The PRC retains the current structural advantage. The decisive leverage is not universal control of ore: it is concentrated processing, refining, and qualified industrial scale across several high-consequence pathways. U.S. and allied strengths in beryllium, titanium access, specialty conversion, and emerging rare-earth magnet production narrow the gap but do not erase it.
This is an adjudicated judgment, not an average. Acute gallium, heavy-rare-earth, graphite, tungsten, antimony, and germanium exposures carry more consequence than the number of commodities in each camp. Unknown stockpile holdings and incomplete Tier-n mapping reduce precision but do not reverse the observed midstream concentration.
China's current leverage is strongest in primary gallium, heavy-rare-earth compounds, refined germanium, graphite/anode material, tungsten, and downstream scale. More allied ore does not solve an unqualified processing stage.
The United States mines more than half of estimated world output, converts material domestically, is a net exporter, and retains defense-qualified downstream production. The weakness is concentration in one integrated producer.
The United States is 100% import reliant for titanium sponge, but Japan supplied 73% of 2025 imports through July. Credible allied access materially changes the comparative call, even though domestic sponge production is absent.
Defense demand, usable stockpile holdings, qualification status, and raw-material origin remain incomplete. GAO found country-of-origin data for fewer than 10% of suppliers behind the mapped F-35 parts in one major illumination effort.
Each driver is adjudicated from consequential pathways and contrary evidence. The overall call is not a mechanical average, and a public-data gap is never converted into a zero.
The PRC leads selected upstream supply in rare earths, graphite, tungsten, and gallium byproduct recovery. The U.S. leads beryllium, while Australia, Canada, Japan, and other partners create meaningful options. Those options count only where operating output and U.S. access are demonstrated.
The PRC does not control every mineral base. U.S. beryllium and allied titanium, cobalt, rare-earth, antimony, and tungsten resources prevent an across-the-board upstream monopoly.
This is the decisive driver. China produced 99% of primary low-purity gallium, 77% of refined germanium in the USGS China baseline, and the dominant shares of multiple selected mineral-processing chains. U.S. primary recovery is absent for gallium and germanium and commercial heavy-rare-earth output was not yet sustained in 2025.
Allied refiners in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway, and Finland reduce direct U.S. exposure in selected chains, and new U.S. rare-earth separation output is operating. Feedstock origin and spare qualified output remain incompletely mapped.
The PRC's broad metals, magnet, battery-material, and component ecosystem creates scale and integration advantages. U.S. capabilities are stronger than the old narrative implied: qualified domestic magnets exist, commercial NdFeB manufacturing began in December 2025, and U.S. firms retain high-value gallium, germanium, tungsten, titanium, and beryllium conversion capabilities.
Public data do not reveal defense-grade output, acceptance rates, or demand coverage across most pathways. Emerging U.S. capacity is therefore credited as operating or qualified where evidenced, but not presumed sufficient.
The U.S. disadvantage is directly observed: procurement records identify the prime item but usually not raw-material or component origin, and major mapping efforts still lose visibility in lower tiers. A relative PRC edge is inferred from greater vertical concentration and state influence, not from a comparable public PRC supplier map.
PRC military supply chains are opaque, so superior PRC visibility cannot be measured directly. This driver records a demonstrated U.S. weakness and a bounded comparative inference—not a symmetrical data comparison.
The U.S. has allied suppliers, recycling capability, substitutes, and a National Defense Stockpile; the PRC has scale, inventories, and internal supply relationships. Public evidence cannot compare usable holdings or defense-demand coverage, so no relative leader is adjudicated.
Visible U.S. annual acquisition plans are not stockpile holdings, and nominal allied production is not reserved access. Semiconductor substitution is generally not a current answer for gallium and related materials.
China enters expansion from a much larger operating base. U.S. execution improved in 2025: domestic NdPr output reached a record, commercial magnet manufacturing began, a domestic antimony mine restarted, and new solid-rocket-motor investment entered qualification work. Much of the remaining portfolio is still commissioning, demonstration, construction, or award activity rather than sustained accepted output.
The U.S. should receive credit for facilities actually producing, not merely for announcements. The assessment does not project a future rating from projects that have not yet delivered qualified output.
The first cut selects consequence to priority Indo-Pacific mission functions, then traces the material through its decisive stage. It does not pretend that all 60 federal minerals are equally important or equally understood.
Selected minerals are traced; the remainder are explicitly not yet applied.
Stage-specific observations crossed a published acute threshold.
Missing denominators and PRC gaps remain visible.
Defense functionHigh-performance motors, actuators, guidance, radar and power systems
Material setNeodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium and boron
Action priorityP1 · break leverage
U.S. mining and light-rare-earth separation are now material capabilities, but the current chain remains exposed at heavy-rare-earth compounds and scaled magnet production. China also demonstrated coercive leverage through 2025 export controls.
Domestic NdPr oxide output reached 2,599 metric tons in 2025; qualified U.S. magnet production exists, and MP Materials began commercial-equipment NdFeB manufacturing in December 2025. Those are operating gains, but sufficient defense coverage is not public.
Defense magnet demand, accepted output by grade, embedded magnets, and stockpile coverage are not publicly comparable.
China produced 270,000 of 390,000 metric tons of estimated world rare-earth mine output.
69.2 percentPRC-controlled stage share: exposed at 50%–74.9%.
Supports PRC edge
Mine share combines light and heavy rare earths and does not measure separated output.
U.S. net import reliance for rare-earth compounds and metals was 67%.
67 percentNet import reliance: exposed at 50%–74.9%.
Supports PRC edge
U.S. net import reliance was 100%; several U.S. companies produced small quantities, but none sustained commercial-scale output.
100 percentNet import reliance: acute at 75% or greater.
Strongly supports PRC edge
Trade codes and output are not available for every individual heavy rare earth.
MP Materials produced a record 2,599 metric tons of NdPr oxide and commenced NdFeB magnet manufacturing on commercial equipment in December 2025.
2599 metric tons NdPr oxideActual output is displayed separately from projected magnet capacity; no condition bucket applies.
Mitigates but does not erase PRC edge
Company filing; magnet tonnage and defense-qualified demand coverage were not disclosed.
Defense functionHigh-temperature magnets, aircraft-engine superalloys, cutting and wear-resistant materials
Material setSamarium and cobalt
Action priorityP2 · close the gap
The United States is highly import reliant while mine supply is concentrated in Congo (Kinshasa) and China remains the leading refined-cobalt producer. Samarium was also included in China's April 2025 rare-earth controls.
Seventy percent of reported U.S. cobalt import sources were Norway, Finland, Canada, and Japan. That allied refinery network materially reduces direct PRC dependence, although upstream ownership and feedstock origin remain incomplete.
Comparable refined-cobalt market shares, defense demand, SmCo output by grade, and usable stockpile holdings are not public.
U.S. net import reliance for cobalt was 79%.
79 percentNet import reliance: acute at 75% or greater.
Supports PRC edge
Import reliance does not identify upstream ownership or defense-grade allocation.
Congo (Kinshasa) produced 230,000 of 310,000 metric tons; calculated country-production HHI is approximately 0.57.
0.57 HHICountry production HHI: exposed at 0.40–0.599.
Shows concentrated upstream risk; not itself PRC control
Country concentration does not resolve Chinese ownership or offtake.
Norway, Finland, Canada, and Japan supplied 70% of reported U.S. cobalt imports.
70 percent of importsOperating allied supply is credited as accessible where trade is observed; no condition bucket applies.
Mitigates direct PRC dependence
Refiners can rely on third-country feedstock and existing customers.
USGS identifies China as the leading refined-cobalt producer, but a comparable current share was not published in the MCS chapter.
Unscored when a comparable value is unavailable.
Prevents false precision
Defense functionRadar, electronic warfare, communications, high-power RF and optoelectronics
Material setGallium metal, gallium arsenide and gallium nitride
Action priorityP1 · break leverage
This is the clearest single pathway of PRC leverage: China produced 99% of primary low-purity gallium, the United States was 100% import reliant, and USGS reports no effective substitutes for many defense GaAs and GaN applications.
The United States retains one high-purity recovery/refining facility using imported feedstock and domestic compound-semiconductor capability. Demonstration funding for primary recovery has not yet become sustained output.
Defense demand, inventory, feedstock origin behind allied imports, and accepted output by purity are not public.
China produced 900,000 of about 909,000 kilograms of estimated world primary low-purity gallium.
99 percentPRC-controlled stage share: acute at 75% or greater.
Decisive PRC leverage
Primary output does not equal high-purity or device output, but it is the feedstock bottleneck.
The United States had no primary recovery and was 100% import reliant.
100 percentNet import reliance: acute at 75% or greater.
Decisive PRC leverage
Excludes gallium arsenide wafers from the reliance calculation.
USGS reports no effective substitutes for GaAs and GaN in many defense-related applications.
Substitute readiness: acute where no viable substitute exists.
Sustains exposure
One U.S. company recovered and refined high-purity gallium from imported primary metal and new scrap.
1 qualified domestic facility reportedIndependent source count: exposed at one source.
Narrow mitigation with shared feedstock risk
Facility output and defense allocation are not public; primary feedstock remains imported.
Defense functionInfrared optics, fiber optics, space solar cells and radiation detectors
Material setGermanium metal, dioxide and tetrachloride
Action priorityP1 · break leverage
China held 77% of refined output in the USGS China baseline and its U.S. export ban drove estimated U.S. germanium-metal imports down 67% in 2025. The United States has no primary refinery output.
Belgium, Canada, and Germany supplied 72% of combined U.S. metal and dioxide imports, and U.S. firms recycle optics, fiber waste, and substrates. Some allied output may still contain upstream Chinese feedstock.
Global refinery data are limited, most producers do not report output, and defense-grade demand and inventory are not public.
China accounted for 77% of refined germanium in the USGS China mineral-industry baseline.
77 percentPRC-controlled stage share: acute at 75% or greater.
Decisive PRC leverage
Global refinery reporting is incomplete and the value is a 2023 baseline.
U.S. net import reliance was greater than 50%.
>50 percentNet import reliance: at least exposed at 50%–74.9%; exact value unavailable.
Supports PRC edge
Estimated U.S. germanium-metal imports fell 67% in 2025 after China's export ban to the United States.
-67 percent year over yearDirect disruption evidence is displayed; no universal condition bucket applies.
Demonstrates exercised PRC leverage
Imports of germanium dioxide rose; metal and dioxide are not interchangeable in every use.
Belgium, Canada, and Germany supplied 72% of combined reported U.S. germanium metal and dioxide imports.
72 percent of importsObserved allied trade is credited as accessible; no condition bucket applies.
Material mitigation
Defense functionAmmunition and lead alloys, flame retardants, glass and specialty materials
Material setAntimony ore, metal and oxide
Action priorityP1 · break leverage
The United States was 91% net import reliant; China supplied 55% of reported U.S. metal and oxide imports and banned antimony exports to the United States. Russia was also a major world producer, compounding access risk.
Domestic mining restarted in 2025 and one U.S. company produced metal and oxide from imported feedstock. Recycling supplied 12% of apparent consumption, principally within the lead-acid battery loop.
New domestic mine output is withheld, defense-grade allocation is unknown, and annual stockpile plans do not reveal usable holdings.
U.S. net import reliance was 91%.
91 percentNet import reliance: acute at 75% or greater.
Supports strong PRC edge
Secondary antimonial lead is largely a closed battery loop and not equivalent to every defense form.
China supplied 55% of total U.S. antimony metal and oxide imports.
55 percentPRC-controlled stage share: exposed at 50%–74.9%.
Supports PRC edge
A domestic mine restarted in 2025, but output was withheld; the sole reported primary metal/oxide producer used imported feedstock.
Actual output and feedstock are displayed separately from announced capacity; no bucket applies.
Mitigation not yet credited as coverage
China banned antimony exports to the United States; the 2025 average price more than doubled to about $25 per pound.
25 dollars per poundObserved disruption and price response are displayed; no universal condition bucket applies.
Strengthens PRC call
Price is a market-wide indicator and not a direct defense-shortage measure.
Defense functionCutting tools, wear parts, high-density components, electronics and specialty alloys
Material setTungsten ore, ammonium paratungstate, metal and carbide
Action priorityP1 · break leverage
China produced about 79% of estimated world mine output in 2025 and imposed export controls on selected tungsten items. The United States has had no commercial mine production since 2015 and remains more than 50% import reliant.
Seven U.S. companies can convert concentrates, APT, oxide, or scrap into powders, carbide, and chemicals. DPA awards support projects in the United States and Canada, but project awards are not current mine output.
U.S. secondary output, industry stocks, apparent consumption, defense allocation, and PRC inventory are withheld or unavailable.
China produced 67,000 of 85,000 metric tons of estimated world mine output.
78.8 percentPRC-controlled stage share: acute at 75% or greater.
Decisive PRC leverage
Mine share does not resolve intermediate conversion or inventory.
U.S. net import reliance was greater than 50% and no tungsten was mined commercially.
>50 percentNet import reliance: at least exposed at 50%–74.9%; exact value unavailable.
Supports PRC edge
The United States had zero operating mines but seven companies able to convert concentrate, APT, oxide, or scrap to downstream products.
0 / 7 mines / convertersSource count is acute at the mine stage; downstream source independence cannot be verified from company count alone.
Shows stage-specific weakness and strength
Converters may share imported feedstock and are not necessarily qualified for every defense form.
China imposed export controls on selected tungsten items and Rotterdam APT prices rose from $331 to $675 per metric ton unit during 2025.
104 percent price increaseObserved disruption and price response are displayed; no universal condition bucket applies.
Strengthens PRC call
Price also reflects broader market conditions and is not a direct defense-shortage measure.
Defense functionBattery anodes, refractories, castings, lubricants and defense-related components
Material setNatural graphite, spherical purified graphite and active anode material
Action priorityP1 · break leverage
The United States produced no natural graphite and was 100% import reliant. China produced 82% of world natural graphite and supplied 55% of U.S. active-anode-material imports in 2025; Chinese-owned production outside China can preserve control despite geographic diversification.
Two U.S. companies produced spherical purified graphite and another commissioned a qualification line. Multiple domestic mines and processing plants remain in development, and Korea supplies qualified anode material.
Defense battery demand, anode qualification by program, ownership-adjusted origin, and usable inventory are not publicly mapped.
USGS estimated that China produced 82% of world natural graphite output in 2025.
82 percentPRC-controlled stage share: acute at 75% or greater.
Decisive PRC leverage
The country table is rounded; natural graphite mine share does not measure synthetic graphite or anode qualification.
The United States produced no natural graphite and was 100% import reliant.
100 percentNet import reliance: acute at 75% or greater.
Supports strong PRC edge
Defense-related demand is not separated from commercial consumption.
China supplied 55% of U.S. graphite active-anode-material imports; Indonesia supplied 31% and Korea 14%.
55 percentPRC-controlled stage share: exposed at 50%–74.9%.
Supports PRC edge
Facility ownership can preserve Chinese control outside China; product grade and defense use are not isolated.
Two U.S. companies produced spherical purified graphite and another commissioned a qualification line.
2+ operating producersActual operating and qualification status is displayed; no universal condition bucket applies.
Mitigates but does not establish coverage
Output, feedstock, qualification scope, and defense demand coverage were not disclosed.
Defense functionAircraft, engines, armor, marine hardware and high-strength structures
Material setTitanium sponge, scrap, powder, ingot and alloy
Action priorityP2 · close the gap
The United States produced no titanium sponge and was 100% import reliant, while China made about 70% of world sponge. That global asymmetry does not equal direct U.S. dependence on China: Japan supplied 73% of U.S. imports through July 2025.
Japan is a credible ally with operating sponge production; Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan supplied most of the remainder. The United States retains downstream ingot, alloy, aerospace manufacturing, scrap, and emerging powder capabilities.
Spare Japanese output, wartime allocation, transport, U.S. industry stocks, and qualified defense demand are not public.
China produced 260,000 of 370,000 metric tons of estimated world titanium sponge.
70.3 percentPRC-controlled stage share: exposed at 50%–74.9%.
Shows global PRC scale
The United States produced no sponge and was 100% import reliant.
100 percentNet import reliance: acute at 75% or greater.
Shows domestic dependency
Domestic downstream capability and allied access are separate observations.
Japan supplied 73% of U.S. titanium sponge imports through July 2025.
73 percent of importsObserved allied supply is credited as accessible; no condition bucket applies.
Materially mitigates direct PRC leverage
Spare capacity, wartime allocation, and transport resilience are not public.
The United States had zero operating sponge facilities but retained ingot and downstream product capability dependent on imported sponge and scrap.
0 domestic sponge facilitiesIndependent source count: acute at the domestic sponge stage.
Produces a contested rather than automatic PRC-lead call
Defense functionAerospace and defense structures, precision instruments, electronics and scientific systems
Material setBertrandite, beryllium metal, oxide and copper alloy
Action priorityP3 · protect the edge
The United States holds a genuine current advantage: it produced about 54% of estimated world mine output, converts domestic ore to metal, oxide, and master alloy, and is a net exporter. A DPA-supported domestic metal capability serves critical defense needs.
Recycling may supply 20% to 25% of U.S. consumption and the leading producer recovers substantial new and old alloy scrap.
The advantage is concentrated in one integrated company. Facility-level redundancy, defense allocation, and recovery time are not public.
The United States produced about 53.5% of estimated world beryllium mine output; China produced about 17.9%.
17.9 percent PRC sharePRC-controlled stage share: adequate at 10%–24.9%.
Supports U.S. lead
Mine estimates include differing ore types and assumed beryllium content.
The United States was a net exporter and operated an integrated mine-to-metal, oxide, and master-alloy chain.
net exporterNet import reliance: resilient below 10%; net exporter is stronger than the threshold.
Supports U.S. lead
Some beryl and product forms are imported; company-level concentration remains.
One company operated the principal domestic mine, hydroxide conversion, and downstream metal/alloy chain.
1 integrated sourceIndependent source count: exposed at one source.
Identifies fragility inside the U.S. advantage
Separate facilities exist within the company, but independent ownership and process redundancy are limited.
Recycling may account for 20% to 25% of U.S. beryllium consumption.
20–25 percent of consumptionQualified secondary-supply coverage is unscored without grade- and demand-specific data.
Adds resilience without inflating the rating
Total quantity, grade, defense allocation, and old-versus-new scrap shares are not available.
Defense functionTactical and strategic missile propulsion
Material setAmmonium perchlorate and other defense-unique energetic inputs
Action priorityP2 · close the gap
The U.S. vulnerability is clear even though the relative PRC position is not: the latest detailed public GAO baseline found one certified U.S. ammonium-perchlorate supplier, many defense-unique ingredients, and expensive requalification when any ingredient changes.
A 2025 DPA award is expanding another solid-rocket-motor source and qualification capacity. FY2024-2026 funding also targets solid rocket motors and critical chemicals, but accepted output by ingredient is not public.
Current PRC supplier count, qualification depth, output, inventory, and comparable disruption performance are not available publicly; no PRC advantage is assigned from the gap.
Public GAO evidence identified one U.S. company certified to provide the principal solid-rocket-motor propellant ingredient.
1 certified sourceIndependent source count: exposed at one source.
Demonstrates U.S. single-source risk
The source is older; current supplier status and alternate qualifications require controlled confirmation.
A typical solid-rocket-motor propellant has about 25–30 ingredients; changing an ingredient requires retest, and a documented past alternate-source qualification took about two years.
730 days, illustrative past caseSecond-source qualification: exposed at 366–1,825 days.
Shows why nominal alternatives do not equal current supply
Lead time varies by motor and ingredient; the past case is method evidence, not a universal current duration.
A January 2025 DPA award supported a new producer's energetics, casting, curing, quality assurance, assembly, and qualification work.
14.3 million dollars awardedAwards and planned capacity are displayed separately from accepted output; no condition bucket applies.
Does not yet prove current coverage
No comparable public PRC supplier, qualification, inventory, or output dataset was found for this pathway.
Missing data is unknown, never zero and never converted into a PRC disadvantage.
Prevents unsupported relative adjudication
Lead time is an implementation attribute—not a forecasted future rating. Every action has an owner, prerequisite, and observable completion test.
DoD cannot consistently see raw-material origin, ownership, qualification, or shared lower-tier choke points, so investment is often reactive.
For the ten applied pathways, require primes to provide a governed material-stage record through the decisive tier: material/form, facility, country of origin, controlling owner, qualification status, alternate source, and affected part or function. Start with priority programs and protect proprietary data rather than demanding an indiscriminate all-supplier census.
PrerequisitesCommon data schema, contract clauses, data-rights and security rules, program-level prioritization
Verify successAt least 85% of declared critical dependencies mapped to material, stage, facility, ownership, country, qualification, and mission use; unmapped share remains visible.
Linked pathwaysCR-P03 · CR-P04 · CR-P05 · CR-P06 · CR-P07 · CR-P10
The strongest PRC leverage sits in processing and qualification, while U.S. policy often counts awards, announcements, or ore as if they were usable defense inputs.
Use purchase commitments, price floors, and offtake agreements tied to sustained accepted lots of heavy-rare-earth compounds and magnets, high-purity gallium and germanium, tungsten intermediates, antimony metal/oxide, and qualified graphite anode material. Pay against commissioning, yield, qualification, and delivery milestones.
PrerequisitesValidated specification and demand signal, feedstock plan, independent source test, qualification authority
Verify successSustained accepted output from at least two independent non-PRC pathways at the required grade; nameplate capacity reported separately.
Linked pathwaysCR-P01 · CR-P02 · CR-P03 · CR-P04 · CR-P05 · CR-P06 · CR-P07 · CR-P10
Nominal allied capacity can be unavailable because of existing customers, feedstock, export authority, ownership, transport, or missing defense qualification.
Negotiate defense-priority offtake and qualification arrangements around operating allied nodes: Japanese titanium sponge; Belgian, Canadian, and German germanium; Norwegian, Finnish, Canadian, and Japanese cobalt; and credible Australian, Canadian, European, and Korean mineral-processing projects. Record controlling ownership and upstream feedstock, not only facility geography.
PrerequisitesExport authority, allocation terms, logistics plan, common specification and qualification pathway
Verify successContracted, qualified output with auditable feedstock, priority access, transport route, and delivery performance; nominal national capacity receives no credit.
Linked pathwaysCR-P02 · CR-P04 · CR-P05 · CR-P06 · CR-P07 · CR-P08
Public annual material plans do not reveal usable holdings, and stockpiling ore does not solve a shortage of defense-grade metal, chemical, magnet, powder, or energetic input.
Set classified or controlled inventory objectives against validated consumption and alternate-source lead time. Hold the processed form that can enter the production line, exercise release protocols, and reduce the buffer as qualified independent output becomes available.
PrerequisitesDefensible demand range, shelf-life and storage plan, specification control, release and replenishment authority
Verify successCoverage is calculated from usable material and validated demand; release exercises prove delivery to an accepting production line.
Linked pathwaysCR-P01 · CR-P02 · CR-P03 · CR-P04 · CR-P05 · CR-P06 · CR-P08 · CR-P09 · CR-P10
Recycling or substitution is often counted at laboratory or gross-tonnage level even when recovered material cannot meet the original defense specification.
Pair recycling and substitution projects with representative parts, acceptance criteria, production yield, retained feedstock, and a named qualification authority. Prioritize magnet scrap, germanium optics and wafers, cobalt and tungsten scrap, graphite anodes, and titanium scrap/powder where current industrial capability exists.
PrerequisitesFeedstock capture, chain-of-custody, specification, representative test article and acceptance authority
Verify successRepeated accepted lots at declared yield and scale; recycled or substitute output is credited only against the demand it can actually meet.
Linked pathwaysCR-P01 · CR-P02 · CR-P03 · CR-P04 · CR-P07 · CR-P08 · CR-P09
Beryllium, tungsten conversion, emerging magnet production, titanium downstream processing, and solid-rocket-motor skills are valuable but concentrated.
Maintain warm equipment and skilled workforces, qualify independent backup processes where economics permit, pre-negotiate surge inputs, and monitor common utilities and sub-tier chemicals. Preserve the integrated beryllium chain while adding recovery and alternate-process resilience rather than fragmenting its current advantage.
PrerequisitesFacility-level dependency map, workforce and equipment baseline, qualification plan, stable demand
Verify successCritical processes have tested continuity plans and either an independent qualified source or a funded, exercised recovery path with defined acceptance criteria.
The findings come first. Open this section to inspect the prioritization trace, metric contracts, full federal universe, evidence limitations, and source records.
Current U.S. and credibly accessible allied position compared with the PRC. A high-end Indo-Pacific contingency is used only to select consequential pathways, not to forecast future ratings.
Projects, awards, and announced capacity appear as mitigations or action options. They do not change the current comparative rating until sustained accepted output is observed.
A current exposed or acute required stage gives the PRC coercive leverage and no publicly demonstrated mitigation is sufficient today.
A direct defense dependency is materially exposed, but operating allied access, domestic capability, or a bounded substitute reduces current PRC leverage.
The U.S. or credible allies hold the current advantage, but concentration or a weak backup path could erode it.
Retained in the federal universe but outside this consequence-selected first cut; never labeled unimportant or safe by omission.
ammunition alloys · flame retardants · specialty materials
direct defense use + acute import reliance + PRC export ban + no quantified domestic coverageaerospace defense structures · precision instruments · electronics
direct defense use + integrated US chain + net exporter + single integrated source fragilityaircraft engine superalloys · SmCo magnets · cutting tools
direct defense use + acute US import reliance + concentrated mine supply + allied refinery mitigationhigh temperature NdFeB magnets for motors actuators guidance and radar
indispensable high performance magnet use + acute heavy RE import reliance + no sustained US commercial scale outputGaAs GaN radar · electronic warfare · communications · high power RF
indispensable defense semiconductor use + 99pct PRC primary output + 100pct US import reliance + no effective substituteinfrared optics · fiber optics · space solar cells · radiation detectors
direct defense use + acute PRC refining share + observed export disruption + allied refinery mitigationbattery anodes · refractories · castings · defense related components
direct defense use + 82pct PRC mine share + 100pct US import reliance + PRC anode material concentrationNdFeB magnets for motors actuators guidance radar and power
indispensable permanent magnet use + exposed import reliance + domestic output not yet proven sufficientNdFeB magnets for motors actuators guidance radar and power
indispensable permanent magnet use + exposed import reliance + domestic output not yet proven sufficientSmCo high temperature magnets
direct high temperature magnet use + PRC export control + allied cobalt refinery mitigation + output gaphigh temperature NdFeB magnets for motors actuators guidance and radar
indispensable high performance magnet use + 100pct reported China import source + no sustained US commercial scale outputaircraft · engines · armor · marine hardware · high strength structures
direct defense use + 100pct US import reliance + credible Japanese access + strong US downstream chaincutting tools · wear parts · high density components · electronics · specialty alloys
direct defense use + acute PRC mine share + no US mine + PRC export controls + US conversion mitigationEach observation preserves the raw fact, rule, bucket, relative effect, source, date, confidence, and limitation. Supply-coverage and inventory rules remain unscored where public denominators do not exist.
Can accessible supply at this exact stage and specification cover scenario demand?
CR-D1|CR-D2|CR-D3 · stage_availabilityratio · higher_betterrequired_dependencycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Verified usable U.S. output plus verified-accessible allied output plus releasable qualified inventory, divided by demand in the same stage, specification, geography, scenario, and horizon.
resilient >=1.25; adequate 1.00-1.249; thin 0.75-0.999; exposed 0.50-0.749; acute <0.50; unscored if denominator is not defensible
Compute separately for the PRC and U.S./verified allies. Do not compare if demand definitions differ materially; show low/base/high demand cases.
How much actual world output at the relevant stage is produced or operationally controlled by PRC entities?
CR-D1|CR-D2|CR-D3 · stage_concentrationpercent · lower_better_for_us_resiliencebottleneckcurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1PRC-controlled actual output divided by world actual output for the exact material form and stage; ownership and facility location are retained separately.
resilient <10%; adequate 10-24.9%; thin 25-49.9%; exposed 50-74.9%; acute >=75%
This is an absolute U.S.-exposure condition, not a symmetric actor score. Report location-only and control-adjusted shares when they differ.
Is output diversified across countries at this exact stage?
CR-D1|CR-D2|CR-D3 · stage_concentrationindex_0_to_1 · lower_betterredundancycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Sum of squared country shares of actual output, using fractional shares from 0 to 1.
resilient <0.15; adequate 0.15-0.249; thin 0.25-0.399; exposed 0.40-0.599; acute >=0.60
Calculate separately by mining, intermediate, refining, and qualified-output stage. Country diversity can overstate independence when ownership or feedstock is shared.
How dependent is the actor on net imports for apparent consumption?
CR-D1|CR-D2|CR-D3 · trade_dependencypercent · lower_betterrequired_dependencycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Net imports divided by apparent consumption, following the source commodity definition; retain negative values for net exporters but cap only for display.
resilient <10%; adequate 10-24.9%; thin 25-49.9%; exposed 50-74.9%; acute >=75%
Use only with matching material forms. Transshipment, embodied imports, grades, and stock changes can break symmetry between U.S. and PRC estimates.
How many genuinely independent sources can deliver the required grade and quantity in the horizon?
CR-D1|CR-D2|CR-D3 · source_diversitycount · higher_betterredundancycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Count sources with verified output, defense qualification where required, accessible logistics, and no shared controlling owner, sole feedstock, facility, or inaccessible jurisdiction.
resilient >=4 sources across >=3 credible jurisdictions; adequate 3 across >=2; thin 2 across >=2; exposed 1; acute 0
Apply to the same specification and demand. Nominal companies sharing a plant or upstream choke point count as one failure mode.
Is claimed capacity producing saleable material at the required stage and grade?
CR-D1|CR-D2|CR-D3 · delivered_outputpercent · context_dependentoutcome_linkcurrent statetrend_onlyapplied_current_v1Actual verified saleable output divided by announced or nameplate capacity for the same facility, period, form, and grade.
No universal condition bucket. Display actual output, nameplate capacity, utilization, feedstock constraint, and confidence separately.
High utilization can mean delivered output but little surge headroom; low utilization can mean headroom or a nonfunctional plant. It is diagnostic, not a stand-alone advantage score.
How much supply depends on the economics and output of another host commodity?
CR-D1|CR-D2 · resource_couplingpercent · lower_better_all_else_equalbottleneckcurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Share of relevant output recovered as a byproduct or co-product, plus identification and concentration of host commodities.
resilient <10%; adequate 10-24.9%; thin 25-49.9%; exposed 50-74.9%; acute >=75%
A high share is not automatically bad if hosts are diverse and scalable. Use as exposure evidence and test host-market sensitivity before it can constrain a driver.
Can the source's product legally and technically enter the priority mission-system production line?
CR-D3 · qualificationordinal · higher_betterrequired_dependencycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Highest verified status for the exact source, material, process, specification, component, and use.
resilient production-qualified with sustained accepted lots; adequate qualified with limited-rate accepted output; thin qualification testing under way with representative output; exposed lab or pilot demonstration only; acute no viable qualified source or failed qualification
Do not transfer qualification across grades, facilities, process changes, or mission uses without evidence. PRC military qualification may require bounded inference.
How long would it take to qualify an alternate source after a disruption?
CR-D3 · qualificationdays · lower_bettersubstitutecurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Elapsed calendar time from authorized start with a viable source to production qualification and accepted deliverable output.
resilient <=30 days; adequate 31-180; thin 181-365; exposed 366-1825; acute >1825 or no viable source
Estimate ranges and identify redesign, test, certification, tooling, and security approvals. Announced sourcing agreements are not qualification.
Can the analyst trace critical inputs to source countries through relevant supplier tiers?
CR-D4 · visibilitypercent · higher_betterconfidence_onlycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Priority-system critical line items with verified country of origin through the designated critical tier, divided by all designated critical line items.
resilient >=95%; adequate 85-94.9%; thin 70-84.9%; exposed 50-69.9%; acute <50%
This conditions confidence and reveals exposure; it is not physical capacity. Supplier self-attestation and unknown origin remain separate categories.
What share of priority dependencies has one qualified source under PRC control and no usable buffer?
CR-D4 · single_point_exposurepercent · lower_betterbottleneckcurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Priority material-component dependencies with exactly one qualified PRC-controlled source and less than 30 days of usable coverage, divided by all mapped priority dependencies.
resilient 0%; adequate >0-5%; thin >5-15%; exposed >15-30%; acute >30%; unscored when CR-M21 mapping coverage is below 85%
Requires a defined dependency universe and verified buffer denominator. Unknown-source dependencies are reported separately and cannot be presumed safe.
How many priority mission systems depend on the same non-substitutable source, facility, route, feedstock, tool, or process?
CR-D4 · shared_chokepointssystem_count · lower_betterbottleneckcurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Count distinct priority mission systems with a required dependency on the same failure node within the horizon.
resilient 0 affected systems; adequate 1; thin 2-3; exposed 4-6; acute >=7
Thresholds are initial triage only and require calibration to the size of the mission-system universe. Record consequence and demand, not count alone.
How long can qualified, accessible inventory meet scenario demand after supply stops?
CR-D5 · inventorydays · higher_bettersubstitutecurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Verified releasable inventory at the required grade and location, divided by average daily scenario demand including loss and yield assumptions.
resilient >=365 days; adequate 180-364; thin 90-179; exposed 30-89; acute <30; unscored if inventory or demand is unavailable
DLA transaction plans are not inventory levels. Commercial inventories and classified war reserve stocks require explicit coverage and confidence labels.
What share of priority dependencies has a genuinely independent qualified alternate able to deliver in the horizon?
CR-D5 · second_sourcingpercent · higher_betterredundancycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Priority dependencies with at least one independent qualified and accessible alternate meeting required quantity, divided by all mapped priority dependencies.
resilient >=95%; adequate 85-94.9%; thin 70-84.9%; exposed 50-69.9%; acute <50%; unscored when CR-M21 mapping coverage is below 85%
Measure by horizon and quantity; a paper alternate or one dependent on the same feedstock is not an independent second source.
Can an alternate material or design replace the constrained input without unacceptable mission loss?
CR-D5 · substitutionordinal · higher_bettersubstitutecurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Highest demonstrated readiness of a substitute for the exact mission use, including qualification, performance penalty, production scale, and redesign burden.
resilient drop-in qualified and scaled; adequate qualified with manageable performance or quantity limit; thin representative demonstration with qualification plan; exposed laboratory option or major redesign; acute no viable substitute
Record mass, thermal, reliability, signature, cost, schedule, and mission-performance penalties. A scientific possibility is not an operational substitute.
How much scenario demand can verified recycled or recovered material meet at the required grade?
CR-D5 · recyclingratio · higher_betterparallel_contributorcurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Qualified secondary output available to the actor in the horizon, divided by demand for the same material form and specification.
resilient >=1.25; adequate 1.00-1.249; thin 0.75-0.999; exposed 0.50-0.749; acute <0.50; unscored without a denominator
Do not use gross collection or theoretical recoverability. Account for scrap availability, yield, contamination, energy, and qualification.
How much evidence supports a project's ability to deliver qualified output by the horizon?
CR-D6 · project_pipelineordinal · higher_betterenablercurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Highest verified maturity for a named project, retaining finance, permits, construction, feedstock, workforce, commissioning, and qualification as separate milestones.
resilient sustained qualified output; adequate commissioning with secured inputs and qualification on schedule; thin construction with finance and core permits secured; exposed definitive feasibility with material milestones open; acute announcement, exploration, or no credible delivery path
Maturity does not measure quantity. Capacity enters a horizon scenario only with a separate output estimate and schedule range.
How quickly can a failed critical stage restore accepted output?
CR-D6 · recoverydays · lower_betteroutcome_linkcurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Calendar time from disruption to sustained accepted output at the scenario-required rate, including repair, workforce, feedstock, restart, and requalification.
resilient <=30 days; adequate 31-180; thin 181-365; exposed 366-1825; acute >1825 or nonrecoverable
Use exercise, outage, restart, or audited schedule evidence where available; otherwise show a range and identify untested assumptions.
How long until a new source delivers accepted output rather than announced capacity?
CR-D6 · capacity_expansiondays · lower_betteroutcome_linkcurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Calendar time from assessment date to sustained qualified output, including permitting, finance, construction, commissioning, process stabilization, and qualification.
resilient <=365 days; adequate 366-730; thin 731-1095; exposed 1096-1825; acute >1825 or no credible path
Report schedule confidence and milestone slippage. Budget authority and awards are leading indicators only.
May allied output actually be credited to the U.S.-allied base case in this scenario and horizon?
CR-D1|CR-D2|CR-D3|CR-D5 · allied_accesscategorical · eligibility_not_scoresubstitutecurrent stateontology_ruleapplied_current_v1Categorical eligibility based on legal authority, exportability, qualification, allocation, logistics, and timing: verified_accessible; horizon_feasible; nominal; unavailable.
No condition bucket. Verified accessible enters the base case; horizon feasible enters only the named milestone case; nominal is displayed without credit; unavailable is excluded.
Apply to actual spare or allocated output, not total allied production. Preserve national owner and destination commitments to prevent double counting.
How much of the declared priority dependency universe has a complete, source-backed stage map?
CR-D4 · visibilitypercent · higher_betterconfidence_onlycurrent stateprovisional_analysisapplied_current_v1Mapped dependencies with material, stage, specification, supplier, ownership, country, qualification, and mission-use fields complete, divided by all declared priority dependencies.
resilient >=95%; adequate 85-94.9%; thin 70-84.9%; exposed 50-69.9%; acute <50%
Never treat unmapped dependencies as non-PRC or resilient. This metric governs assessment confidence, not advantage by itself.
Primary use: Authoritative 60-mineral universe; official byproduct/co-product table; statutory and interagency basis
Known limitation: Broader economic and national-security list rather than a defense mission-priority list; notice is not stage-level defense demand data
Open public source ↗Primary use: Economic disruption scenarios; probability weighting; single-point-of-failure basis; federal prioritization trace
Known limitation: Economic and industrial scope does not resolve defense mission dependencies; model assumptions and source-year lags must be retained
Open public source ↗Primary use: Production; capacity where available; reserves/resources; import reliance; import sources; recycling; substitutes; stockpile and program context
Known limitation: Commodity-level annual estimates; defense grade, ownership, facility utilization, and mission demand often absent
Open public source ↗Primary use: Machine-readable commodity observations and reproducible ingestion
Known limitation: Inherits MCS definitions and gaps; schema does not establish defense qualification or access
Open public source ↗Primary use: Supply-chain stage concepts; project and commodity analyses; disruption/recovery research
Known limitation: Coverage and cadence differ by commodity; program page is an index rather than a single comparable dataset
Open public source ↗Primary use: Project maturity; country capacity; 2025-2029 supply outlook; separation of credible projects from early announcements
Known limitation: Eight commodities only; capacity is not actual output; forecasts and schedules require later validation
Open public source ↗Primary use: PRC mine and processing facility locations; capacity/production context; stage concentration
Known limitation: Public and translated source gaps; ownership, utilization, defense allocation, and current status can be uncertain
Open public source ↗Primary use: Demand/supply outlook; refining concentration; project and policy context
Known limitation: Energy-transition focus does not map directly to defense specifications or demand; some underlying inputs are modeled or commercial
Open public source ↗Primary use: Allied resources, reserves, production, projects, and national baselines
Known limitation: National potential is not evidence of U.S. legal access, spare output, export allocation, transport, or defense qualification
Open public source ↗Primary use: HTS-level value and quantity by partner; monthly trade trends; reproducible queries
Known limitation: Account/API key required; HS codes can mix forms and grades; origin, transshipment, embodied content, and defense use may be unclear
Open public source ↗Primary use: Maximum planned acquisitions and disposals; visible stockpile program actions
Known limitation: Not total holdings, release plan, classified inventory, demand, or days of coverage; planned action may not execute
Open public source ↗Primary use: Tier-n visibility; country-of-origin limitations; scope of DoD supplier network; governance gaps
Known limitation: Does not provide a complete bill of materials or quantify all dependencies; findings reflect reviewed systems and data
Open public source ↗Primary use: Substitution and recycling readiness; technical and adoption barriers; public mitigation evidence
Known limitation: Selected technologies and cases; research activity is not qualification or scaled defense output
Open public source ↗Primary use: Funding intent; project names; mining, processing, microelectronics, magnets, energetics, tooling, and industrial-base interventions
Known limitation: Budget authority, request, obligation, and award are not commissioned capacity or accepted output; schedules can change
Open public source ↗Primary use: Awards, obligations, recipients, place of performance, and transaction history
Known limitation: Award descriptions and industry codes do not establish physical milestones, qualification, ownership depth, or delivered output
Open public source ↗Primary use: Battery materials, cells, manufacturing projects, awards, strategies, and technical roadmaps
Known limitation: Plans and awards are enablers; defense-specific grades, allocation, qualification, and output need independent verification
Open public source ↗Primary use: Historical evidence on solid-rocket-motor ingredients, qualification, supplier concentration, disruption, and workforce failure modes
Known limitation: Older evidence; supplier structure, programs, and corrective actions may have changed and require current corroboration
Open public source ↗Primary use: Defense uses, stockpile governance, procurement restrictions, and known dependence on China for rare earths and other critical materials
Known limitation: Does not disclose stockpile holdings, defense demand, program-level dependencies, or current qualified output
Open public source ↗Primary use: Defense mission uses; mine-to-magnet stages; qualified domestic magnet production; named awards and operating capabilities
Known limitation: Some capacity statements were projections when published and require later operating evidence; defense demand coverage is not disclosed
Open public source ↗Primary use: Actual NdPr oxide output; commissioned metal and alloy steps; start of commercial-equipment NdFeB manufacturing; customer and feedstock disclosures
Known limitation: Company-specific filing; projected capacity is not accepted defense output and qualification coverage is not disclosed
Open public source ↗Primary use: New solid-rocket-motor source; energetics, casting, curing, quality assurance, assembly, and qualification work
Known limitation: Award and planned expansion do not disclose accepted output, ingredient-source diversity, schedule performance, or demand coverage
Open public source ↗Primary use: Current tungsten industrial-base intervention and domestic production sustainment
Known limitation: Award value and purpose do not establish mine output, qualification, independent feedstock, or demand coverage
Open public source ↗The JSON contains the executive judgments, drivers, pathways, actions, and limitations. CSV files expose every applied observation, metric rule, mineral trace, and source record.
This analysis applies the deeper method and reaches the same current overall PRC-lead judgment with far more traceability. The stable ten-category assessment API and four-driver capability record remain unchanged as a separate core contract. Compare the core capability page →