{"schema_version":"1.0","slug":"integrated-statecraft","title":"Integrated Statecraft","status":"published","current_through":"2026-08-14","purpose":"Evaluate how the four instruments combine in actual strategy, independently identify internationally usable sources of power and strategic vulnerability, and expose where strategy aligns with or diverges from those requirements.","boundary":"Integrated Statecraft is a capstone, not a fifth instrument. It does not average domain positions, count edges, prescribe an operational campaign, or name an overall national winner.","decision_question":"How do current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies employ the four instruments; which independently established resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions provide internationally usable state power or leverage; where can adversaries or exogenous events degrade those sources and constrain state options or stability; and where do strategy and requirement align or diverge?","central_finding":"The two systems derive power from different conversion architectures. PRC-centered power is strongest where concentrated physical throughput, processing, construction and industrial absorption can be directed. U.S./partner power is strongest where autonomous states and firms consent to combine finance, technology, access, intelligence, legitimacy and specialized production. Each system is weakest when it must borrow the other's conversion model.","causal_chain":["Objective","Foundations","Instrument delivery","Integration","Response","Outcome","Persistence"],"instruments":[{"id":"ND","title":"National Defense","id_pattern":"ND-D01..ND-D10"},{"id":"EI","title":"Economics & Industry","id_pattern":"EI-D01..EI-D08"},{"id":"DC","title":"Diplomacy & Coalitions","id_pattern":"DC-D01..DC-D10"},{"id":"II","title":"Information & Influence","id_pattern":"II-D01..II-D09"}],"workstreams":[{"id":"SE","title":"National Strategy Evaluation","type":"evaluation","focus":"How current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies select, deliver, combine, and adapt the four instruments for declared objectives","intent":"Evaluate strategic coherence, implementation, cross-instrument interaction, response, outcome, cost, durability, and adaptation","question":"Given a predeclared objective, target or recipient, geography, time window, counterfactual, acceptable cost, and persistence threshold, how coherently and effectively did the system combine its available instruments, and what explains the observed result?","unit":"A bounded national strategy, strategic objective, campaign, or phase","imports":"Instrument evidence plus strategy records, authorities, resources, delivered actions, partner and target response, outcomes, cost, and adaptation","outputs":"Objective-bounded strategy, campaign, mechanism, implementation, outcome, and comparative-pathway findings","prohibited_inference":"A strategy-document claim, simultaneous activity, domain position, or capability inventory cannot establish integration or strategic success.","charter_file":"strategy-evaluation.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_fourteen_pathways_and_red_team_complete_private","route":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-evaluation","result":"Eighteen cases and fourteen cross-instrument pathways adjudicated"},{"id":"CCV","title":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","type":"international_power_and_strategic_risk","focus":"Which resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions can be converted into internationally usable state power or leverage, and which dependencies can external actors or exogenous events exploit to constrain state action, options, or stability","intent":"Identify what must be built, accessed, controlled, protected, substituted, restored, or responsibly employed to preserve freedom of action and produce bounded international effects independently of current strategy","question":"What gives a state usable power or leverage in international affairs; through what authority, delivery, and response mechanism is it converted; where can an adversary or exogenous shock disrupt that chain; and when would the resulting loss materially narrow external options, operational performance, coercion resistance, or state stability?","unit":"A source-of-power and conversion chain under a declared international objective, target or recipient, geography, time horizon, and adversarial or exogenous stress","imports":"Instrument evidence plus resource, authority, taskability, conversion, target and partner response, network position, dependency, external control, adversarial access, shock, substitution, recovery, adaptation, and strategic-effect evidence","outputs":"Power-source, conversion, strategic-dependency, vulnerability, advantage, mitigation, bounded-leverage, self-harm, recovery, and warning-indicator findings","prohibited_inference":"Domestic importance, sector size, resource possession, ownership, concentration, technical sophistication, or current strategy emphasis cannot establish internationally usable power, leverage, or strategic vulnerability. A domestic condition enters only through an evidenced mechanism that constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","charter_file":"critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_ten_focus_findings_twelve_responses_and_red_team_complete_private","architecture_directory":"critical-capabilities","route":"/integrated-statecraft/critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities","result":"Ten focus findings, eighteen cases, and twelve bounded responses"},{"id":"GAP","title":"Strategy–Requirement Gap Analysis","focus":"Where observed strategy aligns with or diverges from independently supported sources of internationally usable power, conversion requirements, strategic vulnerabilities, and advantages","intent":"Identify alignments, execution gaps, strategic blind spots, unrealized advantages, possible misallocation, leverage opportunities, strategic fratricide, and insufficient basis","unit":"A traceable match between one frozen strategy-demand finding and one independently frozen power-source, conversion, strategic-vulnerability, advantage, or leverage finding","input_rule":"Neither workstream can establish or strengthen the other's finding; the layer operates only after both inputs are independently supported and retain separate evidence identities.","output_rule":"Every gap or alignment remains traceable to both contributing records and cannot be aggregated into a national score or overall winner.","charter_file":"strategy-requirement-gaps.md","analysis_status":"twelve_traceable_matches_and_red_team_complete_private","type":"governed_match_layer","route":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-requirement-gaps","result":"Twelve traceable matches from independently frozen inputs"}],"extreme_asymmetries":{"US_partner":["Permissioned alliances, host access, coalition authorization and institutional aggregation","Dollar-centered finance, sanctions jurisdiction and trusted safe-asset depth","Selected advanced-semiconductor, software, research, services and talent nodes distributed across allies"],"PRC_centered":["Industrial and clean-technology manufacturing throughput, shipbuilding and infrastructure construction","Critical-mineral refining, rare-earth separation, permanent magnets and selected battery supply chains","Rapid manufacturing absorption, scale-up and deployment across dense supplier ecosystems"]},"extreme_weaknesses":{"US_partner":["Contested-time conversion of wealth, designs and coalition commitments into munitions, ships, maintenance and lift","Product-specific dependence on PRC midstream processing and magnets","Political continuity and host permission that can delay or revoke otherwise formidable network capacity"],"PRC_centered":["Globally distributed, trusted and pre-authorized partners for costly external security roles","Advanced semiconductor nodes controlled jointly by U.S., Dutch, Japanese, German, Taiwanese and Korean actors","Dollar-equivalent monetary trust, convertibility, safe-asset depth and crisis finance","Maritime oil exposure and the limited taskability of overseas commercial infrastructure"]},"strategy":{"focus":"How current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies select, deliver, combine, and adapt the four instruments for declared objectives","intent":"Evaluate strategic coherence, implementation, cross-instrument interaction, response, outcome, cost, durability, and adaptation","question":"Given a predeclared objective, target or recipient, geography, time window, counterfactual, acceptable cost, and persistence threshold, how coherently and effectively did the system combine its available instruments, and what explains the observed result?","unit":"A bounded national strategy, strategic objective, campaign, or phase","prohibited_inference":"A strategy-document claim, simultaneous activity, domain position, or capability inventory cannot establish integration or strategic success.","cases":[{"case_id":"IS-C01","title":"U.S. and European response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","overall_ruling":"partially_effective_not_terminated","objective_result":"The coalition preserved Ukrainian state and military resistance and imposed costs, but did not terminate the war or remove binding delivery and political-continuity constraints.","mechanism_findings":["Permissioned coalition aggregation worked","Industrial and replenishment conversion remained binding","Outcome persistence depends on policy continuity and Ukrainian agency"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P10","IS-P11","IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO001","IS-AO002","IS-AO003"],"source_ids":["IS-AS001","IS-AS002","IS-AS003"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Durable settlement","Major coalition withdrawal","Measured production reaches or misses stated requirements"]},{"case_id":"IS-C02","title":"NATO and partner engagement in Afghanistan","overall_ruling":"strategy_failure","objective_result":"The effort did not produce a self-sustaining Afghan state and security system; changing objectives, unrealistic timelines, partner exclusion and externally dependent force design failed the persistence test.","mechanism_findings":["Ends, ways and means drifted","Diplomatic bargaining undercut the partner government","Defense design and economic support did not survive withdrawal"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO004","IS-AO005","IS-AO006"],"source_ids":["IS-AS004","IS-AS005"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Material contrary evidence on sustainability or negotiated transition"]},{"case_id":"IS-C03","title":"Advanced-semiconductor controls and allied technology coordination","overall_ruling":"bounded_denial_partial","objective_result":"Controls created friction and delay at selected frontier nodes; permanent denial, military outcome and PRC policy compliance are not established.","mechanism_findings":["Small allied chokepoint coalition achieved coverage","Target adaptation forced repeated rule changes","Ecosystem revenue, partner alignment and substitution bound durability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P09","IS-P12"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO008","IS-AO009"],"source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Equivalent PRC frontier production","Measured military delay","Partner rule divergence or strengthened common coverage"]},{"case_id":"IS-C04","title":"Europe's exit from Russian gas dependence","overall_ruling":"effective_with_high_cost","objective_result":"Europe replaced most Russian pipeline dependence, preserved strategic freedom and institutionalized phaseout, while absorbing significant price and distributional cost.","mechanism_findings":["Diplomacy, regulation, infrastructure, markets and public demand reduction combined","Alternative supply and partner coordination restored options","Sender coercion accelerated loss of its own network position"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P10"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO010","IS-AO011","IS-AO012"],"source_ids":["IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Renewed structural dependence","Phaseout reversal","Evidence that strategic freedom was materially lost despite substitution"]},{"case_id":"IS-C05","title":"U.S.-Philippines alliance and EDCA access conversion","overall_ruling":"access_option_effective_permissioned","objective_result":"The strategy converted assurance, diplomacy and funding into distributed prepared access and cooperation; wartime activation and deterrence remain untested.","mechanism_findings":["Threat alignment increased host demand","Local permission and investment made agreement operational","Sovereign caveats remain part of capability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P09","IS-P11"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO013","IS-AO014","IS-AO015"],"source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013"],"confidence":"high_for_access_low_for_deterrence","revision_triggers":["Mission-specific authorization or refusal","Host government policy reversal","Measured throughput and survivability"]},{"case_id":"IS-C06","title":"Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","overall_ruling":"bounded_objective_effective_persistence_incomplete","objective_result":"The coalition achieved territorial defeat through local partners and cross-instrument coordination; enduring defeat of the organization and ideology remains incomplete.","mechanism_findings":["Military, intelligence, finance and diplomacy reinforced one another","Local partner forces were decisive","Transition and detention risks limit persistence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P12","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO016","IS-AO017","IS-AO018"],"source_ids":["IS-AS006","IS-AS007"],"confidence":"high_for_territorial_outcome","revision_triggers":["Sustained ISIS territorial return","Partner transition failure","Independent attribution of coalition lines"]},{"case_id":"IS-C07","title":"JCPOA bargaining, implementation, withdrawal, and durability","overall_ruling":"initial_success_reversed_into_failure","objective_result":"Negotiation produced verified limits and reciprocal implementation; unilateral withdrawal destroyed persistence and renewed pressure did not restore the bargain.","mechanism_findings":["Economic pressure needed a diplomatic off-ramp","Verification made compliance observable","Policy reversal created cross-instrument fratricide and credibility cost"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO019","IS-AO020","IS-AO021"],"source_ids":["IS-AS014","IS-AS015","IS-AS016","IS-AS017"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Restored verified limits","Evidence that reimposition produced a superior durable outcome"]},{"case_id":"IS-C08","title":"FOCAC action-plan and PRC development-finance conversion in Africa","overall_ruling":"coherent_design_delivery_and_influence_unresolved","objective_result":"FOCAC displays broad policy-message coherence and exceptional means, but the current action plan is prospective and recipient-level conversion varies too much for an overall effectiveness call.","mechanism_findings":["Finance, infrastructure, security, governance and information are formally integrated","Provision scale is a real source of agenda access","Recipient agency and delivered performance prevent automatic influence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO022","IS-AO023","IS-AO024"],"source_ids":["IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS040"],"confidence":"moderate_for_design_low_for_outcomes","revision_triggers":["Audited 2025–2027 delivery","Recipient policy or access decisions causally linked to programs","Large cancellation or backlash wave"]},{"case_id":"IS-C09","title":"World Bank and AIIB pandemic response and project delivery","overall_ruling":"both_delivered_no_zero_sum_influence_call","objective_result":"Both institutions rapidly converted capital and relationships into crisis operations; World Bank scale was much larger, while AIIB demonstrated credible delivery without evidence of displacing or controlling the older system.","mechanism_findings":["Existing country systems and cofinance accelerated delivery","Institutional legitimacy and technical capacity mattered","Project volume did not establish geopolitical alignment"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO025","IS-AO026","IS-AO027"],"source_ids":["IS-AS020","IS-AS021"],"confidence":"high_for_delivery_low_for_influence","revision_triggers":["Independent outcome evaluations","Governance or conditionality changes","Recipient preference evidence"]},{"case_id":"IS-C10","title":"BRICS expansion, Rio commitments, and delivery","overall_ruling":"agenda_reach_supported_taskability_unproven","objective_result":"Expansion and the Rio agenda increased convening and narrative reach, but heterogeneous interests, voluntary implementation and a short observation window prevent a coalition-delivery judgment.","mechanism_findings":["Membership scale amplifies agenda setting","Consensus language masks divergent preferences","No common enforcement or pooled capability matches formal alliance taskability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO028","IS-AO029","IS-AO030"],"source_ids":["IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"confidence":"moderate_for_agenda_low_for_delivery","revision_triggers":["Funded common mechanisms","Repeated aligned member behavior","Implementation scorecard for Rio commitments"]},{"case_id":"IS-C11","title":"PRC overseas port investment to military and strategic access","overall_ruling":"conditional_single_case_conversion","objective_result":"Djibouti demonstrates one real infrastructure-relationship-access sequence; Hambantota demonstrates why finance and operating control do not automatically become military permission.","mechanism_findings":["Host security interests and sovereign agreement are necessary","Commercial ownership is not military taskability","Generalization across ports is unsupported"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P07"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO031","IS-AO032","IS-AO033"],"source_ids":["IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"high_for_cases_low_for_generalization","revision_triggers":["Repeated crisis throughput at multiple ports","New host defense agreements","Evidence of denied access despite ownership"]},{"case_id":"IS-C12","title":"PRC critical-mineral controls and diversification response","overall_ruling":"denial_effective_compellence_unproven","objective_result":"Concentration converted into real product-specific disruption, but targets adapted and no durable policy compliance was demonstrated.","mechanism_findings":["Midstream processing and qualification created leverage","Use revealed the dependency and accelerated substitution","Target agency separated cost from compellence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P10","IS-P12"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO034","IS-AO035","IS-AO036"],"source_ids":["IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"confidence":"high_for_denial_low_for_compellence","revision_triggers":["Verified target policy change","Qualified substitute scale","Sustained cutoff beyond inventories"]},{"case_id":"IS-C13","title":"PRC-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic restoration","overall_ruling":"bounded_diplomatic_success","objective_result":"China helped deliver and sustain restoration of diplomatic relations; the evidence does not support a broader claim of regional security leadership or conflict resolution.","mechanism_findings":["Good offices and trusted venue matched parties ready to settle","Clear narrow terms enabled verification","Prior mediators and party agency limit exclusive Chinese credit"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07","IS-P08","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO037","IS-AO038","IS-AO039"],"source_ids":["IS-AS028","IS-AS029"],"confidence":"high_for_restoration_moderate_for_china_contribution","revision_triggers":["Embassy closure or agreement repudiation","Independent evidence on China's indispensable role","Broader security cooperation caused by the accord"]},{"case_id":"IS-C14","title":"Taiwan Strait deterrence, coercion, and competitive shaping","overall_ruling":"contested_indeterminate","objective_result":"The status quo persisted, but PRC coercion intensified and neither no-war nor no-unification can be causally assigned to a single strategy.","mechanism_findings":["U.S. assurance and Taiwan defense raise denial prospects","PRC pressure shapes daily operating conditions","Actions generate countervailing signaling and coalition feedback"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P06","IS-P08","IS-P09","IS-P10","IS-P11","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO040","IS-AO041","IS-AO042"],"source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"low_for_causal_deterrence","revision_triggers":["Observable decision evidence","Major blockade or invasion","Stable reduction in coercive activity after a defined action"]},{"case_id":"IS-C15","title":"South China Sea pressure and Philippine coalition response","overall_ruling":"tactical_prc_effect_strategic_counterbalancing","objective_result":"PRC gray-zone pressure achieved intermittent tactical denial and cost imposition but strengthened Philippine-U.S. cooperation and did not remove the Philippine outpost or produce a durable settlement.","mechanism_findings":["Coast guard and militia exploit threshold ambiguity","Documentation and alliance assurance mobilized partners","Provisional arrangements managed one flashpoint without resolving the contest"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P11","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO043","IS-AO044","IS-AO045"],"source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013","IS-AS032"],"confidence":"high_for_events_moderate_for_strategy","revision_triggers":["Permanent removal or secure resupply","Treaty activation","Sustained de-escalation or new host access"]},{"case_id":"IS-C16","title":"IPEF supply-chain institutions and crisis-response conversion","overall_ruling":"institution_created_effectiveness_unproven","objective_result":"The United States converted diplomacy into a functioning institutional framework, but no major public stress case yet demonstrates preserved supply or faster recovery.","mechanism_findings":["Agreement and bodies were delivered quickly","No market access narrows incentives","Action teams remain upstream of output"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO046","IS-AO047","IS-AO048"],"source_ids":["IS-AS033","IS-AS034"],"confidence":"high_for_institution_low_for_effect","revision_triggers":["Crisis Response Network activation","Measured diversification","Member withdrawal or expanded commitments"]},{"case_id":"IS-C17","title":"WTO Appellate Body impasse and U.S. institutional trade-offs","overall_ruling":"pressure_achieved_reform_not_achieved_fratricide_risk","objective_result":"The United States disabled the appellate mechanism but did not secure a broadly accepted replacement; pending appeals and MPIA adaptation reduced the value of the institution to U.S. rule-based leverage.","mechanism_findings":["Appointment control provided blocking leverage","Substantive complaints did not become negotiated reform","Alternative institutional action proceeded without the United States"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO049","IS-AO050","IS-AO051"],"source_ids":["IS-AS035","IS-AS036","IS-AS037"],"confidence":"high_for_status_moderate_for_net_effect","revision_triggers":["Agreed reform","U.S. accession to alternative","Evidence paralysis improved bargaining outcomes net of lost enforcement"]},{"case_id":"IS-C18","title":"PRC development-finance delivery, renegotiation, and relationship repair","overall_ruling":"extreme_provision_mixed_conversion_adapting","objective_result":"PRC finance delivered infrastructure and relationships at exceptional scale, but distressed projects, borrower agency and nonautomatic strategic access forced a portfolio reboot and collaborative repair.","mechanism_findings":["Upstream finance and construction are a real advantage","Delivery quality and debt sustainability mediate legitimacy","Renegotiation demonstrates adaptation, not proof of original coercive design or success"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO052","IS-AO053","IS-AO054"],"source_ids":["IS-AS019","IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS038","IS-AS039"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Updated project outcomes","Recipient trust and policy decisions","Repeated strategic access conversion or widespread creditor losses"]}],"pathways":[{"pathway_id":"IS-P01","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Industry becomes military effect only through qualified output, maintenance, logistics and mission timing. Ukraine supports allied aggregation but exposes U.S./partner physical bottlenecks; PRC scale is extreme upstream but distant operational conversion remains less observable.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO002","IS-AO007","IS-AO013"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Industrial capacity to fielded and sustained military effect"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P02","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Diplomacy can create usable access when hosts authorize, fund, exercise and sustain it. EDCA and Djibouti support the mechanism; Hambantota and sovereign caveats reject automatic conversion.","case_ids":["IS-C05","IS-C11","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO013","IS-AO015","IS-AO031","IS-AO032","IS-AO033"],"confidence":"high","title":"Diplomacy to usable access and military reach"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P03","position":"supported_bounded","ruling":"Military assurance contributes to partner commitment when threat perceptions, credible capability and political consultation align; accession and Philippine cooperation support the link, but no-war and retention cannot alone prove deterrence.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO001","IS-AO014","IS-AO040","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Military assurance to coalition commitment and durability"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P04","position":"insufficient_for_independent_effect","ruling":"Credible narratives may support coalition legitimacy, but across Ukraine, FOCAC, Taiwan and the South China Sea, material interests and threat perception dominate the observable decision record. Independent informational contribution is not isolated.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C08","IS-C10","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO014","IS-AO022","IS-AO028","IS-AO041","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"low","title":"Narrative credibility to coalition legitimacy and action"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P05","position":"supported_for_targeted_coverage","ruling":"Coalition coordination can align law and enforcement at a small number of pivotal nodes, as semiconductor, Iran and Russia cases show. Free riding, alternative routes, burden and institutional exclusion bound wider effectiveness.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C16","IS-C17"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO019","IS-AO034","IS-AO046","IS-AO049"],"confidence":"high","title":"Coalition coordination to economic denial or pressure"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P06","position":"rare_and_objective_dependent","ruling":"Economic pressure reliably imposes cost more often than it changes policy. Iran supports one bounded bargain; Russia, Australia-equivalent mineral dynamics and current controls show adaptation or noncompliance. Denial and compellence must remain separate.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C14"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO009","IS-AO019","IS-AO021","IS-AO036"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Economic pressure to target decision or behavior"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P07","position":"supported_but_nonautomatic","ruling":"Development finance and institutional delivery can create valued capability, relationships and agenda access. FOCAC, AIIB, Djibouti and BRI repair show real pathways, but host choice, project performance and nonexclusive alignment prevent automatic influence or military access.","case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C09","IS-C10","IS-C11","IS-C13","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO023","IS-AO027","IS-AO031","IS-AO033","IS-AO037","IS-AO054"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Economic development and finance to diplomatic access or institutional influence"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P08","position":"insufficient_for_state_conversion","ruling":"Cultural and informational attraction creates exposure and relationships, but the selected cases do not isolate a consequential policy choice caused by contact. Independent ecosystem attraction may advantage a country without becoming a taskable instrument.","case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C10","IS-C13","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO024","IS-AO028","IS-AO037"],"confidence":"low","title":"Cultural and informational attraction to relationships and revealed preference"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P09","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Technology and standards become strategic ecosystems when technical performance, production, rules, trust and users align. Semiconductor controls, 5G host choices and IPEF institution-building support pieces of the chain; none alone establishes durable strategic effect.","case_ids":["IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C16","IS-C17"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO008","IS-AO046","IS-AO047","IS-AO050"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Technology and standards to interoperable strategic ecosystems"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P10","position":"supported","ruling":"Resilience can preserve strategic freedom when substitution and recovery arrive before the state-option deadline. Europe's gas shift is the strongest affirmative case; mineral, maritime and semiconductor cases show that nominal alternatives may remain slow or costly.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C04","IS-C12","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO011","IS-AO012","IS-AO035"],"confidence":"high","title":"Resilience to sustained instrument availability and coercion denial"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P11","position":"insufficient_comparative_basis","ruling":"The cases show public attribution and coalition messaging accompanying decisions, but they do not provide matched exposure-to-decision evidence sufficient to isolate information-integrity effects on coalition resilience.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO014","IS-AO040","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"low","title":"Information integrity to decision and coalition resilience"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P12","position":"supported_in_selected_cycles","ruling":"Observed failure can improve later design: rare-earth diversification, iterative semiconductor rules and BRI portfolio repair show adaptation. Afghanistan shows that abundant warnings do not guarantee implemented learning, and cross-system comparison remains weak.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C03","IS-C06","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO004","IS-AO008","IS-AO035","IS-AO053"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Cross-instrument learning and adaptation to improved repeated performance"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P13","position":"supported_only_with_bounded_objective_and_off_ramp","ruling":"Imposed military or economic cost can support bargaining when demands and exits are clear. JCPOA and Saudi-Iran diplomacy show off-ramp value; Afghanistan and unresolved Taiwan/South China Sea contests reject a general cost-to-termination rule.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C06","IS-C07","IS-C13","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO005","IS-AO016","IS-AO019","IS-AO037","IS-AO042","IS-AO045"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Military capability and imposed cost to bargaining, crisis, or termination"},{"pathway_id":"IS-P14","position":"supported","ruling":"One instrument can damage the legitimacy, access, network or future option set that another requires. JCPOA withdrawal and WTO paralysis are direct U.S. cases; PRC coercive use of markets and materials can accelerate diversification and balancing.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C07","IS-C14","IS-C17","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO020","IS-AO036","IS-AO044","IS-AO049","IS-AO050","IS-AO051"],"confidence":"high","title":"Cross-instrument friction, fratricide, and strategic trade-offs"}],"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0-private","status":"strategy_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Eighteen strategy cases, fifty-four applied observations and fourteen pathway rulings","review_type":"precommitted internal adversarial review; not external peer review","hypothesis_results":[{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT01","result":"material_and_bounded","effect":"Synergy was credited only where sequence and directional connection were observed; co-occurrence was not counted."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT02","result":"decisive","effect":"Ukraine and semiconductor cases rejected scale-to-effect shortcuts and exposed qualification, maintenance, supplier and logistics bottlenecks."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT03","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"EDCA, Nordic accession and Ukraine retained partner agency, authorization, burden and policy-continuity conditions."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT04","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"FOCAC coherence was separated from delivery; BRI repair and mineral feedback exposed centralization and information limits."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT05","result":"decisive_withholding","effect":"Narrative and cultural pathways remained insufficient because material interests, threat and independent actors were not controlled."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT06","result":"decisive","effect":"Iran supported a bounded bargain, while Russia, minerals and other cases rejected cost-to-compellence generalization."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT07","result":"decisive","effect":"Djibouti showed possible conversion; Hambantota, AIIB and BRI variation rejected automatic finance-to-alignment or base claims."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT08","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Semiconductor, 5G and institutional cases retained partner autonomy, open diffusion, commercial response and ecosystem erosion."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT09","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"European gas recovery was credited after measured substitution; nominal buffers and no-collapse were not treated as resilience elsewhere."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT10","result":"decisive_withholding","effect":"Information-integrity pathway remained unscored without exposure-to-decision evidence and error or rights costs."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT11","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Learning was supported only for observed design changes; Afghanistan demonstrated warning without effective learning."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT12","result":"decisive","effect":"Taiwan received no deterrence-success call from the absence of invasion."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT13","result":"decisive","effect":"ISIS success was bounded to territorial defeat; Saudi-Iran to diplomatic restoration; no agreement was treated as complete termination."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT14","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Closed-system and classified observability limits prevented symmetric national comparison and an overall winner."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT15","result":"material_and_disclosed","effect":"The sample remains purposive and case-rich in coercion, conflict and documented institutions; no prevalence estimate is made."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT16","result":"pass_with_deduplication","effect":"Each applied observation has one identifier and is linked downstream without tallying repeated domain edges or sources."}],"audit_results":[{"test_id":"IS-T01","result":"pass","note":"Decision question, cases, pathways and gates were frozen before adjudication."},{"test_id":"IS-T02","result":"pass","note":"Foundations remained distinct from Defense, Economics, Diplomacy and Information."},{"test_id":"IS-T03","result":"pass","note":"Every applied observation records instrument IDs and one causal stage."},{"test_id":"IS-T04","result":"pass","note":"Shared events were assigned stable observation IDs and not recounted as separate advantages."},{"test_id":"IS-T05","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Integration claims identify at least two delivered instruments and a directional mechanism."},{"test_id":"IS-T06","result":"pass","note":"Case findings use chronology and do not infer orchestration from simultaneity."},{"test_id":"IS-T07","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Marginal contribution is bounded where counterfactuals are unavailable."},{"test_id":"IS-T08","result":"pass","note":"Substitution, redundancy, friction, fratricide and foregone options are visible."},{"test_id":"IS-T09","result":"pass","note":"Partner, recipient, private and local-force agency is separately attributed."},{"test_id":"IS-T10","result":"pass","note":"Target preferences and adaptation remain explicit rivals."},{"test_id":"IS-T11","result":"pass","note":"Deterrence, denial, compellence, shaping, crisis management and termination are never aggregated."},{"test_id":"IS-T12","result":"pass","note":"No deterrence inference rests on no war; no compellence inference rests on cost."},{"test_id":"IS-T13","result":"pass","note":"ISIS, JCPOA and Saudi-Iran findings include implementation and durability bounds."},{"test_id":"IS-T14","result":"pass","note":"Capability, strategy choice, execution and outcome are distinct fields."},{"test_id":"IS-T15","result":"pass","note":"Fact, mechanism and outcome confidence are disclosed separately where material."},{"test_id":"IS-T16","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Three pathways remain insufficient and Taiwan is indeterminate."},{"test_id":"IS-T17","result":"pass","note":"Afghanistan, Hambantota, WTO, minerals and unresolved cases challenge favored theses."},{"test_id":"IS-T18","result":"pass_bounded","note":"Phase and outcome sensitivity are reflected in split JCPOA, ISIS, gas and development-finance rulings."},{"test_id":"IS-T19","result":"pass","note":"No edge count, score, average or overall national winner exists."},{"test_id":"IS-T20","result":"pass","note":"User authorized full completion and publication remains subject to preview and production verification."}],"surviving_conclusions":["The U.S./partner system has exceptional permissioned aggregation capacity but recurrent physical and political conversion constraints.","The PRC-centered system has exceptional concentrated provision and throughput but recurrent recipient-permission, trust and durable-conversion constraints.","Economic and material denial is more common than compellence.","Host and recipient agency is the decisive bridge between provision and strategic access.","Instrument use can erode the network, market or credibility that creates future power."],"withheld_conclusions":["An overall national winner or composite score","A general causal ranking of deterrence strategies","Independent narrative, cultural or information-integrity contribution","Permanent semiconductor denial or broad mineral compellence","Automatic development-finance conversion to alignment or basing"]}},"critical_capabilities":{"focus":"Which resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions can be converted into internationally usable state power or leverage, and which dependencies can external actors or exogenous events exploit to constrain state action, options, or stability","intent":"Identify what must be built, accessed, controlled, protected, substituted, restored, or responsibly employed to preserve freedom of action and produce bounded international effects independently of current strategy","question":"What gives a state usable power or leverage in international affairs; through what authority, delivery, and response mechanism is it converted; where can an adversary or exogenous shock disrupt that chain; and when would the resulting loss materially narrow external options, operational performance, coercion resistance, or state stability?","unit":"A source-of-power and conversion chain under a declared international objective, target or recipient, geography, time horizon, and adversarial or exogenous stress","prohibited_inference":"Domestic importance, sector size, resource possession, ownership, concentration, technical sophistication, or current strategy emphasis cannot establish internationally usable power, leverage, or strategic vulnerability. A domestic condition enters only through an evidenced mechanism that constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","central_finding":"The two systems derive power from different conversion architectures. PRC-centered power is strongest where concentrated physical throughput, processing, construction and industrial absorption can be directed. U.S./partner power is strongest where autonomous states and firms consent to combine finance, technology, access, intelligence, legitimacy and specialized production. Each system is weakest when it must borrow the other's conversion model.","findings":[{"finding_id":"CCV-F01","title":"Permissioned alliance, access, and coalition networks","updated_ruling":"The U.S./partner system retains an extreme structural advantage. Ukraine, EDCA and Nordic accession show real conversion, while consent delays, industrial delivery and mission caveats prevent automatic credit. The PRC's Djibouti success remains real but exceptional rather than representative.","case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-13","ST-15"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO006","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO054","CCV-AO056","CCV-AO058","CCV-AO059"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS006","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"warning_indicators":["Host restrictions on mission use","Repeated delivery shortfalls","Alliance ratification or budget delays","Multiple PRC facilities with exercised crisis throughput"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_comparative"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F02","title":"Dollar-centered financial commanding layer","updated_ruling":"The U.S.-anchored system holds an extreme advantage in trusted financial centrality and reachable jurisdiction. Iran shows bounded bargaining conversion; Russia shows that even massive denial may not compel a high-resolve target; JCPOA reversal shows that credibility and off-ramps are part of the power base.","case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO002","CCV-AO003","CCV-AO004","CCV-AO039","CCV-AO040","CCV-AO041","CCV-AO042","CCV-AO053"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS051"],"warning_indicators":["Loss of partner sanctions participation","Sustained decline across reserves, invoicing and debt rather than one function","Expansion of liquid non-dollar safe assets","Controls without credible relief terms"],"confidence":"high"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F03","title":"Industrial throughput and physical conversion","updated_ruling":"PRC manufacturing breadth and scale are an extreme power source; U.S./partner innovation, capital and aggregate allied output remain formidable but are bottlenecked by qualified production, maintenance, supplier lead times and transport. Ukraine confirms that monetary resources and alliance commitments are not time-equivalent to fielded output.","case_ids":["ST-08","ST-11"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO008","CCV-AO009","CCV-AO010","CCV-AO011","CCV-AO012","CCV-AO029","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS011","CCV-AS012","CCV-AS013","CCV-AS014","CCV-AS023","CCV-AS034","CCV-AS048","CCV-AS052"],"warning_indicators":["Qualified output below replenishment demand","Single-source energetic or component tiers","Repair backlogs","PRC production growth without matching overseas permission"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_conversion"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F04","title":"Maritime power's mirror-image bottleneck","updated_ruling":"The PRC has extreme commercial shipbuilding and regional fleet scale but limited distant permissions and support; the U.S./partner system has global access and operational relationships but an aging, capacity-constrained shipbuilding, repair and sealift base. Red Sea disruption shows that presence alone may not normalize private routes.","case_ids":["ST-06","ST-11","ST-12","ST-13"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO010","CCV-AO011","CCV-AO012","CCV-AO013","CCV-AO014","CCV-AO034","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO047","CCV-AO048"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS007","CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS010","CCV-AS011","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"warning_indicators":["Surge sealift below readiness threshold","Repair and mariner shortages","Overseas replenishment rights exercised by the PRC","Insurance or rerouting costs persist despite protection"],"confidence":"moderate_comparative"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F05","title":"Critical-mineral processing, magnets, and controllable denial","updated_ruling":"PRC control is extreme at selected midstream stages and has produced real short-run denial. Japan and current controls show severe product-specific target vulnerability and slow qualification, but also that use accelerates substitution, stockpiling, recycling, partner investment and supplier-reputation loss. Strategic compellence remains unproven.","case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO016","CCV-AO018","CCV-AO019","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS016","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS018","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"warning_indicators":["Product-level inventory below qualification time","Controls expand from licensing delay to sustained cutoff","Non-PRC projects fail commissioning","Targets reach qualified substitute scale"],"confidence":"high"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F06","title":"Advanced-semiconductor allied control stack","updated_ruling":"U.S./allied control is extreme at selected frontier nodes and can impose delay, but China retains enormous mature-node, electronics, demand and manufacturing absorption capacity. Durable denial, military effect and policy compellence remain unproven; coalition coverage and ecosystem health are the binding conditions.","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-18"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO020","CCV-AO021","CCV-AO022","CCV-AO023","CCV-AO025","CCV-AO051","CCV-AO052"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022","CCV-AS030","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"warning_indicators":["Partner rule divergence","Frontier-equivalent indigenous PRC tools","Control-induced allied revenue or innovation loss","Taiwan or supplier common-mode outage"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_persistence"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F07","title":"Energy abundance versus seaborne import exposure","updated_ruling":"U.S. supply and allied producer diversity create meaningful partner options; PRC maritime oil dependence is severe. Europe shows that energy networks can be reconfigured at high cost, while the Malacca exposure is not a feasible peacetime lever absent supplier, shipping, route and escalation control.","case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO032","CCV-AO033","CCV-AO034","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO046","CCV-AO047"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS025","CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","CCV-AS046"],"warning_indicators":["Stock or pipeline buffers fall below disruption duration","Supplier coalition changes","Demand flexibility declines","Route threat and insurance failures become correlated"],"confidence":"moderate"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F08","title":"Innovation, talent, cloud, and absorption ecosystems","updated_ruling":"The U.S. leads in frontier quality, services, global talent attraction, software and privately coordinated networks; China leads in manufacturing absorption, deployment and scale. Neither ecosystem is wholly state-taskable. U.S. talent-policy and prototype-to-production fragility mirror PRC openness, trust and selected frontier dependencies.","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-11"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO028","CCV-AO029","CCV-AO030","CCV-AO031","CCV-AO051","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS034","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS052"],"warning_indicators":["Sustained international-talent decline","Cloud common-mode or forced fragmentation","PRC frontier substitution at controlled nodes","Failure to qualify prototypes for scale"],"confidence":"moderate_comparative"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F09","title":"Infrastructure provision does not equal strategic access","updated_ruling":"PRC provision scale is extreme, but access conversion depends on recipient demand and sovereign authorization. Djibouti supports one bounded conversion; Hambantota rejects automatic debt seizure and military access. U.S./partner provision is smaller but often connects to established security permissions.","case_ids":["ST-12","ST-13","ST-14"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO056","CCV-AO057"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"warning_indicators":["Multiple ports provide repeated military throughput","Host law or politics restricts access","Debt restructuring changes ownership or security rights","Commercial utilization remains below maintenance cost"],"confidence":"high_mechanism_moderate_generalization"},{"finding_id":"CCV-F10","title":"Strategic concentration requires a recovery test","updated_ruling":"Taiwan's 2024 earthquake showed extreme concentration and measurable disruption but rapid functional recovery below the strategic threshold. Red Sea, European gas and mineral cases show the converse: systems can avoid collapse yet remain strategically degraded for months or years. Recovery—not exposure—is the decisive variable.","case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06","ST-08","ST-18"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO025","CCV-AO026","CCV-AO027","CCV-AO038","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO047","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS030","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS035","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048"],"warning_indicators":["Recovery exceeds state-option deadline","Simultaneous supplier, power and transport failure","Customer buffers exhaust before qualification","Nominal substitute lacks equivalent quality or authority"],"confidence":"high_methodological"}],"cases":[{"case_id":"ST-01","title":"U.S. dollar, SWIFT, and secondary-sanctions leverage against Iran","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Dollar and banking centrality plus partner implementation imposed reachable financial pressure; diplomacy offered a verifiable off-ramp; Iran completed the required nuclear steps; U.S. withdrawal then reversed relief and the bargain lost durability.","rulings":{"US_power_source":"supported_extreme","Iran_vulnerability":"supported","conversion_to_bargain":"supported_bounded","durable_usable_leverage":"not_supported","self_harm_risk":"supported"},"threshold_result":"Financial centrality produced bargaining leverage and a temporarily implemented agreement, but not durable compliance independent of diplomatic credibility and continued reciprocal performance.","principal_lesson":"Permissioned financial networks are most effective when a coalition controls reachable nodes, states a bounded demand, and preserves an off-ramp; unilateral reversal can destroy the achieved result and weaken future credibility.","rivals_surviving":["Diplomacy and Iranian preferences, not sanctions alone, produced the bargain","Regional security developments and Iranian nonperformance also contributed to collapse"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO039","CCV-AO040"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS040"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"moderate"}},{"case_id":"ST-02","title":"Freeze of Russian reserves, bank restrictions, and financial adaptation","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Coalition jurisdiction immobilized central-bank assets and restricted payments; Russia absorbed substantial cost through controls, rerouting and commodity revenue while continuing the war.","rulings":{"US_partner_power_source":"supported_extreme","reachable_denial":"supported","Russia_vulnerability":"supported_bounded","conversion_to_war_termination":"not_supported","network_erosion":"plausible_not_yet_decisive"},"threshold_result":"The case demonstrates exceptional denial and cost-imposition capacity but does not establish compellence, war termination, or a decisive reduction in Russian military options.","principal_lesson":"The commanding financial layer can deny access faster than it can change a high-resolve state's strategy; adaptation and long-run network response must remain separate judgments.","rivals_surviving":["Commodity prices and domestic controls explain part of Russia's endurance","Battlefield and political variables dominate policy choice"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO041","CCV-AO042"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS064"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"}},{"case_id":"ST-03","title":"PRC–Japan rare-earth disruption and subsequent diversification","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Exceptional PRC processing concentration and Japanese dependence permitted abrupt supply disruption and price pressure; Japan used inventories, thrift, recycling, alternative investment, qualification, diplomacy and WTO action to reduce exposure.","rulings":{"PRC_power_source":"supported_extreme","Japan_vulnerability_2010":"supported","PRC_usable_leverage":"supported_bounded_short_run","Japan_recovery":"supported_multiyear"},"threshold_result":"The case supports short-run denial and material vulnerability, but not durable PRC control over Japanese policy; the exact attribution of the bilateral interruption remains contested.","principal_lesson":"Control is strongest before the target pays the fixed cost of adaptation; use activates substitution, legal action and coalition investment.","rivals_surviving":["Market and licensing changes explain part of the disruption","Demand change and price response aided recovery"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO016","CCV-AO018","CCV-AO019"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS018"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"moderate"}},{"case_id":"ST-04","title":"PRC trade coercion against Australia and market substitution","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"PRC restrictions concentrated losses in exposed sectors; fungible commodity flows and alternative markets preserved aggregate exports and Australian policy autonomy.","rulings":{"PRC_market_power":"supported","sector_vulnerability":"supported","national_strategic_vulnerability":"not_supported","policy_compellence":"not_supported","supplier_reputation_cost":"supported_bounded"},"threshold_result":"The pressure was economically real but failed the state-option threshold: Australia did not reverse the central policies associated with the campaign.","principal_lesson":"A large market is weak leverage when products can reroute and political pressure hardens target resolve; sector pain cannot stand in for national compellence.","rivals_surviving":["PRC measures had mixed legal and commercial rationales","Australian resilience was uneven across firms and regions"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO043","CCV-AO044"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T06","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"}},{"case_id":"ST-05","title":"European dependence on Russian pipeline gas and strategic substitution","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Pipeline concentration created severe exposure; supply manipulation and war accelerated LNG, alternative suppliers, demand reduction, storage and regulation; European Russian-gas dependence then collapsed.","rulings":{"Russia_initial_power_source":"supported_extreme_regional","Europe_initial_vulnerability":"supported","Russian_durable_leverage":"not_supported","Europe_strategic_recovery":"supported","power_base_self_erosion":"supported"},"threshold_result":"Europe absorbed high cost yet preserved its Ukraine policy and removed most of Russia's durable pipeline position, so short-run vulnerability did not become lasting strategic leverage.","principal_lesson":"Weaponizing a relationship-specific network can liquidate the installed base that creates leverage when targets can coordinate costly substitution.","rivals_surviving":["Weather, recession and conservation reduced demand","Russian revenues and exports partly shifted elsewhere"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO032","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO046"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS025","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T11","CCV-T12","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"moderate"}},{"case_id":"ST-06","title":"Red Sea attacks, shipping insurance, naval response, and rerouting","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Persistent attacks shifted shipping around Africa, raising ton-miles, insurance, time and freight cost; naval protection bounded loss but did not restore normal commercial routing.","rulings":{"route_vulnerability":"supported","commercial_substitution":"supported_costly","nonstate_disruption_power":"supported_bounded","coalition_normalization":"not_supported","state_option_loss":"bounded"},"threshold_result":"The network remained functional through rerouting but below its prior cost and reliability threshold; no state or coalition demonstrated full control over restoration.","principal_lesson":"Redundancy can prevent collapse while still allowing a low-cost attacker to impose large system costs; military presence does not automatically task private routing decisions.","rivals_surviving":["Commercial fleet conditions and demand also moved freight rates","Naval action may have prevented a worse counterfactual"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO047","CCV-AO048"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T06","CCV-T07","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"}},{"case_id":"ST-07","title":"U.S.–Japan–Netherlands semiconductor controls and PRC adaptation","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Allied control of EDA, advanced lithography, specialized tools, materials and fabrication enabled targeted denial; rules and partner measures changed repeatedly as PRC firms adapted.","rulings":{"US_partner_power_source":"supported_extreme_at_selected_nodes","PRC_frontier_vulnerability":"supported","conversion_to_delay":"supported","durable_denial":"insufficient","policy_compellence":"not_supported"},"threshold_result":"The case supports friction and delay at selected frontier nodes, not broad Chinese semiconductor weakness, military effect, permanent denial or policy compliance.","principal_lesson":"A permissioned control stack can deny a narrow technology frontier, but coalition coverage, enforcement, target redesign and ecosystem self-harm determine persistence.","rivals_surviving":["Commercial cycles and management choices affect firm outcomes","Controls can accelerate indigenous substitution"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO020","CCV-AO021","CCV-AO022","CCV-AO023"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T08","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"insufficient"}},{"case_id":"ST-08","title":"PRC critical-mineral and magnet export controls","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Extreme refining and magnet concentration became licensing delay and production curtailment; target stockpiles and new projects could not immediately replace qualified product.","rulings":{"PRC_power_source":"supported_extreme","target_vulnerability":"supported_product_specific","denial_conversion":"supported","policy_compellence":"insufficient","long_run_leverage":"bounded_by_adaptation"},"threshold_result":"The controls crossed the production-disruption threshold for selected products but have not established durable policy leverage across target states.","principal_lesson":"Midstream processing and qualification—not ore possession—create the sharpest chokepoints; their use reveals dependencies and mobilizes costly diversification.","rivals_surviving":["Licensing administration and market cycles explain part of delay","Defense-specific inventories and end uses remain opaque"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"low"}},{"case_id":"ST-09","title":"Huawei restrictions, 5G substitution, and digital-network alignment","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"PRC vendors achieved large installed positions; host governments converted security and trust judgments into restrictions; operators faced multi-year switching and qualification costs.","rulings":{"PRC_commercial_power_source":"supported","PRC_state_taskability":"not_supported","host_regulatory_power":"supported","installed_dependency":"supported_bounded","substitution":"supported_slow"},"threshold_result":"Installed scale created switching leverage and exposure but remained subordinate to host law, operator choice and alternative-vendor availability.","principal_lesson":"Digital infrastructure power is jointly produced by vendor scale, standards, trust and host permission; market share alone is neither state control nor permanent lock-in.","rivals_surviving":["Security designations are policy judgments, not controlled technical experiments","Restrictions may also serve industrial-policy goals"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO051","CCV-AO052"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T07","CCV-T09","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"}},{"case_id":"ST-10","title":"RMB internationalization, CIPS, swap lines, and alternatives to dollar finance","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"PRC institutions expanded settlement and bypass options, but capital controls, asset depth, convertibility and trust kept the renminbi far below the dollar across reserves and foreign-exchange intermediation.","rulings":{"PRC_alternative_option":"supported_growing","PRC_global_financial_power":"weak_relative","US_dollar_power":"supported_extreme","rapid_displacement":"not_supported","long_run_erosion":"plausible"},"threshold_result":"CIPS and renminbi use improve resilience at the margin but do not yet replace the dollar-centered commanding layer.","principal_lesson":"Monetary power depends on a bundle of trusted assets, convertibility, markets and institutions; payment rails alone cannot manufacture it.","rivals_surviving":["Currency use differs by trade, reserves, debt and turnover","Sanctions and financial fragmentation could accelerate nonlinear change"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO002","CCV-AO003","CCV-AO004","CCV-AO053"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"moderate"}},{"case_id":"ST-11","title":"Ukraine support, munitions production, and allied burden sharing","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"A broad permissioned coalition aligned requirements, donations, procurement and sustainment, but component lead times, production capacity and political authorization repeatedly bounded timely physical delivery.","rulings":{"US_partner_network_power":"supported_extreme","conversion_to_delivery":"supported_partial","industrial_vulnerability":"supported_severe","partner_additionality":"supported","sufficiency_for_outcome":"not_supported"},"threshold_result":"The system demonstrated exceptional aggregation and real delivery, while exposing a binding inability to convert financial and allied potential into all required contested-time output.","principal_lesson":"Permissioned networks multiply power only through a physical chain of contracts, inputs, production, maintenance, transport and political continuity.","rivals_surviving":["Ukraine's domestic production and adaptation are major independent causes","Classified deliveries and requirements limit sufficiency judgments"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO054","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"}},{"case_id":"ST-12","title":"Philippines EDCA access, distribution, and political authorization","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Shared threat perception and alliance diplomacy expanded EDCA to nine sites; both states funded preparation and exercised cooperation while the Philippines retained sovereign control over use.","rulings":{"US_partner_access_power":"supported","host_authorization":"supported_peacetime","wartime_taskability":"insufficient","distribution_benefit":"supported","political_vulnerability":"supported_bounded"},"threshold_result":"EDCA created a real strategic option, not an unconditional base right; mission-specific permission, throughput and survivability remain untested.","principal_lesson":"Access is a diplomatic product renewed through local benefit, consultation and credible assurance; concrete and agreements do not eliminate host agency.","rivals_surviving":["Philippine policy reflects its own maritime interests","Funding and exercises may not translate to high-end conflict use"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO006","CCV-AO056"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS006","CCV-AS054"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"}},{"case_id":"ST-13","title":"PRC Djibouti base and infrastructure-to-access conversion","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"PRC finance, trade, port relationships and diplomacy preceded a defense agreement and first overseas base; Djibouti retained leverage by hosting multiple foreign forces.","rulings":{"PRC_infrastructure_power":"supported","PRC_access_conversion":"supported_single_case","host_agency":"supported","general_port_to_base_pathway":"not_supported","global_sustainment":"bounded"},"threshold_result":"The case proves that conversion can occur, not that finance automatically purchases access or that the resulting facility supplies unrestricted global military reach.","principal_lesson":"Recipient incentives and sovereign permission are the indispensable bridge between infrastructure and military access.","rivals_surviving":["Security and evacuation requirements independently motivated the base","A rent-maximizing host can preserve nonexclusive relationships"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO036"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"}},{"case_id":"ST-14","title":"Hambantota port, debt restructuring, and disputed leverage claims","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Chinese loans financed an underused port; Sri Lanka later invited a cash-generating commercial concession; a PRC operator gained long-duration operational equity without loan cancellation or demonstrated military basing rights.","rulings":{"PRC_finance_and_operating_power":"supported","Sri_Lanka_fiscal_vulnerability":"supported_broader","debt_for_asset_seizure":"rejected","military_access_conversion":"not_supported","political_leverage":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The transaction created commercial control and relationship presence but fails the automatic debt-trap-to-base causal claim.","principal_lesson":"Infrastructure can produce option value without exclusive strategic control; contract, debt purpose, host security authority and subsequent use must be traced separately.","rivals_surviving":["Sri Lanka's broader fiscal crisis drove the lease","Incomplete disclosure leaves narrower influence channels uncertain"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO057"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T06","CCV-T08","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"insufficient"}},{"case_id":"ST-15","title":"Finland and Sweden NATO accession, capability, and counteraction","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Russia's invasion changed partner preferences; two capable nonaligned states applied; unanimous allied ratification added geography, forces and industry to NATO while also extending collective obligations.","rulings":{"US_partner_aggregation_power":"supported_extreme","permission_conversion":"supported","Russian_counteraction_backfire":"supported_bounded","net_capability_gain":"supported","deterrent_effect":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The alliance converted voluntary political choice into additional capability and geography; deterrence cannot be inferred solely from accession or the absence of attack.","principal_lesson":"Autonomous partner choice is both the source of alliance legitimacy and a consent bottleneck; adversary coercion can strengthen the network it seeks to constrain.","rivals_surviving":["Longstanding partnership made integration unusually easy","New territory and commitments can increase defense burden and escalation exposure"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO058","CCV-AO059"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T13","CCV-T17","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"}},{"case_id":"ST-16","title":"PRC and U.S./partner vaccine provision and influence conversion","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"Both systems delivered valued health goods through different networks; recipient capacity, product timing, uptake, trust and alternatives mediated public value; the admitted evidence does not connect doses to durable foreign-policy behavior.","rulings":{"US_provision_power":"supported","PRC_provision_power":"supported","recipient_agency":"decisive","durable_influence_conversion":"insufficient_both","delivery_as_influence_proxy":"rejected"},"threshold_result":"Provision crossed an exposure and delivery threshold, not the required affinity, access, alignment or behavior threshold.","principal_lesson":"A scarce public good can open diplomatic opportunity, but last-mile performance and recipient attribution determine whether any relationship effect persists.","rivals_surviving":["Humanitarian and commercial motives coexist","Pandemic urgency and product availability dominate many recipient choices"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO060","CCV-AO061"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS059","CCV-AS060","CCV-AS061"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T07","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"insufficient"}},{"case_id":"ST-17","title":"Confucius Institutes, closures, rebranding, and cultural-network taskability","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"PRC support expanded language programs, but agreements and operations varied by host; U.S. funding restrictions and university decisions then collapsed the network while demand for language education persisted through alternatives.","rulings":{"PRC_cultural_network_source":"supported","central_state_taskability":"not_supported","host_control":"supported","network_vulnerability":"supported_extreme_in_US","policy_influence":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The case demonstrates exposure, educational value and host revocability, not durable PRC influence over university or national decisions.","principal_lesson":"Cultural networks gain reach by relying on autonomous hosts; legitimacy loss or funding rules can remove state access while leaving the underlying cultural demand intact.","rivals_surviving":["Closures reflect U.S. domestic politics and security policy","Successor programs can preserve some relationships under new labels"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO062","CCV-AO063"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS062","CCV-AS063"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T05","CCV-T07","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"insufficient"}},{"case_id":"ST-18","title":"Taiwan earthquake exposure and semiconductor strategic recovery","status":"applied_frozen_private","observed_chain":"A major earthquake triggered safety shutdowns and measurable loss at highly concentrated fabs; engineering, trained personnel and restart procedures restored output before an international state option crossed its threshold.","rulings":{"concentration":"supported_extreme","event_degradation":"supported","strategic_vulnerability_realized":"not_supported","functional_recovery":"supported","larger_compound_scenario":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The event falsifies the inference that geographic concentration automatically equals realized strategic vulnerability; it does not test blockade, prolonged energy loss or simultaneous supplier failure.","principal_lesson":"Vulnerability must be measured as loss of function after recovery, not exposure or asset interruption alone.","rivals_surviving":["Customer buffers can hide short disruptions","A longer or compound event could exceed demonstrated recovery"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO025","CCV-AO026","CCV-AO027","CCV-AO038"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS030","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS035"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T06","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T12","CCV-T14","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"}}],"responses":[{"response_id":"CCV-R01","title":"Protect the permissioned network as a capability","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Consultation, credible commitments, local benefit, burden sharing and mission-specific exercises are productive capacity because autonomous partner consent creates the network's advantage.","conditions":["Host sovereignty retained","Costs and risks shared","Alternatives prepared","Political commitments matched by delivery"],"disqualifiers":["Treating access as unconditional","Unfunded assurance","Partner exclusion from decisions"],"case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R02","title":"Convert demand signals into qualified contested-time output","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Multi-year procurement, interoperable requirements, supplier-tier visibility, repair capacity and allied co-production are necessary to turn financial and coalition strength into timely physical effect.","conditions":["Mission-thread requirements","Qualified inputs and workforce","Sustainment and transport included","Actual output measured"],"disqualifiers":["Counting announcements as capacity","Ignoring maintenance or supplier lead time","Crowding out more critical allied needs"],"case_ids":["ST-11"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R03","title":"Diversify the narrowest mineral and magnet products, not every input","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Prioritize product-specific exposures whose qualified inventory and substitution time fall below mission deadlines; combine stockpiles, offtake, processing, recycling and design substitution.","conditions":["Bill-of-material visibility","Equivalent quality qualification","Release authority","Partner coordination"],"disqualifiers":["Ore-share proxies","Universal autarky","Unqualified projects","Stockpiles without usable form or release plan"],"case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R04","title":"Use financial and technology leverage with coalition coverage and credible off-ramps","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation_and_bounded_leverage","finding":"Concentrated finance or technology control is most durable when objectives are narrow, partners cover substitutes, relief terms are credible and ecosystem damage is monitored.","conditions":["Defined demand","Reachable jurisdiction","Partner implementation","Target adaptation monitoring","Reversible relief"],"disqualifiers":["Pain as the outcome","No off-ramp","Unilateral reversal after compliance","Material erosion of the network that creates leverage"],"case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-07","ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS051"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R05","title":"Preserve openness where attraction and innovation are the power source","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Talent attraction, private research, cloud and cultural reach generate national advantage precisely because independent actors choose the ecosystem; security controls should be narrow enough not to destroy that selection effect.","conditions":["Risk-specific safeguards","Research and talent pathways","Private actor autonomy","Trusted legal environment"],"disqualifiers":["Nationality as a risk proxy","Automatic state taskability","Controls that shift users and talent without reducing threat"],"case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-17"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS062"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R06","title":"Build energy and maritime resilience around time, not nominal diversity","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Supplier diversity, route alternatives, storage, demand flexibility, insurance and repair matter only if they preserve the state option for the full disruption window.","conditions":["Scenario-specific duration","Qualified route and supplier capacity","Commercial incentives","Exercise under compound failure"],"disqualifiers":["Counting pipelines, ports or stocks without throughput","Assuming naval presence restores commercial routing","Ignoring price and partner burden"],"case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS027","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R07","title":"Convert PRC infrastructure through recipient value and explicit permission","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_conversion","finding":"Commercial delivery can create relationships and options, but trusted host consent, transparent terms, local benefit and security agreements—not debt exposure—determine strategic access.","conditions":["Recipient demand","Sustainable operation","Host-authorized rights","Nonexclusive relationships tolerated"],"disqualifiers":["Assuming ownership equals sovereign control","Debt distress as a basing mechanism","Visits as proof of sustained throughput"],"case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R08","title":"Avoid exhausting PRC material and market leverage through indiscriminate use","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Mineral and market concentration has greatest option value before targets pay for alternatives; broad or repeated pressure accelerates substitution, coalition alignment and supplier-reputation loss.","conditions":["Narrow product and objective","Target alternatives assessed","Sender revenue and reputation protected","Off-ramp available"],"disqualifiers":["Fungible products","No plausible target behavior","Pressure that strengthens counter-coalitions"],"case_ids":["ST-03","ST-04","ST-05","ST-08"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS017","CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045","CCV-AS048"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R09","title":"Reduce PRC frontier-chip and maritime-energy exposure without assuming rapid autonomy","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Indigenous substitution, efficiency, stocks, pipelines, supplier diversity and mature-node strengths reduce exposure, but frontier tools and seaborne oil remain time- and quality-specific dependencies.","conditions":["Equivalent performance","Qualified production","Inventory and route endurance","Cost and innovation trade-offs disclosed"],"disqualifiers":["Announced capacity","Gross domestic production","Pipelines or stockpiles without scenario sufficiency"],"case_ids":["ST-06","ST-07","ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS022","CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R10","title":"Treat financial internationalization as an institutional bundle","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_conversion","finding":"Payment rails and trade settlement provide resilience, but global monetary power also requires trusted assets, convertibility, legal predictability and deep markets whose expansion can conflict with domestic capital control.","conditions":["Market depth","Asset safety","Convertibility","Predictable governance"],"disqualifiers":["CIPS volume as a dollar-equivalence proxy","Trade share as reserve demand","Ignoring the control-openness trade-off"],"case_ids":["ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R11","title":"Measure provision-to-influence conversion at the recipient","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"measurement_and_power_conversion","finding":"Vaccines, infrastructure, education and media should be credited only when recipient-side evidence shows durable trust, access, preference or behavior beyond delivery and exposure.","conditions":["Recipient baseline","Alternative providers","Longitudinal relationship measure","Observed consequential choice"],"disqualifiers":["Doses, dollars, institutes or audience as influence","Provider-authored attribution","Ignoring host agency"],"case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14","ST-16","ST-17"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS059","CCV-AS061","CCV-AS062","CCV-AS063"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R12","title":"Stress common modes across instruments","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Taiwan fabrication, specialized chip tools, cloud providers, maritime routes, mineral processing, energy and host permissions can fail together; nominal diversification is invalid when substitutes share the same supplier, authority, geography or network.","conditions":["End-to-end dependency map","Compound scenarios","Functional recovery deadline","Private and partner authorization modeled"],"disqualifiers":["Asset counts","Geographic labels without supplier tiers","Recovery of equipment without recovery of state option"],"case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06","ST-07","ST-08","ST-09","ST-12","ST-18"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS020","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048","CCV-AS054"]}],"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0-private","status":"full_portfolio_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Forty-eight broad-screen records, ten frozen focus findings, eighteen case dispositions, and twelve bounded response findings","review_type":"precommitted internal adversarial review; not external peer review","rival_hypothesis_results":[{"id":"CCV-H01","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Commercial hulls, infrastructure finance, R&D spending, platform reach and broad semiconductor output were not counted as power without a conversion path."},{"id":"CCV-H02","result":"pass","effect":"No domestic-only service or welfare finding entered the focus set."},{"id":"CCV-H03","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Private cloud, semiconductor firms, commercial ships, universities and host-owned facilities retain separate taskability and permission judgments."},{"id":"CCV-H04","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Dollar, semiconductor, mineral, market and infrastructure centrality were separated from policy leverage."},{"id":"CCV-H05","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Rare-earth and semiconductor cases retain target adaptation and do not infer compellence from cost or denial."},{"id":"CCV-H06","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Alliance and access findings require authorization and delivery; aggregate allied spending is treated as an input."},{"id":"CCV-H07","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Taiwan, advanced lithography, cloud, mineral processing, shipping and energy routes remain common-mode dependencies despite nominal diversification."},{"id":"CCV-H08","result":"decisive_in_ST_18","effect":"The 2024 earthquake exposure recovered within threshold and was not labeled a demonstrated strategic vulnerability."},{"id":"CCV-H09","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"PRC energy-route exposure and U.S. access dependence are not treated as easily exploitable outside a specified high-escalation scenario."},{"id":"CCV-H10","result":"decisive_in_ST_18","effect":"Company loss and fab interruption were kept below scope absent an international state-option loss."},{"id":"CCV-H11","result":"pass_no_stability_ruling","effect":"No protest, election, hardship or regime-type claim became a state-stability finding."},{"id":"CCV-H12","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"U.S. innovation, culture, media, cloud and university advantages remain ecosystem benefits rather than wholly taskable state instruments."},{"id":"CCV-H13","result":"decisive_in_ST_03_and_ST_07","effect":"Japanese diversification and PRC semiconductor adaptation bound the duration and net effect of leverage."},{"id":"CCV-H14","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Financial, mineral and semiconductor leverage findings retain network fragmentation, substitution and supplier-reputation costs."},{"id":"CCV-H15","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Twelve protective and conversion responses survived as conditional findings only after partner, substitute, market, legal, escalation, and self-harm bounds; no blockade, operational target package, or general compellence recommendation was admitted."},{"id":"CCV-H16","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Intelligence, state endurance, deterrence, cyber and standards comparisons remain withheld or scenario-specific where public observability is asymmetric."}],"mandatory_test_results":[{"id":"CCV-T01","result":"pass","note":"All ten focus findings, eighteen cases, and twelve response findings specify an international option, external effect, coercion-resistance function, or cross-border network."},{"id":"CCV-T02","result":"pass","note":"Each focus finding identifies the exact source and rejects overall domain aggregation."},{"id":"CCV-T03","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Host, partner and private discretion are explicit; ownership and domicile are not control."},{"id":"CCV-T04","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Conversion is supported or bounded separately for both systems in every finding."},{"id":"CCV-T05","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Denial and pain are not promoted to target policy response where behavior evidence is absent."},{"id":"CCV-T06","result":"pass","note":"ST-18 remained below threshold; other vulnerability findings name the state option and response window."},{"id":"CCV-T07","result":"pass","note":"Independent ecosystems remain separately attributed throughout."},{"id":"CCV-T08","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Alliance, access, space and semiconductor findings count partners only through authorization, compliance or delivered mechanisms."},{"id":"CCV-T09","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Finance, minerals, semiconductors and infrastructure retain reachable-node, alternatives and response tests."},{"id":"CCV-T10","result":"pass_first_order","note":"Visible common modes are mapped; hidden supplier tiers remain a declared limit rather than a resilience credit."},{"id":"CCV-T11","result":"pass_with_dynamic_results","note":"Japan and Taiwan show real substitution or recovery; semiconductor and maritime substitutes remain incomplete."},{"id":"CCV-T12","result":"pass","note":"ST-18 measured restoration of production and lack of downstream state-option loss rather than asset repair alone."},{"id":"CCV-T13","result":"pass_with_scenario_bounds","note":"Energy and alliance vulnerabilities remain scenario-bound; material and semiconductor controls have observed access but bounded target effect."},{"id":"CCV-T14","result":"pass","note":"The earthquake was admitted, adjudicated, and kept below strategic threshold on observed evidence."},{"id":"CCV-T15","result":"pass_no_ruling","note":"No state-stability conclusion was attempted."},{"id":"CCV-T16","result":"pass","note":"Adaptation is central to rare-earth, semiconductor, finance, energy and infrastructure findings."},{"id":"CCV-T17","result":"pass_with_bounded_responses","note":"Self-harm bounds all leverage findings; twelve responses survived only as conditional power-preservation, vulnerability-reduction, measurement, or conversion findings."},{"id":"CCV-T18","result":"pass_with_surviving_rivals","note":"Every portfolio case retains material rival causes and actor-theory limits."},{"id":"CCV-T19","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Only stage-matched comparative calls were made; innovation and maritime findings remain split and several candidates are withheld."},{"id":"CCV-T20","result":"pass","note":"There is no score, edge count, composite or overall national winner; negative and insufficient results remain visible."}],"finding_dispositions":{"survived_as_extreme_stage_specific_asymmetry":["CCV-F01","CCV-F02","CCV-F03","CCV-F05","CCV-F06"],"survived_as_split_or_bounded_asymmetry":["CCV-F04","CCV-F07","CCV-F08","CCV-F09"],"survived_as_falsifying_recovery_case":["CCV-F10"],"rejected_inference_examples":["Infrastructure finance automatically produces a base","Financial or material pain automatically compels policy","Commercial shipbuilding share automatically produces global military sustainment","Semiconductor fabrication share equals full-stack control","Geographic concentration automatically equals realized strategic vulnerability"]},"continuing_limits_not_release_blockers":["The product is internally red-teamed public-source analysis and not external peer review or an intelligence assessment.","Product-level bills of material, inventories, and classified logistics remain necessary before operational implementation decisions.","Recipient and target-side evidence remains thin in several influence and compellence cases, which stay bounded or insufficient.","The purposive portfolio is explanatory rather than statistically representative."]}},"gaps":{"focus":"Where observed strategy aligns with or diverges from independently supported sources of internationally usable power, conversion requirements, strategic vulnerabilities, and advantages","intent":"Identify alignments, execution gaps, strategic blind spots, unrealized advantages, possible misallocation, leverage opportunities, strategic fratricide, and insufficient basis","unit":"A traceable match between one frozen strategy-demand finding and one independently frozen power-source, conversion, strategic-vulnerability, advantage, or leverage finding","input_rule":"Neither workstream can establish or strengthen the other's finding; the layer operates only after both inputs are independently supported and retain separate evidence identities.","output_rule":"Every gap or alignment remains traceable to both contributing records and cannot be aggregated into a national score or overall winner.","findings":[{"gap_id":"GAP-01","title":"U.S./partner strategy uses its permissioned-network advantage","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"Ukraine coalition mechanisms, EDCA implementation and Nordic accession align strategy with the independently supported U.S./partner advantage in voluntary coalition aggregation and host permission.","directional_mechanism":"Consultation, treaty institutions, funding and exercises convert autonomous partner choices into access, logistics, production and political legitimacy.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P05"],"material_bound":"Alignment does not prove sufficient delivery or deterrence; each role remains permissioned.","counterfactual":"Without partner authorization and institutions, U.S. resources would provide less geography, legitimacy, intelligence and production.","source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057","IS-AS001","IS-AS003","IS-AS012"],"confidence":"high_mechanism_moderate_outcome"},{"gap_id":"GAP-02","title":"U.S./partner strategies demand physical output faster than the system delivers","finding_state":"Execution gap","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"Ukraine and Indo-Pacific strategies require munitions, ships, repair, lift and qualified components on contested-time schedules that the independently observed U.S./partner industrial chain does not consistently meet.","directional_mechanism":"Budget and allied demand encounter supplier lead times, workforce, tooling, qualification, maintenance and transport bottlenecks before becoming available military effect.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F03","CCV-F04"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P01"],"material_bound":"The gap is mission- and time-specific; aggregate U.S./allied capacity remains large and classified inventories could narrow it.","counterfactual":"Qualified multi-year output, repair and logistics at the required rate would turn existing financial and alliance strength into a larger and more credible option set.","source_ids":["CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS010","CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053","IS-AS002","IS-AS003"],"confidence":"high"},{"gap_id":"GAP-03","title":"European gas strategy closed a critical coercion-resistance requirement","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","system":"European_partner_system","ruling":"REPowerEU aligned implemented strategy with the independent requirement to preserve external policy freedom under energy disruption and achieved functional substitution within the relevant political window.","directional_mechanism":"Alternative suppliers, infrastructure, demand reduction, storage, regulation and coalition policy reduced the sender's control while preserving support for Ukraine.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F07","CCV-F10"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C04"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P10"],"material_bound":"The strategy imposed high and unequal costs; alignment does not imply optimal allocation or costless resilience.","counterfactual":"Without substitution and demand flexibility, Russian pipeline control would have constrained European choices for longer.","source_ids":["CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"confidence":"high"},{"gap_id":"GAP-04","title":"U.S. policy can damage the credibility and institutions that make network power usable","finding_state":"Strategic fratricide","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"JCPOA withdrawal after verified implementation and prolonged WTO appellate paralysis damaged diplomatic credibility or rule-based enforcement that the U.S./partner system relies on for future coalition and financial leverage.","directional_mechanism":"A short-run unilateral instrument action weakens partner confidence, off-ramp credibility and common institutions, reducing the future reach and legitimacy of the permissioned network.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F02"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C07","IS-C17"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P14"],"material_bound":"U.S. substantive objections were real; the finding concerns the observed cross-effect, not a claim that every alternative policy was feasible or better.","counterfactual":"A credible compliance-conditioned off-ramp or negotiated institutional reform would preserve more of the network while pursuing the underlying objective.","source_ids":["CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","IS-AS014","IS-AS016","IS-AS035","IS-AS036","IS-AS037"],"confidence":"high_for_cross_effect_moderate_for_net_policy"},{"gap_id":"GAP-05","title":"Allied semiconductor strategy employs a real chokepoint but risks eroding it","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","secondary_state":"Strategic fratricide","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"Coordinated controls align strategy with a genuine allied frontier-technology advantage, yet broad or unstable restrictions can accelerate substitution, reduce allied revenue and weaken partner coverage that makes the advantage usable.","directional_mechanism":"A distributed set of firms and jurisdictions controls specific tools and inputs; coalition law converts that position into denial, while ecosystem exit and target redesign reduce future leverage.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F06","CCV-F08"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C03"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09","IS-P14"],"material_bound":"Current evidence supports delay, not permanent denial or a net military effect.","counterfactual":"Narrow, stable, partner-aligned controls with monitored leakage and ecosystem costs would preserve more option value.","source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022","IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"confidence":"moderate"},{"gap_id":"GAP-06","title":"PRC mineral strategy converts a critical advantage but accelerates its erosion","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","secondary_state":"Strategic fratricide","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"Export controls employ an independently supported PRC advantage in processing and magnets and have disrupted selected production, while repeated use mobilizes stockpiling, substitution, allied investment and supplier diversification.","directional_mechanism":"Licensing jurisdiction at concentrated midstream nodes delays qualified product; target adaptation reduces duration and may strengthen counter-coalitions.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F05"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C12"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P06","IS-P12","IS-P14"],"material_bound":"Denial is supported; durable policy compellence and net long-run benefit are not.","counterfactual":"Preserving the option or using it narrowly would reveal less dependency information and trigger less diversification.","source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS048","IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"confidence":"high_for_denial_moderate_for_erosion"},{"gap_id":"GAP-07","title":"PRC overseas strategy overweights infrastructure and underweights sovereign permission","finding_state":"Execution gap","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"PRC strategy possesses exceptional financing and construction means, but its port-to-access pathway is constrained by recipient choice, security agreements, local legitimacy and nonexclusive host relationships.","directional_mechanism":"Commercial assets and relationships create option value; only host-authorized rights, exercised logistics and sustained local consent convert them into strategic access.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C11","IS-C18"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P07"],"material_bound":"Djibouti shows the gap can be closed in a bounded case; the finding does not claim that all PRC projects seek military use.","counterfactual":"Transparent, locally valuable projects paired with explicit consensual security arrangements would improve conversion without relying on debt or ownership assumptions.","source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056","IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS024","IS-AS025"],"confidence":"high_mechanism_moderate_portfolio"},{"gap_id":"GAP-08","title":"PRC coercive strategy underweights target substitution and counter-coalition response","finding_state":"Strategic blind spot","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"Across minerals, maritime pressure and earlier trade cases, strategies convert concentrated control into tactical cost but insufficiently account for target adaptation, hardened resolve and stronger U.S./partner coordination.","directional_mechanism":"Pressure reveals dependencies and raises threat perception, which changes the target's willingness to pay for alternatives and partner protection.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F05","CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C12","IS-C15"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P06","IS-P12","IS-P14"],"material_bound":"The cases do not reveal internal PRC estimates or prove that tactical gains are never worth the feedback cost.","counterfactual":"A strategy that prices target adaptation and coalition response ex ante would employ coercion more selectively or pair it with credible accommodation.","source_ids":["CCV-AS017","CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045","IS-AS013","IS-AS026","IS-AS027","IS-AS032"],"confidence":"moderate"},{"gap_id":"GAP-09","title":"PRC provision strategy uses its throughput advantage but lacks reliable influence conversion","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","secondary_state":"Execution gap","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"FOCAC and development finance align strategy with PRC construction, manufacturing and financing strengths, but project performance, debt repair, host agency and trust prevent systematic conversion into alignment, access or durable influence.","directional_mechanism":"Provision supplies valued capability and repeated relationships; recipient-side outcomes and sovereign decisions determine the final strategic effect.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F03","CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C09","IS-C18"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P07"],"material_bound":"Many projects may succeed on development terms without producing or seeking geopolitical alignment.","counterfactual":"Outcome measurement, sustainable terms, local ownership and repair before crisis would improve relationship conversion and legitimacy.","source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS055","IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS021","IS-AS038","IS-AS039"],"confidence":"moderate"},{"gap_id":"GAP-10","title":"Both systems underprotect compound common-mode dependencies","finding_state":"Strategic blind spot","system":"Both systems","ruling":"Strategies address individual chips, minerals, energy, routes, cloud and access nodes, but the independent CCV analysis shows that substitutes often share suppliers, geography, authorities or private platforms and can fail together.","directional_mechanism":"A disruption crossing multiple instruments exhausts buffers faster than single-sector plans predict and may remove both the capability and the partner mechanism used to restore it.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F04","CCV-F05","CCV-F06","CCV-F07","CCV-F08","CCV-F10"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C04","IS-C14","IS-C16"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P09","IS-P10"],"material_bound":"Public data cannot model classified inventories or every compound scenario; this is a requirement gap, not a forecast.","counterfactual":"End-to-end mission-thread stress tests with common authorities, suppliers and recovery deadlines would reveal false diversification before crisis.","source_ids":["CCV-AS020","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048","IS-AS002","IS-AS009","IS-AS010","IS-AS033"],"confidence":"moderate"},{"gap_id":"GAP-11","title":"BRICS and FOCAC activity does not support a resource-misallocation judgment","finding_state":"Insufficient basis","system":"PRC-centered_and_multilateral","ruling":"The evidence shows extensive commitments and uncertain conversion, but lacks opportunity-cost and alternative-allocation evidence required to call the strategy a misallocation.","directional_mechanism":"None admitted: low taskability or incomplete delivery is not enough to prove that resources should have been used elsewhere.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C10"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"material_bound":"This preserves a visible nonfinding instead of converting skepticism into a policy judgment.","counterfactual":"A supported misallocation finding would require marginal returns, feasible alternatives, actual cost and a common bounded objective.","source_ids":["IS-AS018","IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"confidence":"insufficient"},{"gap_id":"GAP-12","title":"Taiwan strategy–requirement match remains unadjudicable from public outcomes","finding_state":"Insufficient basis","system":"Both systems","ruling":"The CCV work identifies real industrial, access, energy, semiconductor and coalition requirements, but Strategy Evaluation cannot determine from no war whether either side possesses or integrates them at the decision threshold that causes deterrence.","directional_mechanism":"Multiple observed and unobserved actions affect expectations; opponent intent and classified capabilities prevent a causal match.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F03","CCV-F04","CCV-F06","CCV-F07","CCV-F10"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C14"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P10","IS-P13"],"material_bound":"The finding does not imply deterrence is absent; it states that public evidence cannot attribute it.","counterfactual":"A supported match would require observable decision evidence or a close comparison connecting a defined capability change to changed opponent expectations.","source_ids":["CCV-AS007","CCV-AS010","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS030","IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"insufficient"}],"excluded_states":{"Unrealized advantage":"No high-confidence case paired a clearly usable, low-cost capability with a strategy omission and supported opportunity counterfactual.","Possible misallocation":"No case met the required opportunity-cost threshold.","Leverage opportunity":"The analysis supports leverage conditions but not a new offensive opportunity whose legality, escalation, partner authorization, target response and net self-harm all pass."},"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0-private","status":"gap_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Twelve gap, alignment and insufficient-basis records","tests":[{"test_id":"GAP-T01","test":"Independent input freeze","result":"pass","note":"Every gap cites frozen CCV and Strategy Evaluation identifiers."},{"test_id":"GAP-T02","test":"No circular support","result":"pass","note":"No workstream finding was upgraded because the other contained a similar claim."},{"test_id":"GAP-T03","test":"Bounded actor and objective","result":"pass","note":"Each record names a system, strategy cases and a material requirement or option."},{"test_id":"GAP-T04","test":"Directional mechanism","result":"pass","note":"Every supported gap states how strategy protects, requires, omits or damages the capability."},{"test_id":"GAP-T05","test":"Counterfactual","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Each finding includes a bounded counterfactual; no causal magnitude is invented."},{"test_id":"GAP-T06","test":"Partner and private control","result":"pass","note":"Permissioned access, technology firms and recipient choices retain actor-specific control."},{"test_id":"GAP-T07","test":"Substitution and adaptation","result":"pass","note":"Industrial, mineral, semiconductor, energy and infrastructure gaps retain adaptation."},{"test_id":"GAP-T08","test":"Self-harm and second order","result":"pass","note":"Fratricide remains visible and is not netted against short-run alignment."},{"test_id":"GAP-T09","test":"Misallocation opportunity-cost threshold","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"No misallocation finding was issued without a supported alternative and marginal-value comparison."},{"test_id":"GAP-T10","test":"Leverage net-benefit threshold","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"No offensive leverage opportunity survived law, escalation, partner and self-harm requirements."},{"test_id":"GAP-T11","test":"Insufficient findings remain visible","result":"pass","note":"BRICS/FOCAC misallocation and Taiwan deterrence matches remain insufficient."},{"test_id":"GAP-T12","test":"No aggregation","result":"pass","note":"There is no gap count as a score, net national position or overall winner."}],"sensitivity_results":["Removing Afghanistan weakens the general strategy-failure sample but does not change the industrial or permission gaps.","Removing Hambantota weakens the negative port case but does not convert finance into a general access pathway.","Treating semiconductor delay as stronger still does not establish permanent denial or target policy compliance.","Treating Russian sanctions costs as larger still does not establish war termination.","A classified Taiwan comparator could materially change GAP-12; public evidence cannot."]}},"method":{"workstream_independence":[{"id":"SE","title":"National Strategy Evaluation","type":"evaluation","focus":"How current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies select, deliver, combine, and adapt the four instruments for declared objectives","intent":"Evaluate strategic coherence, implementation, cross-instrument interaction, response, outcome, cost, durability, and adaptation","question":"Given a predeclared objective, target or recipient, geography, time window, counterfactual, acceptable cost, and persistence threshold, how coherently and effectively did the system combine its available instruments, and what explains the observed result?","unit":"A bounded national strategy, strategic objective, campaign, or phase","imports":"Instrument evidence plus strategy records, authorities, resources, delivered actions, partner and target response, outcomes, cost, and adaptation","outputs":"Objective-bounded strategy, campaign, mechanism, implementation, outcome, and comparative-pathway findings","prohibited_inference":"A strategy-document claim, simultaneous activity, domain position, or capability inventory cannot establish integration or strategic success.","charter_file":"strategy-evaluation.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_fourteen_pathways_and_red_team_complete_private"},{"id":"CCV","title":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","type":"international_power_and_strategic_risk","focus":"Which resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions can be converted into internationally usable state power or leverage, and which dependencies can external actors or exogenous events exploit to constrain state action, options, or stability","intent":"Identify what must be built, accessed, controlled, protected, substituted, restored, or responsibly employed to preserve freedom of action and produce bounded international effects independently of current strategy","question":"What gives a state usable power or leverage in international affairs; through what authority, delivery, and response mechanism is it converted; where can an adversary or exogenous shock disrupt that chain; and when would the resulting loss materially narrow external options, operational performance, coercion resistance, or state stability?","unit":"A source-of-power and conversion chain under a declared international objective, target or recipient, geography, time horizon, and adversarial or exogenous stress","imports":"Instrument evidence plus resource, authority, taskability, conversion, target and partner response, network position, dependency, external control, adversarial access, shock, substitution, recovery, adaptation, and strategic-effect evidence","outputs":"Power-source, conversion, strategic-dependency, vulnerability, advantage, mitigation, bounded-leverage, self-harm, recovery, and warning-indicator findings","prohibited_inference":"Domestic importance, sector size, resource possession, ownership, concentration, technical sophistication, or current strategy emphasis cannot establish internationally usable power, leverage, or strategic vulnerability. A domestic condition enters only through an evidenced mechanism that constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","charter_file":"critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_ten_focus_findings_twelve_responses_and_red_team_complete_private","architecture_directory":"critical-capabilities"}],"gap_rule":"Neither workstream can establish or strengthen the other's finding; the layer operates only after both inputs are independently supported and retain separate evidence identities.","objective_contract":["actor","declared_objective","target_or_recipient","geography","observation_window","baseline","counterfactual","success_threshold","failure_threshold","acceptable_cost","persistence_checkpoint"],"power_vulnerability_contract":["international_state_option_or_effect","source_of_power_or_leverage","state_access_authority_and_practical_control","conversion_pathway_scale_quality_place_and_time","external_target_partner_recipient_or_system_response","state_option_gain_or_loss_threshold","dependencies_control_hidden_tiers_and_common_mode","adversarial_exploitability_or_exogenous_shock","substitution_within_required_time_and_cost","strategic_functional_recovery","mobilization_throughput_and_persistence","target_partner_firm_market_and_competitor_adaptation","state_stability_mechanism_when_domestic_conditions_are_invoked","own_partner_network_legal_legitimacy_escalation_market_innovation_and_distributional_effects","evidence_rivals_observability_confidence_and_revision"],"aggregation_prohibitions":["A domain position cannot be copied into a cross-instrument conclusion.","Several simultaneous instrument actions do not establish integration without an observed connection mechanism.","An upstream resource, activity, output, commitment, reach measure, or posture cannot inherit a downstream strategic outcome.","A favorable outcome cannot be attributed to statecraft without testing target agency, partner agency, opponent adaptation, background conditions, and rival causes.","Possession of resources, production, technology, relationships, access, centrality, or audiences does not establish internationally usable power without observed state access, conversion, and external effect.","Domestic importance or disruption does not establish strategic vulnerability unless the consequence materially constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","A deficit on one side cannot establish the other side's advantage.","Missing or classified evidence remains unknown rather than zero.","The absence of war does not by itself establish deterrence, and the end of fighting does not by itself establish conflict termination or durable settlement."],"disclosure":"Independent, internally red-teamed public-source research; not an intelligence assessment, government validation, external peer review, operational target package, or national strategy."},"sources":[{"id":"IS-AS001","source_id":"IS-AS001","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"The Secretary General's Annual Report 2025","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C01|IS-C05|IS-C14","primary_use":"Measure allied spending, production, force integration, Ukraine support and current institutional delivery.","primary_uses":"Measure allied spending, production, force integration, Ukraine support and current institutional delivery.","limitation":"NATO-authored inputs and activity do not establish causal deterrence, adequacy or war outcome.","known_limitations":"NATO-authored inputs and activity do not establish causal deterrence, adequacy or war outcome.","url":"https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/publications-and-reports/annual-reports/sgar25-en.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS002","source_id":"IS-AS002","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DOD Weapon Replacement Efforts","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C01","primary_use":"Measure appropriations-to-contracts, replenishment and physical supplier constraints.","primary_uses":"Measure appropriations-to-contracts, replenishment and physical supplier constraints.","limitation":"U.S. replacement activity is not identical to delivery, Ukrainian availability or battlefield effect.","known_limitations":"U.S. replacement activity is not identical to delivery, Ukrainian availability or battlefield effect.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106649","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS003","source_id":"IS-AS003","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Ukraine Defense Contact Group National Armaments Directors fact sheet","date":"2025-01","date_or_version":"2025-01","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C01","primary_use":"Trace coalition governance from requirements through production, sustainment and partner contribution.","primary_uses":"Trace coalition governance from requirements through production, sustainment and partner contribution.","limitation":"Actor-authored coordination claims do not prove delivered sufficiency or strategic outcome.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored coordination claims do not prove delivered sufficiency or strategic outcome.","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4026238/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS004","source_id":"IS-AS004","publisher":"Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction","title":"Why the Afghan Government Collapsed","date":"2022-11","date_or_version":"2022-11","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C02","primary_use":"Trace objectives, political exclusion, messaging, institutional weakness and collapse.","primary_uses":"Trace objectives, political exclusion, messaging, institutional weakness and collapse.","limitation":"Retrospective public oversight has interview and classification limits and cannot allocate all causal weight.","known_limitations":"Retrospective public oversight has interview and classification limits and cannot allocate all causal weight.","url":"https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-23-05-IP.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS005","source_id":"IS-AS005","publisher":"Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction","title":"Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed","date":"2023-02","date_or_version":"2023-02","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C02","primary_use":"Trace force-design, sustainment, ownership, corruption, withdrawal and battlefield failure.","primary_uses":"Trace force-design, sustainment, ownership, corruption, withdrawal and battlefield failure.","limitation":"Afghan agency and adversary choices remain important; some operational evidence is unavailable publicly.","known_limitations":"Afghan agency and adversary choices remain important; some operational evidence is unavailable publicly.","url":"https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS006","source_id":"IS-AS006","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Inherent Resolve mission in Iraq and Syria transitioning","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C06","primary_use":"Establish territorial defeat, coalition transition and the continuing ISIS threat.","primary_uses":"Establish territorial defeat, coalition transition and the continuing ISIS threat.","limitation":"Official success framing does not isolate each instrument's causal contribution or measure ideological persistence.","known_limitations":"Official success framing does not isolate each instrument's causal contribution or measure ideological persistence.","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3920032/inherent-resolve-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-transitioning/","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS007","source_id":"IS-AS007","publisher":"Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve","title":"Operation Inherent Resolve in Brief, January–March 2024","date":"2024-05","date_or_version":"2024-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C06","primary_use":"Cross-check continuing threat, partner forces, detention and mission requirements after territorial defeat.","primary_uses":"Cross-check continuing threat, partner forces, detention and mission requirements after territorial defeat.","limitation":"Quarterly reporting covers a limited period and an ongoing campaign.","known_limitations":"Quarterly reporting covers a limited period and an ongoing campaign.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/16/2003466738/-1/-1/1/OIR_Q2_MAR2024_BRIEF_508.PDF","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS008","source_id":"IS-AS008","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security","title":"Commerce strengthens controls on advanced semiconductor production","date":"2024-12","date_or_version":"2024-12","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C03","primary_use":"Establish legal coverage, stated objective, controlled nodes and partner-dependent mechanism.","primary_uses":"Establish legal coverage, stated objective, controlled nodes and partner-dependent mechanism.","limitation":"Rule issuance does not establish enforcement, target delay, military effect or durable denial.","known_limitations":"Rule issuance does not establish enforcement, target delay, military effect or durable denial.","url":"https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS009","source_id":"IS-AS009","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C03","primary_use":"Map segment-specific concentration, allied nodes and PRC strengths on common denominators.","primary_uses":"Map segment-specific concentration, allied nodes and PRC strengths on common denominators.","limitation":"Data lag and public market shares do not reveal classified end uses or evasion.","known_limitations":"Data lag and public market shares do not reveal classified end uses or evasion.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/mapping-the-semiconductor-value-chain_4154cdbf-en.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS010","source_id":"IS-AS010","publisher":"European Commission","title":"REPowerEU: three years of progress phasing out Russian fossil fuels","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C04|IS-C01","primary_use":"Measure strategy implementation, substitution, demand reduction and preserved policy freedom.","primary_uses":"Measure strategy implementation, substitution, demand reduction and preserved policy freedom.","limitation":"EU aggregates do not isolate weather, recession, prices or every national distributional cost.","known_limitations":"EU aggregates do not isolate weather, recession, prices or every national distributional cost.","url":"https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/repowereu-3-years-commission-takes-stock-progress-phase-out-russian-fossil-fuels-2025-05-16_en","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS011","source_id":"IS-AS011","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Gas Market Report Q1 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-01","date_or_version":"2026-01","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C04","primary_use":"Cross-check persistence of Russian pipeline-gas displacement and market adjustment.","primary_uses":"Cross-check persistence of Russian pipeline-gas displacement and market adjustment.","limitation":"Market outcomes alone do not show political causality or acceptable cost for every member.","known_limitations":"Market outcomes alone do not show political causality or acceptable cost for every member.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/gas-market-report-q1-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS012","source_id":"IS-AS012","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"Fourth U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue joint statement","date":"2024-07","date_or_version":"2024-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C05|IS-C15","primary_use":"Trace treaty assurance, EDCA funding, maritime cooperation and host-authorized implementation.","primary_uses":"Trace treaty assurance, EDCA funding, maritime cooperation and host-authorized implementation.","limitation":"A joint statement records commitments, not guaranteed crisis permission or deterrence.","known_limitations":"A joint statement records commitments, not guaranteed crisis permission or deterrence.","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue/","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS013","source_id":"IS-AS013","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea","date":"2025-03","date_or_version":"2025-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C05|IS-C15","primary_use":"Trace PRC pressure, Philippine response, EDCA, resupply and treaty implications.","primary_uses":"Trace PRC pressure, Philippine response, EDCA, resupply and treaty implications.","limitation":"Public legislative analysis cannot observe classified plans or prove deterrence.","known_limitations":"Public legislative analysis cannot observe classified plans or prove deterrence.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12550","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS014","source_id":"IS-AS014","publisher":"International Atomic Energy Agency","title":"IAEA Annual Report 2016 — Nuclear Verification","date":"2017","date_or_version":"2017","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Establish verified Iranian implementation and monitoring delivered by the bargain.","primary_uses":"Establish verified Iranian implementation and monitoring delivered by the bargain.","limitation":"Verification does not assign causal credit to sanctions or determine political durability.","known_limitations":"Verification does not assign causal credit to sanctions or determine political durability.","url":"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2016/gc61-3-nuclear-verification.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS015","source_id":"IS-AS015","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"JCPOA archives","date":"2013-2018","date_or_version":"2013-2018","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Trace reciprocal sanctions relief, licensing and legal implementation.","primary_uses":"Trace reciprocal sanctions relief, licensing and legal implementation.","limitation":"An actor-authored archive does not independently measure Iranian motives or partner credibility.","known_limitations":"An actor-authored archive does not independently measure Iranian motives or partner credibility.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions/joint-plan-of-action-jpoa-archive-and-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-jcpoa-archive","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS016","source_id":"IS-AS016","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"JCPOA wind-down frequently asked questions","date":"2018-05","date_or_version":"2018-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Trace U.S. withdrawal, reimposition and third-party compliance burden.","primary_uses":"Trace U.S. withdrawal, reimposition and third-party compliance burden.","limitation":"Legal instructions do not measure net security effect or every partner response.","known_limitations":"Legal instructions do not measure net security effect or every partner response.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/126/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS017","source_id":"IS-AS017","publisher":"United Nations Security Council","title":"Resolution 2231 background and implementation timeline","date":"2015-2026","date_or_version":"2015-2026","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Cross-check multilateral endorsement, Implementation Day and later reapplication of measures.","primary_uses":"Cross-check multilateral endorsement, Implementation Day and later reapplication of measures.","limitation":"The legal chronology does not allocate responsibility for agreement collapse.","known_limitations":"The legal chronology does not allocate responsibility for agreement collapse.","url":"https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS018","source_id":"IS-AS018","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027)","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C08","primary_use":"Define current PRC objectives, commitments, finance, security, infrastructure and people-to-people mechanisms in Africa.","primary_uses":"Define current PRC objectives, commitments, finance, security, infrastructure and people-to-people mechanisms in Africa.","limitation":"Actor-authored commitments and announced finance are not delivery, recipient benefit or influence.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored commitments and announced finance are not delivery, recipient benefit or influence.","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485719.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS019","source_id":"IS-AS019","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"International Infrastructure Projects: China's Investments Significantly Outpace the U.S.","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C08|IS-C11|IS-C18","primary_use":"Compare financing scale and separate provision from host outcomes and access.","primary_uses":"Compare financing scale and separate provision from host outcomes and access.","limitation":"Selected-sector estimates do not establish strategic intent, recipient agency or military rights.","known_limitations":"Selected-sector estimates do not establish strategic intent, recipient agency or military rights.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106866","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS020","source_id":"IS-AS020","publisher":"World Bank","title":"World Bank COVID-19 Response","date":"2020-2022","date_or_version":"2020-2022","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C09","primary_use":"Measure scale, instruments, country coverage and vaccine-deployment support.","primary_uses":"Measure scale, instruments, country coverage and vaccine-deployment support.","limitation":"Bank-authored commitments and approvals do not equal disbursement, outcome or U.S. strategic influence.","known_limitations":"Bank-authored commitments and approvals do not equal disbursement, outcome or U.S. strategic influence.","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/10/14/world-bank-covid-19-response","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS021","source_id":"IS-AS021","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","title":"COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility","date":"2020-2023","date_or_version":"2020-2023","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C09","primary_use":"Measure AIIB facility size, project mix, members and operational response.","primary_uses":"Measure AIIB facility size, project mix, members and operational response.","limitation":"Approvals and cofinance do not establish comparative development effect or PRC control.","known_limitations":"Approvals and cofinance do not establish comparative development effect or PRC control.","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility/index.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS022","source_id":"IS-AS022","publisher":"BRICS Brazil","title":"Rio de Janeiro Declaration","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C10","primary_use":"Define the expanded group's agreed agenda, institutional claims and commitments.","primary_uses":"Define the expanded group's agreed agenda, institutional claims and commitments.","limitation":"Consensus declaration language does not establish implementation, common strategy or member alignment.","known_limitations":"Consensus declaration language does not establish implementation, common strategy or member alignment.","url":"https://brics.br/en/documents/presidency-documents/250705-brics-leaders-declaration-en.pdf/%40%40download/file","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS023","source_id":"IS-AS023","publisher":"BRICS Brazil","title":"BRICS Summit signs 126 commitments in Rio","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C10","primary_use":"Cross-check the breadth and reader-facing characterization of summit outputs.","primary_uses":"Cross-check the breadth and reader-facing characterization of summit outputs.","limitation":"Host-presidency framing overstates coherence unless delivery and member behavior follow.","known_limitations":"Host-presidency framing overstates coherence unless delivery and member behavior follow.","url":"https://brics.br/en/news/brics-summit-signs-historic-commitment-in-rio-for-more-inclusive-and-sustainable-governance","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS024","source_id":"IS-AS024","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"China's Engagement in Djibouti","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C11","primary_use":"Trace infrastructure, host incentives, defense agreement, base use and nonexclusive access.","primary_uses":"Trace infrastructure, host incentives, defense agreement, base use and nonexclusive access.","limitation":"One case cannot establish a general port-to-base strategy.","known_limitations":"One case cannot establish a general port-to-base strategy.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11304","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS025","source_id":"IS-AS025","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Sri Lanka 2018 Article IV Consultation and Fourth EFF Review","date":"2018-06","date_or_version":"2018-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C11|IS-C18","primary_use":"Separate Hambantota's concession, financing and fiscal purpose from broader debt claims.","primary_uses":"Separate Hambantota's concession, financing and fiscal purpose from broader debt claims.","limitation":"The report predates default and does not expose every contract or political channel.","known_limitations":"The report predates default and does not expose every contract or political channel.","url":"https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2018/175/article-A001-en.xml","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS026","source_id":"IS-AS026","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C12","primary_use":"Measure refining concentration, realized disruptions, controls and diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure refining concentration, realized disruptions, controls and diversification.","limitation":"Energy-sector data are not a complete defense bill of materials and forecasts may slip.","known_limitations":"Energy-sector data are not a complete defense bill of materials and forecasts may slip.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS027","source_id":"IS-AS027","publisher":"Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry","title":"White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2025 — supply-chain resilience","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C12","primary_use":"Trace target adaptation after the 2010 rare-earth shock.","primary_uses":"Trace target adaptation after the 2010 rare-earth shock.","limitation":"A target-government retrospective may understate private cost and contested attribution.","known_limitations":"A target-government retrospective may understate private cost and contested attribution.","url":"https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/wp2025/pdf/2-1-4.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS028","source_id":"IS-AS028","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"Joint Trilateral Statement by China, Saudi Arabia and Iran","date":"2023-03","date_or_version":"2023-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C13","primary_use":"Define the bounded objective, roadmap, sovereignty terms and China's facilitation role.","primary_uses":"Define the bounded objective, roadmap, sovereignty terms and China's facilitation role.","limitation":"A joint success statement does not establish China's unique causal contribution or wider regional peace.","known_limitations":"A joint success statement does not establish China's unique causal contribution or wider regional peace.","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367487.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS029","source_id":"IS-AS029","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"Third China-Iran-Saudi Arabia Trilateral Joint Committee press release","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C13","primary_use":"Test persistence of diplomatic restoration and continued trilateral follow-up.","primary_uses":"Test persistence of diplomatic restoration and continued trilateral follow-up.","limitation":"Actor-authored follow-up does not independently measure trust or effects on regional conflicts.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored follow-up does not independently measure trust or effects on regional conflicts.","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/xwlb_663592/202512/t20251210_11770309.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS030","source_id":"IS-AS030","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues","date":"2026-02","date_or_version":"2026-02","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C14","primary_use":"Assess U.S. policy, PRC coercion, military support and the difficulty of deterrence inference.","primary_uses":"Assess U.S. policy, PRC coercion, military support and the difficulty of deterrence inference.","limitation":"Public analysis cannot observe decision thresholds or establish why conflict has not occurred.","known_limitations":"Public analysis cannot observe decision thresholds or establish why conflict has not occurred.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12481","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS031","source_id":"IS-AS031","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2025","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C11|IS-C14|IS-C15","primary_use":"Assess PLA modernization, coercion, overseas access and operational activity.","primary_uses":"Assess PLA modernization, coercion, overseas access and operational activity.","limitation":"Competitor assessment with classified evidence omitted; claims require corroboration where decisive.","known_limitations":"Competitor assessment with classified evidence omitted; claims require corroboration where decisive.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS032","source_id":"IS-AS032","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C15","primary_use":"Trace PRC gray-zone gains, U.S. policy, legal positions and alliance response.","primary_uses":"Trace PRC gray-zone gains, U.S. policy, legal positions and alliance response.","limitation":"Public legislative analysis cannot resolve classified plans or causal deterrence.","known_limitations":"Public legislative analysis cannot resolve classified plans or causal deterrence.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42784","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS033","source_id":"IS-AS033","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce","title":"IPEF Supply Chain Agreement entry into force","date":"2024-01","date_or_version":"2024-01","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C16","primary_use":"Establish legal entry into force, participants and planned institutions.","primary_uses":"Establish legal entry into force, participants and planned institutions.","limitation":"Agreement architecture and ratification do not establish crisis performance or supply diversification.","known_limitations":"Agreement architecture and ratification do not establish crisis performance or supply diversification.","url":"https://www.commerce.gov/node/6542","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS034","source_id":"IS-AS034","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce","title":"IPEF Ministerial Meeting in Singapore","date":"2024-06","date_or_version":"2024-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C16","primary_use":"Trace operationalization of the Supply Chain Council, Crisis Response Network and Labor Rights Advisory Board.","primary_uses":"Trace operationalization of the Supply Chain Council, Crisis Response Network and Labor Rights Advisory Board.","limitation":"Named officials and bodies do not prove tested response or economic effect.","known_limitations":"Named officials and bodies do not prove tested response or economic effect.","url":"https://www.commerce.gov/node/6774","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS035","source_id":"IS-AS035","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"Appellate Body Members","date":"2026-current","date_or_version":"2026-current","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C17","primary_use":"Establish continuing vacancies and inability to hear appeals.","primary_uses":"Establish continuing vacancies and inability to hear appeals.","limitation":"Institutional status does not adjudicate U.S. substantive complaints or reform counterfactuals.","known_limitations":"Institutional status does not adjudicate U.S. substantive complaints or reform counterfactuals.","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS036","source_id":"IS-AS036","publisher":"Office of the United States Trade Representative","title":"Report on the Appellate Body of the WTO","date":"2020-02","date_or_version":"2020-02","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C17","primary_use":"State the U.S. theory of legal overreach and intended reform pressure.","primary_uses":"State the U.S. theory of legal overreach and intended reform pressure.","limitation":"Actor-authored critique is not an independent assessment and does not provide a delivered reform plan.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored critique is not an independent assessment and does not provide a delivered reform plan.","url":"https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS037","source_id":"IS-AS037","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"MPIA award in EU-China intellectual-property dispute","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C17","primary_use":"Establish that alternative appeal arbitration operates for participating members including China and the EU.","primary_uses":"Establish that alternative appeal arbitration operates for participating members including China and the EU.","limitation":"Two awards do not replace universal dispute settlement or prove superior design.","known_limitations":"Two awards do not replace universal dispute settlement or prove superior design.","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/ds611arb25_21jul25_e.htm","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS038","source_id":"IS-AS038","publisher":"AidData","title":"Belt and Road Reboot","date":"2023-11","date_or_version":"2023-11","kind":"T2","evidence_tier":"T2","coverage":"IS-C18|IS-C08","primary_use":"Measure delivery scale, troubled projects, rescue lending and PRC portfolio adaptation.","primary_uses":"Measure delivery scale, troubled projects, rescue lending and PRC portfolio adaptation.","limitation":"Research dataset coverage ends before current commitments; strategic intent and recipient outcomes vary by project.","known_limitations":"Research dataset coverage ends before current commitments; strategic intent and recipient outcomes vary by project.","url":"https://www.aiddata.org/publications/belt-and-road-reboot","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS039","source_id":"IS-AS039","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Sovereign debt restructuring process is improving","date":"2024-06","date_or_version":"2024-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C18","primary_use":"Trace cooperative restructuring and China's participation with other official creditors.","primary_uses":"Trace cooperative restructuring and China's participation with other official creditors.","limitation":"Process-time improvements do not establish borrower welfare, relationship repair or future lending quality.","known_limitations":"Process-time improvements do not establish borrower welfare, relationship repair or future lending quality.","url":"https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2024/06/26/sovereign-debt-restructuring-process-is-improving-amid-cooperation-and-reform","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"IS-AS040","source_id":"IS-AS040","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"China: With Nearly All U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed","date":"2024-10","date_or_version":"2024-10","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"IS-C08|IS-C10","primary_use":"Test people-to-people network durability and host agency against exposure claims.","primary_uses":"Test people-to-people network durability and host agency against exposure claims.","limitation":"The U.S. host sample cannot represent Africa or the Global South and does not measure prior influence.","known_limitations":"The U.S. host sample cannot represent Africa or the Global South and does not measure prior influence.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105981","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS001","source_id":"CCV-AS001","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"External Sector Report 2025 — Chapter 2: International Monetary System","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"reserve currencies, cross-border finance, network effects, fragmentation","primary_use":"Measure dollar persistence, renminbi constraints, and network-erosion risks.","primary_uses":"Measure dollar persistence, renminbi constraints, and network-erosion risks.","limitation":"System-level shares do not establish coercive success in a particular case; reserve composition also reflects valuation and market demand.","known_limitations":"System-level shares do not establish coercive success in a particular case; reserve composition also reflects valuation and market demand.","url":"https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/esr/2025/english/ch2.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS002","source_id":"CCV-AS002","publisher":"Bank for International Settlements","title":"Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign exchange turnover in April 2025","date":"2025-09","date_or_version":"2025-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"global foreign-exchange market","primary_use":"Measure currency intermediation and compare dollar and renminbi use on a common turnover denominator.","primary_uses":"Measure currency intermediation and compare dollar and renminbi use on a common turnover denominator.","limitation":"A currency appears on both sides of a trade; turnover is not reserves, invoicing, safe-asset supply, or state leverage.","known_limitations":"A currency appears on both sides of a trade; turnover is not reserves, invoicing, safe-asset supply, or state leverage.","url":"https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx25_fx.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS003","source_id":"CCV-AS003","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves","date":"2026-current","date_or_version":"2026-current","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"allocated official reserves","primary_use":"Measure current reserve shares and diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure current reserve shares and diversification.","limitation":"Reported reserves exclude unallocated holdings and cannot identify political motive or crisis usability.","known_limitations":"Reported reserves exclude unallocated holdings and cannot identify political motive or crisis usability.","url":"https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.STA%3ACOFER","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS004","source_id":"CCV-AS004","publisher":"People's Bank of China","title":"2025 RMB Internationalization Report","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"renminbi settlement, CIPS, cross-border use","primary_use":"Measure growth in PRC-centered payment infrastructure and international renminbi activity.","primary_uses":"Measure growth in PRC-centered payment infrastructure and international renminbi activity.","limitation":"Actor-authored activity measures do not establish convertibility, user trust, safe-asset depth, or displacement of dollar networks.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored activity measures do not establish convertibility, user trust, safe-asset depth, or displacement of dollar networks.","url":"https://www.pbc.gov.cn/huobizhengceersi/214481/3871621/5885243/2025122616492523798.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS005","source_id":"CCV-AS005","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"The Secretary General's Annual Report 2025","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"allied spending, forces, production, exercises, partnerships","primary_use":"Measure scale and current delivery potential in the U.S.-anchored treaty network.","primary_uses":"Measure scale and current delivery potential in the U.S.-anchored treaty network.","limitation":"NATO-authored aggregate capacity does not establish scenario-specific national authorization, timely delivery, or deterrence.","known_limitations":"NATO-authored aggregate capacity does not establish scenario-specific national authorization, timely delivery, or deterrence.","url":"https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/publications-and-reports/annual-reports/sgar25-en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS006","source_id":"CCV-AS006","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Defense Logistics Agreements: DOD Should Improve Oversight and Seek Payment from Foreign Partners","date":"2020-03","date_or_version":"2020-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with foreign partners","primary_use":"Establish the breadth and practical logistics mechanism of partner exchange while exposing oversight gaps.","primary_uses":"Establish the breadth and practical logistics mechanism of partner exchange while exposing oversight gaps.","limitation":"Agreement eligibility and orders do not establish high-end crisis permission, survivability, or adequate throughput.","known_limitations":"Agreement eligibility and orders do not establish high-end crisis permission, survivability, or adequate throughput.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-309","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS007","source_id":"CCV-AS007","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2025","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"PLA capabilities, space, overseas logistics and basing","primary_use":"Assess PRC military conversion, Djibouti use, overseas access, and expanding space capability.","primary_uses":"Assess PRC military conversion, Djibouti use, overseas access, and expanding space capability.","limitation":"U.S. government assessment of a competitor; public evidence is incomplete and claims require corroboration where decisive.","known_limitations":"U.S. government assessment of a competitor; public evidence is incomplete and claims require corroboration where decisive.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS008","source_id":"CCV-AS008","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Navy and Coast Guard Shipbuilding: A Disciplined, Strategy-Driven Approach Is Needed","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"U.S. naval shipbuilding output, delay, cost, infrastructure and workforce","primary_use":"Measure delivered U.S. shipbuilding throughput against declared production goals.","primary_uses":"Measure delivered U.S. shipbuilding throughput against declared production goals.","limitation":"Program performance does not alone compare combat effectiveness or prove how quickly reforms can change output.","known_limitations":"Program performance does not alone compare combat effectiveness or prove how quickly reforms can change output.","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-109068/index.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS009","source_id":"CCV-AS009","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Shipbuilding and Repair: Navy Needs a Strategic Approach for Private Sector Industrial Base Investments","date":"2025-02","date_or_version":"2025-02","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"seven U.S. battle-force shipbuilders and supplier base","primary_use":"Assess capacity, workforce, infrastructure, repair, and commercial-base constraints.","primary_uses":"Assess capacity, workforce, infrastructure, repair, and commercial-base constraints.","limitation":"The report covers the U.S. system and does not provide a matched PRC cost, quality, or wartime conversion comparison.","known_limitations":"The report covers the U.S. system and does not provide a matched PRC cost, quality, or wartime conversion comparison.","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-106286/index.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS010","source_id":"CCV-AS010","publisher":"U.S. Military Sealift Command","title":"Military Sealift Command 2025 Handbook","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"surge sealift, fleet age, repair and wartime movement","primary_use":"Connect merchant and support shipping to force projection and identify the declared readiness threshold.","primary_uses":"Connect merchant and support shipping to force projection and identify the declared readiness threshold.","limitation":"Actor-authored summary; it does not model attrition, adversary action, mariner availability, or scenario-specific delivery.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored summary; it does not model attrition, adversary action, mariner availability, or scenario-specific delivery.","url":"https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/Portals/43/Publications/Handbook/MSCHandbook2025-12.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS011","source_id":"CCV-AS011","publisher":"UN Trade and Development","title":"Review of Maritime Transport 2025 — Chapter 2","date":"2025-09","date_or_version":"2025-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"fleet ownership, shipbuilding orderbooks, seaborne trade and rerouting","primary_use":"Compare PRC shipbuilding and fleet position on common global denominators.","primary_uses":"Compare PRC shipbuilding and fleet position on common global denominators.","limitation":"Commercial orderbook and ownership do not establish naval quality, state taskability, crew availability, or overseas military access.","known_limitations":"Commercial orderbook and ownership do not establish naval quality, state taskability, crew availability, or overseas military access.","url":"https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025ch2_en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS012","source_id":"CCV-AS012","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Energy Technology Perspectives 2026: Energy technology manufacturing and trade","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"clean-technology manufacturing and exports","primary_use":"Measure PRC production and trade scale in power, transport, and industrial technologies.","primary_uses":"Measure PRC production and trade scale in power, transport, and industrial technologies.","limitation":"Clean-technology market position does not transfer automatically to military output or coercive leverage.","known_limitations":"Clean-technology market position does not transfer automatically to military output or coercive leverage.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2026/energy-technology-manufacturing-and-trade","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS013","source_id":"CCV-AS013","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Advancing Clean Technology Manufacturing — Executive Summary","date":"2024-05","date_or_version":"2024-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"solar, batteries, wind, electrolysers and heat pumps","primary_use":"Compare manufacturing concentration and facility-cost differences.","primary_uses":"Compare manufacturing concentration and facility-cost differences.","limitation":"Forecasts and announced projects may not become qualified output; product quality and policy support vary.","known_limitations":"Forecasts and announced projects may not become qualified output; product quality and policy support vary.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/advancing-clean-technology-manufacturing/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS014","source_id":"CCV-AS014","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"strategic mineral mining, refining, controls and diversification","primary_use":"Measure concentration, observed 2025 disruption, and the pace of diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure concentration, observed 2025 disruption, and the pace of diversification.","limitation":"Energy-transition coverage is broader than defense demand; future projects may slip and product-level substitutability varies.","known_limitations":"Energy-transition coverage is broader than defense demand; future projects may slip and product-level substitutability varies.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS015","source_id":"CCV-AS015","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Rare earth elements — Executive Summary","date":"2025-11","date_or_version":"2025-11","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"rare-earth mining, refining and permanent magnets","primary_use":"Measure PRC concentration at successive stages and downstream exposure.","primary_uses":"Measure PRC concentration at successive stages and downstream exposure.","limitation":"Modeled exposure is not a forecast of a complete cutoff, target policy change, or successful coercion.","known_limitations":"Modeled exposure is not a forecast of a complete cutoff, target policy change, or successful coercion.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/rare-earth-elements/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS016","source_id":"CCV-AS016","publisher":"U.S. Geological Survey","title":"Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026","date":"2026-01","date_or_version":"2026-01","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"production, processing, import reliance and reserves","primary_use":"Cross-check material-specific concentration and U.S. import exposure.","primary_uses":"Cross-check material-specific concentration and U.S. import exposure.","limitation":"National aggregates can conceal product quality, inventories, ownership, qualification and re-export paths.","known_limitations":"National aggregates can conceal product quality, inventories, ownership, qualification and re-export paths.","url":"https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS017","source_id":"CCV-AS017","publisher":"Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry","title":"White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2025 — Supply-chain resilience and critical minerals","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Japan's rare-earth response and later import structure","primary_use":"Measure the 2010 shock response, diversification, substitution and persistence.","primary_uses":"Measure the 2010 shock response, diversification, substitution and persistence.","limitation":"Japan-authored retrospective may understate private adaptation costs and does not prove the exact cause of every 2010 shipment interruption.","known_limitations":"Japan-authored retrospective may understate private adaptation costs and does not prove the exact cause of every 2010 shipment interruption.","url":"https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/wp2025/pdf/2-1-4.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS018","source_id":"CCV-AS018","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"DS432: China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum","date":"2012-2015","date_or_version":"2012-2015","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"challenged measures, findings and implementation","primary_use":"Establish the legal measures, multilateral response and removal of disputed restrictions.","primary_uses":"Establish the legal measures, multilateral response and removal of disputed restrictions.","limitation":"The dispute concerns formal export restrictions and does not adjudicate the separate claim of an informal Japan-specific embargo.","known_limitations":"The dispute concerns formal export restrictions and does not adjudicate the separate claim of an informal Japan-specific embargo.","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds432_e.htm","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS019","source_id":"CCV-AS019","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"semiconductor segments, trade links, concentration and dependencies","primary_use":"Map the full stack and prevent fabrication share from standing in for control of tools, materials, design or end use.","primary_uses":"Map the full stack and prevent fabrication share from standing in for control of tools, materials, design or end use.","limitation":"Some input-output data lag fast-moving capacity and do not reveal classified end uses, inventories or evasion.","known_limitations":"Some input-output data lag fast-moving capacity and do not reveal classified end uses, inventories or evasion.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/mapping-the-semiconductor-value-chain_4154cdbf-en.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS020","source_id":"CCV-AS020","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Economic Security in a Changing World — Special Focus: Semiconductor Value Chains","date":"2025-10","date_or_version":"2025-10","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"specialized tools, EDA, lithography and geographic concentration","primary_use":"Identify high-control niche layers and common-mode dependencies.","primary_uses":"Identify high-control niche layers and common-mode dependencies.","limitation":"Several market-share inputs originate in industry studies; share does not establish state control or durable denial.","known_limitations":"Several market-share inputs originate in industry studies; share does not establish state control or durable denial.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/economic-security-in-a-changing-world_4eac89c7-en/full-report/special-focus-semiconductor-value-chains_dc772986.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS021","source_id":"CCV-AS021","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security","title":"Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors","date":"2024-12","date_or_version":"2024-12","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"advanced-node equipment, software, HBM and foreign-direct-product controls","primary_use":"Establish the controlled nodes, legal reach and stated security mechanism.","primary_uses":"Establish the controlled nodes, legal reach and stated security mechanism.","limitation":"Rule scope and actor theory do not establish enforcement, net delay, military effect, partner cost or target response.","known_limitations":"Rule scope and actor theory do not establish enforcement, net delay, military effect, partner cost or target response.","url":"https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS022","source_id":"CCV-AS022","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"U.S. Export Controls and China's Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Industries","date":"2025-11","date_or_version":"2025-11","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"controls, gaps, partner rules, workarounds and PRC adaptation","primary_use":"Assess implementation, leakage, modified products and indigenous substitution.","primary_uses":"Assess implementation, leakage, modified products and indigenous substitution.","limitation":"Public information cannot resolve classified end uses or construct a precise no-controls counterfactual.","known_limitations":"Public information cannot resolve classified end uses or construct a precise no-controls counterfactual.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48642/R48642.1.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS023","source_id":"CCV-AS023","publisher":"National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics","title":"The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2026","date":"2026-03","date_or_version":"2026-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"R&D, publications, talent, venture capital, KTI manufacturing and services","primary_use":"Compare innovation inputs, high-impact outputs, manufacturing absorption, services and talent dependence.","primary_uses":"Compare innovation inputs, high-impact outputs, manufacturing absorption, services and talent dependence.","limitation":"National aggregates mix public and private actors and cannot establish government taskability or a single innovation leader.","known_limitations":"National aggregates mix public and private actors and cannot establish government taskability or a single innovation leader.","url":"https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsbsep20261/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS024","source_id":"CCV-AS024","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Competition in the Provision of Cloud Computing Services","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"hyperscaler concentration, switching, egress and competition","primary_use":"Assess the privately controlled digital layer and common-provider exposure.","primary_uses":"Assess the privately controlled digital layer and common-provider exposure.","limitation":"Jurisdictional market estimates differ by year and method; commercial leadership is not automatic state capability.","known_limitations":"Jurisdictional market estimates differ by year and method; commercial leadership is not automatic state capability.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/05/competition-in-the-provision-of-cloud-computing-services_f42582ad/595859c5-en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS025","source_id":"CCV-AS025","publisher":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","title":"The United States remained the world's largest liquefied natural gas exporter in 2024","date":"2025-03","date_or_version":"2025-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"U.S. LNG production, exports and destinations","primary_use":"Assess energy supply as a source of partner support and external flexibility.","primary_uses":"Assess energy supply as a source of partner support and external flexibility.","limitation":"Export volume does not establish discretionary state control, spare capacity, affordability or recipient policy change.","known_limitations":"Export volume does not establish discretionary state control, spare capacity, affordability or recipient policy change.","url":"https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64844","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS026","source_id":"CCV-AS026","publisher":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","title":"China's crude oil imports decreased from a record as refinery activity slowed","date":"2025-02","date_or_version":"2025-02","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"PRC oil consumption, domestic production, imports and suppliers","primary_use":"Measure the scale and diversity of PRC crude import dependence.","primary_uses":"Measure the scale and diversity of PRC crude import dependence.","limitation":"Trade data do not establish wartime stockpiles, demand reduction, pipeline availability or exploitable denial.","known_limitations":"Trade data do not establish wartime stockpiles, demand reduction, pipeline availability or exploitable denial.","url":"https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64544","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS027","source_id":"CCV-AS027","publisher":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","title":"World Oil Transit Chokepoints","date":"2026-03","date_or_version":"2026-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"oil and LNG flows through Malacca and other chokepoints","primary_use":"Measure route concentration and alternative-route constraints.","primary_uses":"Measure route concentration and alternative-route constraints.","limitation":"Flow exposure is not adversary control; rerouting, pipelines, stocks and escalation can bound vulnerability and exploitability.","known_limitations":"Flow exposure is not adversary control; rerouting, pipelines, stocks and escalation can bound vulnerability and exploitability.","url":"https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS028","source_id":"CCV-AS028","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"International Infrastructure Projects: China's Investments Significantly Outpace the U.S.","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"BRI and U.S. overseas infrastructure finance, delivery and host effects","primary_use":"Compare upstream provision scale while retaining recipient benefit, debt and strategic-conversion tests.","primary_uses":"Compare upstream provision scale while retaining recipient benefit, debt and strategic-conversion tests.","limitation":"Funding estimates do not establish ownership, military rights, political compliance, durability or exclusivity.","known_limitations":"Funding estimates do not establish ownership, military rights, political compliance, durability or exclusivity.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106866","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS029","source_id":"CCV-AS029","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"China's Engagement in Djibouti","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"PRC finance, port relationships and first overseas base","primary_use":"Trace the Djibouti conversion sequence and host incentives.","primary_uses":"Trace the Djibouti conversion sequence and host incentives.","limitation":"A single small host and base cannot establish a general infrastructure-to-access pathway.","known_limitations":"A single small host and base cannot establish a general infrastructure-to-access pathway.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-products/product/pdf/IF/IF11304/1","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS030","source_id":"CCV-AS030","publisher":"Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","title":"TSMC 2024 Annual Report","date":"2025-04","date_or_version":"2025-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"foundry scale, geographic concentration, continuity and overseas expansion","primary_use":"Measure strategic production position, dependencies, earthquake loss and diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure strategic production position, dependencies, earthquake loss and diversification.","limitation":"Company-authored risk and performance disclosure cannot fully reveal customer inventories, defense use or systemic counterfactuals.","known_limitations":"Company-authored risk and performance disclosure cannot fully reveal customer inventories, defense use or systemic counterfactuals.","url":"https://investor.tsmc.com/static/annualReports/2024/english/index.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS031","source_id":"CCV-AS031","publisher":"U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","title":"TSMC Statement on April 3rd Earthquake, Form 6-K","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"event response and tool recovery","primary_use":"Measure actual degradation and early functional recovery after a large exogenous shock.","primary_uses":"Measure actual degradation and early functional recovery after a large exogenous shock.","limitation":"Early company statement is not independent and does not measure every customer or downstream effect.","known_limitations":"Early company statement is not independent and does not measure every customer or downstream effect.","url":"https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1046179/000104617924000034/a20240403.htm","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS032","source_id":"CCV-AS032","publisher":"U.S. Space Force","title":"International Partnership Strategy","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"allied, partner and commercial space integration","primary_use":"Identify exercised cooperative mechanisms and the role of international geography in space power.","primary_uses":"Identify exercised cooperative mechanisms and the role of international geography in space power.","limitation":"Strategy and selected examples are actor theory and inputs; they do not establish wartime survivability or comparative effect.","known_limitations":"Strategy and selected examples are actor theory and inputs; they do not establish wartime survivability or comparative effect.","url":"https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/2/Documents/SAF_2025/USSF%20International%20Partnership%20Strategy.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS033","source_id":"CCV-AS033","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Space Operations: DOD Is Pursuing Collaboration with Allies and Partners but Needs to Address Key Challenges","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"implementation of allied space collaboration","primary_use":"Test conversion limits in staffing, authority, coordination and information sharing.","primary_uses":"Test conversion limits in staffing, authority, coordination and information sharing.","limitation":"Public oversight cannot observe classified integration, adversary counterspace or operational outcomes.","known_limitations":"Public oversight cannot observe classified integration, adversary counterspace or operational outcomes.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108043","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS034","source_id":"CCV-AS034","publisher":"National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics","title":"Translation to Impact: U.S. and Global Science, Technology, and Innovation Output","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"KTI value added, semiconductor production and services","primary_use":"Compare sector-specific output and distinguish services from manufacturing.","primary_uses":"Compare sector-specific output and distinguish services from manufacturing.","limitation":"Value added does not establish physical units, quality, state control or strategic availability.","known_limitations":"Value added does not establish physical units, quality, state control or strategic availability.","url":"https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20262/production-patterns-of-knowledge-and-technology-intensive-industries","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS035","source_id":"CCV-AS035","publisher":"Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","title":"TSMC Arizona and U.S. Department of Commerce Announce Proposed CHIPS Funding and Third Fab","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"T2","evidence_tier":"T2","coverage":"planned geographic diversification of leading-edge production","primary_use":"Document the scale, timing and node of a major diversification pathway.","primary_uses":"Document the scale, timing and node of a major diversification pathway.","limitation":"A company and government announcement is not completed capacity; construction, qualification, workforce and cost remain execution risks.","known_limitations":"A company and government announcement is not completed capacity; construction, qualification, workforce and cost remain execution risks.","url":"https://pr.tsmc.com/english/news/3122","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS036","source_id":"CCV-AS036","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Designing an Effective Strategic Stockpiling System for Critical Minerals","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"stockpile design, release, coordination and market effects","primary_use":"Test whether inventories can bridge a disruption without assuming that gross tonnage is usable resilience.","primary_uses":"Test whether inventories can bridge a disruption without assuming that gross tonnage is usable resilience.","limitation":"General design guidance does not establish actual inventory, quality, release authority or sufficiency for a named state option.","known_limitations":"General design guidance does not establish actual inventory, quality, release authority or sufficiency for a named state option.","url":"https://www.iea.org/commentaries/designing-an-effective-strategic-stockpiling-system-for-critical-minerals","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS037","source_id":"CCV-AS037","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"Joint Plan of Action and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action archives","date":"2013-2018","date_or_version":"2013-2018","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Iran sanctions relief, implementation, licensing and reimposition","primary_use":"Trace the legal and operational connection between negotiated nuclear steps and U.S. financial sanctions relief.","primary_uses":"Trace the legal and operational connection between negotiated nuclear steps and U.S. financial sanctions relief.","limitation":"An actor-authored sanctions archive does not independently establish why Iran negotiated or the agreement's net security effect.","known_limitations":"An actor-authored sanctions archive does not independently establish why Iran negotiated or the agreement's net security effect.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions/joint-plan-of-action-jpoa-archive-and-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-jcpoa-archive","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS038","source_id":"CCV-AS038","publisher":"International Atomic Energy Agency","title":"IAEA Annual Report 2016 — Nuclear Verification","date":"2017","date_or_version":"2017","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"verified Iranian nuclear steps and continuing JCPOA monitoring","primary_use":"Establish Implementation Day and the observable nuclear restrictions delivered through the bargain.","primary_uses":"Establish Implementation Day and the observable nuclear restrictions delivered through the bargain.","limitation":"IAEA verification addresses nuclear commitments, not the independent effect of sanctions or the political durability of U.S. participation.","known_limitations":"IAEA verification addresses nuclear commitments, not the independent effect of sanctions or the political durability of U.S. participation.","url":"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2016/gc61-3-nuclear-verification.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS039","source_id":"CCV-AS039","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"JCPOA wind-down frequently asked questions","date":"2018-05","date_or_version":"2018-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"U.S. withdrawal, sanctions reimposition and commercial wind-down","primary_use":"Trace the reversal of relief and the new compliance burden placed on partners and firms.","primary_uses":"Trace the reversal of relief and the new compliance burden placed on partners and firms.","limitation":"The document states U.S. legal requirements but does not measure target behavior, partner trust or humanitarian effects.","known_limitations":"The document states U.S. legal requirements but does not measure target behavior, partner trust or humanitarian effects.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/126/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS040","source_id":"CCV-AS040","publisher":"United Nations Security Council","title":"Resolution 2231 background and implementation timeline","date":"2015-2026","date_or_version":"2015-2026","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"JCPOA endorsement, Implementation Day and sanctions reapplication","primary_use":"Cross-check the multilateral bargain, verified implementation and later reapplication of prior Security Council measures.","primary_uses":"Cross-check the multilateral bargain, verified implementation and later reapplication of prior Security Council measures.","limitation":"The timeline records legal events but cannot allocate causal credit or determine whether pressure produced durable compliance.","known_limitations":"The timeline records legal events but cannot allocate causal credit or determine whether pressure produced durable compliance.","url":"https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS041","source_id":"CCV-AS041","publisher":"Council of the European Union","title":"EU sanctions against Russia explained","date":"2022-2026","date_or_version":"2022-2026","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"asset immobilization, financial restrictions and use of extraordinary revenues","primary_use":"Measure reachable coalition jurisdiction and the scale of Russian central-bank assets immobilized in the EU.","primary_uses":"Measure reachable coalition jurisdiction and the scale of Russian central-bank assets immobilized in the EU.","limitation":"Blocked assets and legal measures do not establish war termination, lost military output or a clean sanctions counterfactual.","known_limitations":"Blocked assets and legal measures do not establish war termination, lost military output or a clean sanctions counterfactual.","url":"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS042","source_id":"CCV-AS042","publisher":"European Commission","title":"REPowerEU: three years of reducing Russian fossil-fuel dependence","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Russian gas, oil and coal substitution, demand reduction and diversification","primary_use":"Measure observed European strategic recovery after a major external energy shock.","primary_uses":"Measure observed European strategic recovery after a major external energy shock.","limitation":"EU-authored aggregates do not isolate the effects of prices, weather, conservation, recession or national policy.","known_limitations":"EU-authored aggregates do not isolate the effects of prices, weather, conservation, recession or national policy.","url":"https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/repowereu-3-years-commission-takes-stock-progress-phase-out-russian-fossil-fuels-2025-05-16_en","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS043","source_id":"CCV-AS043","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Gas Market Report Q1 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-01","date_or_version":"2026-01","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Russian pipeline deliveries, European gas demand and market adjustment","primary_use":"Cross-check the magnitude and persistence of Europe's reduction in Russian pipeline gas.","primary_uses":"Cross-check the magnitude and persistence of Europe's reduction in Russian pipeline gas.","limitation":"Regional market outcomes do not prove that every state or industry recovered at acceptable cost.","known_limitations":"Regional market outcomes do not prove that every state or industry recovered at acceptable cost.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/gas-market-report-q1-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS044","source_id":"CCV-AS044","publisher":"Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade","title":"Address to the ABARES Outlook 2023 Conference","date":"2023-03","date_or_version":"2023-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Australian export diversification after PRC trade barriers","primary_use":"Establish the Australian government's account of market substitution and policy continuity during economic pressure.","primary_uses":"Establish the Australian government's account of market substitution and policy continuity during economic pressure.","limitation":"An actor-authored retrospective can overstate resilience and understate concentrated losses to affected firms and regions.","known_limitations":"An actor-authored retrospective can overstate resilience and understate concentrated losses to affected firms and regions.","url":"https://ministers.dfat.gov.au/minister/tim-ayres/speech/address-abares-outlook-2023-conference","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS045","source_id":"CCV-AS045","publisher":"Australian Productivity Commission","title":"Trade and Assistance Review 2021-22","date":"2023","date_or_version":"2023","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"trade restrictions, coal diversion and economy-wide adjustment","primary_use":"Test whether PRC restrictions created national strategic constraint or mostly sector-specific redistribution and rerouting.","primary_uses":"Test whether PRC restrictions created national strategic constraint or mostly sector-specific redistribution and rerouting.","limitation":"Aggregate trade performance can conceal severe firm-level losses and does not reveal confidential policy deliberations.","known_limitations":"Aggregate trade performance can conceal severe firm-level losses and does not reveal confidential policy deliberations.","url":"https://www.pc.gov.au/ongoing/trade-assistance/2021-22/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS046","source_id":"CCV-AS046","publisher":"UN Trade and Development","title":"Review of Maritime Transport 2025","date":"2025-09","date_or_version":"2025-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Red Sea rerouting, freight rates, ton-miles and network adjustment","primary_use":"Measure realized cost and substitution after persistent route disruption.","primary_uses":"Measure realized cost and substitution after persistent route disruption.","limitation":"Industry-wide aggregates do not assign precise causal responsibility or measure every military and political objective.","known_limitations":"Industry-wide aggregates do not assign precise causal responsibility or measure every military and political objective.","url":"https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025_en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS047","source_id":"CCV-AS047","publisher":"International Maritime Organization","title":"Red Sea area: attacks on international shipping","date":"2024-2026","date_or_version":"2024-2026","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"ship attacks, safety, crew effects and international response","primary_use":"Establish the continuing security disruption and the limits of normal maritime operation.","primary_uses":"Establish the continuing security disruption and the limits of normal maritime operation.","limitation":"The IMO record does not compare military campaign effectiveness or quantify all commercial adaptation.","known_limitations":"The IMO record does not compare military campaign effectiveness or quantify all commercial adaptation.","url":"https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/red-sea.aspx","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS048","source_id":"CCV-AS048","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — Outlook","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"2025 export controls, refining concentration, downstream disruption and diversification","primary_use":"Measure product-specific control and the observed consequences of new restrictions.","primary_uses":"Measure product-specific control and the observed consequences of new restrictions.","limitation":"Energy-sector coverage is not a complete defense bill of materials; announced diversification may not become qualified supply.","known_limitations":"Energy-sector coverage is not a complete defense bill of materials; announced diversification may not become qualified supply.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/outlook","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS049","source_id":"CCV-AS049","publisher":"European Commission","title":"Communication on implementation of the EU 5G cybersecurity toolbox","date":"2023-06","date_or_version":"2023-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"high-risk supplier restrictions, implementation gaps and persistent dependencies","primary_use":"Trace how security judgments became host-country vendor restrictions while retaining uneven implementation.","primary_uses":"Trace how security judgments became host-country vendor restrictions while retaining uneven implementation.","limitation":"EU member states retain authority; designation and restriction do not establish technical inferiority or a PRC policy response.","known_limitations":"EU member states retain authority; designation and restriction do not establish technical inferiority or a PRC policy response.","url":"https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/communication-commission-implementation-5g-cybersecurity-toolbox","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS050","source_id":"CCV-AS050","publisher":"European Commission","title":"Commission proposes three-year phase-out of high-risk suppliers in 5G networks","date":"2026","date_or_version":"2026","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"proposed EU-wide phase-out and switching period","primary_use":"Test the continuing cost and time required to unwind installed digital-network dependence.","primary_uses":"Test the continuing cost and time required to unwind installed digital-network dependence.","limitation":"A proposal is not final law, completed replacement or proof that every network faces equal risk.","known_limitations":"A proposal is not final law, completed replacement or proof that every network faces equal risk.","url":"https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/miscellaneous/european-union-commission-proposes-3-year-phase-out-high-risk-suppliers-5g-networks","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS051","source_id":"CCV-AS051","publisher":"Bank for International Settlements","title":"Renminbi internationalisation: the role of financial links","date":"2026","date_or_version":"2026","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"currency use, financial links and constraints on renminbi internationalization","primary_use":"Assess whether growing trade and payment activity is becoming a broadly trusted monetary network.","primary_uses":"Assess whether growing trade and payment activity is becoming a broadly trusted monetary network.","limitation":"Empirical associations do not identify state intent or forecast the pace of convertibility and market reform.","known_limitations":"Empirical associations do not identify state intent or forecast the pace of convertibility and market reform.","url":"https://www.bis.org/publ/work1345.htm","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS052","source_id":"CCV-AS052","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DOD Weapon Replacement Efforts","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"stockpile replacement, industrial capacity, raw materials and lead times","primary_use":"Measure the physical-production bottlenecks beneath coalition resource commitments.","primary_uses":"Measure the physical-production bottlenecks beneath coalition resource commitments.","limitation":"U.S. replacement performance is not the same as deliveries to Ukraine or battlefield effect.","known_limitations":"U.S. replacement performance is not the same as deliveries to Ukraine or battlefield effect.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106649","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS053","source_id":"CCV-AS053","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Fact Sheet on Ukraine Defense Contact Group National Armaments Directors","date":"2025-01","date_or_version":"2025-01","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"multinational production, sustainment and capability-coalition coordination","primary_use":"Trace how partner commitments are organized into procurement, production and sustainment mechanisms.","primary_uses":"Trace how partner commitments are organized into procurement, production and sustainment mechanisms.","limitation":"Actor-authored commitments and capacity targets do not establish delivered quantities, sufficiency or war outcome.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored commitments and capacity targets do not establish delivered quantities, sufficiency or war outcome.","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4026238/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS054","source_id":"CCV-AS054","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"Joint Statement on the Fourth U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue","date":"2024-07","date_or_version":"2024-07","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"EDCA sites, bilateral funding, maritime security and alliance implementation","primary_use":"Establish agreed access preparation, funded infrastructure and sovereign bilateral decision mechanisms.","primary_uses":"Establish agreed access preparation, funded infrastructure and sovereign bilateral decision mechanisms.","limitation":"Joint statements describe intent and inputs; they do not guarantee mission-specific wartime authorization or survivable throughput.","known_limitations":"Joint statements describe intent and inputs; they do not guarantee mission-specific wartime authorization or survivable throughput.","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS055","source_id":"CCV-AS055","publisher":"Sri Lanka Ports Authority","title":"Hambantota concession and ownership chronology","date":"2017-2018","date_or_version":"2017-2018","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"lease, equity structure, payments and port operation","primary_use":"Establish host-authorized commercial control and the transaction sequence from the recipient side.","primary_uses":"Establish host-authorized commercial control and the transaction sequence from the recipient side.","limitation":"The port-authority record does not independently evaluate debt sustainability, PRC strategic intent or military access.","known_limitations":"The port-authority record does not independently evaluate debt sustainability, PRC strategic intent or military access.","url":"https://www.slpa.lk/port-colombo/slpa","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS056","source_id":"CCV-AS056","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Sri Lanka 2018 Article IV Consultation and Fourth EFF Review","date":"2018-06","date_or_version":"2018-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Hambantota financing, lease proceeds and Sri Lankan public debt","primary_use":"Separate the port concession from Sri Lanka's broader debt stock and identify the fiscal purpose of proceeds.","primary_uses":"Separate the port concession from Sri Lanka's broader debt stock and identify the fiscal purpose of proceeds.","limitation":"Contemporaneous staff analysis predates Sri Lanka's later default and does not resolve every contractual or political claim.","known_limitations":"Contemporaneous staff analysis predates Sri Lanka's later default and does not resolve every contractual or political claim.","url":"https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2018/175/article-A001-en.xml","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS057","source_id":"CCV-AS057","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Relations with Finland and accession timeline","date":"2023-2026","date_or_version":"2023-2026","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"application, unanimous ratification and alliance integration","primary_use":"Trace partner choice and the consensus permissions required to add capability and geography to the alliance.","primary_uses":"Trace partner choice and the consensus permissions required to add capability and geography to the alliance.","limitation":"Membership and official assessments do not prove deterrence or the speed of operational integration.","known_limitations":"Membership and official assessments do not prove deterrence or the speed of operational integration.","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-finland","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS058","source_id":"CCV-AS058","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Swedish flag raised at NATO Headquarters","date":"2024-03","date_or_version":"2024-03","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Swedish accession, Article 5 and new allied capabilities","primary_use":"Establish the completed accession and stated capability contribution.","primary_uses":"Establish the completed accession and stated capability contribution.","limitation":"Ceremonial and actor-authored claims do not quantify net force contribution, new obligations or deterrent effect.","known_limitations":"Ceremonial and actor-authored claims do not quantify net force contribution, new obligations or deterrent effect.","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2024/03/11/swedish-flag-raised-at-nato-headquarters","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS059","source_id":"CCV-AS059","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"COVID-19 vaccine deliveries","date":"2024-02","date_or_version":"2024-02","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"U.S. donated doses and recipient coverage","primary_use":"Measure delivered U.S. vaccine provision rather than pledges alone.","primary_uses":"Measure delivered U.S. vaccine provision rather than pledges alone.","limitation":"Delivery totals do not establish uptake, health effect, recipient attribution, gratitude or durable influence.","known_limitations":"Delivery totals do not establish uptake, health effect, recipient attribution, gratitude or durable influence.","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/covid-19-vaccine-deliveries","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS060","source_id":"CCV-AS060","publisher":"World Health Organization","title":"WHO lists Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine for emergency use","date":"2021-05","date_or_version":"2021-05","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"PRC vaccine authorization, efficacy evidence and deployment option","primary_use":"Establish that PRC provision included a WHO-listed product available to global recipients.","primary_uses":"Establish that PRC provision included a WHO-listed product available to global recipients.","limitation":"Emergency-use listing is not a comparative effectiveness judgment or evidence of diplomatic conversion.","known_limitations":"Emergency-use listing is not a comparative effectiveness judgment or evidence of diplomatic conversion.","url":"https://www.who.int/news/item/07-05-2021-who-lists-additional-covid-19-vaccine-for-emergency-use-and-issues-interim-policy-recommendations","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS061","source_id":"CCV-AS061","publisher":"World Health Organization","title":"COVID-19 vaccine implementation analysis insights","date":"2022-09","date_or_version":"2022-09","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"delivery capacity, uptake and country implementation constraints","primary_use":"Test why dose provision alone is an incomplete measure of delivered public value and influence.","primary_uses":"Test why dose provision alone is an incomplete measure of delivered public value and influence.","limitation":"Cross-country implementation findings do not isolate U.S. or PRC diplomatic effect.","known_limitations":"Cross-country implementation findings do not isolate U.S. or PRC diplomatic effect.","url":"https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-vaccine-implementation-analysis-insights-2-september-2022","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS062","source_id":"CCV-AS062","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"China: With Nearly All U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative Language Support","date":"2024-10","date_or_version":"2024-10","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"closures, successor arrangements, federal incentives and language capacity","primary_use":"Measure host control over a PRC-supported cultural network and the consequences of withdrawal.","primary_uses":"Measure host control over a PRC-supported cultural network and the consequences of withdrawal.","limitation":"U.S. institutions are not a representative global sample, and closure does not reveal prior attitudinal or policy effect.","known_limitations":"U.S. institutions are not a representative global sample, and closure does not reveal prior attitudinal or policy effect.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105981","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS063","source_id":"CCV-AS063","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"China: Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but Institute Operations Vary","date":"2019-02","date_or_version":"2019-02","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"contracts, university control, programming and reported benefits or concerns","primary_use":"Assess state support, host discretion and variation before the later closure wave.","primary_uses":"Assess state support, host discretion and variation before the later closure wave.","limitation":"University self-report and contract review cannot establish covert influence, participant attitudes or national policy effects.","known_limitations":"University self-report and contract review cannot establish covert influence, participant attitudes or national policy effects.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-278","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"},{"id":"CCV-AS064","source_id":"CCV-AS064","publisher":"World Bank","title":"Global Economic Prospects, June 2025 — Europe and Central Asia","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"T1","evidence_tier":"T1","coverage":"Russian growth, sanctions, payment constraints and adaptation","primary_use":"Cross-check whether financial restrictions constrained the target while leaving war finance and policy response as separate questions.","primary_uses":"Cross-check whether financial restrictions constrained the target while leaving war finance and policy response as separate questions.","limitation":"Macroeconomic forecasts are revised and cannot isolate sanctions from war, labor, commodity and domestic-policy effects.","known_limitations":"Macroeconomic forecasts are revised and cannot isolate sanctions from war, labor, commodity and domestic-policy effects.","url":"https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/8bf0b62ec6bcb886d97295ad930059e9-0050012025/related/GEP-June-2025-Chapter-2.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft"}],"counts":{"peer_instruments":4,"analytical_workstreams":2,"governed_match_layers":1,"strategy_cases":18,"strategy_pathways":14,"critical_capability_candidates_screened":48,"critical_capability_findings":10,"critical_capability_cases":18,"bounded_responses":12,"gap_findings":12,"sources":104},"overall_composite":null,"overall_winner":null,"routes":{"landing":"/integrated-statecraft","strategy":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-evaluation","critical_capabilities":"/integrated-statecraft/critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities","gaps":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-requirement-gaps","methodology":"/integrated-statecraft/methodology","sources":"/integrated-statecraft/sources","data":"/integrated-statecraft/data","api":"/api/v1/statecrafts/integrated-statecraft"}}