Economic & Industrial Statecraft · Analysis

What campaigns actually changed.

Six cases trace policy tools through implementation, target adaptation, coalition cost, observed results, and the evidence that could change the judgment.

6 campaigns22 shared sourcesCurrent through August 7, 2026
Campaign analyses

Six tests of economic power.

Policy activity is not treated as strategic effect. Each case distinguishes the instrument used from delivery, behavior change, substitution, evasion, and sender cost.

EI-C01Partial strategic effect

Russia sanctions, export controls & the oil price cap

Objective

Raise the cost of aggression, constrain access to finance and technology, and reduce energy revenue while limiting global supply disruption.

  • Asset freezes
  • Financial sanctions
  • Export controls
  • Oil price cap
  • Coalition enforcement

The campaign imposed real costs and technology friction but did not compel near-term policy reversal; adaptation and measurement gaps materially limited efficacy.

Observed

  • GAO estimated a large 2022 growth effect but did not find statistically different growth in 2023–24.
  • The price cap likely helped preserve export volume while reducing revenue, but the shadow fleet and routing alternatives weakened leverage.
  • Export controls hindered access to U.S. military-relevant technology without fully preventing acquisition.
Uncertainty
The invasion, fiscal mobilization, commodity prices, capital controls, sanctions, and export controls are simultaneous; public evidence cannot cleanly isolate each instrument.
Evidence that could change this assessment
Clear outcome targets, item-level denial and substitution data, verified revenue effects, coalition leakage measures, and evidence of changed Russian capacity or behavior.
GAO-RUSSIA-2025OFAC-PROGRAMS-2026FED-DOLLAR-2026
EI-C02Chokepoint under adaptation

Advanced-semiconductor controls

Objective

Limit access to advanced computing and manufacturing capabilities with military and intelligence applications while preserving the innovation base.

  • Item controls
  • End-use controls
  • Entity restrictions
  • Foreign-produced item rules
  • Licensing
  • Partner alignment

The control architecture reaches genuine chokepoints, but its durable effect depends on foreign availability, enforcement, threshold updates, partner coverage, and the balance between denial and ecosystem revenue.

Observed

  • BIS retains supercomputer and semiconductor-manufacturing end-use restrictions in the current EAR.
  • Licensing policy changed again in January 2026 for specified advanced chips, demonstrating that the instrument is actively recalibrated.
  • GAO documented implementation and compliance challenges but did not establish a complete outcome measure.
Uncertainty
Public data do not provide a complete counterfactual for Chinese capability, diversion, performance degradation, indigenous substitution, or lost U.S. innovation funding.
Evidence that could change this assessment
A recurring, public foreign-availability and outcome assessment that links controlled performance, diversion, indigenous alternatives, and military-relevant capability.
BIS-EAR-744-2026BIS-CHIPS-POLICY-2026GAO-EXPORT-CONTROLS-2024NSF-SE-2026
EI-C03Exposure revealed; diversification incomplete

Critical-mineral export controls & diversification

Objective

Use concentrated processing as leverage—or reduce exposure to that leverage—across high-technology, energy, automotive, aerospace, and defense chains.

  • Export licensing
  • Stockpiles
  • Public finance
  • Offtake
  • Allied sourcing
  • Substitution and recycling

Recent restrictions made processing concentration operationally consequential. Diversification is progressing in selected stages, but midstream and downstream gaps, higher costs, and slow qualification remain decisive.

Observed

  • IEA reports the number of mineral tariff codes subject to Chinese controls has tripled since 2023.
  • Refining concentration increased in 2025 even as rare-earth diversification showed targeted policy can move a specific stage.
  • Public-finance commitments expanded rapidly, but disbursement and balanced value-chain delivery lag.
Uncertainty
Commercial inventories, contract terms, product grades, license approvals, and firm-level substitutions are often proprietary.
Evidence that could change this assessment
Verified qualified throughput outside the dominant supplier across refining and component stages, shorter substitution times, transparent inventories, and durable offtake.
IEA-MINERALS-2026USGS-MCS-2026OECD-SECURITY-2025
EI-C04Large pipeline; early delivery evidence

CHIPS incentives: money to qualified output

Objective

Restore leading-edge and specialized semiconductor capacity, strengthen suppliers and packaging, and reduce geographic concentration.

  • Grants
  • Loans
  • Tax incentives
  • Milestone payments
  • Workforce support
  • R&D infrastructure

The portfolio is strategically broad and one leading-edge facility had reached certification by mid-2025, but most milestones and completion dates remained ahead. The program should be judged by qualified output, not award totals.

Observed

  • GAO counted 40 projects across 19 companies covering materials through packaging.
  • Nearly 40% of projects were intended for leading-edge logic, with Commerce estimating a move from 0% U.S. share in 2022 to 20% by 2030.
  • Only 24 of 161 milestones had completion reports as of July 2025, so the dominant evidence was still prospective.
Uncertainty
Awards, company commitments, later renegotiations, tax support, and private capital are not directly comparable; future yield and cost competitiveness are unknown.
Evidence that could change this assessment
On-time construction, equipment installation, product qualification, sustained yield and utilization, workforce fill, supplier localization, and transparent milestone reporting.
GAO-CHIPS-2025NSF-SE-2026CENSUS-AIES-2026
EI-C05Substantial resilience gain

Europe's exit from Russian gas dependence

Objective

Reduce an exploitable energy dependency without losing security of supply or coalition political cohesion.

  • Diversified imports
  • LNG infrastructure
  • Storage
  • Demand adjustment
  • Renewables
  • Binding phase-out rules

This is a strong case of an exposed coalition changing physical supply and law together: Russian gas fell from 45% of EU imports in 2021 to 12% in 2025, with a binding phase-out now underway.

Observed

  • The EU reduced Russian gas volumes from 152 bcm in 2021 to 36 bcm in 2025.
  • IEA reports Russian piped deliveries to the EU fell 90% between 2021 and 2025.
  • The 2026 regulation phases out remaining LNG and pipeline contracts on staged timelines through 2027.
Uncertainty
The transition involved price, subsidy, industrial-demand, infrastructure, and third-country effects; resilience gains do not imply zero cost.
Evidence that could change this assessment
Secure completion of the phase-out without emergency reversal, persistent supplier diversity, manageable industrial costs, and no replacement with an equally concentrated dependency.
EU-ENERGY-2026IEA-GAS-2026
EI-C06Institution built; performance unproven

IPEF supply-chain institutions

Objective

Create standing Indo-Pacific mechanisms to map critical sectors, coordinate resilience projects, and respond collectively to disruptions.

  • Supply Chain Council
  • Crisis Response Network
  • Exercises
  • Information sharing
  • Business matching
  • Workforce cooperation

The agreement created useful standing bodies and a crisis channel. Public evidence remains too thin to judge whether they can deliver alternative supply or coordinated action under a major disruption.

Observed

  • The Supply Chain Agreement entered into force in February 2024 and established three implementation bodies.
  • The design includes mapping, simulations, emergency communication, business matching, and alternative logistics coordination.
  • A signed architecture is an input; the missing evidence is stress-test performance and delivery against named sector vulnerabilities.
Uncertainty
Detailed vulnerability maps, exercise findings, response times, investment pipelines, and partner-specific commitments are not comprehensively public.
Evidence that could change this assessment
Published sector work plans, exercise after-action results, response-time standards, funded projects, and evidence the network solved an actual disruption.
COMMERCE-IPEF-2024OECD-SECURITY-2025
How to interpret these cases

One campaign does not establish a universal rule.

Effects depend on the objective, instrument, market structure, coalition, target adaptation, enforcement, timing, and cost. The methodology keeps those causal steps visible.

Read the methodology