","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"Universal institution under stress","observation":"The WTO dispute system retained meaningful activity despite Appellate Body paralysis and members continued using alternative mechanisms.","quantitative_value":"13 new disputes in 2025, the highest annual count since the 2019 impasse","comparative_use":"Bounds the counterexample: U.S. obstruction impaired a core function but did not eliminate the entire institution.","source_ids":["DC-S59","DC-S60"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"New filings show use rather than completed adjudication, compliance, or successful institutional repair.","ruling":"mixed","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O020","basket":"universal","institution":"Cross-institution U.S. participation","period":"2025-2026","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","actor_system":"United States","observation":"The administration directed withdrawal and cessation of participation or funding across a large set of international bodies while explicitly prioritizing sovereignty and national interest.","quantitative_value":"66 organizations or entities: 35 non-UN and 31 UN","comparative_use":"Strong current evidence that inherited U.S.-anchored institutional capacity and current U.S. stewardship cannot be treated as the same variable.","source_ids":["DC-S63"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The actor announcement is advocacy; affected bodies vary in importance and legal form, and withdrawal may reflect a strategic judgment rather than incapacity.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O021","basket":"universal","institution":"World Health Organization","period":"2026","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"durable_effect","actor_system":"United States within a universal institution","observation":"WHO confirmed U.S. notification of withdrawal and identified pending institutional and legal questions.","quantitative_value":"notification acknowledged 2026-01-24","comparative_use":"Independent institutional confirmation prevents reliance on the White House announcement alone.","source_ids":["DC-S63","DC-S64"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"WHO is an interested party defending its performance; withdrawal does not measure all U.S. health cooperation or the merits of the U.S. critique.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O022","basket":"universal","institution":"Paris Agreement","period":"2026","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"durable_effect","actor_system":"United States within a universal institution","observation":"The UNFCCC status record shows the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement.","quantitative_value":"withdrawal date 2026-01-27","comparative_use":"A separate treaty record corroborates current discontinuity in U.S. multilateral stewardship.","source_ids":["DC-S63","DC-S65"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Federal treaty status does not capture subnational action, actual emissions, prospective reentry, or the administration's cost-benefit judgment.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O023","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"BRICS","period":"2025-2026","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"coalition_formed","actor_system":"PRC-influenced but member-driven institution","observation":"BRICS expanded its member and partner tiers under consensus, demonstrating attraction beyond formal U.S. alliances.","quantitative_value":"11 members and 10 partner countries under the official 2026 roster","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of coalition reach and alternative agenda access, with partner agency preserved.","source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S25"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Membership can reflect hedging, status, or access to all BRICS members; Saudi participation ambiguity and internal rivalry caution against bloc attribution.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O024","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"BRICS","period":"2025 Rio cycle","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","actor_system":"PRC-influenced but member-driven institution","observation":"The Rio presidency recorded a broad agenda and a large commitment inventory.","quantitative_value":"126 commitments; more than 200 meetings and mechanisms claimed","comparative_use":"Shows agenda breadth and institutional tempo but is deliberately stopped at the commitment stage.","source_ids":["DC-S26","DC-S66"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"context_only","contrary_or_limit":"Commitments differ in specificity; meetings and mechanisms are activity; no complete owner-resource-deadline-delivery ledger yet exists.","ruling":"context_only","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O025","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"BRICS","period":"2024 Kazan cycle through 2025-05-21","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"PRC-influenced but member-driven institution","observation":"A state-affiliated compliance project reports substantial action on a selected Kazan portfolio, including high China and Russia scores.","quantitative_value":"7 scored commitments selected from 250; average 83%; China and Russia 94%; regional security 67%","comparative_use":"Evidence that BRICS should not be dismissed as declarations only, but it is insufficient for a comparative delivery finding by itself.","source_ids":["DC-S67"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"State affiliation, selective commitments, short window, and coding that can count statements or partial actions limit independent outcome confidence.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O026","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"BRICS","period":"2011-2015 calibration","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"Original BRICS institution","observation":"Earlier university coding also found nonzero and higher compliance for priority commitments than for other commitments.","quantitative_value":"average score approximately +0.57 for priority commitments versus +0.40 for other commitments","comparative_use":"Provides a separate institutional family and historical cross-check on the proposition that BRICS sometimes converts commitments.","source_ids":["DC-S68"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"indirect","contrary_or_limit":"The evidence predates expansion and current geopolitical shocks, covers the original membership, and inherits selected-commitment coding limits.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O027","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","period":"2016-2026","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"resourced","actor_system":"PRC-initiated multilateral institution","observation":"AIIB converted a PRC initiative into a broadly joined, capitalized, active multilateral development bank.","quantitative_value":"111 approved members; $100 billion capital; $62.58 billion new commitment amount as of 2026-03-31","comparative_use":"Strong evidence of institution building, partner attraction, and material program capacity in the PRC-centered basket.","source_ids":["DC-S28","DC-S69"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Commitments are not disbursement or outcomes; many U.S. allies are autonomous members, and professional multilateralization limits attribution to Beijing.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O028","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","period":"2016-2026","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"PRC-initiated multilateral institution","observation":"AIIB created a Board-reporting unit for project evaluation, complaints, integrity, and institutional learning.","quantitative_value":"CEIU established in 2016; direct Board reporting; completed and ongoing projects selectively assessed","comparative_use":"Positive evidence that the institution includes accountability and repair mechanisms rather than finance alone.","source_ids":["DC-S70"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Independence is internal, review coverage is selective, and the existence of a mechanism does not establish use, correction, or equivalence to older banks.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O029","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","period":"Duqm project review","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"PRC-initiated multilateral institution","observation":"AIIB's own learning review identified limits in financial and economic analysis at completion, demonstrating both oversight activity and incomplete result substantiation.","quantitative_value":"single completed-project learning review","comparative_use":"Retains a concrete failure or weakness inside the strongest PRC-centered delivery case.","source_ids":["DC-S71"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"One project cannot represent the portfolio, and a learning review may be less independent or comprehensive than a full impact evaluation.","ruling":"counters_prc_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O030","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Forum on China-Africa Cooperation","period":"2024-2027","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"commitment_documented","actor_system":"PRC-centered forum with African partners","observation":"The action plan contains named implementation mechanisms, and an African Union representative publicly tied follow-up to African ownership and Agenda 2063.","quantitative_value":"2025-2027 action plan; AU implementation symposium and further alignment process in late 2025","comparative_use":"Shows partner-side engagement and a plausible implementation path rather than counting only a Chinese announcement.","source_ids":["DC-S43","DC-S72"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"The AU statement is diplomatic and favorable; it does not provide an obligation-level ledger, disbursement, completion, independent evaluation, or representative African preferences.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O031","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","period":"2026 current structure","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"coalition_formed","actor_system":"PRC- and Russia-influenced institution","observation":"The SCO maintains differentiated member, observer, dialogue-partner, and institutional-relationship tiers across a broad Eurasian network.","quantitative_value":"10 full members; 2 observers; 15 dialogue partners; formal ties with the UN Secretariat, 7 UN agencies, and 9 other organizations","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of institutional reach while preventing partner tiers from being coded as aligned or activated capacity.","source_ids":["DC-S27","DC-S73"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Formal relationships and membership do not show role assignment, policy alignment, delivery, or specifically Chinese leadership.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O032","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","period":"2026 current structure","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"authorized","actor_system":"PRC- and Russia-influenced institution","observation":"The SCO has permanent coordination machinery, but its central secretariat is small and rotates leadership among members.","quantitative_value":"36 seconded officials; six departments; nonrenewable three-year secretary-general rotation","comparative_use":"Shows real but bounded institutional implementation capacity and material member agency.","source_ids":["DC-S27","DC-S74"],"evidence_role":"measurement","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Secretariat size is only an input and excludes RATS and national bodies; small organizations can coordinate effectively within narrow mandates.","ruling":"mixed","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O033","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","period":"2015-2026 analysis window","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"PRC- and Russia-influenced institution","observation":"Independent research finds durable inward-looking security cooperation but also competing China, Russia, and India preferences and blocked Chinese economic-integration proposals.","quantitative_value":"Russia blocked proposed SCO development-bank and free-trade initiatives; membership expanded from 6 to 10 since 2015","comparative_use":"Directly limits attribution of SCO breadth to PRC command and separates attraction from agenda conversion.","source_ids":["DC-S75","DC-S76"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"indirect","contrary_or_limit":"Qualitative studies do not provide a complete decision, activation, or delivery denominator and may underobserve informal coordination.","ruling":"counters_prc_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O034","basket":"prc_centered","institution":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","period":"2025 Qingdao defence-minister meeting","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"authorized","actor_system":"SCO member disagreement","observation":"India's official account publicly criticized double standards and states that shelter terrorist groups, revealing a live member divergence inside a consensus institution.","quantitative_value":"one observed high-level disagreement","comparative_use":"A serious counterexample to assuming that common SCO anti-terrorism language guarantees agreed attribution or activation.","source_ids":["DC-S77"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The official Indian account does not reconstruct the full draft negotiation or prove general SCO paralysis; its public position may also serve bilateral signaling.","ruling":"counters_prc_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O035","basket":"synthesis","institution":"Western institutional basket","period":"current with trailing implementation records","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"U.S.-anchored system with participating partners","observation":"Across NATO, the G7, OECD, and World Bank evidence, the Western basket demonstrates repeated conversion from collective rules or commitments into monitored implementation at a depth not yet matched across the full PRC-centered basket.","quantitative_value":"multi-institution qualitative profile; no weighted composite","comparative_use":"This is the decisive positive basis for a bounded U.S./partner edge in institutional leadership.","source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S49","DC-S50","DC-S51","DC-S52","DC-S53"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Institutional age, mandate, threat, wealth, and partner preferences are rival explanations; the United States cannot claim autonomous partner delivery.","ruling":"synthesis_us_partner_edge","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O036","basket":"synthesis","institution":"Current U.S. stewardship","period":"2025-2026","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"durable_effect","actor_system":"United States","observation":"Lower U.S. G7 compliance, UN arrears, WTO adjudication obstruction, and withdrawals from WHO, the Paris Agreement, and other bodies materially weaken any claim of current U.S./partner lead.","quantitative_value":"multiple institutions and independent institutional families; no weighted composite","comparative_use":"This counterevidence changes the proposed result from lead to edge and requires separate reporting of inherited system depth and current U.S. stewardship.","source_ids":["DC-S50","DC-S56","DC-S59","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Some actions are intentional reforms or sovereignty choices rather than capability failures; correlated decisions by one administration must not be counted as independent events.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O037","basket":"synthesis","institution":"PRC-centered institutional basket","period":"current with trailing implementation records","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"PRC-centered system with participating partners","observation":"BRICS expansion and partial compliance evidence, AIIB's membership, finance, and oversight, FOCAC partner-side follow-up, and SCO reach establish genuine institution-building capacity rather than an empty alternative-order label.","quantitative_value":"multi-institution qualitative profile; no weighted composite","comparative_use":"This evidence rules out a U.S./partner lead and supports a PRC-centered edge inside the alternative-institution basket.","source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S26","DC-S67","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S72","DC-S73"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Independent obligation-level delivery evidence is sparse; institutions are member-driven and differently mandated, and PRC causal attribution is often partial.","ruling":"supports_prc_centered","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-O038","basket":"synthesis","institution":"Attribution boundary","period":"all baskets","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M26","DC-M28","DC-M29"],"causal_stage":"delivered","actor_system":"Both systems and participating partners","observation":"Institutional performance is credited to an actor-centered system only when sponsorship, governance leverage, coalition support, or a necessary contribution is observed; otherwise it remains institutional or partner output.","quantitative_value":"nonquantitative adjudication rule","comparative_use":"Prevents NATO, G7, World Bank, BRICS, SCO, and AIIB performance from being assigned wholesale to Washington or Beijing.","source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S24","DC-S28","DC-S29","DC-S50","DC-S54","DC-S69","DC-S74"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"context_only","contrary_or_limit":"Private bargaining and informal agenda setting remain underobserved, so some national influence will remain indeterminate.","ruling":"mixed","ledger":"institutional leadership"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD001","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"security_crisis_activation","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"NATO response to Russia's full-scale invasion","trigger_or_denominator":"Russia began the full-scale invasion on 2022-02-24","observed_result":"The North Atlantic Council met and activated NATO defence plans on the trigger date, giving commanders additional authority to move forces.","elapsed_or_rate":"same day; public record does not permit an hourly clock","role_or_output_coverage":"Collective political authorization is observed; national caveats and complete assigned-role participation are not.","source_ids":["DC-S78"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","comparative_use":"Shows real-event political-to-command activation rather than design alone.","contrary_or_limit":"Direct threat and extensive warning enabled preparation; NATO authorship and missing national records limit attribution and denominator-based participation.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_positive","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD002","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M21","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"security_crisis_activation","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"NATO Response Force authorization","trigger_or_denominator":"The 2022-02-24 invasion and same-day defence-plan activation","observed_result":"On 2022-02-25 all 30 allies agreed to deploy elements of the NATO Response Force and delegated location and movement decisions to SACEUR.","elapsed_or_rate":"one day after the invasion trigger","role_or_output_coverage":"All allies joined the authorization; the public record does not identify an eligible assigned-role denominator or every national contribution.","source_ids":["DC-S79"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","comparative_use":"Demonstrates consensus, delegated authority, and transition from council decision to implementation.","contrary_or_limit":"Agreement to deploy elements is not proof that all members delivered an assigned operational role or that every caveat was resolved.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_positive","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD003","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M22","DC-M23","DC-M24"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"security_crisis_activation","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"First NATO Response Force collective-defence deployment","trigger_or_denominator":"The 2022-02-24 invasion","observed_result":"Lead elements of about 500 French troops arrived in Romania on 2022-02-28 and 2022-03-01 in the first NRF collective-defence deployment.","elapsed_or_rate":"four to five days after the invasion trigger","role_or_output_coverage":"A verified lead element and host role are observed; the complete force package, acceptance criteria, and critical-role map are not public.","source_ids":["DC-S80"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","comparative_use":"Connects collective authorization to a physical output within days.","contrary_or_limit":"A lead element cannot establish full activation participation, full force delivery, quality, or strategic effect.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_positive","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD004","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M22","DC-M23","DC-M24"],"case_id":"DC-C02","matched_set":"security_crisis_activation","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"NATO Afghanistan decision and evacuation review","trigger_or_denominator":"The U.S.-Taliban agreement, allied withdrawal decision, and 2021 Afghan government collapse","observed_result":"NATO's own lessons process found delayed reporting and encumbered direction, insufficient meaningful discussion of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, and an evacuation conducted outside NATO command and control.","elapsed_or_rate":"multi-stage failure; no common public clock","role_or_output_coverage":"A broad coalition activated and delivered for years, but key endgame consultation, coordination, and outcome chains broke.","source_ids":["DC-S48"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","comparative_use":"Prevents a standing-machinery success from being generalized across every high-stakes event.","contrary_or_limit":"The evacuation was not a NATO operation, and Afghanistan's outcome also reflects military strategy, local politics, and U.S. bilateral choices outside coalition machinery.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_counterevidence","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD005","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M21","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C12","matched_set":"security_crisis_activation","system":"PRC-centered / participating partners","event_or_portfolio":"SCO response after the Taliban takeover of Kabul","trigger_or_denominator":"Taliban forces entered Kabul on 2021-08-15","observed_result":"The first SCO summit after the takeover adopted common language and named exercises and programs, but independent analysis found no concrete common action plan and reported that most assistance remained bilateral.","elapsed_or_rate":"33 days to the 2021-09-17 summit declaration","role_or_output_coverage":"Member consensus on a declaration is observed; assigned crisis roles, collective authorization, and an executable institutional response are not.","source_ids":["DC-S81","DC-S82"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","comparative_use":"Tests the SCO against its own coordination function after a regionally central security shock.","contrary_or_limit":"The SCO is not a collective-defence alliance and deliberately limits intervention; bilateral member action may be rational and should not be coded institutional failure automatically.","adjudication_weight":"material_comparator","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD006","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M21","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C12","matched_set":"consensus_failure_and_repair","system":"PRC-centered / participating partners","event_or_portfolio":"SCO defence-minister meeting","trigger_or_denominator":"The 2025-06-26 defence-minister meeting's proposed joint statement","observed_result":"The meeting failed to adopt a joint statement after India objected that its terrorism concerns were not represented.","elapsed_or_rate":"no authorization at the meeting","role_or_output_coverage":"Consensus coverage fell short because one pivotal member withheld approval; downstream assigned action was therefore absent for the proposed instrument.","source_ids":["DC-S77","DC-S83"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","comparative_use":"Provides a directly observed consensus failure rather than inferring friction from institutional heterogeneity.","contrary_or_limit":"One ministerial statement is not the SCO's full security portfolio; India's account and reporting do not reconstruct the complete negotiation.","adjudication_weight":"material_comparator","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD007","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C12","matched_set":"consensus_failure_and_repair","system":"PRC-centered / participating partners","event_or_portfolio":"SCO Tianjin summit declaration","trigger_or_denominator":"The 2025-06-26 ministerial failure","observed_result":"Heads of state later adopted a declaration that included language condemning the Pahalgam attack, demonstrating formal consensus repair at a higher level.","elapsed_or_rate":"67 days from ministerial failure to 2025-09-01 declaration","role_or_output_coverage":"All heads of state joined a repaired declaratory output; no executable common security action or assigned delivery follows from that fact alone.","source_ids":["DC-S84"],"evidence_role":"counter_counterevidence","comparative_use":"Prevents the June failure from being treated as permanent paralysis and records repair capacity.","contrary_or_limit":"Repair was slower and declaratory; the public text does not reveal the mechanism, concessions, national implementation, or PRC causal role.","adjudication_weight":"material_positive_prc","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD008","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C18","matched_set":"pandemic_mdb_activation","system":"U.S.-influenced multilateral institution","event_or_portfolio":"World Bank Fast Track COVID-19 Facility","trigger_or_denominator":"WHO characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic on 2020-03-11","observed_result":"The World Bank Board approved a $14 billion fast-track package on 2020-03-17.","elapsed_or_rate":"six days after the common trigger","role_or_output_coverage":"Board authorization and a defined facility are observed; disbursement, borrower implementation, and accepted output are separate stages.","source_ids":["DC-S85","DC-S86"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","comparative_use":"Supplies a common-trigger institutional activation clock outside security alliances.","contrary_or_limit":"The facility was prepared before March 11, mandates differ from AIIB, and output belongs to the bank and members rather than Washington.","adjudication_weight":"material_matched","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD009","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C13","matched_set":"pandemic_mdb_activation","system":"PRC-initiated multilateral institution","event_or_portfolio":"AIIB COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility","trigger_or_denominator":"WHO characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic on 2020-03-11","observed_result":"AIIB reports that facility work began on 2020-02-24, the facility launched on 2020-04-03, and the first Board approvals followed on 2020-04-16.","elapsed_or_rate":"preparation began 16 days before; facility launch 23 days after; first Board approvals 36 days after the common trigger","role_or_output_coverage":"Institutional preparation, facility authorization, and first approvals are observed; national implementation and accepted output are separate stages.","source_ids":["DC-S85","DC-S90"],"evidence_role":"affirmative_prc","comparative_use":"Shows real and comparatively rapid PRC-initiated institutional activation, ruling out an empty-institution claim.","contrary_or_limit":"AIIB and World Bank used different approval structures and scales; earlier preparation complicates a single trigger clock, and the bank is multilateral rather than a PRC coalition proxy.","adjudication_weight":"material_matched","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD010","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24"],"case_id":"DC-C18","matched_set":"pandemic_mdb_delivery","system":"U.S.-influenced multilateral institution","event_or_portfolio":"World Bank first COVID-19 operations","trigger_or_denominator":"World Bank Board authorization on 2020-03-17 and WHO pandemic trigger on 2020-03-11","observed_result":"The first operations, totaling $1.9 billion across 25 countries, were approved on 2020-04-02; the broader World Bank Group later reported $204 billion in pandemic response commitments during April 2020-March 2022 and $10.1 billion in vaccine operations across 78 countries by mid-2022.","elapsed_or_rate":"16 days after Board authorization; 22 days after common trigger for first operations","role_or_output_coverage":"Large country and financing coverage is observed, but approvals and commitments are not full accepted-output or outcome measures.","source_ids":["DC-S87","DC-S88"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","comparative_use":"Demonstrates rapid scale-up and breadth of institutional delivery after authorization.","contrary_or_limit":"Aggregates combine instruments and implementing actors; borrower delivery, disbursement, quality, health outcome, and U.S. causal credit are incomplete.","adjudication_weight":"material_positive","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD011","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M22","DC-M23","DC-M24"],"case_id":"DC-C18","matched_set":"pandemic_mdb_delivery","system":"U.S.-influenced multilateral institution","event_or_portfolio":"World Bank early COVID-19 response evaluation","trigger_or_denominator":"Early emergency-health portfolio","observed_result":"Independent evaluation found rapid processing and just under $1.9 billion supporting critical goods, while identifying gaps in coordination, adaptive management, and operational quality.","elapsed_or_rate":"early-response period","role_or_output_coverage":"Process speed and critical-goods support are independently reviewed; full portfolio outcomes and a common AIIB quality denominator are unavailable.","source_ids":["DC-S89"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","comparative_use":"Adds independent quality and repair evidence rather than accepting approval totals.","contrary_or_limit":"The evaluation covers the early World Bank response, not the complete pandemic portfolio, and is not directly symmetric with AIIB's internal closeout review.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_quality_check","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD012","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24"],"case_id":"DC-C13","matched_set":"pandemic_mdb_delivery","system":"PRC-initiated multilateral institution","event_or_portfolio":"AIIB first-year COVID-19 response","trigger_or_denominator":"AIIB facility launch and 2020 implementation","observed_result":"By the end of 2020 AIIB had approved 27 crisis-response projects totaling $7.07 billion for 19 members.","elapsed_or_rate":"within the first facility year","role_or_output_coverage":"Project, finance, and recipient coverage are observed; approved amounts are not a complete disbursement, acceptance, or outcome denominator.","source_ids":["DC-S90"],"evidence_role":"affirmative_prc","comparative_use":"Provides positive PRC-initiated institutional delivery evidence on the same crisis class.","contrary_or_limit":"Most operations involved member and co-financier agency; approval totals cannot be attributed wholly to Beijing or compared directly with World Bank scale.","adjudication_weight":"material_matched","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD013","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24"],"case_id":"DC-C13","matched_set":"pandemic_mdb_delivery","system":"PRC-initiated multilateral institution","event_or_portfolio":"AIIB completed COVID-19 facility portfolio","trigger_or_denominator":"Facility close on 2023-12-31","observed_result":"AIIB reports 68 projects, $18.48 billion in approved financing, and 26 recipient members over the life of the facility.","elapsed_or_rate":"facility lifetime","role_or_output_coverage":"A closed portfolio with defined project, value, and recipient counts is observed; final accepted outputs and outcomes require completion evidence.","source_ids":["DC-S91"],"evidence_role":"affirmative_prc","comparative_use":"Shows sustained material scale beyond the first-year announcement.","contrary_or_limit":"Approved finance is not automatically disbursed or effective, many projects were co-financed, and the institution is multilateralized.","adjudication_weight":"material_matched","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD014","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24"],"case_id":"DC-C13","matched_set":"pandemic_mdb_delivery","system":"PRC-initiated multilateral institution","event_or_portfolio":"AIIB COVID-19 facility completion review","trigger_or_denominator":"Eleven project completion notes available at the early-March 2024 review cutoff","observed_result":"Of the 11 reviewed operations, Management reported that 10 had fully disbursed and achieved their intended objectives; seven met all targets, three met more than 75 percent, and one operation was terminated.","elapsed_or_rate":"11 of 68 projects had completion notes at review cutoff","role_or_output_coverage":"Positive reviewed-project completion is observed, but completion-note coverage was about 16 percent of the facility and target definitions were not common across projects.","source_ids":["DC-S92"],"evidence_role":"affirmative_prc_with_limit","comparative_use":"Prevents lower PRC-centered observability from being treated as non-delivery while bounding confidence to the reviewed subset.","contrary_or_limit":"Internal management review, sparse completion-note coverage, co-financing, and heterogeneous targets prevent a portfolio-wide independent delivery rate.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_counterevidence","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD015","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24","DC-M25"],"case_id":"DC-C07","matched_set":"selected_commitment_compliance","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"G7 selected 2025 commitments","trigger_or_denominator":"Twenty selected commitments from 148 commitments made at the Apulia summit","observed_result":"The independent G7 Research Group reported 80 percent average compliance; the United States scored 73 percent, below the group average.","elapsed_or_rate":"20 of 148 commitments selected; 80 percent reported average","role_or_output_coverage":"Member-level implementation is coded, but outputs differ by commitment and U.S. sponsorship or added value is not established.","source_ids":["DC-S50"],"evidence_role":"affirmative_with_attribution_limit","comparative_use":"Shows substantial club implementation and autonomous partner delivery under a disclosed method.","contrary_or_limit":"Selection, three-point coding, commitment ease, and action-versus-outcome limits prevent a full delivery rate; partner performance cannot be assigned to Washington.","adjudication_weight":"material_matched","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD016","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24","DC-M25"],"case_id":"DC-C11","matched_set":"selected_commitment_compliance","system":"PRC-centered / participating partners","event_or_portfolio":"BRICS selected 2024 commitments","trigger_or_denominator":"The report says seven priority commitments were selected from 250 Kazan commitments, while its result tables display eight issue rows","observed_result":"The state-affiliated RANEPA study reported 83 percent average compliance, with China and Russia at 94 percent.","elapsed_or_rate":"selected subset; 83 percent reported average","role_or_output_coverage":"Member actions are coded across a disclosed selected sample; accepted output, quality, outcome, and PRC-added value are not established.","source_ids":["DC-S67"],"evidence_role":"affirmative_prc_with_limit","comparative_use":"Provides material positive implementation evidence comparable in form, though not sample, to G7 compliance coding.","contrary_or_limit":"State affiliation, selection, internal inconsistency in the number of scored commitments, and permissive action coding sharply reduce independent comparative weight.","adjudication_weight":"material_matched","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD017","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24","DC-M25"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"ukraine_aid_delivery","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"Government aid allocations to Ukraine","trigger_or_denominator":"Public donor commitments and allocations after the 2022 invasion","observed_result":"Kiel tracks 41 government donors and defines allocations as aid already delivered or concretely specified for short- or medium-term delivery, placing them closer to usable delivery than headline commitments.","elapsed_or_rate":"rolling through 2026-04","role_or_output_coverage":"Comparable donor, aid-type, and period coverage is available; classified support, acceptance, and military effect remain incomplete.","source_ids":["DC-S93","DC-S94"],"evidence_role":"measurement","comparative_use":"Creates a more disciplined delivery numerator and preserves partner-level contributions.","contrary_or_limit":"Allocation is not always physical arrival or operational acceptance, valuation varies, and the tracker does not isolate coalition machinery as the cause.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_measurement","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD018","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M24","DC-M25"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"ukraine_aid_delivery","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"European adaptation after the 2025 U.S. aid withdrawal","trigger_or_denominator":"The sharp reduction in new U.S. allocations during 2025","observed_result":"Kiel reports one new U.S. military package of about EUR0.4 billion and no new U.S. financial or humanitarian aid, while European military allocations rose 67 percent and financial and humanitarian allocations rose 59 percent from the 2022-2024 annual average; aggregate military aid remained about 4 percent below 2022.","elapsed_or_rate":"2025 annual comparison","role_or_output_coverage":"European partners replaced much but not all of the U.S. gap, and 24 donors used NATO's PURL mechanism for EUR3.7 billion by year end.","source_ids":["DC-S95"],"evidence_role":"affirmative_with_counterevidence","comparative_use":"Shows coalition adaptation and partner-system delivery despite principal-provider retrenchment.","contrary_or_limit":"Direct threat and European national policy may explain the response; aggregate totals can hide capability, timing, quality, and remaining critical-role gaps.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_positive","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD019","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M24","DC-M25"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"ukraine_aid_delivery","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"Intra-European Ukraine aid burden distribution","trigger_or_denominator":"European military allocations in 2025","observed_result":"Northern Europe supplied about 33 percent of European military aid with about 8 percent of European GDP, while Southern Europe supplied about 3 percent with about 19 percent of GDP.","elapsed_or_rate":"2025 annual comparison","role_or_output_coverage":"The coalition delivered at aggregate scale but burden and critical-role supply remained highly uneven across partners.","source_ids":["DC-S95"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","comparative_use":"Prevents aggregate adaptation from becoming evidence of broad or balanced member delivery.","contrary_or_limit":"GDP is not an obligation or role denominator; threat exposure, inventories, fiscal choices, and aid quality differ.","adjudication_weight":"decisive_counterevidence","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD020","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"metric_ids":["DC-M20","DC-M22"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"contingent_security_activation","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"Coalition of the Willing Multinational Force Ukraine","trigger_or_denominator":"A credible ceasefire and Ukrainian request are the declared activation conditions; neither had occurred at the evidence cutoff","observed_result":"Coalition co-chairs reported the force ready to operate, established an operational headquarters, rotated command from France to the United Kingdom, and scheduled exercises.","elapsed_or_rate":"pre-trigger readiness; no activation clock available","role_or_output_coverage":"Command and coordination architecture are observed, but complete participant roles, national caveats, and force contributions are not public.","source_ids":["DC-S129","DC-S130"],"evidence_role":"boundary","comparative_use":"Shows material pre-trigger coordination capacity while withholding activation credit until the declared trigger occurs.","contrary_or_limit":"First-party readiness claims are not exercise results; the force is contingent, unactivated, and not evidence of delivered effect.","adjudication_weight":"material_boundary","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-AD021","category_ids":["DC-D07"],"metric_ids":["DC-M23","DC-M25"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"ukraine_aid_delivery","system":"U.S. / partner","event_or_portfolio":"NATO Ankara Ukraine-support commitment","trigger_or_denominator":"All NATO allies at the July 2026 summit","observed_result":"Allies pledged EUR70 billion in equipment, assistance, and training for 2026 and equivalent levels in 2027, while stating that European allies and Canada financed the vast majority of current security assistance.","elapsed_or_rate":"2026 pledge and burden statement","role_or_output_coverage":"The record supplies a current obligation and burden-shift checkpoint but not a delivered-output numerator.","source_ids":["DC-S128"],"evidence_role":"boundary","comparative_use":"Confirms continuing collective commitment after U.S. retrenchment without counting the pledge as delivery.","contrary_or_limit":"Alliance-authored statement; national allocations, physical delivery, acceptance, quality, and the counterfactual contribution of NATO machinery remain unreported.","adjudication_weight":"material_boundary","ledger":"activation and delivery"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO001","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"metric_ids":["DC-M01"],"case_id":"DC-C20","matched_set":"formal_reach_global","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2023 source year","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"The PRC operated the largest measured diplomatic network in the common Lowy inventory.","quantitative_value":"274 posts; three more than the United States","comparative_use":"Positive matched evidence of global formal coverage, but not expertise or conversion.","source_ids":["DC-S01","DC-S02","DC-S96"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Collection ended in 2023; posts differ in staffing and function, and three posts are not a material global advantage by themselves.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO002","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"metric_ids":["DC-M01"],"case_id":"DC-C20","matched_set":"formal_reach_global","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2023 source year","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"The United States operated a nearly identical global network and led in several regions.","quantitative_value":"271 posts; lead in Europe, North and Central America, and South Asia","comparative_use":"Positive matched evidence that formal reach remains globally competitive and regionally differentiated.","source_ids":["DC-S01","DC-S02","DC-S96"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"The United States trails in Africa, East Asia, and the Pacific, and post totals do not establish capability at post.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO003","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"metric_ids":["DC-M01","DC-M04"],"case_id":"DC-C20","matched_set":"formal_reach_regional","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2025","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"The 2025 Asia Power Index found PRC diplomatic influence at the highest level recorded by that index, while a separate Southeast Asia index placed the United States tenth for diplomatic influence.","quantitative_value":"regional composite direction; no common category-level conversion rate","comparative_use":"Provides positive regional evidence that the near-tie in global posts masks a PRC advantage in Asian diplomatic activity and standing.","source_ids":["DC-S97","DC-S123"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Both indexes are composites and cannot isolate mission expertise, access continuity, or specific policy effects.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO004","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"metric_ids":["DC-M02","DC-M03"],"case_id":"DC-C20","matched_set":"formal_expertise_system","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"current rules through 2026","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"The U.S. system has a dedicated proficiency-tested language school, assignment-linked language training, and an objective that officers reach professional proficiency in two foreign languages before senior level.","quantitative_value":"formal training and testing system; actual worldwide fill rate unavailable","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of institutionalized expertise production.","source_ids":["DC-S99"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"A training rule is not an observed post-level proficiency or staffing result.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO005","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"metric_ids":["DC-M02","DC-M03"],"case_id":"DC-C20","matched_set":"formal_expertise_system","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"historical audit through 2009","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"GAO found persistent staffing, experience, and foreign-language gaps despite U.S. training and assignment initiatives.","quantitative_value":"historical readiness gap; not a current rate","comparative_use":"Prevents institutional design from being treated as demonstrated mission readiness.","source_ids":["DC-S100"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The audit is too old to estimate the 2026 condition and cannot be compared directly with opaque PRC personnel data.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO006","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"metric_ids":["DC-M02","DC-M03"],"case_id":"DC-C20","matched_set":"formal_expertise_system","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2023 personnel snapshot published 2026","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"A biographical dataset of PRC ambassadors finds professionalization, improved education, and foreign-language proficiency alongside strong party discipline.","quantitative_value":"169 ambassadors studied","comparative_use":"Positive evidence that the PRC footprint is supported by a professionalizing senior corps rather than post count alone.","source_ids":["DC-S98"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Ambassador biographies do not reveal mission-level vacancies, tour continuity, junior expertise, or comparative proficiency.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO007","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"metric_ids":["DC-M02","DC-M03","DC-M04","DC-M05"],"case_id":"DC-C20","matched_set":"formal_expertise_boundary","system":"Both systems","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"No common public dataset measures mission staffing, language match, tour continuity, recurring political access, warning quality, and crisis-channel readiness for both systems.","quantitative_value":"four decisive components lack a matched denominator","comparative_use":"Sets low comparative confidence and prevents a lead judgment despite strong reach evidence.","source_ids":["DC-S01","DC-S06","DC-S96","DC-S98","DC-S99","DC-S100"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"asymmetric","contrary_or_limit":"PRC non-disclosure cannot be coded as failure, while older U.S. oversight makes U.S. weaknesses more visible.","ruling":"boundary","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO008","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"metric_ids":["DC-M06","DC-M07","DC-M08"],"case_id":"DC-C09","matched_set":"informal_network_southeast_asia","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"YSEALI evaluation window","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"The YSEALI evaluation documents a continuing regional alumni network and self-reported professional, civic, and cross-border collaboration effects.","quantitative_value":"evaluation cohort; outcome shares not made directly comparable here","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of a plural, partner-facing U.S. informal network with observed post-program activity.","source_ids":["DC-S09"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Selection, self-report, missing nonparticipant counterfactuals, and limited policy-conversion evidence constrain causal credit.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO009","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"metric_ids":["DC-M06","DC-M07"],"case_id":"DC-C09","matched_set":"informal_network_global","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"1940-2026 cumulative","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"The International Visitor Leadership Program reports a long-lived network of international leaders spanning government, business, academia, and other sectors.","quantitative_value":"more than 230,000 participants; more than 500 later heads of state or government","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of scale, elite access, and cross-government persistence.","source_ids":["DC-S103"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Career attainment is highly selection-affected; the record does not show that alumni support U.S. policy or remain reciprocal contacts.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO010","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"metric_ids":["DC-M06","DC-M07"],"case_id":"DC-C14","matched_set":"informal_network_global","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2002-2017","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"Systematic ID-CPC records show a very large party network reaching governing and opposition actors outside normal foreign-ministry channels.","quantitative_value":"3,658 delegation contacts; 462 parties in 161 countries","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of distinctive elite access and central taskability.","source_ids":["DC-S101"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"More than half of parties had no more than two observed contacts; reporting ends in 2017 and activity is not policy conversion.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO011","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"metric_ids":["DC-M07","DC-M08"],"case_id":"DC-C14","matched_set":"informal_network_southeast_asia","system":"PRC-centered","period":"cases published 2023","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"Southeast Asian cases find material and ideational benefits, local agency, controversy, and noticeable but non-structural effects from CPC party diplomacy.","quantitative_value":"four illustrative countries; characterized as a moderate status-quo multiplier","comparative_use":"Positive effect evidence with an explicit ceiling on conversion.","source_ids":["DC-S102"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The cases are illustrative rather than representative and do not use a matched U.S. program cohort.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO012","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"metric_ids":["DC-M08"],"case_id":"DC-C09","matched_set":"informal_conversion_method","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"evaluation literature through 2026","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"A synthesis of citizen-diplomacy evaluations finds measurable relationship and participant outcomes but heterogeneous methods and weak policy counterfactuals.","quantitative_value":"twelve evaluation studies synthesized","comparative_use":"Validates that U.S. networks produce some outcomes while keeping influence claims bounded.","source_ids":["DC-S104"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Program sponsors and participants often supply the data, and no common PRC comparison exists.","ruling":"boundary","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO013","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"metric_ids":["DC-M06","DC-M07","DC-M08"],"case_id":"DC-C09","matched_set":"informal_network_comparability","system":"Both systems","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"relationship_established","observation":"The U.S. plural exchange and civic network and the PRC party-state network are both broad and consequential, but they optimize different actors, control, and outcomes.","quantitative_value":"no common entity-level denominator","comparative_use":"Supports a Contested call with low confidence rather than ranking unlike network forms.","source_ids":["DC-S09","DC-S101","DC-S102","DC-S103","DC-S104","DC-S127"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"asymmetric","contrary_or_limit":"Private ties are underobserved, PRC records emphasize activity, U.S. evaluations emphasize participant outcomes, and covert or coercive channels are excluded from ordinary capability credit.","ruling":"contested","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO014","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"metric_ids":["DC-M09","DC-M10"],"case_id":"DC-C05","matched_set":"functional_coalition_forming","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2014-2025","causal_stage":"coalition_formed","observation":"The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS assembled states and organizations across every continent around differentiated military, finance, fighter-flow, stabilization, and communications roles.","quantitative_value":"87 members reported in February 2025","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of broad and function-specific coalition formation.","source_ids":["DC-S45","DC-S105"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Membership does not show role fulfillment or isolate U.S. attraction from the shared ISIS threat.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO015","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"metric_ids":["DC-M09","DC-M10","DC-M11"],"case_id":"DC-C10","matched_set":"institutional_coalition_forming","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024-2026","causal_stage":"coalition_formed","observation":"Expanded BRICS attracted major regional powers and created a partner tier that broadens geographic and political reach beyond the original five.","quantitative_value":"eleven members and at least ten partners in the 2025-2026 record","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of voluntary attraction and alternative-institution reach.","source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S106"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Membership motives include prestige, hedging, market access, and autonomy; meaningful assigned roles remain uneven.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO016","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"metric_ids":["DC-M11"],"case_id":"DC-C10","matched_set":"institutional_partner_agency","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2023-2025 expansion","causal_stage":"coalition_formed","observation":"Member perspectives show that BRICS expansion was not simply a PRC command: Brazil resisted aspects of expansion and members seek distinct, sometimes conflicting objectives.","quantitative_value":"qualitative multi-country finding","comparative_use":"Preserves partner agency while still crediting Beijing for necessary sponsorship where observed.","source_ids":["DC-S106"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Private bargaining is not public, so exact PRC versus Russian versus partner influence remains unresolved.","ruling":"counters_prc_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO017","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08"],"metric_ids":["DC-M10","DC-M11"],"case_id":"DC-C16","matched_set":"un_vote_coalition_alignment","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2021-2025","causal_stage":"coalition_formed","observation":"On clean opposite U.S.-PRC General Assembly votes, substantially more other members aligned with the PRC position.","quantitative_value":"PRC-position coalition larger on 331 resolutions; U.S.-position coalition larger on 44","comparative_use":"Strong positive evidence of issue-position coalition breadth in the universal-institution vote universe.","source_ids":["DC-S20"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Alignment does not show Beijing sponsored, persuaded, or assigned roles to those states; issue repetition and bloc preferences may drive the aggregate.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO018","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"metric_ids":["DC-M09","DC-M10","DC-M11"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"security_coalition_forming","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"coalition_formed","observation":"NATO and adjacent partner formats retained pivotal military, economic, logistics, and political participants after Russia's invasion, while Finland and Sweden voluntarily joined the alliance.","quantitative_value":"32 NATO members plus differentiated external partners","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of high-capability role coverage and attraction under pressure.","source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S93","DC-S95","DC-S121"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Direct threat and preexisting alignment explain much participation; military and economic output belong in adjacent domains.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO019","category_ids":["DC-D03"],"metric_ids":["DC-M09","DC-M10","DC-M11","DC-M12"],"case_id":"DC-C10","matched_set":"coalition_forming_synthesis","system":"Both systems","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"coalition_formed","observation":"The U.S. system shows stronger formation of narrow-to-broad coalitions with explicit high-cost roles; the PRC system shows stronger expansion of Global South forums and broader recent vote alignment.","quantitative_value":"opposed strengths across functions and regions","comparative_use":"Supports Contested globally with moderate confidence.","source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S93","DC-S105","DC-S106"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Formation is not activation, delivery, institutional leadership, or outcome; threat and material offers confound attraction.","ruling":"contested","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO020","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M13","DC-M14"],"case_id":"DC-C19","matched_set":"formal_commitment_architecture","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"current treaty architecture","causal_stage":"commitment_documented","observation":"The U.S. system maintains multiple ratified collective-defense arrangements with specified geographies, attack conditions, and constitutional processes.","quantitative_value":"NATO plus bilateral Japan, ROK, Philippines and other arrangements","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of obligation clarity, domestic authorization pathways, and institutionalized assurance.","source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S107"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Treaty wording and ratification do not prove performance if a qualifying trigger occurs; some language preserves national discretion.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO021","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M13","DC-M14","DC-M15"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"formal_commitment_resourcing","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"authorized","observation":"NATO commitments connect treaty obligations to standing councils, commands, plans, forces, exercises, and revised investment commitments.","quantitative_value":"all allies reported at least 2 percent defense spending in 2025; new 2035 plan","comparative_use":"Positive evidence that core commitments are not merely declaratory.","source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S49","DC-S121"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Spending is an input, the new target is undelivered, and direct threat explains increased resourcing.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO022","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M16"],"case_id":"DC-C19","matched_set":"alliance_reliability_calibration","system":"Comparative historical","period":"1816-2019","causal_stage":"activated","observation":"Updated research estimates that most invoked formal alliances were honored, while showing substantial violation and major sensitivity to definitions and postwar case selection.","quantitative_value":"64-70 percent alliance-level fulfillment across two war datasets","comparative_use":"Calibrates the credibility value and limits of formal alliance commitments without assigning the global historical rate to Washington.","source_ids":["DC-S109"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The dataset is not a current U.S.-PRC comparison, excludes deterred cases, and codes only written obligations under defined triggers.","ruling":"boundary","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO023","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M13","DC-M16"],"case_id":"DC-C19","matched_set":"formal_commitment_architecture","system":"PRC-centered","period":"1961-2026","causal_stage":"commitment_documented","observation":"The China-DPRK friendship, cooperation, and mutual-assistance treaty remains in force and was reaffirmed by both leaders at its 65th anniversary.","quantitative_value":"one current mutual-assistance treaty case","comparative_use":"Positive PRC evidence of a durable legal security commitment.","source_ids":["DC-S108","DC-S126"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"No recent qualifying trigger provides a comparable fulfillment test, and official anniversary claims are not performance evidence.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO024","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M14","DC-M15","DC-M16"],"case_id":"DC-C26","matched_set":"development_commitment_conversion","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2000-2023 implementation record","causal_stage":"delivered","observation":"AidData finds a very large PRC development-finance portfolio with completed projects, troubled projects, rescue activity, and reforms intended to improve speed, safeguards, and reputation.","quantitative_value":"20,985 projects; about $1.34 trillion committed across 165 lower-income countries","comparative_use":"Positive evidence that PRC commitments often convert into material output and repair rather than remaining summit pledges.","source_ids":["DC-S110","DC-S127"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Portfolio scale is not a fulfillment rate for all promises; terms, cancellations, and quality remain incompletely disclosed.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO025","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M16"],"case_id":"DC-C21","matched_set":"agreement_continuity_failure","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2015-2018","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"The P5+1 coalition obtained verified Iranian nuclear implementation, but the United States later withdrew from the agreement despite initial verification.","quantitative_value":"initial implementation followed by U.S. withdrawal in May 2018","comparative_use":"Direct counterevidence to U.S. policy continuity and durable non-treaty commitment credibility.","source_ids":["DC-S63","DC-S118","DC-S119"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The United States argued the agreement was inadequate; later Iranian violations and other participants' choices complicate long-run blame.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO026","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M16"],"case_id":"DC-C25","matched_set":"current_policy_continuity","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"authorized","observation":"The 2025 foreign-aid order paused new obligations and disbursements pending review, while related withdrawals, arrears, and budget changes created a broad current continuity shock.","quantitative_value":"90-day review order plus program-specific waivers and later policy changes","comparative_use":"Direct current counterevidence for predictable implementation of political and assistance commitments.","source_ids":["DC-S56","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S111"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Lawful reprioritization is not automatically breach, and the program-level denominator of terminated versus resumed commitments is incomplete.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO027","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M16","DC-M34"],"case_id":"DC-C15","matched_set":"agreement_continuity_failure","system":"PRC-centered","period":"1984-2026","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"The United Kingdom continues to assess the PRC as noncompliant with core Joint Declaration guarantees in Hong Kong.","quantitative_value":"counterparty assessment of ongoing noncompliance; some economic autonomy remains","comparative_use":"Serious counterevidence to treating long-running PRC agreements as uniformly reliable.","source_ids":["DC-S112"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The United Kingdom is a counterparty and Beijing disputes its interpretation; the case is not a security-alliance comparator.","ruling":"counters_prc_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO028","category_ids":["DC-D04"],"metric_ids":["DC-M13","DC-M14","DC-M15","DC-M16"],"case_id":"DC-C19","matched_set":"commitment_credibility_synthesis","system":"Both systems","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"delivered","observation":"The U.S./partner system has a broader observed portfolio of specific, domestically authorized, standing commitments; the PRC has material delivery and one durable mutual-assistance treaty but relies more heavily on political and programmatic forms.","quantitative_value":"qualitative matched profile; no universal fulfillment rate","comparative_use":"Supports a low-confidence U.S./partner edge while retaining major discontinuities on both sides.","source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S31","DC-S33","DC-S43","DC-S67","DC-S107","DC-S108","DC-S109","DC-S110","DC-S111","DC-S112"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"asymmetric","contrary_or_limit":"PRC obligations and failures are less observable, U.S. failure disclosure is richer, and formal specificity may trade flexibility for rigidity.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO029","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17"],"case_id":"DC-C23","matched_set":"overseas_access_network","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2024 inventory","causal_stage":"access_usable","observation":"CRS identified a globally distributed U.S. network governed by treaties, compacts, SOFAs, defense agreements, and other host arrangements.","quantitative_value":"at least 128 bases in at least 51 countries","comparative_use":"Strong positive evidence of legal, physical, resourced, and geographically distributed access.","source_ids":["DC-S113"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Base count includes different functions and does not prove unrestricted use in a specific contingency.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO030","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17","DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C23","matched_set":"host_access_stress","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2003-2024","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"Host governments have restricted or revoked U.S. access, including Turkey's 2003 combat-use refusal and Niger's 2024 forced withdrawal after a coup.","quantitative_value":"two salient restrictions within a much larger network","comparative_use":"Directly establishes sovereignty, revocability, and government-change risk.","source_ids":["DC-S113"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Salient failures do not measure the network-wide denial rate and may overrepresent unstable hosts.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO031","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17","DC-M18"],"case_id":"DC-C03","matched_set":"indo_pacific_access_conversion","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2023-2026","causal_stage":"exercised_or_tested","observation":"The Philippines and United States expanded EDCA to nine locations, assigned site-development resources, and linked access to recurring exercises and alliance guidelines.","quantitative_value":"nine EDCA locations; bilateral funding commitments","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of host authorization and conversion toward usable access.","source_ids":["DC-S37","DC-S117"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Public records do not establish completed capacity, unrestricted offensive use, or permission in every Taiwan or South China Sea scenario.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO032","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17","DC-M34"],"case_id":"DC-C23","matched_set":"compact_access_conversion","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"renewed compact period through 2026","causal_stage":"access_usable","observation":"Renewed Compacts of Free Association provide regional U.S. military access and security rights that survived renegotiation, while GAO found delays in assistance implementation and oversight.","quantitative_value":"three freely associated states; access rights renewed","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of legally durable access with partner-side implementation limits visible.","source_ids":["DC-S116"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The audit does not test crisis throughput, and assistance delays could erode future political support.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO033","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17","DC-M18"],"case_id":"DC-C24","matched_set":"prc_military_access_conversion","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2017-2026","causal_stage":"exercised_or_tested","observation":"The PRC operates its Djibouti base and has persistent PLAN use plus a joint support and training center at the expanded Ream facility.","quantitative_value":"one acknowledged overseas base plus observed preferential access at Ream","comparative_use":"Positive evidence that PRC overseas access is real and expanding beyond commercial calls.","source_ids":["DC-S114","DC-S115"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Ream's legal terms are undisclosed, Cambodia denies exclusivity, and the network remains far narrower than U.S. basing.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO034","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17","DC-M18"],"case_id":"DC-C24","matched_set":"prc_port_access_potential","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2000-2025","causal_stage":"exercised_or_tested","observation":"PRC finance reaches ports globally, and Chinese ownership correlates with a higher incidence of observed PRC naval activity.","quantitative_value":"363 activities at 168 ports in 90 countries; naval activity at more than half of financed ports with a Chinese owner","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of access pathways and logistical familiarity beyond formal bases.","source_ids":["DC-S114"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"The naval-activity measure includes port calls, hospital ships, and exercises; none alone proves crisis permission, throughput, or exclusivity.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO035","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17"],"case_id":"DC-C24","matched_set":"commercial_to_crisis_access_gate","system":"PRC-centered","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"access_usable","observation":"A U.S. ship visit at Ream and Cambodian denials of exclusive foreign control show that host-state agency can preserve nonexclusive access even at a PRC-developed facility.","quantitative_value":"one observed U.S. visit after expansion","comparative_use":"Counterevidence to converting construction, finance, or recurring PLAN presence automatically into exclusive PRC access.","source_ids":["DC-S115","DC-S124"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"A ceremonial or scheduled visit does not reveal access under a crisis or disprove reserved facilities.","ruling":"counters_prc_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO036","category_ids":["DC-D05"],"metric_ids":["DC-M17","DC-M18","DC-M19"],"case_id":"DC-C23","matched_set":"usable_access_synthesis","system":"Both systems","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"activated","observation":"The U.S./partner system has the broader verified chain from agreement to funded site, exercise, persistent presence, and activation; the PRC has real but narrower bases and a large pool of conditional port pathways.","quantitative_value":"order-of-magnitude network difference; no common capacity denominator","comparative_use":"Supports a U.S./partner edge with moderate confidence, not a global lead.","source_ids":["DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S37","DC-S113","DC-S114","DC-S115","DC-S116","DC-S117","DC-S124"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Classified permissions, capacity, survivability, nonmilitary access, and scenario-specific host consent remain unresolved for both systems.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO037","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"metric_ids":["DC-M30","DC-M31","DC-M32"],"case_id":"DC-C21","matched_set":"nuclear_bargaining_outcome","system":"U.S. / partner with PRC participation","period":"2013-2018 initial window","causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","observation":"The P5+1 obtained an agreement and verified initial Iranian nuclear implementation, demonstrating real coalition bargaining conversion.","quantitative_value":"decisive nuclear measures initially implemented and verified","comparative_use":"Positive U.S.-anchored multilateral outcome evidence.","source_ids":["DC-S118","DC-S119"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The PRC was a coalition participant, sanctions and bilateral channels were major causes, and U.S. withdrawal destroyed durability.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO038","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"metric_ids":["DC-M30","DC-M31","DC-M32"],"case_id":"DC-C22","matched_set":"regional_normalization_outcome","system":"PRC-centered facilitation","period":"2023-2026","causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","observation":"Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations after a Beijing agreement, with prior Iraqi and Omani groundwork and independent incentives acknowledged.","quantitative_value":"embassy restoration achieved; broader security settlement not established","comparative_use":"Positive PRC diplomatic outcome evidence with bounded attribution.","source_ids":["DC-S120"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"This is mediation between two states, not a PRC-centered coalition bargaining against an opponent; compliance beyond formal ties is mixed.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO039","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"metric_ids":["DC-M30","DC-M32"],"case_id":"DC-C06","matched_set":"coercive_coalition_outcome","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"1990-1991","causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","observation":"The UN-authorized coalition achieved Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, but overwhelming military force was the proximate mechanism.","quantitative_value":"bounded territorial objective achieved","comparative_use":"Historical positive outcome that cannot be assigned mainly to diplomacy.","source_ids":["DC-S44"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The case belongs primarily to National Defense and is not a matched contemporary PRC diplomatic comparator.","ruling":"boundary","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO040","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"metric_ids":["DC-M30","DC-M31","DC-M32"],"case_id":"DC-C05","matched_set":"counterterrorism_outcome","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2014-2026","causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","observation":"The coalition eliminated ISIS territorial control and shifted missions, but ISIS branches persist and the mechanism was principally military, financial, and local-partner action.","quantitative_value":"territorial objective achieved; enduring defeat incomplete","comparative_use":"Shows why coalition delivery and strategic outcome cannot be collapsed.","source_ids":["DC-S45","DC-S46","DC-S105"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Objectives evolved, causal mechanisms span domains, and no PRC-centered matched case exists.","ruling":"boundary","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO041","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"metric_ids":["DC-M30","DC-M31","DC-M32"],"case_id":"DC-C02","matched_set":"political_settlement_outcome","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2001-2021","causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","observation":"A broad coalition activated and delivered for two decades in Afghanistan but did not secure a durable political settlement or partner-state survival.","quantitative_value":"durable political endpoint failed","comparative_use":"Major negative case against inferring bargaining success from coalition breadth or delivery.","source_ids":["DC-S47","DC-S48"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Local politics, military strategy, Pakistan, and the U.S.-Taliban bilateral process are powerful rival explanations.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO042","category_ids":["DC-D09"],"metric_ids":["DC-M30","DC-M31","DC-M32"],"case_id":"DC-C17","matched_set":"bargaining_comparability_gate","system":"Both systems","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"bargaining_outcome","observation":"The completed case set contains genuine successes and failures for both systems but no predeclared cross-issue portfolio with common objective difficulty, opponent leverage, compliance windows, and coalition counterfactuals.","quantitative_value":"zero matched portfolio-level comparisons meeting all three metric contracts","comparative_use":"Requires Insufficient comparative basis rather than Contested.","source_ids":["DC-S21","DC-S44","DC-S45","DC-S47","DC-S48","DC-S58","DC-S118","DC-S119","DC-S120"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"asymmetric","contrary_or_limit":"Private objectives and side payments remain hidden; economic and military leverage often dominates the political conversion layer.","ruling":"unscored","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO043","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M33","DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"alliance_shock_durability","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"1949-2026 with 2022 shock focus","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"NATO survived repeated government changes, adapted after the Cold War, and expanded to Finland and Sweden after Russia's 2022 invasion while integrating new plans and forces.","quantitative_value":"32 members; more than 75 years of continuity","comparative_use":"Strong positive evidence of retention, adaptation, and attraction under a major adversarial shock.","source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S49","DC-S121"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Direct Russian threat, member self-interest, and autonomous European action explain much durability; current transatlantic friction remains material.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO044","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M33","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"delivery_shock_durability","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"European partners increased and partly substituted support after U.S. aid withdrawal, demonstrating system resilience but also dependence on a contested principal role.","quantitative_value":"European allocations largely replaced the 2025 U.S. withdrawal in aggregate; critical categories remain uneven","comparative_use":"Positive partner-system resilience and counterevidence to equating it with uninterrupted U.S. leadership.","source_ids":["DC-S93","DC-S94","DC-S95"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Allocations are not final delivery or military effect, and burden concentration and regional threat explain the response.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO045","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C25","matched_set":"government_change_discontinuity","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"U.S. withdrawals, arrears, foreign-aid review, and organizational changes show that political commitments can change sharply after an election even when partner institutions persist.","quantitative_value":"correlated multi-policy administration shock","comparative_use":"Serious counterevidence to a U.S./partner lead in government-change persistence.","source_ids":["DC-S56","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S111"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"These are deliberate legal policy changes, not one common commitment universe or necessarily allied abandonment.","ruling":"counters_us_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO046","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C03","matched_set":"bilateral_alliance_turnover","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2016-2026","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"The U.S.-Philippines alliance contracted politically under Duterte but retained its treaty and later expanded access and exercises under Marcos.","quantitative_value":"five original EDCA sites expanded to nine after government change","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of institutional persistence and repair, paired with visible turnover sensitivity.","source_ids":["DC-S37","DC-S113","DC-S117"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"The reversal also shows that usable access depends heavily on one host election and the security environment.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO047","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M33","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C10","matched_set":"institutional_expansion_durability","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2009-2026","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"BRICS retained its original members through serious bilateral disputes and expanded substantially, showing durable demand for the forum.","quantitative_value":"five original members expanded to eleven plus partner tier","comparative_use":"Strong positive evidence of retention and attraction.","source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S106","DC-S122"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Continued membership and summit attendance do not show stable role delivery, common alignment, or PRC leadership over other members.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO048","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M33","DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C15","matched_set":"regional_forum_durability","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2000-2026","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"FOCAC sustained regular political engagement for twenty-five years and evolved from infrastructure emphasis toward broader implementation and follow-up mechanisms.","quantitative_value":"twenty-five years of forum continuity","comparative_use":"Positive evidence of long-lived PRC-centered regional relationship architecture.","source_ids":["DC-S43","DC-S72","DC-S125"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Independent obligation-level retention and delivery rates are incomplete; joint retrospective sources may favor success cases.","ruling":"supports_prc","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO049","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M33","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C12","matched_set":"consensus_shock_and_repair","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2021-2025","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"The SCO retained members and repaired a 2025 consensus failure at the heads-of-state level, while repeated India-China and India-Pakistan disputes constrain cohesion.","quantitative_value":"67-day declaratory repair after ministerial failure","comparative_use":"Mixed evidence of institutional persistence without reliable executable unity.","source_ids":["DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77","DC-S83","DC-S84"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"A declaratory repair is not role delivery; the SCO's narrower functions differ from an alliance.","ruling":"contested","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO050","category_ids":["DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M33","DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"durability_synthesis","system":"Both systems","period":"current evidence cutoff","causal_stage":"durable_effect","observation":"U.S.-anchored alliances show deeper stress-tested role retention and repair; PRC-centered forums show durable attraction and expansion but thinner evidence of continued costly-role delivery.","quantitative_value":"qualitative matched profile across alliance, club, forum, and bilateral cases","comparative_use":"Supports a low-confidence U.S./partner edge, not a lead.","source_ids":["DC-S19","DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S43","DC-S72","DC-S83","DC-S84","DC-S93","DC-S95","DC-S106","DC-S111","DC-S121","DC-S122","DC-S125"],"evidence_role":"synthesis","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"partial_matched","contrary_or_limit":"Institutional age, direct threat, mandate, disclosure, and non-random shocks explain much observed difference; current U.S. discontinuity sharply narrows the edge.","ruling":"supports_us_partner","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO051","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M15","DC-M23","DC-M25","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"current_ukraine_commitment_and_burden","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2026-07","causal_stage":"commitment_documented","observation":"NATO allies pledged EUR70 billion in Ukraine equipment, assistance, and training for 2026 and equivalent levels in 2027, while recording that European allies and Canada now finance the vast majority of security assistance.","quantitative_value":"EUR70 billion pledged for 2026; at least equivalent level pledged for 2027","comparative_use":"Current positive evidence of coalition commitment continuity and partner substitution after reduced U.S. delivery; the pledge is not counted as delivered output.","source_ids":["DC-S128"],"evidence_role":"affirmative","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"NATO authored the claim; country obligations, delivery, acceptance, quality, and causal attribution are incomplete.","ruling":"supports_us_partner_edge_not_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO052","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M13","DC-M14","DC-M34","DC-M35"],"case_id":"DC-C01","matched_set":"contingent_security_guarantee","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2026-07","causal_stage":"authorized","observation":"Coalition of the Willing co-chairs documented a contingent security-guarantee design, a ready-to-operate multinational force, a standing Paris headquarters, and a French-to-British command rotation.","quantitative_value":"triggered only after a credible ceasefire and Ukrainian request","comparative_use":"Evidence of commitment specificity, authorization, coordination, and partner-led continuity; it remains pre-trigger capacity rather than activation or delivery.","source_ids":["DC-S129","DC-S130"],"evidence_role":"boundary","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Participant obligations and caveats are incomplete, exercises were still planned, and no trigger or deployment had occurred.","ruling":"supports_us_partner_edge_not_lead","ledger":"domain completion"},{"observation_id":"DC-CO053","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D10"],"metric_ids":["DC-M14","DC-M17","DC-M34"],"case_id":"DC-C03","matched_set":"current_host_permission_and_caveat","system":"U.S. / partner","period":"2026-03","causal_stage":"access_usable","observation":"Philippine authorities reaffirmed that all nine EDCA locations remain Philippine-owned and controlled, U.S. presence is rotational, and the sites are not authorized for offensive action unrelated to Philippine purposes.","quantitative_value":"nine host-controlled agreed locations","comparative_use":"Confirms continuing access while directly preserving sovereign-host control, mission limits, and revocability as constraints on usable access and commitment certainty.","source_ids":["DC-S131"],"evidence_role":"counterevidence","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_observability":"direct_unmatched","contrary_or_limit":"Official statements do not reveal site-level readiness or predict permissions in a high-end crisis; political and scenario caveats can change.","ruling":"supports_us_partner_edge_not_lead","ledger":"domain completion"}],"sources":[{"source_id":"DC-S01","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"Global Diplomacy Index 2024: About and methodology","date_or_version":"2024 release; data collected July-November 2023","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"method_documented_network_input","actor_coverage":"66 countries and territories including United States and PRC","update_cadence":"multi-year releases","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Formal post definitions, collection method, geographic footprint, and time-series caveats","known_limitations":"Counts offices rather than staff quality, political access, implementation, or outcomes; coverage is not universal and observation year lags release year","url":"https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/about","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Lowy Institute project page and documented collection methodology","language":"English","id":"DC-S01","date":"2024 release; data collected July-November 2023","primary_use":"Formal post definitions, collection method, geographic footprint, and time-series caveats","limitation":"Counts offices rather than staff quality, political access, implementation, or outcomes; coverage is not universal and observation year lags release year"},{"source_id":"DC-S02","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"Global Diplomacy Index 2024: Country ranking","date_or_version":"2024 release","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"comparative_network_input","actor_coverage":"United States, PRC, and 64 other covered networks","update_cadence":"multi-year releases","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Matched post counts and post-type composition","known_limitations":"Raw footprint cannot establish expertise or effectiveness; 2024 page primarily reflects 2023 collection and changed counting rules","url":"https://www.globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/country_ranking","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Interactive ranking tied to the Global Diplomacy Index methodology","language":"English","id":"DC-S02","date":"2024 release","primary_use":"Matched post counts and post-type composition","limitation":"Raw footprint cannot establish expertise or effectiveness; 2024 page primarily reflects 2023 collection and changed counting rules"},{"source_id":"DC-S03","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"Asia Power Index methodology","date_or_version":"2025 edition","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"method_documented_composite_reference","actor_coverage":"27 Indo-Pacific actors","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D03","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Existing indicator definitions for diplomatic network, dialogues, multilateral participation, voting, and institutional shares; negative design reference for avoiding one composite","known_limitations":"Uses expert weights and some perception measures; regional rather than global; activity and input measures remain distinct from outcomes","url":"https://power.lowyinstitute.org/methodology/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Published methodology for the annual Asia Power Index","language":"English","id":"DC-S03","date":"2025 edition","primary_use":"Existing indicator definitions for diplomatic network, dialogues, multilateral participation, voting, and institutional shares; negative design reference for avoiding one composite","limitation":"Uses expert weights and some perception measures; regional rather than global; activity and input measures remain distinct from outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S04","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"Diplomatic dialogues: bilateral","date_or_version":"2025 edition; 2024 observations","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"coded_activity_input","actor_coverage":"27 Indo-Pacific actors","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D03"],"primary_uses":"Leader- and foreign-minister bilateral dialogue tempo","known_limitations":"Meeting count does not show content, access below minister level, concessions, or implementation; home-hosting and regional calendars can distort comparison","url":"https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/diplomatic-influence/foreign-policy/diplomatic-dialogues-bilateral/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Lowy-coded dialogue series published with Asia Power Index","language":"English","id":"DC-S04","date":"2025 edition; 2024 observations","primary_use":"Leader- and foreign-minister bilateral dialogue tempo","limitation":"Meeting count does not show content, access below minister level, concessions, or implementation; home-hosting and regional calendars can distort comparison"},{"source_id":"DC-S05","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"Diplomatic dialogues: multilateral","date_or_version":"2025 edition; 2024 observations","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"coded_activity_input","actor_coverage":"27 Indo-Pacific actors","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Plurilateral and multilateral leader- and foreign-minister participation","known_limitations":"Participation volume is partly opportunity-driven and does not establish leadership, consensus, delivery, or bargaining success","url":"https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/diplomatic-influence/multilateral-power/diplomatic-dialogues-multilateral/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Lowy-coded dialogue series published with Asia Power Index","language":"English","id":"DC-S05","date":"2025 edition; 2024 observations","primary_use":"Plurilateral and multilateral leader- and foreign-minister participation","limitation":"Participation volume is partly opportunity-driven and does not establish leadership, consensus, delivery, or bargaining success"},{"source_id":"DC-S06","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"2 FAM 130: The U.S. Government's Overseas Presence","date_or_version":"CT:GEN-632; 2026-05-18","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","directness":"official_definition_and_structure","actor_coverage":"United States","update_cadence":"irregular policy updates","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Current official post types, embassy functions, mission composition, and overseas staffing model concepts","known_limitations":"Describes intended structure rather than filled staffing, skill match, host-country access, or comparative performance","url":"https://fam.state.gov/fam/02fam/02fam0130.html","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Current Foreign Affairs Manual chapter maintained by the Department of State","language":"English","id":"DC-S06","date":"CT:GEN-632; 2026-05-18","primary_use":"Current official post types, embassy functions, mission composition, and overseas staffing model concepts","limitation":"Describes intended structure rather than filled staffing, skill match, host-country access, or comparative performance"},{"source_id":"DC-S07","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"10 FAH-1 H-020: Public diplomacy at posts abroad","date_or_version":"current manual page","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","directness":"official_definition_and_structure","actor_coverage":"United States","update_cadence":"irregular policy updates","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D02"],"primary_uses":"Official public-diplomacy roles, staffing relationships, resources, and embassy responsibilities","known_limitations":"Defines intended organization and responsibilities; does not show audience behavior, access conversion, or comparative effectiveness","url":"https://fam.state.gov/FAM/10FAH01/10FAH010020.html","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Current Foreign Affairs Handbook page maintained by the Department of State","language":"English","id":"DC-S07","date":"current manual page","primary_use":"Official public-diplomacy roles, staffing relationships, resources, and embassy responsibilities","limitation":"Defines intended organization and responsibilities; does not show audience behavior, access conversion, or comparative effectiveness"},{"source_id":"DC-S08","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"10 FAH-1 H-040: Public diplomacy strategic planning, reporting and evaluations","date_or_version":"current manual page","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","directness":"official_method_and_reporting_rule","actor_coverage":"United States","update_cadence":"irregular policy updates","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D02","DC-D07"],"primary_uses":"Country-context, implementation-plan, monitoring, and evaluation requirements","known_limitations":"Process requirements do not prove compliance, quality, causal impact, or consistency across posts","url":"https://fam.state.gov/FAM/10FAH01/10FAH010040.html","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Current Foreign Affairs Handbook page maintained by the Department of State","language":"English","id":"DC-S08","date":"current manual page","primary_use":"Country-context, implementation-plan, monitoring, and evaluation requirements","limitation":"Process requirements do not prove compliance, quality, causal impact, or consistency across posts"},{"source_id":"DC-S09","publisher":"U.S. Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs","title":"Evaluation of the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Academic and Professional Fellows Programs","date_or_version":"evaluation posted 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State ECA","directness":"program_evaluation","actor_coverage":"United States and ASEAN participant network","update_cadence":"one-time evaluation","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"primary_uses":"Exchange-network persistence, alumni interaction, collaboration, and self-reported outcomes","known_limitations":"Program-selected participants, survey response and self-report limits, and no matched PRC comparator; networking outcomes are not coalition behavior","url":"https://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/dos1635_ysealiexchangereport_final_508.pdf","source_origin":"Official evaluation","provenance":"Externally conducted program evaluation published by State ECA","language":"English","id":"DC-S09","date":"evaluation posted 2025","primary_use":"Exchange-network persistence, alumni interaction, collaboration, and self-reported outcomes","limitation":"Program-selected participants, survey response and self-report limits, and no matched PRC comparator; networking outcomes are not coalition behavior"},{"source_id":"DC-S10","publisher":"International Department of the CPC Central Committee","title":"Department Profile","date_or_version":"current page accessed 2026-08-12","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"CPC International Department","directness":"actor_reported_network_scope","actor_coverage":"PRC party-to-party network and claimed global ties","update_cadence":"irregular","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03"],"primary_uses":"Institutional mandate, channel types, and self-reported ties with more than 600 parties and organizations","known_limitations":"First-party scope claim; no denominator, recency test, independent verification, or outcome evidence; party relationships vary in governing relevance","url":"https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/zlbjj/jgsz/202308/t20230810_161827.html","source_origin":"PRC official primary","provenance":"English-language page on the official CPC International Department site","language":"English","id":"DC-S10","date":"current page accessed 2026-08-12","primary_use":"Institutional mandate, channel types, and self-reported ties with more than 600 parties and organizations","limitation":"First-party scope claim; no denominator, recency test, independent verification, or outcome evidence; party relationships vary in governing relevance"},{"source_id":"DC-S11","publisher":"International Department of the CPC Central Committee","title":"Welcome Message","date_or_version":"current page accessed 2026-08-12","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"CPC International Department","directness":"official_mandate_statement","actor_coverage":"PRC party, public, and people-to-people diplomacy","update_cadence":"irregular","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Official description of the integrated party-to-party, public, and people-to-people diplomacy model","known_limitations":"Normative and self-promotional statement; establishes intent and organization, not reach quality, legitimacy, conversion, or effects","url":"https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/zlbjj/bzzc/","source_origin":"PRC official primary","provenance":"English-language message on the official CPC International Department site","language":"English","id":"DC-S11","date":"current page accessed 2026-08-12","primary_use":"Official description of the integrated party-to-party, public, and people-to-people diplomacy model","limitation":"Normative and self-promotional statement; establishes intent and organization, not reach quality, legitimacy, conversion, or effects"},{"source_id":"DC-S12","publisher":"Frederick S. Pardee Institute for International Futures, University of Denver","title":"Diplometrics datasets","date_or_version":"current project page accessed 2026-08-12","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"University of Denver Pardee Institute","directness":"method_documented_dataset_index","actor_coverage":"Global and bilateral historical coverage varies by dataset","update_cadence":"dataset-specific","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Existing-solution preflight for diplomatic representation, leader travel, organizations, treaties, influence, and non-state networks","known_limitations":"Coverage dates, access, actor definitions, and update cadence vary; several datasets are historical and not sufficient for a current position","url":"https://korbel.du.edu/pardee/diplometrics/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University research program with dataset-level methods and citation guidance","language":"English","id":"DC-S12","date":"current project page accessed 2026-08-12","primary_use":"Existing-solution preflight for diplomatic representation, leader travel, organizations, treaties, influence, and non-state networks","limitation":"Coverage dates, access, actor definitions, and update cadence vary; several datasets are historical and not sufficient for a current position"},{"source_id":"DC-S13","publisher":"Correlates of War Project","title":"Diplomatic Exchange dataset v2006.1","date_or_version":"1817-2005 coverage","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Correlates of War Project","directness":"coded_historical_network_data","actor_coverage":"Interstate-system members","update_cadence":"static historical release","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Historical ambassador, minister, and chargé-level representation for calibration and long-run network research","known_limitations":"Ends before the current competition period and codes representation level rather than staff, informal channels, access, or outcomes","url":"https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/diplomatic-exchange/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Academic dataset hosted by the Correlates of War Project","language":"English","id":"DC-S13","date":"1817-2005 coverage","primary_use":"Historical ambassador, minister, and chargé-level representation for calibration and long-run network research","limitation":"Ends before the current competition period and codes representation level rather than staff, informal channels, access, or outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S14","publisher":"United Nations Treaty Section","title":"United Nations Treaty Collection","date_or_version":"current service","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations Treaty Section","directness":"official_treaty_and_status_record","actor_coverage":"Global","update_cadence":"continuous registration with consolidation lags","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Treaty text, registration, signature, ratification, accession, reservations, and depositary status","known_limitations":"Registration is not performance; some agreements are not registered promptly and political commitments may fall outside the collection","url":"https://treaties.un.org/pages/home.aspx?lang=eng","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN treaty registration and depositary portal","language":"English and treaty languages","id":"DC-S14","date":"current service","primary_use":"Treaty text, registration, signature, ratification, accession, reservations, and depositary status","limitation":"Registration is not performance; some agreements are not registered promptly and political commitments may fall outside the collection"},{"source_id":"DC-S15","publisher":"Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project, Rice University","title":"ATOP dataset 5.1","date_or_version":"alliances signed 1815-2018","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"ATOP Project","directness":"coded_treaty_content_data","actor_coverage":"Global state alliances","update_cadence":"periodic research releases","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Alliance obligation content, conditions, institutional provisions, and duration for calibration and baseline coding","known_limitations":"Coverage ends in 2018; treaty text does not show current authorization, usable access, activation, fulfillment, or informal alignment","url":"https://www.atopdata.org/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Rice-hosted academic alliance treaty dataset and codebook","language":"English","id":"DC-S15","date":"alliances signed 1815-2018","primary_use":"Alliance obligation content, conditions, institutional provisions, and duration for calibration and baseline coding","limitation":"Coverage ends in 2018; treaty text does not show current authorization, usable access, activation, fulfillment, or informal alignment"},{"source_id":"DC-S16","publisher":"Correlates of War Project","title":"Formal Alliances v4.1","date_or_version":"1816-2012","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Correlates of War Project","directness":"coded_historical_treaty_data","actor_coverage":"Global interstate alliances","update_cadence":"static historical release","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Defense pact, neutrality, non-aggression, and entente classification for historical calibration","known_limitations":"Coverage ends in 2012; broad alliance types omit many obligation details and say nothing about current performance","url":"https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Academic dataset and release notes hosted by Correlates of War","language":"English","id":"DC-S16","date":"1816-2012","primary_use":"Defense pact, neutrality, non-aggression, and entente classification for historical calibration","limitation":"Coverage ends in 2012; broad alliance types omit many obligation details and say nothing about current performance"},{"source_id":"DC-S17","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Consensus decision-making at NATO","date_or_version":"updated 2023-06-30","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"NATO","directness":"official_decision_rule","actor_coverage":"NATO members","update_cadence":"irregular","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Consensus rule, consultation process, and application at every committee level","known_limitations":"Formal rule does not reveal issue-specific negotiation time, blocked proposals, opt-outs, or implementation after a decision","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/consensus-decision-making-at-nato","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official NATO description of its decision process","language":"English","id":"DC-S17","date":"updated 2023-06-30","primary_use":"Consensus rule, consultation process, and application at every committee level","limitation":"Formal rule does not reveal issue-specific negotiation time, blocked proposals, opt-outs, or implementation after a decision"},{"source_id":"DC-S18","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Military Committee","date_or_version":"updated 2025-01-17","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"NATO","directness":"official_implementation_structure","actor_coverage":"NATO members and named partner formats","update_cadence":"irregular","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Standing link from political decisions to military direction, committee cadence, partner formats, and implementation roles","known_limitations":"Institutional design and self-description do not establish speed, force availability, national caveats, or operational results","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-structure/nato-military-committee/military-committee","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official NATO organizational page","language":"English","id":"DC-S18","date":"updated 2025-01-17","primary_use":"Standing link from political decisions to military direction, committee cadence, partner formats, and implementation roles","limitation":"Institutional design and self-description do not establish speed, force availability, national caveats, or operational results"},{"source_id":"DC-S19","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Secretary General's Annual Report 2025","date_or_version":"2026 publication covering 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"NATO","directness":"actor_reported_delivery_and_activity","actor_coverage":"NATO members and partners","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Reported defense-spending commitments, exercises, decisions, partner activity, support delivery, and trend chronology","known_limitations":"NATO-authored and some figures are estimates or national submissions; military output belongs to Defense and must not be double counted","url":"https://nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/secretary-generals-annual-report/secretary-generals-annual-report-2025","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official annual report with linked expenditure and exercise data","language":"English","id":"DC-S19","date":"2026 publication covering 2025","primary_use":"Reported defense-spending commitments, exercises, decisions, partner activity, support delivery, and trend chronology","limitation":"NATO-authored and some figures are estimates or national submissions; military output belongs to Defense and must not be double counted"},{"source_id":"DC-S20","publisher":"United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library","title":"United Nations General Assembly voting data","date_or_version":"version 5; resolutions through 2025-12-30","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"structured_official_vote_data","actor_coverage":"UN member states","update_cadence":"versioned periodic release","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Issue-specific vote alignment, coalition mobilization, defections, and durability; 947,434 member-resolution records","known_limitations":"Includes recorded votes on adopted resolutions, not failed drafts or paragraph votes; abstention and absence require separate treatment; resolutions differ in importance","url":"https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4060887?ln=en","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN CSV and metadata derived from Digital Library voting records","language":"English metadata","id":"DC-S20","date":"version 5; resolutions through 2025-12-30","primary_use":"Issue-specific vote alignment, coalition mobilization, defections, and durability; 947,434 member-resolution records","limitation":"Includes recorded votes on adopted resolutions, not failed drafts or paragraph votes; abstention and absence require separate treatment; resolutions differ in importance"},{"source_id":"DC-S21","publisher":"United Nations Security Council","title":"Voting records since 1992","date_or_version":"rolling official dataset","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"structured_official_vote_and_outcome_data","actor_coverage":"Security Council members by term","update_cadence":"rolling","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D09"],"primary_uses":"Draft-resolution votes, outcomes, agenda topics, and veto behavior in the Security Council","known_limitations":"Council composition is selective, permanent-member veto power is asymmetric, and voting does not reveal private bargaining or implementation","url":"https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/voting-records-1992","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official Security Council voting dashboard with underlying Peace and Security Data Hub records","language":"English","id":"DC-S21","date":"rolling official dataset","primary_use":"Draft-resolution votes, outcomes, agenda topics, and veto behavior in the Security Council","limitation":"Council composition is selective, permanent-member veto power is asymmetric, and voting does not reveal private bargaining or implementation"},{"source_id":"DC-S22","publisher":"United Nations Committee on Contributions","title":"Assessments","date_or_version":"2025-2027 scales and current records","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"official_financial_obligation_data","actor_coverage":"UN member states","update_cadence":"annual and triennial scale updates","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Assessed obligations, scale rules, and institutional resource provision","known_limitations":"Assessment rate is capacity-based rather than voluntary leadership; assessed amounts, payments, arrears, and broader voluntary contributions are distinct","url":"https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/assessments.shtml","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN Committee on Contributions records","language":"English","id":"DC-S22","date":"2025-2027 scales and current records","primary_use":"Assessed obligations, scale rules, and institutional resource provision","limitation":"Assessment rate is capacity-based rather than voluntary leadership; assessed amounts, payments, arrears, and broader voluntary contributions are distinct"},{"source_id":"DC-S23","publisher":"United Nations Peacekeeping","title":"Troop and police contributors","date_or_version":"monthly files 2010-2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"structured_delivered_contribution_data","actor_coverage":"UN troop- and police-contributing countries","update_cadence":"monthly","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Actual monthly personnel contributions by country, post, and mission as one form of institutional delivery","known_limitations":"Personnel numbers omit mandate quality, caveats, equipment readiness, finance, performance, and political leadership; not a U.S.-PRC coalition measure by itself","url":"https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN Peacekeeping contribution files","language":"English","id":"DC-S23","date":"monthly files 2010-2026","primary_use":"Actual monthly personnel contributions by country, post, and mission as one form of institutional delivery","limitation":"Personnel numbers omit mandate quality, caveats, equipment readiness, finance, performance, and political leadership; not a U.S.-PRC coalition measure by itself"},{"source_id":"DC-S24","publisher":"BRICS Brazil Presidency","title":"About the BRICS","date_or_version":"updated 2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"BRICS Presidency","directness":"official_membership_and_decision_rule","actor_coverage":"BRICS members, partners, and invited organizations","update_cadence":"presidency-cycle updates","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Membership and partner categories, rotating presidency, objectives, and consensus rule","known_limitations":"Presidency-authored; membership labels and Saudi status have been reported inconsistently elsewhere; size and consensus do not establish delivery or PRC control","url":"https://brics.br/en/about-the-brics","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Official 2025 BRICS presidency site","language":"English","id":"DC-S24","date":"updated 2025","primary_use":"Membership and partner categories, rotating presidency, objectives, and consensus rule","limitation":"Presidency-authored; membership labels and Saudi status have been reported inconsistently elsewhere; size and consensus do not establish delivery or PRC control"},{"source_id":"DC-S25","publisher":"BRICS Brazil Presidency","title":"Nine nations announced as BRICS partner countries","date_or_version":"2025-01-17","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"BRICS Presidency","directness":"official_membership_process","actor_coverage":"BRICS members and initial partner countries","update_cadence":"one-time announcement","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Partner admission stages, consensus requirement, participation rights, and declaration endorsement options","known_limitations":"Invitation and acceptance are not assigned roles, implementation, alignment, or durability; later partner additions require updates","url":"https://brics.br/en/news/nine-nations-announced-as-brics-partner-countries","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Official 2025 BRICS presidency announcement","language":"English","id":"DC-S25","date":"2025-01-17","primary_use":"Partner admission stages, consensus requirement, participation rights, and declaration endorsement options","limitation":"Invitation and acceptance are not assigned roles, implementation, alignment, or durability; later partner additions require updates"},{"source_id":"DC-S26","publisher":"BRICS Brazil Presidency","title":"Rio de Janeiro Declaration: Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance","date_or_version":"2025-07-06","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"BRICS Presidency","directness":"official_collective_commitment_record","actor_coverage":"BRICS members","update_cadence":"annual summit cycle","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Collective agenda, commitments, institutional reform positions, and named implementation intentions","known_limitations":"Consensus declaration language varies in specificity and may mask internal disagreement; implementation requires independent and sector-specific follow-up","url":"https://brics.br/en/documents/presidency-documents/250705-brics-leaders-declaration-en.pdf/%40%40download/file","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Official declaration published by the 2025 BRICS presidency","language":"English","id":"DC-S26","date":"2025-07-06","primary_use":"Collective agenda, commitments, institutional reform positions, and named implementation intentions","limitation":"Consensus declaration language varies in specificity and may mask internal disagreement; implementation requires independent and sector-specific follow-up"},{"source_id":"DC-S27","publisher":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat","title":"Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization","date_or_version":"2002 charter; current official copy","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","directness":"official_charter_and_decision_rule","actor_coverage":"SCO members","update_cadence":"foundational document","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Objectives, legal personality, institutional bodies, interaction categories, obligation rule, and consensus decision procedure","known_limitations":"Founding rules do not show current cohesion, decision speed, implementation, or the relative influence of China and other members","url":"https://eng.sectsco.org/images/07e8/0c/14/1625960.pdf","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official English copy hosted by the SCO Secretariat","language":"English translation","id":"DC-S27","date":"2002 charter; current official copy","primary_use":"Objectives, legal personality, institutional bodies, interaction categories, obligation rule, and consensus decision procedure","limitation":"Founding rules do not show current cohesion, decision speed, implementation, or the relative influence of China and other members"},{"source_id":"DC-S28","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","title":"Members of the Bank","date_or_version":"as of 2026-05-29","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","directness":"structured_official_governance_data","actor_coverage":"AIIB members","update_cadence":"updated as membership and subscriptions change","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Membership, subscriptions, regional status, and voting power; China held 26.3642 percent of voting power on the stated date","known_limitations":"Voting power is not agenda control, project quality, coalition alignment, or implementation; many U.S. allies are members and must not be assigned to a PRC bloc automatically","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official AIIB governance table","language":"English","id":"DC-S28","date":"as of 2026-05-29","primary_use":"Membership, subscriptions, regional status, and voting power; China held 26.3642 percent of voting power on the stated date","limitation":"Voting power is not agenda control, project quality, coalition alignment, or implementation; many U.S. allies are members and must not be assigned to a PRC bloc automatically"},{"source_id":"DC-S29","publisher":"World Bank Group","title":"Voting Powers","date_or_version":"current service with dated tables","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Bank Group","directness":"structured_official_governance_data","actor_coverage":"World Bank member countries","update_cadence":"periodic","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"IBRD and affiliated-institution voting power and governance weight; current tables support U.S.-PRC comparison","known_limitations":"Voting power is an institutional input and differs by World Bank entity; it does not establish agenda success, stewardship, lending outcomes, or legitimacy","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official World Bank voting-power portal and linked dated tables","language":"English","id":"DC-S29","date":"current service with dated tables","primary_use":"IBRD and affiliated-institution voting power and governance weight; current tables support U.S.-PRC comparison","limitation":"Voting power is an institutional input and differs by World Bank entity; it does not establish agenda success, stewardship, lending outcomes, or legitimacy"},{"source_id":"DC-S30","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Trust in Global Co-operation: the vision for the OECD for the next decade","date_or_version":"2021 ministerial vision","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"OECD","directness":"official_mandate_and_values_statement","actor_coverage":"OECD members and partner engagement","update_cadence":"decadal strategy","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Stated institutional values, rules-based-order role, standards, peer review, and external engagement","known_limitations":"Member-authored normative statement does not establish U.S. leadership, current compliance, global legitimacy, or implementation of particular standards","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/about/trust-in-global-cooperation-the-vision-for-the-oecd-for-the-next-decade.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official OECD member vision statement","language":"English","id":"DC-S30","date":"2021 ministerial vision","primary_use":"Stated institutional values, rules-based-order role, standards, peer review, and external engagement","limitation":"Member-authored normative statement does not establish U.S. leadership, current compliance, global legitimacy, or implementation of particular standards"},{"source_id":"DC-S31","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Compendium of International Organisations' Practices: Strengthening implementation of international instruments","date_or_version":"2021","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"OECD","directness":"method_documented_intergovernmental_analysis","actor_coverage":"International organizations surveyed by OECD","update_cadence":"irregular","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Implementation-stage model, assistance, compliance, advocacy, monitoring, peer review, and evaluation mechanisms","known_limitations":"Cross-institution synthesis rather than U.S.-PRC performance data; reported practices and survey participation vary","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/compendium-of-international-organisations-practices_846a5fa0-en.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"OECD report based on international-organization practice templates and survey work","language":"English","id":"DC-S31","date":"2021","primary_use":"Implementation-stage model, assistance, compliance, advocacy, monitoring, peer review, and evaluation mechanisms","limitation":"Cross-institution synthesis rather than U.S.-PRC performance data; reported practices and survey participation vary"},{"source_id":"DC-S32","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"Appellate Body","date_or_version":"current page accessed 2026-08-12","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Trade Organization","directness":"official_institutional_status_and_case_record","actor_coverage":"WTO members","update_cadence":"rolling notices","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current inability to hear appeals, vacancy history, notified appeals, and institutional design; counterevidence for liberal-order stewardship claims","known_limitations":"The page establishes institutional status but not the full causal responsibility, negotiating positions, or comparative PRC stewardship record","url":"https://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official WTO institutional and case-status page","language":"English","id":"DC-S32","date":"current page accessed 2026-08-12","primary_use":"Current inability to hear appeals, vacancy history, notified appeals, and institutional design; counterevidence for liberal-order stewardship claims","limitation":"The page establishes institutional status but not the full causal responsibility, negotiating positions, or comparative PRC stewardship record"},{"source_id":"DC-S33","publisher":"G7 Research Group, University of Toronto","title":"G7 compliance reports and coding manual","date_or_version":"1996-2026 series","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"University of Toronto G7 Research Group","directness":"independent_commitment_compliance_coding","actor_coverage":"G7 members and EU by selected commitments","update_cadence":"summit-cycle updates","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Existing-solution preflight for commitment identification, compliance coding, and longitudinal delivery research","known_limitations":"Selection of commitments and coding judgment can affect results; G7 compliance does not represent all Western institutions or coalition outcomes","url":"https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/index.html","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University research group reports with published coding methodology","language":"English","id":"DC-S33","date":"1996-2026 series","primary_use":"Existing-solution preflight for commitment identification, compliance coding, and longitudinal delivery research","limitation":"Selection of commitments and coding judgment can affect results; G7 compliance does not represent all Western institutions or coalition outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S34","publisher":"Pew Research Center","title":"More people view the U.S. positively than China across 35 surveyed countries","date_or_version":"2024-07-09","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Pew Research Center","directness":"cross_national_public_opinion_survey","actor_coverage":"35 surveyed countries with varying modes and dates","update_cadence":"periodic","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Regional favorability comparison and survey-method baseline for legitimacy sensitivity checks","known_limitations":"Country coverage is not globally representative; favorability is volatile and does not equal elite access, policy alignment, willingness to act, or cost bearing","url":"https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/07/09/more-people-view-the-us-positively-than-china-across-35-surveyed-countries/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Pew cross-national survey analysis with linked methodology","language":"English","id":"DC-S34","date":"2024-07-09","primary_use":"Regional favorability comparison and survey-method baseline for legitimacy sensitivity checks","limitation":"Country coverage is not globally representative; favorability is volatile and does not equal elite access, policy alignment, willingness to act, or cost bearing"},{"source_id":"DC-S35","publisher":"ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute","title":"The State of Southeast Asia: 2026 Survey Report","date_or_version":"2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute","directness":"regional_elite_perception_survey","actor_coverage":"Southeast Asian policy and regional-affairs respondents","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Regional perceptions of influence, leadership, trust, alignment pressure, and ASEAN preferences","known_limitations":"Non-probability specialist survey rather than mass public or government behavior; aggregate results can hide country variation and cannot establish coalition action","url":"https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/The-State-of-Southeast-Asia-2026-Survey-Final-Single.pdf","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Annual ASEAN Studies Centre survey report with published methodology","language":"English","id":"DC-S35","date":"2026","primary_use":"Regional perceptions of influence, leadership, trust, alignment pressure, and ASEAN preferences","limitation":"Non-probability specialist survey rather than mass public or government behavior; aggregate results can hide country variation and cannot establish coalition action"},{"source_id":"DC-S36","publisher":"Afrobarometer","title":"Africa Day: Majority of Africans say African countries should be given greater influence in international decision-making bodies","date_or_version":"2025-05-23","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Afrobarometer","directness":"cross_national_public_opinion_survey","actor_coverage":"African countries covered in Afrobarometer Round 9","update_cadence":"survey-round updates","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"African demand for institutional voice and comparative perceptions of Chinese, U.S., EU, and regional influence","known_limitations":"Public perceptions do not equal government alignment or implementation; country coverage and question wording must be retained and influence ratings can reflect economic activity","url":"https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/africa-day-majority-of-africans-say-african-countries-should-be-given-greater-influence-in-international-decision-making-bodies/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Afrobarometer analysis tied to nationally representative surveys and downloadable release","language":"English","id":"DC-S36","date":"2025-05-23","primary_use":"African demand for institutional voice and comparative perceptions of Chinese, U.S., EU, and regional influence","limitation":"Public perceptions do not equal government alignment or implementation; country coverage and question wording must be retained and influence ratings can reflect economic activity"},{"source_id":"DC-S37","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines","date_or_version":"2023-05-03","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Defense","directness":"official_bilateral_commitment_and_access_record","actor_coverage":"United States and Philippines","update_cadence":"one-time with later implementation records required","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07"],"primary_uses":"Commitment scope, treaty trigger interpretation, EDCA access, interoperability, information sharing, and intended implementation","known_limitations":"Joint official summary does not prove site completion, crisis permission, national caveats, activation speed, or operational performance","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3383607/fact-sheet-us-philippines-bilateral-defense-guidelines/","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Official U.S. joint-guidelines fact sheet","language":"English","id":"DC-S37","date":"2023-05-03","primary_use":"Commitment scope, treaty trigger interpretation, EDCA access, interoperability, information sharing, and intended implementation","limitation":"Joint official summary does not prove site completion, crisis permission, national caveats, activation speed, or operational performance"},{"source_id":"DC-S38","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Regional Cooperation Framework for U.S.-ROK Alliance Contributions to Security in the Indo-Pacific","date_or_version":"2024-11-04","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Defense","directness":"official_bilateral_framework_and_implementation_plan","actor_coverage":"United States, Republic of Korea, and intended regional partners","update_cadence":"annual project intention","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07"],"primary_uses":"Named cooperation areas, implementation contacts, annual project intention, exercises, information sharing, and partner capacity building","known_limitations":"Framework language and intended projects do not establish delivered initiatives, partner demand, attribution, or outcomes","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3951831/regional-cooperation-framework-for-us-rok-alliance-contributions-to-security-in/","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Official U.S. release of bilateral framework","language":"English","id":"DC-S38","date":"2024-11-04","primary_use":"Named cooperation areas, implementation contacts, annual project intention, exercises, information sharing, and partner capacity building","limitation":"Framework language and intended projects do not establish delivered initiatives, partner demand, attribution, or outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S39","publisher":"U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian","title":"Visits by Foreign Leaders","date_or_version":"current historical database","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian","directness":"official_historical_visit_record","actor_coverage":"Foreign leaders visiting the United States","update_cadence":"historical updates","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D03"],"primary_uses":"Leader-visit chronology and separate-meeting threshold for U.S. diplomatic attention research","known_limitations":"Inbound U.S. visits only; visit occurrence does not reveal substance, access below the leader level, concessions, or comparative PRC activity","url":"https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Official Department of State historical database","language":"English","id":"DC-S39","date":"current historical database","primary_use":"Leader-visit chronology and separate-meeting threshold for U.S. diplomatic attention research","limitation":"Inbound U.S. visits only; visit occurrence does not reveal substance, access below the leader level, concessions, or comparative PRC activity"},{"source_id":"DC-S40","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"Holding High the Banner of Building a Community with a Shared Future For Mankind and Striving for Greater Achievements In Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics","date_or_version":"2025-01-27","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs","directness":"actor_strategy_and_claim_record","actor_coverage":"PRC global diplomatic system and claimed partner participation","update_cadence":"annual or irregular strategic statements","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Official theory of change, named forums, self-reported participation, policy priorities, and implementation claims requiring independent tests","known_limitations":"Normative and self-promotional; participation and support claims use actor-defined thresholds and do not establish partner agency, implementation, legitimacy, or comparative outcomes","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbzhd/202501/t20250127_11546599.html","source_origin":"PRC official primary","provenance":"Official English-language Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication of Wang Yi's Qiushi article","language":"English translation","id":"DC-S40","date":"2025-01-27","primary_use":"Official theory of change, named forums, self-reported participation, policy priorities, and implementation claims requiring independent tests","limitation":"Normative and self-promotional; participation and support claims use actor-defined thresholds and do not establish partner agency, implementation, legitimacy, or comparative outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S41","publisher":"United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library","title":"Voting Information","date_or_version":"current service","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"official_data_discovery_and_scope_guide","actor_coverage":"UN General Assembly and Security Council","update_cadence":"continuous","category_ids":["DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Authoritative route to voting records from 1946 onward and scope guidance","known_limitations":"Discovery page rather than a dataset; analysis must use the underlying records and preserve vote context","url":"https://www.un.org/en/node/75083","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN Library voting-data guide","language":"English","id":"DC-S41","date":"current service","primary_use":"Authoritative route to voting records from 1946 onward and scope guidance","limitation":"Discovery page rather than a dataset; analysis must use the underlying records and preserve vote context"},{"source_id":"DC-S42","publisher":"University of Gothenburg","title":"GenDip dataset on gender and diplomatic representation","date_or_version":"1968-2024 dataset; 2025 codebook","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"University of Gothenburg GenDip Project","directness":"coded_diplomatic_personnel_data","actor_coverage":"Global bilateral ambassadors","update_cadence":"versioned research releases","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Ambassador-level personnel continuity and representation research; methodological reference for person-level diplomatic data","known_limitations":"Gender representation is not a proxy for expertise or effectiveness; ambassador coverage omits broader mission staff and informal networks","url":"https://www.gu.se/en/gendip/gendip-data/the-gendip-dataset-on-gender-and-diplomatic-representation","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University research dataset with codebook and source documentation","language":"English","id":"DC-S42","date":"1968-2024 dataset; 2025 codebook","primary_use":"Ambassador-level personnel continuity and representation research; methodological reference for person-level diplomatic data","limitation":"Gender representation is not a proxy for expertise or effectiveness; ambassador coverage omits broader mission staff and informal networks"},{"source_id":"DC-S43","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)","date_or_version":"2024-09-06","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FOCAC","directness":"official_multilateral_action_plan","actor_coverage":"PRC and African FOCAC participants","update_cadence":"three-year plan with scheduled follow-up meetings","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Named commitments, implementation mechanisms, party and local-government exchanges, issue forums, financing intentions, and follow-up timetable","known_limitations":"Joint official plan establishes commitments and intended mechanisms but not recipient agency, delivered resources, implementation quality, additionality, or durable outcomes","url":"https://2024focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hyqk_1/202409/t20240906_11486213.htm","source_origin":"PRC official primary","provenance":"Official English-language text published for the 2024 FOCAC summit","language":"English translation","id":"DC-S43","date":"2024-09-06","primary_use":"Named commitments, implementation mechanisms, party and local-government exchanges, issue forums, financing intentions, and follow-up timetable","limitation":"Joint official plan establishes commitments and intended mechanisms but not recipient agency, delivered resources, implementation quality, additionality, or durable outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S44","publisher":"United Nations Security Council","title":"Resolution 678 (1990)","date_or_version":"1990-11-29","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"official_authorization_and_vote_record","actor_coverage":"Security Council members, Iraq, Kuwait, and cooperating member states","update_cadence":"one-time resolution","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Authorization terms, deadline, recorded vote, and legal basis for a historical coalition-conversion case","known_limitations":"The resolution does not identify every coalition role, explain individual votes, measure subsequent delivery, or establish the causes and durability of the outcome","url":"https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/102245?ln=en","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN Digital Library resolution record and voting metadata","language":"English","id":"DC-S44","date":"1990-11-29","primary_use":"Authorization terms, deadline, recorded vote, and legal basis for a historical coalition-conversion case","limitation":"The resolution does not identify every coalition role, explain individual votes, measure subsequent delivery, or establish the causes and durability of the outcome"},{"source_id":"DC-S45","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","date_or_version":"2021-2025 archived collection","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","directness":"actor_program_and_output_archive","actor_coverage":"United States, Iraq, Syria-related partners, and Global Coalition members","update_cadence":"archived collection with dated releases","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Coalition membership claims, working structures, declared objectives, ministerial records, and reported outputs across phases","known_limitations":"U.S.-maintained archive is selection-prone and cannot alone establish partner agency, independent delivery, attribution, civilian effects, or durable defeat","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/bureaus-archive/the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis","source_origin":"U.S. official primary","provenance":"Archived Department of State collection of coalition materials","language":"English","id":"DC-S45","date":"2021-2025 archived collection","primary_use":"Coalition membership claims, working structures, declared objectives, ministerial records, and reported outputs across phases","limitation":"U.S.-maintained archive is selection-prone and cannot alone establish partner agency, independent delivery, attribution, civilian effects, or durable defeat"},{"source_id":"DC-S46","publisher":"Governments of the United States and Iraq","title":"Joint Statement Announcing the Timeline for the End of the Military Mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq","date_or_version":"2024-09-27","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. and Iraqi governments","directness":"joint_transition_commitment","actor_coverage":"United States, Iraq, and referenced Global Coalition members","update_cadence":"one-time statement with implementation milestones","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Specified consultation process, September 2025 transition deadline, bilateral follow-on intent, and durability checkpoints","known_limitations":"Joint statement does not prove deadline fulfillment, continuing pressure on ISIS, coalition-wide consent, or durable bilateral implementation","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq/","source_origin":"Joint official primary","provenance":"Official publication of a U.S.-Iraq joint statement","language":"English","id":"DC-S46","date":"2024-09-27","primary_use":"Specified consultation process, September 2025 transition deadline, bilateral follow-on intent, and durability checkpoints","limitation":"Joint statement does not prove deadline fulfillment, continuing pressure on ISIS, coalition-wide consent, or durable bilateral implementation"},{"source_id":"DC-S47","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"ISAF's mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)","date_or_version":"updated 2022-05-30","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","directness":"actor_mission_history_and_output_claims","actor_coverage":"NATO, Afghanistan, and 51 NATO and partner contributors at peak","update_cadence":"historical page","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Mission mandate, expansion, participation, transition design, stated objectives, and claimed outputs","known_limitations":"NATO retrospective is actor-authored; aggregation obscures caveats and burden distribution, and claimed capacity building must be tested against the 2021 collapse and independent evidence","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/operations-and-missions/isafs-mission-in-afghanistan-2001-2014","source_origin":"Alliance official primary","provenance":"Official NATO historical mission record","language":"English","id":"DC-S47","date":"updated 2022-05-30","primary_use":"Mission mandate, expansion, participation, transition design, stated objectives, and claimed outputs","limitation":"NATO retrospective is actor-authored; aggregation obscures caveats and burden distribution, and claimed capacity building must be tested against the 2021 collapse and independent evidence"},{"source_id":"DC-S48","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Afghanistan Lessons Learned Process","date_or_version":"2021-11","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","directness":"actor_lessons_learned_summary","actor_coverage":"NATO engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2021","update_cadence":"one-time review","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Actor-recognized political, planning, consultation, capacity-building, and sustainability failures for a thesis-challenging case","known_limitations":"Public factsheet summarizes an internal process, may omit classified or reputationally damaging findings, and requires independent corroboration","url":"https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/legacy-wcm/media_pdf/2021/12/pdf/2112-factsheet-afgh-lessons-en.pdf","source_origin":"Alliance official primary","provenance":"Official NATO public factsheet on its lessons-learned process","language":"English","id":"DC-S48","date":"2021-11","primary_use":"Actor-recognized political, planning, consultation, capacity-building, and sustainability failures for a thesis-challenging case","limitation":"Public factsheet summarizes an internal process, may omit classified or reputationally damaging findings, and requires independent corroboration"},{"source_id":"DC-S49","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Overview: 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague","date_or_version":"2025-06","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","directness":"official_collective_decision_and_commitment_record","actor_coverage":"NATO members and summit partners","update_cadence":"summit cycle","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Consensus adoption of the Hague commitment, institutional agenda conversion, and a dated implementation baseline","known_limitations":"Collective adoption does not establish national delivery, U.S. causal leadership, output quality, or persistence through 2035","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/2025/6/overview---2025-nato-summit-in-the-hague","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official NATO summit overview and linked declaration","language":"English","id":"DC-S49","date":"2025-06","primary_use":"Consensus adoption of the Hague commitment, institutional agenda conversion, and a dated implementation baseline","limitation":"Collective adoption does not establish national delivery, U.S. causal leadership, output quality, or persistence through 2035"},{"source_id":"DC-S50","publisher":"G7 Research Group, University of Toronto","title":"2025 G7 Kananaskis Summit Final Compliance Report","date_or_version":"2026-06-10; actions through 2026-06-01","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"University of Toronto G7 Research Group","directness":"independent_selected_commitment_compliance_coding","actor_coverage":"G7 members and European Union across 20 selected commitments","update_cadence":"summit cycle","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Member-level and issue-level implementation of a preidentified subset of 2025 commitments","known_limitations":"Only 20 of 148 commitments are coded; public evidence, selection, ambition, and a three-point scale can affect results; collective machinery and U.S. sponsorship are not identified","url":"https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025compliance-final/index.html","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University-based report with disclosed selection, scale, and commitment-level records","language":"English","id":"DC-S50","date":"2026-06-10; actions through 2026-06-01","primary_use":"Member-level and issue-level implementation of a preidentified subset of 2025 commitments","limitation":"Only 20 of 148 commitments are coded; public evidence, selection, ambition, and a three-point scale can affect results; collective machinery and U.S. sponsorship are not identified"},{"source_id":"DC-S51","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Inclusive Framework on BEPS shows progress in making dispute resolution more effective","date_or_version":"2025-03-31","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS","directness":"peer_review_implementation_summary","actor_coverage":"Jurisdictions covered by Action 14 peer review","update_cadence":"periodic batches","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Evidence that an OECD-centered standard uses repeated peer review, legal-framework changes, and follow-up rather than adoption alone","known_limitations":"OECD-authored summary; jurisdictions and review stages vary, and implementation does not establish U.S. sponsorship or comparative leadership","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/announcements/2025/03/inclusive-framework-on-beps-shows-progress-in-making-dispute-resolution-more-effective.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official OECD summary linked to peer-review reports","language":"English","id":"DC-S51","date":"2025-03-31","primary_use":"Evidence that an OECD-centered standard uses repeated peer review, legal-framework changes, and follow-up rather than adoption alone","limitation":"OECD-authored summary; jurisdictions and review stages vary, and implementation does not establish U.S. sponsorship or comparative leadership"},{"source_id":"DC-S52","publisher":"World Bank Group Development Committee","title":"Chair's Statement: 112th Meeting of the Development Committee","date_or_version":"2025-10-17","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"World Bank Group Development Committee","directness":"official_collective_output_and_resource_record","actor_coverage":"World Bank Group members and clients","update_cadence":"semiannual","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"FY25 institutional commitments, private-capital mobilization, reform, partnership, and results-monitoring claims","known_limitations":"Member-authored chair statement reports commitments rather than disbursement or impact and cannot assign performance to U.S. leadership","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2025/10/17/chair-s-statement-112th-meeting-of-the-development-committee","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official statement by the joint ministerial committee","language":"English","id":"DC-S52","date":"2025-10-17","primary_use":"FY25 institutional commitments, private-capital mobilization, reform, partnership, and results-monitoring claims","limitation":"Member-authored chair statement reports commitments rather than disbursement or impact and cannot assign performance to U.S. leadership"},{"source_id":"DC-S53","publisher":"World Bank Group Independent Evaluation Group","title":"Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2025: Overview","date_or_version":"2026 release; FY2022-FY2024 performance window","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"World Bank Group Independent Evaluation Group","directness":"independent_validation_and_portfolio_evaluation","actor_coverage":"World Bank, IFC, and MIGA evaluated portfolios","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Validated project-outcome rates, monitoring gaps, and performance trends for a mature multilateral delivery institution","known_limitations":"Evaluated cohorts lag current operations; outcome standards differ by institution and project mix, and institutional performance is not U.S. national performance","url":"https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/results-and-performance-world-bank-group-2025/overview","source_origin":"Independent institutional oversight","provenance":"IEG validations of institutional self-evaluations with published methodology","language":"English","id":"DC-S53","date":"2026 release; FY2022-FY2024 performance window","primary_use":"Validated project-outcome rates, monitoring gaps, and performance trends for a mature multilateral delivery institution","limitation":"Evaluated cohorts lag current operations; outcome standards differ by institution and project mix, and institutional performance is not U.S. national performance"},{"source_id":"DC-S54","publisher":"International Bank for Reconstruction and Development","title":"IBRD Information Statement FY25","date_or_version":"2025-09-23; data as of 2025-06-30","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Bank Group","directness":"audited_financial_and_governance_record","actor_coverage":"IBRD and its 189 members","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Voting power, subscribed capital, lending scale, financial capacity, and institutional governance inputs","known_limitations":"A securities information statement emphasizes financial condition; voting share and lending scale do not establish agenda success, legitimacy, development impact, or U.S. control","url":"https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/02acefd82f121687f3aa3b429ee50801-0340022025/original/IBRD-Information-Statement-FY25.pdf","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official IBRD information statement with audited financial material","language":"English","id":"DC-S54","date":"2025-09-23; data as of 2025-06-30","primary_use":"Voting power, subscribed capital, lending scale, financial capacity, and institutional governance inputs","limitation":"A securities information statement emphasizes financial condition; voting share and lending scale do not establish agenda success, legitimacy, development impact, or U.S. control"},{"source_id":"DC-S55","publisher":"United Nations General Assembly","title":"Scale of assessments for United Nations peacekeeping operations, 2025-2027","date_or_version":"A/79/318/Add.1","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"official_financial_obligation_scale","actor_coverage":"UN member states","update_cadence":"triennial scale with annual effective rates","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Matched U.S. and PRC assessed peacekeeping obligations under the same adopted scale","known_limitations":"Assessment rates reflect the agreed capacity formula and permanent-member premium, not voluntary leadership, payment timing, operational delivery, or political stewardship","url":"https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/scale_of_assessments_for_the_apportionment_of_the_expenses_of_un_peacekeeping_operations_1_january_2025_to_31_december_2027.pdf","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official General Assembly assessment table","language":"English","id":"DC-S55","date":"A/79/318/Add.1","primary_use":"Matched U.S. and PRC assessed peacekeeping obligations under the same adopted scale","limitation":"Assessment rates reflect the agreed capacity formula and permanent-member premium, not voluntary leadership, payment timing, operational delivery, or political stewardship"},{"source_id":"DC-S56","publisher":"United Nations","title":"Financial situation of the United Nations: May 2026 presentation","date_or_version":"2026-05","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"official_payment_and_arrears_snapshot","actor_coverage":"UN member states","update_cadence":"periodic financial updates","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current regular-budget assessment status and arrears for matched stewardship testing","known_limitations":"Snapshot timing can change quickly; regular-budget arrears exclude voluntary contributions and do not alone establish overall leadership or causation","url":"https://static.un.org/en/ga/contributions/Presentation%20May%202026.pdf","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN financial presentation","language":"English","id":"DC-S56","date":"2026-05","primary_use":"Current regular-budget assessment status and arrears for matched stewardship testing","limitation":"Snapshot timing can change quickly; regular-budget arrears exclude voluntary contributions and do not alone establish overall leadership or causation"},{"source_id":"DC-S57","publisher":"United Nations Committee on Contributions","title":"Honour roll 2025","date_or_version":"2025 payment year","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"official_assessed_contribution_payment_record","actor_coverage":"UN member states paying the regular budget in full","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Payment timing and full-payment status for the 2025 UN regular budget","known_limitations":"Honor-roll status is a narrow binary and excludes peacekeeping, tribunals, voluntary finance, arrears from other years, and nonfinancial stewardship","url":"https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/honourroll_2025.shtml","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN Committee on Contributions payment record","language":"English","id":"DC-S57","date":"2025 payment year","primary_use":"Payment timing and full-payment status for the 2025 UN regular budget","limitation":"Honor-roll status is a narrow binary and excludes peacekeeping, tribunals, voluntary finance, arrears from other years, and nonfinancial stewardship"},{"source_id":"DC-S58","publisher":"United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library","title":"Security Council veto list","date_or_version":"1946-2026 rolling table","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations","directness":"official_veto_event_record","actor_coverage":"Permanent members of the UN Security Council","update_cadence":"rolling","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D09"],"primary_uses":"Matched U.S. and PRC veto events and issue chronology as institutional activation and obstruction evidence","known_limitations":"A veto can protect a legitimate red line or obstruct collective action; the list omits threatened vetoes, bargaining, draft quality, and implementation","url":"https://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_table_en.htm","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UN library table linked to meeting records and drafts","language":"English","id":"DC-S58","date":"1946-2026 rolling table","primary_use":"Matched U.S. and PRC veto events and issue chronology as institutional activation and obstruction evidence","limitation":"A veto can protect a legitimate red line or obstruct collective action; the list omits threatened vetoes, bargaining, draft quality, and implementation"},{"source_id":"DC-S59","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"Post-MC14 briefing note: WTO reform and dispute settlement reform","date_or_version":"updated through 2026-05","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Trade Organization","directness":"official_current_institutional_status_and_member_positions","actor_coverage":"WTO's 166 members","update_cadence":"ministerial and General Council cycle","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current reform process, Appellate Body status, U.S. objection, member support for appointments, and alternative mechanisms","known_limitations":"WTO briefing note is not a legal interpretation; appointment obstruction does not resolve the merits of U.S. reform objections or PRC compliance","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc14_e/briefing_notes_e/wtoreform_e.htm","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official WTO explanatory note with links to governing records","language":"English","id":"DC-S59","date":"updated through 2026-05","primary_use":"Current reform process, Appellate Body status, U.S. objection, member support for appointments, and alternative mechanisms","limitation":"WTO briefing note is not a legal interpretation; appointment obstruction does not resolve the merits of U.S. reform objections or PRC compliance"},{"source_id":"DC-S60","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"Dispute settlement activity: some figures","date_or_version":"updated through 2024 data","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Trade Organization","directness":"official_case_and_appeal_statistics","actor_coverage":"WTO members and dispute proceedings","update_cadence":"annual or periodic","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Use of dispute settlement, appeals, and pending-appeal stock during institutional paralysis","known_limitations":"Case counts do not measure ruling quality, compliance, responsibility for the impasse, or the performance of alternative appeal arrangements","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official WTO dispute statistics","language":"English","id":"DC-S60","date":"updated through 2024 data","primary_use":"Use of dispute settlement, appeals, and pending-appeal stock during institutional paralysis","limitation":"Case counts do not measure ruling quality, compliance, responsibility for the impasse, or the performance of alternative appeal arrangements"},{"source_id":"DC-S61","publisher":"World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body","title":"Members again unable to commence Appellate Body selection process","date_or_version":"2024-01-26","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"World Trade Organization","directness":"official_member_decision_and_objection_record","actor_coverage":"WTO members participating in the Dispute Settlement Body","update_cadence":"meeting cycle","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Recorded support for restarting appointments and the stated U.S. objection under the consensus rule","known_limitations":"Meeting summary captures public positions but not private reform bargaining; a 2024 event requires current-status corroboration","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/dsb_26jan24_e.htm","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official WTO meeting account","language":"English","id":"DC-S61","date":"2024-01-26","primary_use":"Recorded support for restarting appointments and the stated U.S. objection under the consensus rule","limitation":"Meeting summary captures public positions but not private reform bargaining; a 2024 event requires current-status corroboration"},{"source_id":"DC-S62","publisher":"Office of the United States Trade Representative","title":"2026 Trade Policy Agenda and 2025 Annual Report","date_or_version":"2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Trade Representative","directness":"actor_policy_and_rationale_record","actor_coverage":"United States policy toward WTO and trading partners","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current U.S. rationale and conditions for WTO dispute-settlement reform","known_limitations":"Self-justifying actor document; it establishes policy and objections, not their legal merit, member acceptance, or comparative stewardship","url":"https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/2026%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%202025%20Annual%20Report.pdf","source_origin":"U.S. official primary","provenance":"Statutorily submitted U.S. trade-policy agenda and annual report","language":"English","id":"DC-S62","date":"2026","primary_use":"Current U.S. rationale and conditions for WTO dispute-settlement reform","limitation":"Self-justifying actor document; it establishes policy and objections, not their legal merit, member acceptance, or comparative stewardship"},{"source_id":"DC-S63","publisher":"The White House","title":"Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States","date_or_version":"2026-01-07","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Executive Office of the President","directness":"actor_withdrawal_decision_and_rationale","actor_coverage":"United States and 66 named international organizations or entities","update_cadence":"one-time decision with implementation follow-up","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current U.S. decisions to cease participation and funding and the administration's stated sovereignty and effectiveness rationale","known_limitations":"Political fact sheet is advocacy; it does not establish legal completion, savings, institutional effects, or the merit of the affected organizations","url":"https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/","source_origin":"U.S. official primary","provenance":"Official announcement linked to the presidential memorandum","language":"English","id":"DC-S63","date":"2026-01-07","primary_use":"Current U.S. decisions to cease participation and funding and the administration's stated sovereignty and effectiveness rationale","limitation":"Political fact sheet is advocacy; it does not establish legal completion, savings, institutional effects, or the merit of the affected organizations"},{"source_id":"DC-S64","publisher":"World Health Organization","title":"WHO statement on notification of withdrawal of the United States","date_or_version":"2026-01-24","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"World Health Organization","directness":"institutional_confirmation_and_counterclaim","actor_coverage":"United States and WHO","update_cadence":"one-time with legal follow-up","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Institutional confirmation of U.S. withdrawal notification, identified governance questions, and a direct counterposition","known_limitations":"WHO is an interested institution defending its performance; the statement does not independently settle pandemic-performance disputes or final legal obligations","url":"https://www.who.int/news/item/24-01-2026-who-statement-on-notification-of-withdrawal-of-the-united-states","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official WHO response to member notification","language":"English","id":"DC-S64","date":"2026-01-24","primary_use":"Institutional confirmation of U.S. withdrawal notification, identified governance questions, and a direct counterposition","limitation":"WHO is an interested institution defending its performance; the statement does not independently settle pandemic-performance disputes or final legal obligations"},{"source_id":"DC-S65","publisher":"United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change","title":"United States of America: Paris Agreement ratification status","date_or_version":"updated 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"UNFCCC","directness":"official_treaty_status_record","actor_coverage":"United States and Paris Agreement parties","update_cadence":"event updated","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Official date of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for commitment and stewardship coding","known_limitations":"Treaty status does not measure subnational action, emissions outcomes, the administration's rationale, or wider U.S. institutional leadership","url":"https://unfccc.int/node/61231","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official UNFCCC party-status record","language":"English","id":"DC-S65","date":"updated 2026","primary_use":"Official date of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for commitment and stewardship coding","limitation":"Treaty status does not measure subnational action, emissions outcomes, the administration's rationale, or wider U.S. institutional leadership"},{"source_id":"DC-S66","publisher":"BRICS Brazil Presidency","title":"BRICS Summit signs historic commitment in Rio for more inclusive and sustainable governance","date_or_version":"2025-07-07","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"BRICS Presidency","directness":"actor_commitment_inventory_and_activity_claim","actor_coverage":"BRICS members, partners, and summit participants","update_cadence":"presidency cycle","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Claimed 126 commitments, summit agenda breadth, participation, and named follow-up initiatives","known_limitations":"Presidency-authored count treats commitments of unequal specificity alike; announcement does not establish authorization, resources, implementation, PRC attribution, or outcomes","url":"https://brics.br/en/news/brics-summit-signs-historic-commitment-in-rio-for-more-inclusive-and-sustainable-governance","source_origin":"Official primary","provenance":"Official 2025 BRICS presidency account","language":"English","id":"DC-S66","date":"2025-07-07","primary_use":"Claimed 126 commitments, summit agenda breadth, participation, and named follow-up initiatives","limitation":"Presidency-authored count treats commitments of unequal specificity alike; announcement does not establish authorization, resources, implementation, PRC attribution, or outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S67","publisher":"Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration","title":"RANEPA's 2024 BRICS Kazan Final Compliance Report","date_or_version":"2025-06-05; actions through 2025-05-21","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"RANEPA Center for International Institutions Research","directness":"state_affiliated_selected_commitment_compliance_coding","actor_coverage":"Nine BRICS members across selected 2024 commitments","update_cadence":"summit cycle","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Obligation-level implementation claims, member variation, issue variation, and a method comparable in form to G7 compliance work","known_limitations":"Russian state-affiliated research; seven scored commitments from 250; coding can award implementation credit for national statements or activity and is not independent verification of outcomes","url":"https://www.brics.unipr.it/wedit/fileman/Uploads/RANEPA_BRICS_2024_Final_report.pdf","source_origin":"State-affiliated research","provenance":"Report by a Russian presidential academy using a disclosed adaptation of G7 compliance coding","language":"English","id":"DC-S67","date":"2025-06-05; actions through 2025-05-21","primary_use":"Obligation-level implementation claims, member variation, issue variation, and a method comparable in form to G7 compliance work","limitation":"Russian state-affiliated research; seven scored commitments from 250; coding can award implementation credit for national statements or activity and is not independent verification of outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S68","publisher":"BRICS Research Group, University of Toronto","title":"BRICS compliance by priority and other commitments, 2011-2015","date_or_version":"2011-2015 calibration","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"University of Toronto BRICS Research Group","directness":"historical_selected_commitment_compliance_coding","actor_coverage":"Original BRICS members","update_cadence":"historical calibration","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Independent historical compliance comparison by commitment priority","known_limitations":"Dated, small original membership, and selection and three-point coding limitations prevent direct inference to the expanded 2026 BRICS","url":"https://g7g20.utoronto.ca/accountability/11-tab-17.html","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University research-group comparative table","language":"English","id":"DC-S68","date":"2011-2015 calibration","primary_use":"Independent historical compliance comparison by commitment priority","limitation":"Dated, small original membership, and selection and three-point coding limitations prevent direct inference to the expanded 2026 BRICS"},{"source_id":"DC-S69","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","title":"Project Summary","date_or_version":"status 2026-08-07; finance through 2026-03-31","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","directness":"official_portfolio_membership_and_finance_dashboard","actor_coverage":"AIIB's 111 approved members and project portfolio","update_cadence":"rolling dashboard","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Institutional growth, approved financing, project portfolio, member attraction, and delivery baseline","known_limitations":"New commitment amount is not disbursement, completion, additionality, safeguard performance, or PRC causal leadership; the bank is multilateral","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/summary/index.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official AIIB project dashboard","language":"English","id":"DC-S69","date":"status 2026-08-07; finance through 2026-03-31","primary_use":"Institutional growth, approved financing, project portfolio, member attraction, and delivery baseline","limitation":"New commitment amount is not disbursement, completion, additionality, safeguard performance, or PRC causal leadership; the bank is multilateral"},{"source_id":"DC-S70","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Complaints-resolution, Evaluation and Integrity Unit","title":"Introduction to CEIU","date_or_version":"current 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"AIIB CEIU","directness":"institutional_oversight_mandate_and_output_index","actor_coverage":"AIIB operations and project-affected people","update_cadence":"rolling","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Board-reporting evaluation, complaints, integrity, and institutional-learning mechanisms in a PRC-initiated bank","known_limitations":"Independence is internal and Board-defined; evaluation is selective, the bank is young, and mandate existence does not establish coverage or correction quality","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/complaints-resolution-evaluation-integrity-unit/introduction/index.html","source_origin":"Independent institutional oversight","provenance":"Official CEIU mandate with direct Board reporting and linked outputs","language":"English","id":"DC-S70","date":"current 2026","primary_use":"Board-reporting evaluation, complaints, integrity, and institutional-learning mechanisms in a PRC-initiated bank","limitation":"Independence is internal and Board-defined; evaluation is selective, the bank is young, and mandate existence does not establish coverage or correction quality"},{"source_id":"DC-S71","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Complaints-resolution, Evaluation and Integrity Unit","title":"Project Learning Review summary: Duqm Port Commercial Terminal and Operational Zone Development Project","date_or_version":"2024 review","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"AIIB CEIU","directness":"project_completion_learning_review","actor_coverage":"AIIB-financed Duqm port project in Oman","update_cadence":"one-time project review","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Concrete test of completion evidence, economic and financial analysis, results measurement, and institutional learning","known_limitations":"Single project cannot represent the portfolio; a learning review is not a full independent impact evaluation and may have incomplete completion evidence","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/complaints-resolution-evaluation-integrity-unit/news-publications/_download/BAQ-PLR-Summary-Note.pdf","source_origin":"Independent institutional oversight","provenance":"AIIB CEIU project learning review summary","language":"English","id":"DC-S71","date":"2024 review","primary_use":"Concrete test of completion evidence, economic and financial analysis, results measurement, and institutional learning","limitation":"Single project cannot represent the portfolio; a learning review is not a full independent impact evaluation and may have incomplete completion evidence"},{"source_id":"DC-S72","publisher":"African Union Peace and Security Department","title":"Opening Statement at the Post-FOCAC Symposium on Implementing the Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)","date_or_version":"2025-11-26","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"African Union Commission","directness":"partner_side_implementation_and_ownership_statement","actor_coverage":"African Union, African states, China, and UN participants","update_cadence":"one-time implementation checkpoint","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"African partner framing, ownership claims, alignment with Agenda 2063, and stated next-step implementation process","known_limitations":"Diplomatic statement is favorable and nonquantitative; it identifies planned coordination rather than verified obligation-level delivery or representative African opinion","url":"https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/opening-statement-at-the-post-focac-symposium-on-implementing-the-beijing-action-plan-2025-2027","source_origin":"Partner intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official statement by the AU permanent representative to China","language":"English","id":"DC-S72","date":"2025-11-26","primary_use":"African partner framing, ownership claims, alignment with Agenda 2063, and stated next-step implementation process","limitation":"Diplomatic statement is favorable and nonquantitative; it identifies planned coordination rather than verified obligation-level delivery or representative African opinion"},{"source_id":"DC-S73","publisher":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat","title":"General information","date_or_version":"2026-03-06","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","directness":"official_external_network_and_status_record","actor_coverage":"SCO members, two observers, 15 dialogue partners, and linked organizations","update_cadence":"irregular updates","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current partner tiers, external institutional relationships, and declared international strategy","known_limitations":"Network breadth and formal ties do not establish alignment, assigned roles, activation, delivery, or PRC control","url":"https://eng.sectsco.org/20260306/2185609.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official SCO Secretariat organizational page","language":"English translation","id":"DC-S73","date":"2026-03-06","primary_use":"Current partner tiers, external institutional relationships, and declared international strategy","limitation":"Network breadth and formal ties do not establish alignment, assigned roles, activation, delivery, or PRC control"},{"source_id":"DC-S74","publisher":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat","title":"SCO Secretariat","date_or_version":"2026-03-05","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","directness":"official_implementation_structure_and_staffing_record","actor_coverage":"SCO permanent executive body and members","update_cadence":"irregular updates","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Secretariat mandate, leadership rotation, country quotas, and staff size as implementation-capacity inputs","known_limitations":"A 36-official secretariat can coordinate more activity than headcount suggests, while permanent organs outside it are excluded; structure does not establish outcomes","url":"https://eng.sectsco.org/20260305/2184451.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official SCO Secretariat organizational page","language":"English translation","id":"DC-S74","date":"2026-03-05","primary_use":"Secretariat mandate, leadership rotation, country quotas, and staff size as implementation-capacity inputs","limitation":"A 36-official secretariat can coordinate more activity than headcount suggests, while permanent organs outside it are excluded; structure does not establish outcomes"},{"source_id":"DC-S75","publisher":"Swedish Institute of International Affairs","title":"The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: An evolving platform that should not be overlooked","date_or_version":"2025","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Swedish Institute of International Affairs","directness":"independent_institutional_assessment","actor_coverage":"SCO members and regional context","update_cadence":"one-time report","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Independent assessment of SCO functions, adaptation, membership heterogeneity, relevance, and limitations","known_limitations":"Qualitative assessment; limited obligation-level implementation data and uncertain access to internal bargaining constrain causal judgments","url":"https://www.ui.se/butiken/uis-publikationer/ui-report/2025/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-sco--an-evolving-platform-that-should-not-be-overlooked/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Report by a government-funded but editorially independent foreign-policy institute","language":"English","id":"DC-S75","date":"2025","primary_use":"Independent assessment of SCO functions, adaptation, membership heterogeneity, relevance, and limitations","limitation":"Qualitative assessment; limited obligation-level implementation data and uncertain access to internal bargaining constrain causal judgments"},{"source_id":"DC-S76","publisher":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","title":"Expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: a platform for regional cooperation or a tool for power projection?","date_or_version":"2026-05-05","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","directness":"peer_reviewed_institutional_case_analysis","actor_coverage":"SCO members with emphasis on China, Russia, India, and new members","update_cadence":"one-time article","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Independent analysis of attraction, inward-looking security cooperation, competing leadership, blocked initiatives, and cohesion limits","known_limitations":"Qualitative single-author study; some evidence predates expansion and it does not produce a complete activation or delivery universe","url":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2026.2658324","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Peer-reviewed open-access research article","language":"English","id":"DC-S76","date":"2026-05-05","primary_use":"Independent analysis of attraction, inward-looking security cooperation, competing leadership, blocked initiatives, and cohesion limits","limitation":"Qualitative single-author study; some evidence predates expansion and it does not produce a complete activation or delivery universe"},{"source_id":"DC-S77","publisher":"Government of India Press Information Bureau","title":"Every act of terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable, SCO must unite in eliminating the menace for collective safety and security","date_or_version":"2025-06-26","evidence_tier":"Tier 3","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Government of India Ministry of Defence","directness":"member_position_and_activation_counterevidence","actor_coverage":"India and SCO defence-minister format","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Member-defined disagreement, conditional support, and limits on collective language in a consensus institution","known_limitations":"Indian actor account emphasizes its own position; it does not by itself reconstruct every draft, negotiation, other member view, or broader SCO delivery","url":"https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2139754&lang=2&reg=48","source_origin":"Member-state official primary","provenance":"Official Indian Ministry of Defence meeting account","language":"English","id":"DC-S77","date":"2025-06-26","primary_use":"Member-defined disagreement, conditional support, and limits on collective language in a consensus institution","limitation":"Indian actor account emphasizes its own position; it does not by itself reconstruct every draft, negotiation, other member view, or broader SCO delivery"},{"source_id":"DC-S78","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Press briefing by the NATO Secretary General following an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council","date_or_version":"2022-02-24","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","directness":"same_day_collective_decision_record","actor_coverage":"All 30 NATO allies at the invasion trigger","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06"],"primary_uses":"Same-day consultation and activation of NATO defence plans after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","known_limitations":"Alliance-authored account does not disclose internal disagreement, exact decision timestamps, national caveats, or whether every planned role was immediately usable","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2022/02/24/press-briefing","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official NATO transcript issued on the trigger date","language":"English","id":"DC-S78","date":"2022-02-24","primary_use":"Same-day consultation and activation of NATO defence plans after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","limitation":"Alliance-authored account does not disclose internal disagreement, exact decision timestamps, national caveats, or whether every planned role was immediately usable"},{"source_id":"DC-S79","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Press conference by the NATO Secretary General following the extraordinary virtual summit of NATO Heads of State and Government","date_or_version":"2022-02-25","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","directness":"collective_authorization_and_delegation_record","actor_coverage":"All 30 NATO allies and the NATO Response Force","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"primary_uses":"Allied agreement to deploy elements of the NATO Response Force and delegated implementation authority to SACEUR","known_limitations":"Alliance-authored account gives no eligible-role denominator, country-level caveats, acceptance standard, or independent verification of every announced contribution","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2022/02/25/press-conference","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official NATO summit press-conference transcript","language":"English","id":"DC-S79","date":"2022-02-25","primary_use":"Allied agreement to deploy elements of the NATO Response Force and delegated implementation authority to SACEUR","limitation":"Alliance-authored account gives no eligible-role denominator, country-level caveats, acceptance standard, or independent verification of every announced contribution"},{"source_id":"DC-S80","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"NATO Response Force units arrive in Romania","date_or_version":"2022-03-02","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","directness":"first_deployment_output_record","actor_coverage":"NATO Response Force lead elements and Romania","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"primary_uses":"Arrival of the first NATO Response Force collective-defence deployment within days of the invasion trigger","known_limitations":"The first approximately 500 French troops are a lead element rather than the complete force or a denominator-based measure of coalition participation and delivery quality","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2022/03/02/nato-response-force-units-arrive-in-romania","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official NATO operational update","language":"English","id":"DC-S80","date":"2022-03-02","primary_use":"Arrival of the first NATO Response Force collective-defence deployment within days of the invasion trigger","limitation":"The first approximately 500 French troops are a lead element rather than the complete force or a denominator-based measure of coalition participation and delivery quality"},{"source_id":"DC-S81","publisher":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat","title":"Dushanbe Declaration of the 20th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","date_or_version":"2021-09-17","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","directness":"post_trigger_collective_declaration_and_program_record","actor_coverage":"SCO members after the Taliban takeover of Kabul","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Collective positions on Afghanistan and named security-cooperation activities at the first summit after the takeover","known_limitations":"A declaration and planned exercises do not establish an executable common action plan, assigned national roles, timing, delivered outputs, or PRC control","url":"https://eng.sectsco.org/20210917/782639.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official SCO summit declaration","language":"English translation","id":"DC-S81","date":"2021-09-17","primary_use":"Collective positions on Afghanistan and named security-cooperation activities at the first summit after the takeover","limitation":"A declaration and planned exercises do not establish an executable common action plan, assigned national roles, timing, delivered outputs, or PRC control"},{"source_id":"DC-S82","publisher":"Foreign Policy Research Institute","title":"The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Will Not Fill Any Vacuum in Afghanistan","date_or_version":"2021-09-30","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Foreign Policy Research Institute","directness":"independent_post_trigger_institutional_assessment","actor_coverage":"SCO members and Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover","update_cadence":"one-time analysis","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Independent assessment of whether the SCO produced a common Afghanistan action plan and how member assistance was organized","known_limitations":"Contemporaneous expert analysis rather than a complete internal-decision or delivery ledger; the SCO's limited mandate makes alliance-style expectations inappropriate","url":"https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/09/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-will-not-fill-any-vacuum-in-afghanistan/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Nonprofit foreign-policy institute analysis citing member behavior and summit output","language":"English","id":"DC-S82","date":"2021-09-30","primary_use":"Independent assessment of whether the SCO produced a common Afghanistan action plan and how member assistance was organized","limitation":"Contemporaneous expert analysis rather than a complete internal-decision or delivery ledger; the SCO's limited mandate makes alliance-style expectations inappropriate"},{"source_id":"DC-S83","publisher":"Associated Press","title":"India refuses to sign joint statement at China-hosted SCO meeting","date_or_version":"2025-06-26","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_reporting","institutional_family":"Associated Press","directness":"independent_consensus_failure_report","actor_coverage":"SCO defence ministers and India","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Independent confirmation that the defence-minister meeting failed to adopt a joint statement and the stated Indian objection","known_limitations":"News reporting cannot reconstruct the complete draft, bargaining sequence, every member position, or downstream cooperation","url":"https://apnews.com/article/china-india-meeting-statement-refusal-67bfc09a329e93b9c721029c36e31176","source_origin":"Independent reporting","provenance":"Associated Press report with attributed Indian government explanation","language":"English","id":"DC-S83","date":"2025-06-26","primary_use":"Independent confirmation that the defence-minister meeting failed to adopt a joint statement and the stated Indian objection","limitation":"News reporting cannot reconstruct the complete draft, bargaining sequence, every member position, or downstream cooperation"},{"source_id":"DC-S84","publisher":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation member-state publication","title":"Tianjin Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","date_or_version":"2025-09-01","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation","directness":"collective_declaration_and_repair_record","actor_coverage":"SCO heads of state after the June 2025 defence-minister impasse","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Evidence of later consensus language including condemnation of the Pahalgam attack and broader institutional output","known_limitations":"Member-state publication of a declaration documents formal repair but not the private mechanism, executable security action, assigned roles, or delivery","url":"https://en.special.kremlin.ru/supplement/6376","source_origin":"Member-state official primary","provenance":"English-language official publication of the adopted SCO declaration","language":"English translation","id":"DC-S84","date":"2025-09-01","primary_use":"Evidence of later consensus language including condemnation of the Pahalgam attack and broader institutional output","limitation":"Member-state publication of a declaration documents formal repair but not the private mechanism, executable security action, assigned roles, or delivery"},{"source_id":"DC-S85","publisher":"World Health Organization","title":"WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19","date_or_version":"2020-03-11","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"World Health Organization","directness":"common_global_trigger_record","actor_coverage":"WHO members and the global COVID-19 emergency","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"primary_uses":"Common dated pandemic trigger for comparing institutional crisis-response activation and delivery","known_limitations":"WHO characterization did not create the outbreak or require an identical decision from development banks; preparatory work began earlier","url":"https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official WHO statement characterizing COVID-19 as a pandemic","language":"English","id":"DC-S85","date":"2020-03-11","primary_use":"Common dated pandemic trigger for comparing institutional crisis-response activation and delivery","limitation":"WHO characterization did not create the outbreak or require an identical decision from development banks; preparatory work began earlier"},{"source_id":"DC-S86","publisher":"World Bank","title":"Chair Summary: World Bank COVID-19 Response under the Fast Track COVID-19 Facility","date_or_version":"2020-03-17","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"World Bank Group","directness":"board_authorization_record","actor_coverage":"World Bank Group and eligible client countries","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Board approval timing, facility size, authorities, and implementation framework after the common pandemic trigger","known_limitations":"Board authorization is not disbursement, accepted output, health outcome, or U.S. causal leadership; preparation preceded the pandemic characterization","url":"https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/271831585274457435/pdf/World-Bank-COVID-19-Response-under-the-Fast-Track-COVID-19-Facility-and-Proposed-Investment-in-IFC-Fast-Track-COVID-19-Facility-Chair-Summary.pdf","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official World Bank Board chair summary","language":"English","id":"DC-S86","date":"2020-03-17","primary_use":"Board approval timing, facility size, authorities, and implementation framework after the common pandemic trigger","limitation":"Board authorization is not disbursement, accepted output, health outcome, or U.S. causal leadership; preparation preceded the pandemic characterization"},{"source_id":"DC-S87","publisher":"World Bank","title":"World Bank Group launches first operations for COVID-19 emergency health support","date_or_version":"2020-04-02","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"World Bank Group","directness":"first_project_approval_output_record","actor_coverage":"Twenty-five initial client countries","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Timing, country coverage, and value of the first emergency health operations after facility authorization","known_limitations":"Approvals are not disbursements or outcomes; the bank and borrowers, not Washington alone, produced the output","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/02/world-bank-group-launches-first-operations-for-covid-19-coronavirus-emergency-health-support-strengthening-developing-country-responses","source_origin":"Intergovernmental primary","provenance":"Official World Bank portfolio launch record","language":"English","id":"DC-S87","date":"2020-04-02","primary_use":"Timing, country coverage, and value of the first emergency health operations after facility authorization","limitation":"Approvals are not disbursements or outcomes; the bank and borrowers, not Washington alone, produced the output"},{"source_id":"DC-S88","publisher":"World Bank","title":"World Bank Group operational response to COVID-19: projects list","date_or_version":"updated through 2022","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Bank Group","directness":"cumulative_crisis_response_portfolio","actor_coverage":"World Bank Group crisis operations and client countries","update_cadence":"periodic portfolio update","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Cumulative response financing, vaccine operations, and country coverage beyond initial approvals","known_limitations":"Aggregate commitments combine instruments, periods, and implementing actors; they are not full disbursement, outcome, additionality, or U.S. attribution measures","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do/brief/world-bank-group-operational-response-covid-19-coronavirus-projects-list","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official World Bank crisis-response portfolio page","language":"English","id":"DC-S88","date":"updated through 2022","primary_use":"Cumulative response financing, vaccine operations, and country coverage beyond initial approvals","limitation":"Aggregate commitments combine instruments, periods, and implementing actors; they are not full disbursement, outcome, additionality, or U.S. attribution measures"},{"source_id":"DC-S89","publisher":"World Bank Independent Evaluation Group","title":"The World Bank's early support to addressing COVID-19: quality of the response","date_or_version":"2022 evaluation","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"World Bank Independent Evaluation Group","directness":"independent_crisis_response_process_evaluation","actor_coverage":"World Bank early health response operations","update_cadence":"one-time evaluation","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Independent assessment of processing speed, critical-goods support, operational quality, coordination, and adaptive management","known_limitations":"Early-response evaluation does not cover the full pandemic portfolio or establish health impact, cross-bank equivalence, or U.S. causal leadership","url":"https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/world-banks-early-support-addressing-covid-19/chapter-4-quality-response-operational","source_origin":"Independent institutional oversight","provenance":"World Bank IEG evaluation reporting to the Board","language":"English","id":"DC-S89","date":"2022 evaluation","primary_use":"Independent assessment of processing speed, critical-goods support, operational quality, coordination, and adaptive management","limitation":"Early-response evaluation does not cover the full pandemic portfolio or establish health impact, cross-bank equivalence, or U.S. causal leadership"},{"source_id":"DC-S90","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","title":"AIIB 2020 Annual Report: COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility","date_or_version":"2020 annual report","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","directness":"first_year_crisis_response_portfolio","actor_coverage":"AIIB members receiving crisis-response finance","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Facility development chronology and first-year approved project, member, and financing totals","known_limitations":"Institution-authored approval totals are not disbursement, outcome, additionality, independent quality, or PRC-only delivery","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/annual-report/2020/covid-19/index.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official AIIB annual-report section","language":"English","id":"DC-S90","date":"2020 annual report","primary_use":"Facility development chronology and first-year approved project, member, and financing totals","limitation":"Institution-authored approval totals are not disbursement, outcome, additionality, independent quality, or PRC-only delivery"},{"source_id":"DC-S91","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","title":"COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility","date_or_version":"closed 2023-12-31","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","directness":"completed_facility_portfolio_record","actor_coverage":"AIIB crisis-response projects and recipient members","update_cadence":"facility closeout","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Final project, member, and financing totals for the AIIB crisis-response facility","known_limitations":"Approved financing is not automatically disbursed or effective; many operations were co-financed and the institution is multilateral rather than a PRC bloc","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility/index.html","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"Official AIIB facility closeout page","language":"English","id":"DC-S91","date":"closed 2023-12-31","primary_use":"Final project, member, and financing totals for the AIIB crisis-response facility","limitation":"Approved financing is not automatically disbursed or effective; many operations were co-financed and the institution is multilateral rather than a PRC bloc"},{"source_id":"DC-S92","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","title":"Final Review of the AIIB COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility","date_or_version":"2024 review","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","directness":"internal_management_completion_review","actor_coverage":"AIIB's 68-project crisis-response facility","update_cadence":"one-time closeout review","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D08"],"primary_uses":"Completion reporting, disbursement status, target achievement, co-financing, and implementation lessons","known_limitations":"Management review is not independent; only 11 project completion notes were available at the review cutoff, most projects were co-financed, and reported targets are not common outcome measures","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility/_download/Final-Review-of-the-AIIB-COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility-public.pdf","source_origin":"Institutional management review","provenance":"Official AIIB Management review submitted after facility closeout","language":"English","id":"DC-S92","date":"2024 review","primary_use":"Completion reporting, disbursement status, target achievement, co-financing, and implementation lessons","limitation":"Management review is not independent; only 11 project completion notes were available at the review cutoff, most projects were co-financed, and reported targets are not common outcome measures"},{"source_id":"DC-S93","publisher":"Kiel Institute for the World Economy","title":"Ukraine Support Tracker","date_or_version":"data through 2026-04","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Kiel Institute for the World Economy","directness":"country_level_aid_allocation_tracker","actor_coverage":"Forty-one government donors to Ukraine","update_cadence":"periodic","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Comparable allocations by donor, aid type, period, and recipient for coalition delivery and burden analysis","known_limitations":"Public data miss classified support and non-government channels; allocations are closer to delivery than commitments but can include short- and medium-term earmarks","url":"https://www.kielinstitut.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University-based research institute tracker using official donor and recipient records","language":"English","id":"DC-S93","date":"data through 2026-04","primary_use":"Comparable allocations by donor, aid type, period, and recipient for coalition delivery and burden analysis","limitation":"Public data miss classified support and non-government channels; allocations are closer to delivery than commitments but can include short- and medium-term earmarks"},{"source_id":"DC-S94","publisher":"Kiel Institute for the World Economy","title":"Ukraine Support Tracker research note","date_or_version":"current methodology release","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Kiel Institute for the World Economy","directness":"aid_tracker_methodology_and_definitions","actor_coverage":"Government aid allocations and commitments to Ukraine","update_cadence":"method update","category_ids":["DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Definitions separating commitments and allocations and the treatment of delivery timing","known_limitations":"Allocation remains an imperfect proxy for physical arrival or usable acceptance; valuation and classified support uncertainty persist","url":"https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/Subject_Dossiers_Topics/Ukraine/Ukraine_Support_Tracker/Ukraine_Support_Tracker_-_Research_Note.pdf","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Published methodology for the Kiel tracker","language":"English","id":"DC-S94","date":"current methodology release","primary_use":"Definitions separating commitments and allocations and the treatment of delivery timing","limitation":"Allocation remains an imperfect proxy for physical arrival or usable acceptance; valuation and classified support uncertainty persist"},{"source_id":"DC-S95","publisher":"Kiel Institute for the World Economy","title":"Europe largely fills the US aid withdrawal in 2025","date_or_version":"2026-02 policy brief","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Kiel Institute for the World Economy","directness":"independent_country_level_delivery_analysis","actor_coverage":"European, U.S., and other government aid to Ukraine through 2025","update_cadence":"one-time annual analysis","category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Changes in donor delivery after the U.S. withdrawal, NATO PURL participation, and intra-European burden concentration","known_limitations":"Aid allocations do not measure military effect or bargaining outcomes; regional threat exposure and economic size confound institutional attribution","url":"https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/f04639f3-0d21-421b-ba4f-f87be40506ae-KPB2023_EN.pdf","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Kiel policy brief derived from the Ukraine Support Tracker","language":"English","id":"DC-S95","date":"2026-02 policy brief","primary_use":"Changes in donor delivery after the U.S. withdrawal, NATO PURL participation, and intra-European burden concentration","limitation":"Aid allocations do not measure military effect or bargaining outcomes; regional threat exposure and economic size confound institutional attribution"},{"source_id":"DC-S96","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"Global Diplomacy Index 2024: Key findings","date_or_version":"2024 release; data collected July-November 2023","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"matched_global_and_regional_post_inventory","actor_coverage":"United States and PRC formal posts globally and by region","update_cadence":"multi-year releases","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Matched post totals and regional distributions for formal reach","known_limitations":"A post is an input; the index does not measure staffing, expertise, access quality, warning, or policy conversion","url":"https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/key_findings","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Method-documented Lowy diplomatic-network release","language":"English","id":"DC-S96","date":"2024 release; data collected July-November 2023","primary_use":"Matched post totals and regional distributions for formal reach","limitation":"A post is an input; the index does not measure staffing, expertise, access quality, warning, or policy conversion"},{"source_id":"DC-S97","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"2025 Asia Power Index: China gains advantage","date_or_version":"2025 release","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"regional_diplomatic_influence_composite","actor_coverage":"United States, PRC, and twenty-five other Asia-Pacific actors","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D03"],"primary_uses":"Regional diplomatic-influence direction and sensitivity check","known_limitations":"Composite blends dialogues, leadership, and other inputs; it cannot isolate diplomatic staffing, expertise, or causal conversion","url":"https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2025-asia-power-index-report/china-gains-advantage","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Annual index synthesis with published methodology","language":"English","id":"DC-S97","date":"2025 release","primary_use":"Regional diplomatic-influence direction and sensitivity check","limitation":"Composite blends dialogues, leadership, and other inputs; it cannot isolate diplomatic staffing, expertise, or causal conversion"},{"source_id":"DC-S98","publisher":"Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy","title":"Who Are China's Diplomats? Beyond Wolf Warrior Hype","date_or_version":"2026-02-13","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Georgetown University","directness":"biographical_dataset_and_professionalization_analysis","actor_coverage":"169 PRC ambassadors and senior foreign-affairs officials","update_cadence":"one-time study","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Professionalization, education, foreign-language proficiency, and political-control profile of the PRC diplomatic corps","known_limitations":"Senior and ambassador biographies do not reveal mission staffing, vacancy rates, access quality, or operational performance","url":"https://isd.georgetown.edu/publications/report-who-are-chinas-diplomats-beyond-wolf-warrior-hype/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University institute report based on a disclosed biographical dataset","language":"English","id":"DC-S98","date":"2026-02-13","primary_use":"Professionalization, education, foreign-language proficiency, and political-control profile of the PRC diplomatic corps","limitation":"Senior and ambassador biographies do not reveal mission staffing, vacancy rates, access quality, or operational performance"},{"source_id":"DC-S99","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"13 FAM 201.1: Language training general information","date_or_version":"updated 2025-07-16","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","directness":"official_training_and_proficiency_rule","actor_coverage":"U.S. Foreign Service personnel","update_cadence":"rule update","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Language requirements, training responsibility, and professional-proficiency objectives","known_limitations":"Policy and training availability do not show actual position fill, proficiency at post, or diplomatic effect","url":"https://fam.state.gov/FAM/13FAM/13FAM020101.html","source_origin":"U.S. official","provenance":"Current Foreign Affairs Manual policy","language":"English","id":"DC-S99","date":"updated 2025-07-16","primary_use":"Language requirements, training responsibility, and professional-proficiency objectives","limitation":"Policy and training availability do not show actual position fill, proficiency at post, or diplomatic effect"},{"source_id":"DC-S100","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Persistent Staffing and Foreign Language Gaps Compromise Diplomatic Readiness","date_or_version":"GAO-09-1046T; 2009-09-24","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","directness":"historical_readiness_audit","actor_coverage":"U.S. State Department overseas staffing and language-designated positions","update_cadence":"one-time oversight testimony","category_ids":["DC-D01"],"primary_uses":"Failure-mode calibration for staffing, experience, and language gaps","known_limitations":"Evidence is historical and cannot establish current gap rates; it is retained as a test of whether formal training rules equal readiness","url":"https://www.gao.gov/assets/a123400.html","source_origin":"Independent oversight","provenance":"Congressional audit testimony based on State staffing and language data","language":"English","id":"DC-S100","date":"GAO-09-1046T; 2009-09-24","primary_use":"Failure-mode calibration for staffing, experience, and language gaps","limitation":"Evidence is historical and cannot establish current gap rates; it is retained as a test of whether formal training rules equal readiness"},{"source_id":"DC-S101","publisher":"International Studies Quarterly","title":"Struggle for Minds and Influence: The Chinese Communist Party's Global Outreach","date_or_version":"2020; open-access article","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Oxford University Press","directness":"cross_regional_party_contact_dataset","actor_coverage":"3,658 delegation contacts and 462 parties in 161 countries, 2002-2017","update_cadence":"one-time peer-reviewed study","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03"],"primary_uses":"Coverage, recency, ruling-versus-opposition access, taskability, and concentration of CPC party diplomacy","known_limitations":"More than half of parties had only one or two observed contacts; the period ends in 2017 and effects are harder to observe than activity","url":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa028","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Peer-reviewed analysis of systematically collected ID-CPC public records","language":"English","id":"DC-S101","date":"2020; open-access article","primary_use":"Coverage, recency, ruling-versus-opposition access, taskability, and concentration of CPC party diplomacy","limitation":"More than half of parties had only one or two observed contacts; the period ends in 2017 and effects are harder to observe than activity"},{"source_id":"DC-S102","publisher":"Asian Perspective via Fudan University","title":"Assessing Effects of China's Party Diplomacy vis-a-vis Southeast Asia","date_or_version":"2023","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Asian Perspective","directness":"regional_network_effects_case_study","actor_coverage":"Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar, and Malaysia","update_cadence":"one-time peer-reviewed study","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Partner agency, benefits, controversy, and conversion effects of CPC party diplomacy","known_limitations":"Illustrative cases do not provide a common U.S.-PRC cohort or a representative global effect estimate","url":"https://iis.fudan.edu.cn/c5/ef/c6852a640495/page.htm","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"University-hosted abstract and link to peer-reviewed article","language":"English and Chinese","original_title":"Assessing Effects of China's Party Diplomacy vis-a-vis Southeast Asia: Ideas, Interests, and Controversies","id":"DC-S102","date":"2023","primary_use":"Partner agency, benefits, controversy, and conversion effects of CPC party diplomacy","limitation":"Illustrative cases do not provide a common U.S.-PRC cohort or a representative global effect estimate"},{"source_id":"DC-S103","publisher":"U.S. Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs","title":"International Visitor Leadership Program","date_or_version":"current through 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","directness":"official_program_inventory_and_alumni_outputs","actor_coverage":"More than 230,000 participants since 1940","update_cadence":"continuous program page","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"primary_uses":"Scale, elite access, and longevity of a major U.S. professional-exchange network","known_limitations":"Alumni titles and participation are selection-affected inputs and do not prove policy influence or reciprocal access","url":"https://exchanges.state.gov/non-us/program/international-visitor-leadership-program-ivlp","source_origin":"U.S. official","provenance":"Official program record","language":"English","id":"DC-S103","date":"current through 2026","primary_use":"Scale, elite access, and longevity of a major U.S. professional-exchange network","limitation":"Alumni titles and participation are selection-affected inputs and do not prove policy influence or reciprocal access"},{"source_id":"DC-S104","publisher":"Institute of International Education","title":"Evaluating and Measuring the Impact of Citizen Diplomacy","date_or_version":"current publication page","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Institute of International Education","directness":"evaluation_synthesis","actor_coverage":"Twelve evaluations of U.S. citizen-diplomacy program types","update_cadence":"one-time study","category_ids":["DC-D02"],"primary_uses":"Outcome-measure design and limits for exchanges and citizen diplomacy","known_limitations":"Programs and evaluations are heterogeneous and often rely on participant self-report without a PRC comparator","url":"https://www.iie.org/publications/evaluating-measuring-impact-of-citizen-diplomacy/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Nonprofit research synthesis of program evaluations","language":"English","id":"DC-S104","date":"current publication page","primary_use":"Outcome-measure design and limits for exchanges and citizen diplomacy","limitation":"Programs and evaluations are heterogeneous and often rely on participant self-report without a PRC comparator"},{"source_id":"DC-S105","publisher":"U.S. Central Command","title":"Global military leaders discuss Defeat ISIS campaign","date_or_version":"2025-02-03","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","directness":"official_membership_and_role_record","actor_coverage":"87 coalition members across every continent","update_cadence":"event update","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Breadth and differentiated task lines in a U.S.-anchored functional coalition","known_limitations":"Membership and official role descriptions do not establish equal participation, accepted output, or coalition added value","url":"https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/4051599/global-military-leaders-meet-and-discuss-defeat-isis-campaign-at-combined-force/","source_origin":"U.S. official","provenance":"Coalition command statement","language":"English","id":"DC-S105","date":"2025-02-03","primary_use":"Breadth and differentiated task lines in a U.S.-anchored functional coalition","limitation":"Membership and official role descriptions do not establish equal participation, accepted output, or coalition added value"},{"source_id":"DC-S106","publisher":"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace","title":"BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants","date_or_version":"2025-03","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace","directness":"multi_country_partner_perspective_analysis","actor_coverage":"BRICS members, partners, and aspirants","update_cadence":"one-time study","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Partner motives, agency, prestige, hedging, and internal disagreement around BRICS expansion","known_limitations":"Country chapters are qualitative and do not measure common role fulfillment or counterfactual attraction","url":"https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Multi-author comparative policy study","language":"English","id":"DC-S106","date":"2025-03","primary_use":"Partner motives, agency, prestige, hedging, and internal disagreement around BRICS expansion","limitation":"Country chapters are qualitative and do not measure common role fulfillment or counterfactual attraction"},{"source_id":"DC-S107","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements","date_or_version":"archived 2009-2017 page; treaty texts remain operative where not superseded","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. treaty system","directness":"official_obligation_inventory","actor_coverage":"NATO, Australia-New Zealand, Philippines, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Rio arrangements","update_cadence":"archival reference","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Treaty form, trigger language, parties, and constitutional-process qualifications","known_limitations":"Archived summary omits current implementation, funding, caveats, and any obligations modified or terminated after publication","url":"https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/index.htm","source_origin":"U.S. official","provenance":"Official treaty summary","language":"English","id":"DC-S107","date":"archived 2009-2017 page; treaty texts remain operative where not superseded","primary_use":"Treaty form, trigger language, parties, and constitutional-process qualifications","limitation":"Archived summary omits current implementation, funding, caveats, and any obligations modified or terminated after publication"},{"source_id":"DC-S108","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China treaty database","title":"China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance","date_or_version":"signed 1961-07-11; effective 1961-09-10","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"PRC treaty system","directness":"official_treaty_record","actor_coverage":"PRC and DPRK","update_cadence":"treaty record","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Existence, legal form, and continuity of the PRC's principal mutual-assistance treaty","known_limitations":"Treaty existence and official characterization do not reveal trigger interpretation or performance in a qualifying crisis","url":"https://treaty.mfa.gov.cn/web/detail1.jsp?objid=1531876401715","source_origin":"PRC official primary","provenance":"Official treaty database record","language":"Chinese","original_title":"中华人民共和国和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国友好合作互助条约","id":"DC-S108","date":"signed 1961-07-11; effective 1961-09-10","primary_use":"Existence, legal form, and continuity of the PRC's principal mutual-assistance treaty","limitation":"Treaty existence and official characterization do not reveal trigger interpretation or performance in a qualifying crisis"},{"source_id":"DC-S109","publisher":"International Studies Quarterly","title":"What Does It Mean to Be a Reliable Ally?","date_or_version":"2026-02-26","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Oxford University Press","directness":"updated_alliance_war_performance_dataset","actor_coverage":"Invoked formal alliances over roughly two centuries through 2019","update_cadence":"one-time peer-reviewed study","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Historical trigger-fulfillment calibration and coding sensitivity for alliance reliability","known_limitations":"The sample is non-random, not a U.S.-PRC comparison, and post-1945 multilateral results are sensitive to a few related cases","url":"https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/70/1/sqag012/8499277","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Peer-reviewed open-access article and updated dataset","language":"English","id":"DC-S109","date":"2026-02-26","primary_use":"Historical trigger-fulfillment calibration and coding sensitivity for alliance reliability","limitation":"The sample is non-random, not a U.S.-PRC comparison, and post-1945 multilateral results are sensitive to a few related cases"},{"source_id":"DC-S110","publisher":"AidData at William & Mary","title":"Belt and Road Reboot: Beijing's Bid to De-Risk Its Global Infrastructure Initiative","date_or_version":"2023-11-06","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"AidData","directness":"project_level_commitment_and_implementation_dataset","actor_coverage":"20,985 PRC-financed projects in 165 low- and middle-income countries, 2000-2021 with implementation through 2023","update_cadence":"major dataset release","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"PRC commitment scale, implementation, repair, risk, and adaptation","known_limitations":"Official PRC terms and failures are incompletely disclosed; finance and project completion do not by themselves establish diplomatic credibility","url":"https://www.aiddata.org/publications/belt-and-road-reboot","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Method-documented project-level research release","language":"English","id":"DC-S110","date":"2023-11-06","primary_use":"PRC commitment scale, implementation, repair, risk, and adaptation","limitation":"Official PRC terms and failures are incompletely disclosed; finance and project completion do not by themselves establish diplomatic credibility"},{"source_id":"DC-S111","publisher":"The White House","title":"Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid","date_or_version":"2025-01-20","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. executive branch","directness":"official_policy_discontinuity","actor_coverage":"U.S. foreign development assistance programs","update_cadence":"one-time executive order","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current continuity shock, pause scope, review process, and waiver authority","known_limitations":"A lawful policy review is not automatically a treaty breach; program-level cancellations and partner effects require separate evidence","url":"https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid/","source_origin":"U.S. official","provenance":"Presidential action","language":"English","id":"DC-S111","date":"2025-01-20","primary_use":"Current continuity shock, pause scope, review process, and waiver authority","limitation":"A lawful policy review is not automatically a treaty breach; program-level cancellations and partner effects require separate evidence"},{"source_id":"DC-S112","publisher":"Government of the United Kingdom","title":"Six-monthly report on Hong Kong: 1 July to 31 December 2025","date_or_version":"2026-04","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"United Kingdom government","directness":"counterparty_compliance_assessment","actor_coverage":"Sino-British Joint Declaration commitments in Hong Kong","update_cadence":"six-monthly","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Counterparty assessment of PRC compliance and preserved versus eroded commitments","known_limitations":"The United Kingdom is a treaty counterparty, not a neutral adjudicator; Beijing disputes the legal and factual characterization","url":"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/six-monthly-report-on-hong-kong-july-to-december-2025/six-monthly-report-on-hong-kong-1-july-to-31-december-2025","source_origin":"Partner-government official","provenance":"Treaty counterparty's structured reporting against declaration provisions","language":"English","id":"DC-S112","date":"2026-04","primary_use":"Counterparty assessment of PRC compliance and preserved versus eroded commitments","limitation":"The United Kingdom is a treaty counterparty, not a neutral adjudicator; Beijing disputes the legal and factual characterization"},{"source_id":"DC-S113","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"U.S. Overseas Basing: Background and Issues for Congress","date_or_version":"R48123; 2024-07-10","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"Congressional Research Service","directness":"government_research_basing_inventory","actor_coverage":"At least 128 U.S. overseas bases in at least 51 countries","update_cadence":"periodic report","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Scale, legal arrangements, persistent and rotational access, host-country restrictions, and withdrawals","known_limitations":"Unclassified inventory omits some sites and cannot establish scenario-specific wartime permission or survivability","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48123.html","source_origin":"Independent government research","provenance":"Nonpartisan congressional research report","language":"English","id":"DC-S113","date":"R48123; 2024-07-10","primary_use":"Scale, legal arrangements, persistent and rotational access, host-country restrictions, and withdrawals","limitation":"Unclassified inventory omits some sites and cannot establish scenario-specific wartime permission or survivability"},{"source_id":"DC-S114","publisher":"AidData at William & Mary","title":"Anchoring Global Ambitions: Beijing's Ports Financing and the Race for Maritime Dominance","date_or_version":"2026-03-04","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"AidData","directness":"port_finance_ownership_and_naval_activity_dataset","actor_coverage":"363 projects at 168 ports in 90 countries, 2000-2025","update_cadence":"major dataset release","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"PRC port reach, ownership, naval activity, prospective access, and limits of finance-to-access conversion","known_limitations":"Port calls, ownership, finance, and dual-use potential do not establish legal crisis access or exclusive military permission","url":"https://docs.aiddata.org/reports/anchoring-global-ambitions/full-report.html","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Method-documented project and naval-activity dataset","language":"English","id":"DC-S114","date":"2026-03-04","primary_use":"PRC port reach, ownership, naval activity, prospective access, and limits of finance-to-access conversion","limitation":"Port calls, ownership, finance, and dual-use potential do not establish legal crisis access or exclusive military permission"},{"source_id":"DC-S115","publisher":"Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies","title":"A Tale of Two Reams: Questions Remain at Cambodia's Growing Naval Base","date_or_version":"2025-05-05","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative","directness":"satellite_and_visit_based_facility_assessment","actor_coverage":"Ream Naval Base, Cambodia","update_cadence":"event and imagery update","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Physical readiness, observed PLAN use, joint center, and possible exclusive access at Ream","known_limitations":"Satellite imagery and port-call patterns cannot reveal classified legal terms; Cambodia denies exclusive PRC access","url":"https://amti.csis.org/a-tale-of-two-reams-questions-remain-at-cambodias-growing-naval-base/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Satellite imagery and official-photo analysis","language":"English","id":"DC-S115","date":"2025-05-05","primary_use":"Physical readiness, observed PLAN use, joint center, and possible exclusive access at Ream","limitation":"Satellite imagery and port-call patterns cannot reveal classified legal terms; Cambodia denies exclusive PRC access"},{"source_id":"DC-S116","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Compacts of Free Association: Education and Health Remain Priorities, but Implementation and Oversight Are Delayed","date_or_version":"GAO-26-107778; 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","directness":"compact_implementation_and_access_audit","actor_coverage":"Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau, and U.S. agencies","update_cadence":"one-time oversight report","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Legally durable U.S. military access and current implementation delays under renewed compacts","known_limitations":"The report's principal audit is assistance implementation rather than operational access quality or crisis activation","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-107778/index.html","source_origin":"Independent oversight","provenance":"Congressional audit of compact implementation","language":"English","id":"DC-S116","date":"GAO-26-107778; 2026","primary_use":"Legally durable U.S. military access and current implementation delays under renewed compacts","limitation":"The report's principal audit is assistance implementation rather than operational access quality or crisis activation"},{"source_id":"DC-S117","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue","date_or_version":"2024-07-30","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S.-Philippines alliance","directness":"bilateral_authorization_and_resourcing_record","actor_coverage":"Nine EDCA locations and related U.S. and Philippine investments","update_cadence":"event statement","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Host authorization, site-development resources, exercises, and bilateral role assignment","known_limitations":"Joint statement is first-party evidence; announced funds and sites do not prove completion, unrestricted crisis use, or host acceptance in every scenario","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3854902/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue/","source_origin":"U.S. and partner official","provenance":"Joint ministerial statement","language":"English","id":"DC-S117","date":"2024-07-30","primary_use":"Host authorization, site-development resources, exercises, and bilateral role assignment","limitation":"Joint statement is first-party evidence; announced funds and sites do not prove completion, unrestricted crisis use, or host acceptance in every scenario"},{"source_id":"DC-S118","publisher":"International Atomic Energy Agency","title":"IAEA Annual Report 2018","date_or_version":"2019 release covering 2018","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Atomic Energy Agency","directness":"independent_verification_record","actor_coverage":"Iran nuclear-related commitments under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA","update_cadence":"annual","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Verification before and after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA","known_limitations":"The IAEA verifies nuclear commitments, not every sanctions-relief obligation, bargaining cause, or later durability outcome","url":"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2018/gc63-5.pdf","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","provenance":"IAEA safeguards and monitoring report","language":"English","id":"DC-S118","date":"2019 release covering 2018","primary_use":"Verification before and after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA","limitation":"The IAEA verifies nuclear commitments, not every sanctions-relief obligation, bargaining cause, or later durability outcome"},{"source_id":"DC-S119","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action","date_or_version":"2015-2017 implementation archive","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"P5+1 and European Union","directness":"official_agreement_and_implementation_record","actor_coverage":"Iran, P5+1, and European Union","update_cadence":"archival implementation page","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Predeclared objective, negotiated commitments, and initial verified implementation","known_limitations":"U.S. first-party summary predates U.S. withdrawal and cannot isolate coalition added value or durable compliance","url":"https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/?safe=1","source_origin":"U.S. official","provenance":"Official agreement and implementation archive","language":"English","id":"DC-S119","date":"2015-2017 implementation archive","primary_use":"Predeclared objective, negotiated commitments, and initial verified implementation","limitation":"U.S. first-party summary predates U.S. withdrawal and cannot isolate coalition added value or durable compliance"},{"source_id":"DC-S120","publisher":"Associated Press","title":"Iran and Saudi Arabia agree to resume ties with China's help","date_or_version":"2023-03-10","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_reporting","institutional_family":"Associated Press","directness":"independent_event_reporting","actor_coverage":"PRC-brokered Saudi-Iran agreement","update_cadence":"event report","category_ids":["DC-D09","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Observable negotiated terms, prior Iraqi and Omani groundwork, and immediate attribution limits","known_limitations":"Embassy restoration is not proof of broader regional settlement, long-term compliance, or a PRC-centered coalition mechanism","url":"https://apnews.com/article/2f80bb71a995910cb4b172e5dbee3526","source_origin":"Independent reporting","provenance":"Independent reporting with the joint communique and participant statements","language":"English","id":"DC-S120","date":"2023-03-10","primary_use":"Observable negotiated terms, prior Iraqi and Omani groundwork, and immediate attribution limits","limitation":"Embassy restoration is not proof of broader regional settlement, long-term compliance, or a PRC-centered coalition mechanism"},{"source_id":"DC-S121","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Deterrence and defence","date_or_version":"updated 2026","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"NATO","directness":"official_shock_response_and_integration_record","actor_coverage":"Thirty-two NATO allies","update_cadence":"continuous topic update","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Finland and Sweden integration, post-2022 adaptation, force planning, and the 2025 investment commitment","known_limitations":"Official alliance account does not independently verify national output or isolate U.S. diplomatic causation from Russian threat","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/deterrence-and-defence","source_origin":"Intergovernmental official","provenance":"Current NATO capability and policy record","language":"English","id":"DC-S121","date":"updated 2026","primary_use":"Finland and Sweden integration, post-2022 adaptation, force planning, and the 2025 investment commitment","limitation":"Official alliance account does not independently verify national output or isolate U.S. diplomatic causation from Russian threat"},{"source_id":"DC-S122","publisher":"South African Institute of International Affairs","title":"Life After Expansion: The BRICS Quest for Institutional Coherence","date_or_version":"2025-08","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"South African Institute of International Affairs","directness":"partner_region_cohesion_analysis","actor_coverage":"Expanded BRICS membership","update_cadence":"one-time policy study","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D08","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Internal heterogeneity, institutional coherence, and adaptation after expansion","known_limitations":"Policy analysis is not an obligation-level retention or delivery dataset and may underobserve informal bargaining","url":"https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SAIIA_PI_168_LifeAfterExpansionBRICS.pdf","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"African policy institute analysis","language":"English","id":"DC-S122","date":"2025-08","primary_use":"Internal heterogeneity, institutional coherence, and adaptation after expansion","limitation":"Policy analysis is not an obligation-level retention or delivery dataset and may underobserve informal bargaining"},{"source_id":"DC-S123","publisher":"Lowy Institute","title":"United States profile: Southeast Asia Influence Index","date_or_version":"2025 release","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Lowy Institute","directness":"regional_multi_indicator_profile","actor_coverage":"United States relative to nine other external partners across eleven Southeast Asian states","update_cadence":"annual or periodic release","category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Regional sensitivity for formal diplomacy, defence networks, culture, and influence","known_limitations":"Composite influence is not a direct measure of expertise or conversion, and weights embed analytic choices","url":"https://influence.lowyinstitute.org/profile/united-states/","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Method-documented regional index","language":"English","id":"DC-S123","date":"2025 release","primary_use":"Regional sensitivity for formal diplomacy, defence networks, culture, and influence","limitation":"Composite influence is not a direct measure of expertise or conversion, and weights embed analytic choices"},{"source_id":"DC-S124","publisher":"Associated Press","title":"U.S. warship visits Cambodia naval base expanded with China's help","date_or_version":"2026-01","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_reporting","institutional_family":"Associated Press","directness":"independent_access_event_reporting","actor_coverage":"Ream Naval Base and U.S.-Cambodia-PRC access claims","update_cadence":"event report","category_ids":["DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Nonexclusive-access counterevidence and host-state agency at a PRC-developed facility","known_limitations":"A single visit does not disprove preferential or reserved PRC access at other facilities or in a crisis","url":"https://apnews.com/article/a8d9fe4d1dda8c7cf9bec2639718b19c","source_origin":"Independent reporting","provenance":"Independent report of an observed port visit and official statements","language":"English","id":"DC-S124","date":"2026-01","primary_use":"Nonexclusive-access counterevidence and host-state agency at a PRC-developed facility","limitation":"A single visit does not disprove preferential or reserved PRC access at other facilities or in a crisis"},{"source_id":"DC-S125","publisher":"Inclusive Society Institute","title":"FOCAC at Twenty-Five: A Reflective Inquiry into a Matured Partnership","date_or_version":"2025 symposium report","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"Inclusive Society Institute and Zhejiang Normal University","directness":"partner_side_longitudinal_reflection","actor_coverage":"China-Africa cooperation through FOCAC since 2000","update_cadence":"one-time retrospective","category_ids":["DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Institutional continuity, partner experience, adaptation, and delivery claims over twenty-five years","known_limitations":"Joint sponsorship includes a PRC university and the report is reflective rather than an independent obligation-level audit","url":"https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/focac-at-twenty-five-a-reflective-inquiry-into-a-matured-partnership","source_origin":"Mixed independent and partner research","provenance":"Joint symposium synthesis with African and Chinese contributors","language":"English","id":"DC-S125","date":"2025 symposium report","primary_use":"Institutional continuity, partner experience, adaptation, and delivery claims over twenty-five years","limitation":"Joint sponsorship includes a PRC university and the report is reflective rather than an independent obligation-level audit"},{"source_id":"DC-S126","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un mark the 65th anniversary of the China-DPRK treaty","date_or_version":"2026-07-11","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"PRC-DPRK treaty relationship","directness":"current_official_continuity_claim","actor_coverage":"PRC and DPRK","update_cadence":"anniversary statement","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current official treatment of the treaty as an active political and legal foundation","known_limitations":"Anniversary rhetoric is not an observed trigger test or independent proof of fulfillment","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202607/t20260713_11980494.html","source_origin":"PRC official primary","provenance":"Current bilateral leader statements","language":"English","id":"DC-S126","date":"2026-07-11","primary_use":"Current official treatment of the treaty as an active political and legal foundation","limitation":"Anniversary rhetoric is not an observed trigger test or independent proof of fulfillment"},{"source_id":"DC-S127","publisher":"AidData at William & Mary","title":"BRI From the Ground Up: Leaders from 129 countries evaluate a decade of Beijing's signature initiative","date_or_version":"2024-03-26","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"AidData","directness":"partner_perception_survey","actor_coverage":"Public, private, and civil-society leaders in 129 countries","update_cadence":"one-time global survey","category_ids":["DC-D02","DC-D03","DC-D04","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Partner-defined benefits, costs, implementation experience, and demand for PRC cooperation","known_limitations":"Perceptions are not audited project outcomes; respondents and countries differ from U.S. program evaluation samples","url":"https://docs.aiddata.org/reports/bri-from-the-ground-up/full-report.html","source_origin":"Independent research","provenance":"Cross-national leader survey with published methods","language":"English","id":"DC-S127","date":"2024-03-26","primary_use":"Partner-defined benefits, costs, implementation experience, and demand for PRC cooperation","limitation":"Perceptions are not audited project outcomes; respondents and countries differ from U.S. program evaluation samples"},{"source_id":"DC-S128","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"The Ankara Summit Declaration","date_or_version":"2026-07-08","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"NATO","directness":"official_collective_commitment_and_output_record","actor_coverage":"Thirty-two NATO allies and partner support to Ukraine","update_cadence":"summit declaration","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D07","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current allied investment, procurement, burden-shift, and Ukraine-support commitments, including the stated 2026 and 2027 levels","known_limitations":"Alliance-authored; procurement and investment figures are reported outputs but the EUR70 billion Ukraine figure is a pledge, and the statement does not expose country-level delivery or acceptance","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration","source_origin":"Intergovernmental official","provenance":"Official declaration adopted by NATO heads of state and government","language":"English","id":"DC-S128","date":"2026-07-08","primary_use":"Current allied investment, procurement, burden-shift, and Ukraine-support commitments, including the stated 2026 and 2027 levels","limitation":"Alliance-authored; procurement and investment figures are reported outputs but the EUR70 billion Ukraine figure is a pledge, and the statement does not expose country-level delivery or acceptance"},{"source_id":"DC-S129","publisher":"United Kingdom Prime Minister's Office","title":"Statement of the co-chairs of the Coalition of the Willing","date_or_version":"2026-07-13","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Coalition of the Willing co-chairs","directness":"official_multilateral_commitment_and_readiness_record","actor_coverage":"Ukraine, coalition participants, United States, European Union, and NATO","update_cadence":"event statement","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current commitment terms, activation condition, partner-consent rule, multinational-force readiness claim, and planned exercise","known_limitations":"Co-chair statement does not identify every participant or assigned role; readiness is self-reported, the ceasefire trigger has not occurred, and planned exercises are not completed activation or delivery","url":"https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-of-the-co-chairs-of-the-coalition-of-the-willing-13-july-2026","source_origin":"Partner official primary","provenance":"Official statement by the coalition's United Kingdom co-chair","language":"English","id":"DC-S129","date":"2026-07-13","primary_use":"Current commitment terms, activation condition, partner-consent rule, multinational-force readiness claim, and planned exercise","limitation":"Co-chair statement does not identify every participant or assigned role; readiness is self-reported, the ceasefire trigger has not occurred, and planned exercises are not completed activation or delivery"},{"source_id":"DC-S130","publisher":"United Kingdom Ministry of Defence","title":"UK takes command of multinational force for Ukraine","date_or_version":"2026-07-24","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and Multinational Force Ukraine","directness":"official_command_and_coordination_record","actor_coverage":"Multinational Force Ukraine participants","update_cadence":"event record","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D06","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Observed command handover, operational headquarters, declared readiness, contingent mission, and planned exercises","known_limitations":"First-party account; the force remains contingent on a ceasefire, participant obligations and caveats are not fully disclosed, and command establishment does not prove deployment performance","url":"https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-takes-command-of-multinational-force-for-ukraine","source_origin":"Partner official primary","provenance":"Official United Kingdom Ministry of Defence record","language":"English","id":"DC-S130","date":"2026-07-24","primary_use":"Observed command handover, operational headquarters, declared readiness, contingent mission, and planned exercises","limitation":"First-party account; the force remains contingent on a ceasefire, participant obligations and caveats are not fully disclosed, and command establishment does not prove deployment performance"},{"source_id":"DC-S131","publisher":"Philippine News Agency","title":"Defense official: EDCA sites under PH control, not American bases","date_or_version":"2026-03-02","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Philippine defense and national-security authorities","directness":"official_host_permission_and_caveat_record","actor_coverage":"Nine Philippine EDCA locations and rotational U.S. access","update_cadence":"event statement","category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D10"],"primary_uses":"Current host ownership, control, rotational-access terms, offensive-use caveat, logistics, prepositioning, exercise, and disaster-response purposes","known_limitations":"Government news report reproducing official statements; it does not test permissions in a high-end crisis, disclose site-by-site readiness, or establish that political caveats cannot change","url":"https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1270083","source_origin":"Partner official primary","provenance":"Philippine government news agency report quoting defense, armed-forces, and national-security officials","language":"English","id":"DC-S131","date":"2026-03-02","primary_use":"Current host ownership, control, rotational-access terms, offensive-use caveat, logistics, prepositioning, exercise, and disaster-response purposes","limitation":"Government news report reproducing official statements; it does not test permissions in a high-end crisis, disclose site-by-site readiness, or establish that political caveats cannot change"}],"review":{"type":"Internal adversarial review","disclosure":"This is a structured second-pass challenge and sensitivity review, not external peer review or government validation.","ruling":"No category is scored from the other side's deficit alone. Partner action is credited only when observed and attributed to the system or partner that supplied it. Current U.S. policy shocks are treated as correlated rather than independent observations. AIIB, World Bank, BRICS, NATO, and G7 output is not assigned wholesale to Beijing or Washington. Missing PRC data lowers confidence and never counts as nonperformance.","hypotheses":[{"id":"DC-H01","claim":"The U.S./partner system converts commitments into coordinated action more reliably when a standing alliance or institution supplies decision and implementation machinery.","affirmative_case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C07","DC-C13","DC-C18"],"challenge_case_ids":["DC-C02","DC-C11","DC-C12"],"source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S33","DC-S48","DC-S50","DC-S67","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71","DC-S73","DC-S74","DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77","DC-S78","DC-S79","DC-S80","DC-S81","DC-S82","DC-S83","DC-S84","DC-S85","DC-S86","DC-S87","DC-S88","DC-S89","DC-S90","DC-S91","DC-S92","DC-S93","DC-S94","DC-S95"],"strongest_alternative":"Threat intensity, U.S. material capacity, or case selection may explain participation and delivery rather than standing diplomatic machinery.","disconfirming_evidence":"Matched cases in which standing U.S.-anchored machinery repeatedly fails to authorize, activate, or deliver while a comparable PRC-centered mechanism succeeds under similar stakes and partner incentives.","required_tests":["Separate formal decision speed from lowest-common-denominator output.","Control for direct threat, geography, U.S. military or economic contribution, and preexisting partner preference.","Retain opt-outs, caveats, late delivery, abandoned commitments, and post-event erosion."],"open_gaps":"The applied ledger contains 19 observations across security activation, pandemic development-bank response, selected club implementation, and Ukraine delivery, but mandate-adjusted event breadth, eligible-role denominators, accepted outputs, and 24-month durability remain incomplete.","adjudication":{"category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"positions":{"DC-D06":"U.S. / partner edge","DC-D07":"U.S. / partner edge"},"fact_confidence":"high","comparative_confidence":"low","ruling":"Observed U.S./partner machinery converts a live security trigger into authorization and deployed output and shows a broader high-cost delivery portfolio, while NATO Afghanistan, World Bank-AIIB parity, positive AIIB completion evidence, selected BRICS implementation, and uneven partner burdens preclude leads.","strongest_counterevidence":"NATO's Afghanistan endgame, competitive AIIB pandemic activation and delivery, an 83 percent reported BRICS selected-compliance rate, incomplete European replacement of U.S. Ukraine aid, and mandate and disclosure asymmetry.","sensitivity":"Both calls fall to Contested if mandate-adjusted PRC-centered cases match activation and critical-role delivery or a larger U.S.-anchored sample repeats Afghanistan-style consultation and coordination failures."}},{"id":"DC-H02","claim":"The PRC has stronger formal and party-to-party reach in parts of Asia and the Global South than embassy counts alone reveal.","affirmative_case_ids":["DC-C10","DC-C14","DC-C15","DC-C20"],"challenge_case_ids":["DC-C09","DC-C16","DC-C20"],"source_ids":["DC-S01","DC-S02","DC-S03","DC-S04","DC-S05","DC-S10","DC-S11","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S40","DC-S43"],"strongest_alternative":"Reported party and forum relationships may be ceremonial, dormant, or driven by economic exposure and elite incentives rather than usable diplomatic access.","disconfirming_evidence":"Entity-level sampling shows low recency or reciprocity, weak access across government changes, or no higher conversion into agenda entry, warning, coordination, or policy than matched U.S. networks.","required_tests":["Verify reported relationships at the partner level and distinguish governing, opposition, and ceremonial contacts.","Compare network recency, reciprocity, access, and policy conversion rather than totals.","Separate PRC party-state tasking advantages from legitimacy, autonomy, and durability costs."],"open_gaps":"The PRC network is documented mainly by actor claims; a matched entity-level dataset for U.S. plural and PRC party-state channels does not yet exist.","adjudication":{"category_ids":["DC-D01","DC-D02"],"positions":{"DC-D01":"Contested","DC-D02":"Contested"},"fact_confidence":"high for formal reach and moderate for informal reach","comparative_confidence":"low","ruling":"The PRC holds measurable regional and party-channel advantages, while the U.S. retains broader plural networks and stronger reach in other regions. Neither system converts its network advantages consistently enough across regions and channels to support a global edge.","strongest_counterevidence":"PRC post density and party contacts in Asia and much of the Global South challenge a U.S. advantage, while thin relationship frequency, asymmetric staffing data, U.S. alumni depth, and regional reversals challenge a PRC advantage.","sensitivity":"Either category could become a regional edge if matched staffing, recency, reciprocity, consequential access, and policy-conversion evidence remains directionally consistent within that region."}},{"id":"DC-H03","claim":"U.S. institutional leadership is strongest inside Western security and economic institutions but weaker when current stewardship, representativeness, and global legitimacy are included.","affirmative_case_ids":["DC-C01","DC-C07","DC-C18"],"challenge_case_ids":["DC-C08","DC-C13","DC-C16","DC-C17"],"source_ids":["DC-S17","DC-S18","DC-S19","DC-S20","DC-S21","DC-S22","DC-S28","DC-S29","DC-S30","DC-S31","DC-S32","DC-S33","DC-S34","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S49","DC-S50","DC-S51","DC-S52","DC-S53","DC-S54","DC-S55","DC-S56","DC-S57","DC-S58","DC-S59","DC-S60","DC-S61","DC-S62","DC-S63","DC-S64","DC-S65","DC-S66","DC-S67","DC-S68","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71","DC-S72","DC-S73","DC-S74","DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77"],"strongest_alternative":"The United States may remain the indispensable provider and agenda setter even when it challenges an institution, while survey criticism and governance inequities do not show PRC leadership.","disconfirming_evidence":"Across predeclared Western and universal-institution portfolios, U.S.-sponsored proposals fail, U.S. obligations are not implemented, institutions remain unrepaired, or members shift to alternatives at rates inconsistent with a U.S. edge.","required_tests":["Assess Western, universal, and PRC-centered institutional baskets separately.","Distinguish governance power from agenda adoption, implementation, stewardship, inclusion, and legitimacy.","Apply stated institutional rules to both powers and include counterexamples to each strongest claim."],"open_gaps":"The first adjudication now applies 38 observations across Western, universal, and PRC-centered baskets, but proposal sponsorship, private bargaining, regionally matched implementation, and independent obligation-level PRC-centered delivery records remain incomplete.","adjudication":{"category_id":"DC-D08","position":"U.S. / partner edge","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_confidence":"moderate","ruling":"Western institutional execution depth remains greater, while current U.S. stewardship failures and genuine PRC-centered institution building preclude a lead.","strongest_counterevidence":"U.S. G7 implementation below the group average, large UN arrears, WTO Appellate Body obstruction, 2025-2026 withdrawals, broad PRC-position UN vote alignment, and material AIIB and BRICS implementation evidence.","sensitivity":"Falls to Contested if current U.S. stewardship failures persist while at least two PRC-centered institutional families show independently verified obligation-level delivery and retention, or if matched attribution removes most Western-system credit."}},{"id":"DC-H04","claim":"PRC-centered forums broaden participation and agenda reach, while consensus rules and member heterogeneity may constrain activation and delivery.","affirmative_case_ids":["DC-C10","DC-C13","DC-C14","DC-C15"],"challenge_case_ids":["DC-C11","DC-C12","DC-C16"],"source_ids":["DC-S24","DC-S25","DC-S26","DC-S27","DC-S28","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S40","DC-S43","DC-S67","DC-S69","DC-S70","DC-S71","DC-S73","DC-S74","DC-S75","DC-S76","DC-S77","DC-S81","DC-S82","DC-S83","DC-S84","DC-S90","DC-S91","DC-S92"],"strongest_alternative":"Flexible consensus and heterogeneous membership may be deliberate strengths that preserve partner agency and enable selective, durable cooperation without alliance-like activation.","disconfirming_evidence":"Obligation-level records show high authorization, resource, implementation, and retention rates across consequential PRC-centered initiatives despite divergent member preferences.","required_tests":["Evaluate each forum against its stated function rather than an alliance template.","Separate new members, partners, observers, meeting participants, and material implementers.","Trace named commitments through owners, resources, milestones, delivered output, and participant retention."],"open_gaps":"The SCO stress cases and AIIB and BRICS implementation evidence now test the claim directly, but independent obligation inventories and representative activation and delivery samples for BRICS, SCO, and FOCAC remain incomplete.","adjudication":{"category_ids":["DC-D06","DC-D07"],"ruling":"The claim is provisionally supported but bounded: SCO consensus can fail and later repair, while AIIB crisis response and reported BRICS implementation show that heterogeneity does not prevent material selective delivery.","comparative_effect":"This evidence supports low-confidence U.S./partner edges rather than leads and makes the development-bank and selected-club delivery slices Contested.","strongest_counterevidence":"AIIB activated and delivered a large multilateral pandemic portfolio, and the selected BRICS compliance study reports substantial member implementation.","sensitivity":"The hypothesis weakens if independent obligation-level data show broad, timely, critical-role delivery across PRC-centered institutional families despite member divergence."}},{"id":"DC-H05","claim":"U.S. plural informal networks may be broad and durable but less centrally taskable; PRC party-state networks may be more taskable but more exposed to legitimacy and partner-autonomy costs.","affirmative_case_ids":["DC-C09","DC-C14","DC-C15"],"challenge_case_ids":["DC-C09","DC-C14","DC-C16"],"source_ids":["DC-S07","DC-S08","DC-S09","DC-S10","DC-S11","DC-S34","DC-S35","DC-S36","DC-S40","DC-S43"],"strongest_alternative":"Central taskability and plural durability are assumed organizational traits that may reverse by country, sponsor, issue, and political regime.","disconfirming_evidence":"Matched network cohorts show no systematic difference in taskability, reciprocity, policy conversion, autonomy costs, or persistence after leadership change.","required_tests":["Code channel sponsor and form without assuming public, private, party, or civil actors act as a unified national system.","Require an observed conversion from relationship to consequential access, warning, coordination, or policy.","Measure partner-defined benefits, reciprocal influence, attrition, and behavior after political turnover."],"open_gaps":"Private networks are intrinsically underobserved and the available evaluations use different participant, outcome, and disclosure standards.","adjudication":{"category_id":"DC-D02","position":"Contested","fact_confidence":"moderate","comparative_confidence":"low","ruling":"The evidence supports the organizational contrast but not a global capability edge: PRC party-state channels are more centrally taskable, while U.S. educational, professional, business, civil-society, and political networks are more plural and often more durable.","strongest_counterevidence":"Many reported CPC contacts are infrequent, U.S. alumni outcomes are selection-sensitive, and neither system discloses a representative universe of private access or failed conversions.","sensitivity":"Moves only if matched cohorts demonstrate a persistent difference in consequential access, warning, coordination, or policy conversion after partner agency and political turnover are included."}},{"id":"DC-H06","claim":"Both systems will look less capable when commitments are followed through authorization, resources, usable access, activation, delivery, outcomes, and durability rather than counted at signature.","affirmative_case_ids":["DC-C02","DC-C03","DC-C04","DC-C07","DC-C11","DC-C15"],"challenge_case_ids":["DC-C05","DC-C06","DC-C13"],"source_ids":["DC-S14","DC-S15","DC-S16","DC-S19","DC-S26","DC-S31","DC-S33","DC-S37","DC-S38","DC-S43","DC-S44","DC-S45","DC-S46","DC-S47","DC-S48"],"strongest_alternative":"Some diplomatic commitments are intentionally expressive, deterrent, or constitutive; demanding downstream material output from every instrument could create a false failure rate.","disconfirming_evidence":"Preclassified commitments show little attrition at the stages applicable to their stated form and purpose, or apparent attrition is explained by incorrect denominators rather than nonperformance.","required_tests":["Classify each commitment's intended function before selecting applicable causal stages.","Use the same obligation specificity and milestone rules for both systems.","Do not penalize a nonmaterial political commitment for lacking resources unless its own objective requires them."],"open_gaps":"Complete, comparable commitment universes with implementation deadlines are not yet built for either system.","adjudication":{"category_ids":["DC-D04","DC-D05","DC-D06","DC-D07","DC-D09","DC-D10"],"positions":{"DC-D04":"U.S. / partner edge","DC-D05":"U.S. / partner edge","DC-D06":"U.S. / partner edge","DC-D07":"U.S. / partner edge","DC-D09":"Insufficient comparative basis","DC-D10":"U.S. / partner edge"},"fact_confidence":"high","comparative_confidence":"low to moderate except DC-D09, which is not assessed","ruling":"Following commitments through the full conversion chain narrows both systems substantially. The U.S./partner system retains edges in formal credibility, usable access, activation, delivery, and durability, but recurrent violations, revocations, burden gaps, policy reversals, and partner autonomy preclude leads. Bargaining outcomes do not support a comparative arrow.","strongest_counterevidence":"U.S. alliance nonfulfillment, aid discontinuity, base revocations, Afghanistan, and JCPOA reversal coexist with PRC treaty continuity, development-finance repair, port-network growth, selective institutional delivery, and Saudi-Iran mediation.","sensitivity":"The edge calls fall toward Contested if a representative matched portfolio shows equivalent PRC-centered authorization, exercised access, critical-role delivery, and post-turnover retention; DC-D09 remains unscored until objectives and counterfactual contribution become comparable."}},{"id":"DC-H07","claim":"Bargaining outcomes are more case- and issue-specific than the other capability positions and may remain unscored longest.","affirmative_case_ids":["DC-C05","DC-C06","DC-C17"],"challenge_case_ids":["DC-C02","DC-C08","DC-C16"],"source_ids":["DC-S20","DC-S21","DC-S32","DC-S44","DC-S45","DC-S46","DC-S47","DC-S48"],"strongest_alternative":"A sufficiently broad portfolio may reveal systematic differences in coalition legitimacy, leverage, information, or enforcement that generalize across cases.","disconfirming_evidence":"Predeclared matched cases show a stable cross-issue conversion advantage after controlling for material leverage, objective difficulty, threat, and partner preferences.","required_tests":["Recover objectives documented before the outcome and retain abandoned or revised demands.","Test opponent compliance and reversal at 12 and 24 months.","State and challenge the counterfactual contribution of the coalition apart from military and economic power."],"open_gaps":"Objectives, private concessions, side payments, and credible counterfactuals are frequently unobservable or selected after the fact.","adjudication":{"category_id":"DC-D09","position":"Insufficient comparative basis","fact_confidence":"high","comparative_confidence":"not assessed","ruling":"The completed case audit finds meaningful successes, reversals, partial outcomes, and attribution problems on both sides, but no common denominator that separates coalition-added diplomatic leverage from military power, economic leverage, objective difficulty, prior mediation, and partner preference.","strongest_counterevidence":"JCPOA implementation and reversal, PRC-facilitated Saudi-Iran normalization, NATO Afghanistan, coalition action against the Islamic State, and mixed institutional bargaining outcomes point in different directions under non-equivalent objectives.","sensitivity":"A position requires a preregistered, cross-issue matched portfolio with ex ante objectives, concessions, compliance windows, reversal coding, and an explicit coalition counterfactual."}}],"cross_cutting_alternatives":[{"id":"DC-A01","name":"Threat and interest alignment","claim":"Coalitions form and act because partners independently perceive the same threat or benefit, not because either leading power has superior diplomatic capability."},{"id":"DC-A02","name":"Material-power substitution","claim":"Military protection, market access, finance, or coercion produces participation and outcomes; diplomacy mainly communicates material incentives generated in other domains."},{"id":"DC-A03","name":"Partner hedging","claim":"States join multiple institutions to preserve options, status, or access, so membership and favorable votes are not durable alignment with either system."},{"id":"DC-A04","name":"Institutional function and age","claim":"Differences in delivery reflect mandate, legal authority, maturity, and issue type rather than U.S. or PRC leadership."},{"id":"DC-A05","name":"Domestic-politics constraint","claim":"Elections, legislatures, bureaucratic capacity, public opinion, and elite turnover explain commitment conversion and durability more than diplomatic-system quality."},{"id":"DC-A06","name":"Visibility and selection bias","claim":"Open U.S. systems disclose failures while opaque PRC systems disclose successes; public research also overselects famous coalitions and observable formal activity."}],"mandatory_audit_tests":["The U.S./partner and PRC/partner observations use the same unit, period, geography, issue, denominator, and stage wherever a direct comparison is claimed.","A deficit, failure, or missing observation on one side never establishes an advantage for the other.","Insufficient comparative basis is used instead of Contested when positive evidence for both sides is absent.","Partner capacity, access, votes, and delivery are credited only when observed, authorized, relevant, and timely.","Formal posts, visits, dialogue counts, signatures, memberships, and favorable sentiment remain inputs unless a defined conversion is observed.","First-party material establishes rules, commitments, contributions, and actor claims but not comparative effectiveness, legitimacy, or causal attribution by itself.","Sources from the same government, institution, or dataset family are not counted as independent corroboration.","Formal and informal channels remain distinct, while hybrid party-state and quasi-official channels retain their actual sponsor and legal character.","Western, universal, and PRC-centered institutions are assessed in separate baskets before any cross-institution synthesis.","U.S. liberal-order leadership is tested through compliance, stewardship, repair, inclusion, and implementation, including serious counterexamples.","PRC alternative-institution leadership is tested through partner agency, implementation, additionality, inclusion, and durability, including serious counterexamples.","Every global position survives regional and issue sensitivity checks or is narrowed to the slices the evidence supports.","Every outcome claim declares the objective, baseline, endpoint, compliance window, rival explanations, and coalition counterfactual.","Successes, failures, mixed outcomes, ongoing cases, abandoned initiatives, opt-outs, and non-events are eligible for the sample.","Recent cases are not given durability credit before 12- and 24-month checkpoints.","No weighted overall diplomatic-power composite is calculated."]},"publication":{"status":"published","date":"2026-08-12","assessment_current_through":"2026-08-12","analytical_baseline_commit":"4b0e1a2","review_type":"internal_adversarial_editorial_and_product_review","external_peer_review":false,"freshness_review":{"completed_on":"2026-08-12","latest_event_checked":"2026-08-10","sources_added":["DC-S128","DC-S129","DC-S130","DC-S131"],"observations_added":["DC-AD020","DC-AD021","DC-CO051","DC-CO052","DC-CO053"],"judgment_effect":"No category position changed. The additions sharpen the distinction between pledges and delivery, between contingent and actual activation, and between access and host-controlled permission."},"public_routes":{"overview":"/diplomacy-coalitions","review":"/diplomacy-coalitions/review","methodology":"/diplomacy-coalitions/methodology","sources":"/diplomacy-coalitions/sources","data":"/diplomacy-coalitions/data","api":"/api/v1/statecrafts/diplomacy-coalitions"}},"counts":{"categories":10,"scored_categories":9,"unscored_categories":1,"cases":26,"metrics":35,"observations":112,"sources":131},"position_counts":{"partner":6,"contested":3,"competitor":0,"unscored":1},"overall_composite":null}